ORDER : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. Assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the Order dated 30.4.2019 passed by Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur in Misc. Civil Appeal No.9/2019 titled as “Smt. Umravati Bai v. Brijmohan Sahu and Others”, the present Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, CPC) has been preferred by the original Defendant Smt. Umravati Bai (who died during pendency of this Civil Revision and therefore the matter is now being pursued by her Legal Representative who has been brought on record), by which the appeal filed by her under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC has been dismissed affirming the Order dated 9.1.2019 passed by the First Civil Judge, Class-I, Raipur in Civil M.J.C. No.01/2010 whereby the application preferred by the Applicant/Defendant under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of CPC has been rejected finding no sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree granted against her on 30.3.2005 after she being proceeded ex parte on 2.2.2002 in the Civil Suit filed by the Plaintiff. 2. The original Plaintiff namely Jagdish Ram Sahu (who also died during pendency of the matter before the Court below and therefore the matter is now being pursued by his Legal Representatives brought on record) filed Civil Suit No.83A/88 before the Trial Court against the Defendant for declaration of title and possession over the suit property, wherein after declaring the Defendant ex parte on 15.2.1989, an ex parte decree was passed in favour of the Plaintiff by the Trial Court by its Order dated 20.10.1989 which though was set-aside by Order dated 17.10.1997 passed in Civil Appeal No.37A/97, filed by the Defendant under Section 96 of CPC, holding that the provision of Order 5 Rule 17 of CPC was not complied with by the Trial Court while passing the said ex parte decree and the suit was ordered to be restored for hearing in accordance with law and fixed the matter on 5.11.1997 with a direction to the Defendant to appear in the matter to pursue her case. Down the line, the matter proceeded and on 13.10.2001 the Plaintiff initiated an interlocutory proceeding in the suit by filing an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and on 15.1.2002 the Court granted time to the Defendant’s counsel for filing their reply to the said interlocutory proceeding initiated by the Plaintiff fixing the matter on 2.2.2002. However, on 2.2.2002, the Defendant was again proceeded ex parte and ultimately, on 30.3.2005, an ex parte decree was passed against the Defendant and in favour of the Plaintiff by the Trial Court. The Defendant then went to challenge the said ex parte decree in Civil M.J.C. No. 01/2010 by filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of CPC before the jurisdictional Civil Court which finally proceeded to dismiss the said application by its Order dated 9.1.2019. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said Order dated 9.1.2019, the Defendant preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No.09/2019 under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC before the Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur who however dismissed the appeal of the Defendant by its Order dated 30.4.2019 against which the present Civil Revision under Section 115 of CPC has been preferred by the Defendant. 3. Mr. Anurag Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant/Defendant, submits that on 2.2.2002, when the suit was proceeded ex parte by the Court, on that date the matter was fixed for hearing on interlocutory proceeding (for reply by the Defendant to the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC filed by the Plaintiff on 13.10.2001) and as such in a proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 of IPC where an interlocutory proceeding under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC was impugned, the Trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to proceed ex parte against the Defendant which eventually culminated in an ex parte decree passed on 30.3.2005 against the Defendant and in favour of the Plaintiff and therefore the subsequent proceeding is without jurisdiction and without any authority of law. Thus, the impugned Order of ex parte decree is liable to set-aside for the reason that the Civil Court has not rejected the application and passed the impugned ex parte decree based on the fact that the original Defendant has been proceeded ex parte twice in the proceeding. 4. Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing along with Mr. Thus, the impugned Order of ex parte decree is liable to set-aside for the reason that the Civil Court has not rejected the application and passed the impugned ex parte decree based on the fact that the original Defendant has been proceeded ex parte twice in the proceeding. 4. Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing along with Mr. Sunil Verma, learned Counsel, on behalf of Non-applicant(s)/Plaintiff(s), submits that the present Civil Revision is not maintainable in view of the provision contained in Section 115 of CPC, as on account of grant of the revision the hearing of the suit would commence again and it would be barred by the proviso to Section 115 of CPC since it was preferred against an interlocutory order. He further submits that the Trial Court has rightly held that no sufficient cause has been shown by the Defendant for not appearing when the suit was called for hearing. He thus prayed for dismissal of the present Civil Revision. 5. I have heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also perused the record of the case minutely and thoroughly. 6. The first contention that has been put forth by learned Counsel for the Non-applicant(s)/Plaintiff(s) is that the present Civil Revision is not maintainable in light of the provision contained in Section 115 of CPC. 7. For ready reference, Section 115 of CPC is being reproduced herein under:- “115. Revision.