ORDER : Arvind Kumar Verma, J. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.09.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track Special Court Surajpur, District Surajpur in Special Sessions Trial No.26/2021 by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and has been sentenced to undergo RI for ten years with fine of Rs.200/- u/s. 376, and to undergo RI for 10 years with fine of Rs. 200/- u/s.4 of the POCSO Act, with default stipulations. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2.As per prosecution case, on 30.03.2021, a written report Ex.P-6 was lodged by the prosecutrix alleging that on 29.03.2021 at night, she went along with the appellants Kandapariha, Shiv Kumar and Jeevan Singh to the house of Keso Singh in pooja and at about 10.00 pm. while returning, Kandapariha and Shivkumar went to their home and she came with Jeevan Singh. On the way, the present appellant forcefully carried her to the abandoned public toilet room and committed rape on her. On the basis of the written report at police station Ramanujnagar, FIR Ex.P-7 was registered against the appellant in Crime No. 63/2021 for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and Section 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act. Appellant was arrested and charge sheet was filed. 3.The Trial Court framed charges under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 against the appellant. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded innocence stating therein that he has been falsely implicated in this case. 4.The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 9 witnesses. 5.The Trial Court by the impugned judgment dated 27.09.2022 convicted and sentenced the appellant for the above-mentioned charges. Hence this appeal. 6.Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the Court below, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecutrix was a consenting party and the Trial Court has wrongly held that she was minor. 5.The Trial Court by the impugned judgment dated 27.09.2022 convicted and sentenced the appellant for the above-mentioned charges. Hence this appeal. 6.Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the Court below, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecutrix was a consenting party and the Trial Court has wrongly held that she was minor. It is submitted that although the prosecutrix had alleged that she was forcibly raped by the appellant but the manner in which the appellant carried her on his shoulder but she did not try to resist or raise any alarm, makes it clear that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. He submits that if the school admission and discharge register is taken into consideration, her age was found to be above 16 years and below 18 years and if the margin of error of two years is taken in favour of the appellant then it is clear that the prosecutrix was major. There is no kotwari register or ossification report produced by the prosecution to determine the actual age of the prosecutrix and there is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix stating that on the date of incident she was minor. 7.Per Contra, the submission made by the counsel for the appellant is vehemently opposed by learned counsel for the State. It is submitted that as per school record, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 17.05.2003 and she was forcefully subjected to rape by the appellant on the date of incident. Thus, it is clear that the prosecutrix was minor. She submits that the School Admission and Discharge Register is an admissible piece of evidence to determine age of the prosecutrix, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the finding of learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of the Court below needs no interference. 8.Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 9.The prosecution case is based mainly on two grounds -i) whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim was minor and ii) whether the prosecutrix was a consenting party? 10.The first question for consideration is whether on the date of incident the prosecutrix was minor? 9.The prosecution case is based mainly on two grounds -i) whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim was minor and ii) whether the prosecutrix was a consenting party? 10.The first question for consideration is whether on the date of incident the prosecutrix was minor? In the present case, the Investigating Agency during the course of investigation, seized the school admission and discharge register Ex.P-11 A in which the date of the birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 17.05.2003 having entry at Sl. No. 292 in the admission register and her progress card of Class-9, issued by the Principal, Government High School, Aamgaon, which is marked as Ex.P-3. 11.In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix, evidence has to be examined which is produced by the prosecution. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school admission and discharge register Ex.P-11 A which is the progress card of class 9 where the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 17.05.2003. Mark sheet of the prosecutrix was seized vide Ex.P-3 after preparing seizure memo Ex.P-2. 12.Victim (PW-2) has deposed that she has studied upto 12th Class. She has stated that on the date of incident she had gone for Devari along with Kandapariha, Shiv Kumar and the appellant and while returning the appellant finding her alone, carried her on his shoulder to a nearby baadi and forcefully committed rape on her and after resisting she came home, narrated about the incident to her mother, brother, aunt, Sonsai, Ramdas and Sukhsai. A written report was lodged at police station vide Ex.P-6 on the basis of which FIR was registered vide Ex.P-7 at police station Ramanujnagar. Spot map Ex.P-1 was prepared and the police seized the mark sheet of 9th Class vide Ex.P-3. After taking consent from her parents, she was medically examined vide Ex.P-8. Statement was recorded before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surajpur vide Ex.P-9. 13.Sukhdev Singh (PW-3) is the teacher of Govt. Primary School, Manvarpara Salhi, District Surajpur. He had given the school admission and discharge register of the year 2009 to the police in which name of the prosecutrix is mentioned at Sl. No. 292. The prosecutrix has got her admission on 18.07.2009 and her date of birth is 17.05.2003. 13.Sukhdev Singh (PW-3) is the teacher of Govt. Primary School, Manvarpara Salhi, District Surajpur. He had given the school admission and discharge register of the year 2009 to the police in which name of the prosecutrix is mentioned at Sl. No. 292. The prosecutrix has got her admission on 18.07.2009 and her date of birth is 17.05.2003. He has stated that the entry was made by the Headmistress Poonam Singh who was posted at the relevant time. Thus, he is neither author of the date of birth of the prosecutrix nor the school admission and discharge register. Father of the prosecutrix (PW-4) has deposed that on the date of incident, he was on duty and his wife informed him by phone about the incident. 14.Dr. Priyanka Sharma (PW-5) is the doctor at Primary Health Centre, Ramanujnagar. She has medically examined the prosecutrix and opined that hymen was ruptured and that no definite opinion could be given about rape. Dr. Omdutt Singh (PW-7) has medically examined the appellant vide Ex.P-18 and has stated that he was capable of performing sexual intercourse. 15.In the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263 wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- “23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion." 16.Thus, from the evidence available on record with respect to the age of the prosecutrix i.e. in the school admission and discharge register, the author of the same has not been examined. Even the parents of the prosecutrix or she herself has not stated about her age. In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , which is in respect of admissibility of school records of a person, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , which is in respect of admissibility of school records of a person, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 17.In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: 40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 18. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 19. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 20.Thus, as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, relevancy of the document in school admission and discharge register is only a corroborative evidence which has to be supported by other evidence. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized that the entry made in the official record by an official or person authorized in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the court/authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. In the present case, the statements of the parents of the prosecutrix, the serological report Ex.P-35, the school admission and discharge register as well as other facts as has been mentioned above in respect of the age of the victim ie. below 18 years at the time of incident ie. 30.03.2021, cannot be believed hence, the trial Court has wrongly held that on the date of incident, she was minor. 21.The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed rape on minor victim and that she was a consenting party? In the present case, the prosecutrix had clearly stated on the date of incident, while returning from Devari, the appellant forcefully carried her on his shoulder to a nearby baadi and forcefully, committed rape on her. She however resisted and came out of his clutches, ran towards her house weeping and informed about the incident to her mother, brother and aunt. She has also informed about the incident to Sonsai, Ramdas and Sukhsai. As per the MLC report, it was found that the hymen of the prosecutrix was torn but no injury was found on her person. She has also informed about the incident to Sonsai, Ramdas and Sukhsai. As per the MLC report, it was found that the hymen of the prosecutrix was torn but no injury was found on her person. The serological report Ex.P-35 also mentions that in Article A1, B & C which are vaginal slides, underwear of the victim and the appellant, contains human sperm. 22.The statement of the mother of the prosecutrix (PW-1) wherein she has deposed that on the date of incident, when her daughter was returning from Devari (for worshiping) along with Kanda Pariha, Shiv Kumar and the appellant, on the way, the appellant finding her alone, carried her on his should to an isolated place and forcefully subjected her to rape. Thereafter, she came weeping and narrated the incident to her. In her cross-examination, she has stated that the appellant is her relative and therefore trusting him to be a family member, she sent the prosecutrix with her. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of consent, but is a case of forceful rape. The prosecutrix has specifically stated in her evidence that she was forcefully subjected to rape by the appellant. She has narrated the incident to her mother, brother, aunt, Sonsai, Ramdas and Sukhsai. No contradictory statement has been made by the victim concerning the incident of sexual assault and she has explained clearly about the fact of sexual assault. The FSL report Ex.P-35, wherein the Article A 1,B & C contain human spermatazoa. Even in the serological report, Article A1, B & C which are the vaginal slides, underwear of the victim and the appellant, contains human sperm. Even otherwise it is well established principle of law that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is reliable & trustworthy then looking for corroborative evidence is nothing but adding a pinch of salt to her injury. 23. From the aforesaid discussion, it would be appropriate to revisit the law laid down by this Court regarding the weight to be attached to the testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences where the prosecution's case hinges on the victim’s evidence in the present case. 24. Law is well settled that generally speaking, oral testimony may be classified into three categories, viz.: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 24. Law is well settled that generally speaking, oral testimony may be classified into three categories, viz.: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The first two category of cases may not pose serious difficulty for the Court in arriving at its conclusion(s). However, in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and look for corroboration of any material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a requirement of the rule of prudence. 25.In Ganesan v. State (2020) 10 SCC 573 , the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it was observed and held as under: 10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v.State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 ] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v.Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 ] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty- bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … *** 21. … The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 ], this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P.v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 ], this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction.Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 ] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 ]. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 26. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 26. In the case of Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 , it is observed a It is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v.21 State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 ]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p.29) “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 27.Further it has laid down that although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related to sexual offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused guilty, the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix's testimony is found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and lacunae. It was held thus: “31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said offences. 32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. 32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated independently, which they could have done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the appellant.” 28.In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, { (2019) 11 SCC 575 }, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well- settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 ]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 ]. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 ]. 29.In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, { (2018) 18 SCC 34 }, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must,while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. It is also by now well settled that the courts must,while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarikav. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 ).” 30.The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP Vs. Sonu Kushwaha (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : 12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.” 31. From the statements of the prosecutrix and her mother who had specifically stated that on the date of incident she went along with the appellant, who is the relative and two others for Devari (pooja) and while returning,taking advantage of her loneliness, subjected her to rape by the appellant and immediately after the incident the prosecutrix came weeping and narrated the incident to her mother and other family members. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.” 32. Considering the totality of the facts & circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed the offence under Sections 376 IPC. Therefore the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 IPC is upheld. Considering the totality of the facts & circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed the offence under Sections 376 IPC. Therefore the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 IPC is upheld. So far as the conviction under Section 4 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 is concerned, it is to be noted that the prosecution has failed to prove that at the time of incident, the prosecutrix was minor therefore the accused/appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. 33.With aforesaid observations, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.09.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge FTSC, Surajpur, District-Surajpur (CG) in Special Sessions Trial No.26/2021 for the offence under Section 376 IPC is hereby affirmed. 34.Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.