—4(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears— (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation.—In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding.” 8. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that revision would not be maintainable if the order impugned has been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or “other proceedings”. However, in the instant case, grant of revision would definitely not dispose of the suit but in fact it would dispose of the proceeding initiated under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of CPC that has been initiated in Civil M.J.C. No.01/2010 which was affirmed in the aforesaid appeal by impugned Order dated 30.4.2019 against which the present Civil Revision has been filed on behalf of the Defendant. 9. This issue was considered by this Court in the matter of Ahmed Mansuri v. Nandu Sao and Others, 2007 (2) C.G.L.J. 379 in which this Court relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matters of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 659 dispelled the argument in similar fact situation and observed in paragraph-12 as under:- “12. Lastly, it was argued by learned counsel for the non-applicants No.1 to 4/defendants that the revision was barred under the proviso to Section 115 of the Code, since it was preferred against an interlocutory order. Under the proviso to Section 115 of the Code, the test for considering whether an order impugned is an interlocutory order or not, is that if the impugned order had been in favour of the party applying for revision, it would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. Under the proviso to Section 115 of the Code, the test for considering whether an order impugned is an interlocutory order or not, is that if the impugned order had been in favour of the party applying for revision, it would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. It is obvious that if the miscellaneous civil appeal filed by the applicant/plaintiff under Order 43 Rule 1(c) of the Code had been allowed, Miscellaneous Judicial Case No.3/2002 would have been finally disposed of, since the suit would have been restored to file. In my considered opinion, the miscellaneous judicial case falls under the expression “other proceedings” used in the proviso to Section 115 of the Code. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur Vs. Swaraj Developers and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 659 , I am of the considered opinion that the civil revision is maintainable.” 10. Following the mandate of the provisions contained in Section 115 of CPC and in light of the decision rendered by this Court in Ahmed Mansuri (supra), I am of the considered opinion that since grant of revision would dispose of the other proceedings and not the suit itself, the present Civil Revision would be maintainable and it would not be barred by the proviso to Section 115 of CPC. 11. Now, coming to the merits of the matter, it is vehemently argued by learned Counsel for the Applicant/Defendant that under Order 9 Rule 6 read with Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC, the Trial Court would require the jurisdiction to proceed ex parte when the case is fixed for hearing. For convenience sake, Order 9 Rule 6 as well as Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC are being reproduced herein under:- ORDER IX Appearance of parties and consequence of non-appearance *** *** *** 6. For convenience sake, Order 9 Rule 6 as well as Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC are being reproduced herein under:- ORDER IX Appearance of parties and consequence of non-appearance *** *** *** 6. Procedure when only plaintiff appears.—(1) Where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, then— (a) When summons duly served.—if it is proved that the summons was duly served, the Court may make an order that the suit shall be heard ex parte; (b) When summons not duly served.—if it is not proved that the summons was duly served, the Court shall direct a second summons to be issued and served on the defendant; (c) When summons served but not in due time.—if it is proved that the summons was served on the defendant, but not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons, the Court shall postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day to be fixed by the Court, and shall direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant. (2) Where it is owing to the plaintiff’s default that the summons was not duly served or was not served in sufficient time, the Court shall order the plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement.” ORDER XVII Adjournments *** *** *** (2) Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed.—Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit. [Explanation.— Where the evidence or a substantial portion of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the Court may, in its discretion proceed with the case as if such party were present.]” 12. [Explanation.— Where the evidence or a substantial portion of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the Court may, in its discretion proceed with the case as if such party were present.]” 12. Now, the question, as to what is the meaning of “hearing of the suit”, came to be considered before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Rambabu Ghasilal Goyal v. Bhagirath Prasad Basantilal, 1983 M.P.L.J. 455 in which it has been held that Order 17 Rule 2 read with Order 9 Rule 6 of CPC would be attracted to construe take a suit to have been fixed for hearing, only when the date fixed should be for taking up of evidence, hearing of arguments or considering the questions relating to the suit, which is distinct from interlocutory matters, and the suit could not be proceeded ex parte on the date when it is fixed only on hearing of interlocutory matters and it was observed in paragraphs 7 & 11 as under:- “7. In order that a suit may be regarded to have been fixed for hearing, it should be the date for taking up of evidence, or hearing of arguments, or considering of questions relating to the suit, which would enable the Judge to finally come to an adjudication upon it, and not for consideration of merely interlocutory matters. In this case, the trial Court, purporting to act under Order. 17, Rule 2 read with Order 9, Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, appears to have acted on the assumption that from 7-8-1981, the "hearing of the suit" was adjourned to 21-8-1981 and that the latter date was a date to which the "hearing of the suit" had been adjourned. In this respect, the trial Court appears to have acted in oblivion of the correct position of law governing the situation. In this respect, the trial Court appears to have acted in oblivion of the correct position of law governing the situation. Order 17, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code provides that- "Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit." (Emphasis supplied.) Order 9, Civil Procedure Code refers to cases of default of appearance of parties at the first hearing, whereas this Rule (Rule 2 of Order 17) makes the provisions of Order 9 applicable to cases of such default on the adjourned hearing. Now, even on the adjourned hearing, in order that the Court may, on failure of a party to appear, proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9, it is necessary that the hearing of the suit should have been adjourned from an earlier date to a subsequent date. To put it differently, if the hearing of the suit is not so adjourned, the trial Court will have no jurisdiction to proceed in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9, or make such order as it thinks fit. I am fortified in this view by the ratio of the decision in Balmukund v. Lachmi Narain, AIR 1920 Pat. 595, wherein it has been held that- "Rules 2 and 3 of Order 17, apply only to cases where the actual hearing of the suit has been adjourned, and by the hearing of the suit it meant the hearing at which the Judge would be either taking evidence or hearing arguments or would have to consider questions relating to the determination of the suit which would enable him finally to come to au adjudication upon it. But in cases where it was clearly never intended - that there should be a hearing of the suit in the ordinary sense of the word but merely some interlocutory matter decided between the parties as to the future conduct of the suit, the provisions of these rules have no application." The law on the point has been further laid down in Manohar Dass v. Birandari Sheikhupurain, AIR 1936 Lah. 280, thus: "By the hearing of the suit is meant the hearing at which the Judge would be either taking evidence or hearing arguments or would have to consider questions relating to the determination of the suit which would enable him finally to come to an adjudication upon it. In a case where a Commissioner is appointed and is asked to submit his report by a certain date and the Commissioner before that date files an application praying for an extension of time, it is for the Court to extend the time which the Commissioner asks for or it can refuse it. The parties have nothing to do with the matter. The date on which the Court expected the report of the Commissioner is not "the date of the hearing." In Balmukund Ram Marwari v. Madho Prashad, AIR 1924 Pat. 714, where the suit was adjourned for appointment of a guardian on plaintiff's petition and the suit was dismissed in default of the plaintiff's appearance, it was held that the suit could not be so dismissed for default, nor the date so fixed could be regarded to be a date fixed for disposal of the suit. *** *** *** 11. In this view of the matter, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte against the defendant on 21.8.1981. As a logical corollary flowing from this legal position, it has further to be held that all subsequent orders, passed by the trial Court, without jurisdiction. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the impugned order manifests exercise of jurisdiction in an illegal manner and/or with material irregularity. If the impugned order is allowed to stand, the defendant-applicant herein will suffer irreparable injury and it will occasion failure of justice also.” 13. Similarly, in the matter of Sohan Singh, Etc. v. Hans Ran, AIR 1960 P&H 34 , the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the day on which interlocutory matters concerning the future conduct of the case are taken up for consideration does not fall within the ambit of the expression “the date of the hearing” and observed in paragraphs 5 & 6 as under:- “5. Now, what is the meaning of the expression "hearing" in its application to the particular facts and circumstances of this case? To "hear" implies that there is someone before the Court to speak. Now, what is the meaning of the expression "hearing" in its application to the particular facts and circumstances of this case? To "hear" implies that there is someone before the Court to speak. In a broad general sense the expression "hearing" is applied to the consideration of a case before a per-son clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial powers at the several stages of its progress, subsequent to its inception. A hearing is said to be 'final' if the case is 'interlocutory' if its purpose is to get the case into such shape that it may, in the end, be properly heard and finally adjudicated on the merits. In a more technical sense the expression "hearing" means the introduction of evidence, the arguments of counsel and the pronouncement of a decree. I think the word "hearing" in rule 6 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been used not in its broad or general sense but in its technical sense to mean a hearing at which the Judge either takes evidence or hears arguments or considers questions relating to the determination of the suit which would enable him finally to come up to an adjudication upon it (Balmakund Marwari v. Lachmi Narain Marwari, AIR 1920 Pat. 595, Mt. Barkat Bibi v. Fateh Ali, AIR 1949 Lah. 63). A day on which interlocutory matters concerning the future conduct of the case are taken up for consideration does not fall within the ambit of the expression "the date of the hearing" (Mt. Barkat Bibi v. Fateh Ali, AIR 1949 Lah. 63). A day on which a commissioner submits his report to the Court and on which no other mat-ter relating to the suit is taken up for consideration cannot possibly be regarded as the date of the hear-ing (Manohar Dass v. Birandari Sheikhupurain, AIR 1936.Lah. 280). On that day it is not necessary for anyone to speak, for no evidence is to be recorded, no arguments are to be heard and no other question regarding the determination of the suit is to be agi-tated. The Court is only to direct that the commis-sioner's report be placed on the file. 6. I am of the opinion that the proceedings which took place on the 29th June 1950 cannot properly be called a "hearing" and it was not within the power of the Court to proceed ex parte against the defendants. The Court is only to direct that the commis-sioner's report be placed on the file. 6. I am of the opinion that the proceedings which took place on the 29th June 1950 cannot properly be called a "hearing" and it was not within the power of the Court to proceed ex parte against the defendants. Ex parte proceedings under Order 9 rule 6 can be taken if, and only if, the defendant fails to appear in Court when the suit is called on for "hearing".” 14. Thus, in view of the mandate flowing from Order 9 Rule 6 and Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC, it is quite vivid that when the matter is fixed for interlocutory proceeding and not for hearing of the suit or for recording of evidence or for questions relating to hearing of the suit, such proceeding cannot be called as hearing of the suit. Therefore, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to proceed ex parte against the Defendant on the date when the matter was fixed for interlocutory proceeding. An ex parte proceeding under Order 9 Rule 6 can be taken against the Defendant only if the Defendant fails to appear before the Court when the suit is called on for “hearing”. 15. Now, coming to the facts of the case, to find out as to whether the matter was fixed for hearing of the suit or it was fixed for interlocutory proceeding, it appears from the record of the case that on 13.10.2001, the Plaintiff had filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC on which the Defendant was directed to file her written reply and thereafter from time to time the matter was fixed on 21.11.2001, 13.12.2001, 9.1.2002 and 15.1.2002 on which date, awaiting the reply of the Defendant to the aforesaid interlocutory application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and arguments on that application, the Trial Court adjourned the case to be fixed on 2.2.2002. As such, on 2.2.2002, the matter was fixed for interlocutory matters, i.e., for reply/ argument to the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, and it was not fixed for hearing of the suit or, for that matter, either for recording of the evidence or for hearing of final arguments or for considering the questions relating to merits of the suit. Therefore, the Trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to proceed ex parte in terms of Order 9 Rule 6 read with Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC and Trial Court as such could not have proceeded ex parte against the Defendant on 2.2.2002 and also could not have passed the ex parte decree on 30.3.2005. 16. Thus, in view the aforesaid discussion and the legal corollary in light of the above-referred decisions, since the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte against the Defendant on 2.2.2002 and it is an illegal exercise of jurisdiction which is conferred on it, all the consequent proceedings passed by the Trial Court are without jurisdiction including the rejection of application and dismissal of appeal of the Defendant. 17. As fallout, the application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of CPC filed by the Applicant/Defendant before the Trial Court is allowed. Consequently, the impugned Order dated 30.4.2019 passed in Misc. Civil Appeal No.09/2019 and the Order dated 9.1.2019 passed in Civil M.J.C. No.01/2010 as well as the ex parte decree passed by the Trial Court on 30.3.2005 including the ex parte proceeding conducted against the Defendant on 2.2.2002 all are hereby set aside/quashed and the Trial Court is directed to proceed from the stage at which the matter was fixed on 2.2.2002 and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. 18. However, considering the fact that the Civil Suit was filed on 22.9.1988 and it is already more than 35 years’ long period that has elapsed by now, the Trial Court is directed to do well and take up the proceeding of the matter on day-to-day basis and dispose it of as early as possible, preferably within an outer limit of four months from the date of presentation/receipt of certified copy of this Order. 19. The District Judge, Rapur also is directed to ensure that the Order of this Court is complied with within the time stipulated herein above, considering the fact that it is an old matter which is pending since more than 35 years. 20. With aforesaid observations, the Civil Revision is allowed. Interim Order if any, stands vacated and merged with this final Order. 21. There shall be no order as to cost(s).