JUDGMENT Murahari Sri Raman, J. The challenge: Assailing legality and propriety of the decision taken by the Collector, Balasore vide Order dated 09.02.2018 rejecting the claim for counting seniority in service by treating him as appointee of 1997, the petitioner has approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar by way of filing Original Application giving rise to O.A. No.435 of 2018 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 1.1. After abolition of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Notification F. No. A-11014/10/2015-AT [G.S.R.552(E).], dated 2nd August, 2019), the said case having been transferred to this Court, O.A. No. 435 of 2018 has been registered as WPC (OA) No.435 of 2018. The facts: 2. The facts leading the petitioner to come up before this Court as culled out from the pleadings of the writ petition, are narrated. 2.1. As claimed by the petitioner, responding to the advertisement published in the daily newspaper 'The Samaja' on 22.10.1990, he, having qualification of Masters in Arts, applied for the post of Junior Clerk. Being selected in the written test conducted by the Collector, Balasore, he attended the type test and was selected in the type test. 2.2. It is stated that though the list of selected candidates was not published for a period of more than six years, ultimately, it got published on 14.05.1997. It is asserted that though 66 vacant posts were advertised in 1990, the opposite party No. 2, Collector, Balasore published the merit list of 34 candidates. It is alleged that the Collector, Balasore instead of preparing the list of 132 selected candidates, i.e., twice the number of vacancies advertised in terms of Rule 11 of the Orissa Ministerial Services (Method of Recruitment to the Posts of Junior Clerks in the District Offices) Rules, 1985 ('OMS Rules', for brevity), only 34 candidates were shown to have been successful candidates selected for the post of Junior Clerks. 2.3. 2.3. Being aggrieved by the action of the Collector, Balasore who has violated the provisions of the OMS Rules, the petitioner approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal by way of filing application bearing O.A. No. 1288 of 1997, which came to be disposed of by an Order dated 06.03.1999 with the following directions, as Balasore district got bifurcated into two districts, namely Balasore district and Bhadrak district with effect from 01.04.1993: 'These three applications are, therefore, disposed of with the following directions: i. The select list be revised by including other candidates who might have been left out limiting it to 56. ii. If the applicants come within the revised list, then they may be appointed against the available vacancies either in Bhadrak. district or Balasore district in respect of the male (general) category to which they belong, taking into account their placement in the list and relaxing their upper age limit. iii. The number of vacancies against which appointments are made on the basis of this revised select list shall be excluded from the next advertisement, by obtaining Government orders for relaxing the relevant provisions of the OMS Rules, 1985 by taking recourse to Rule 14.' 2.4. The opposite parties preferred review petition giving rise to R.P. No.68 of 1999 for modification of the Order dated 06.03.1999, which stood dismissed by the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal vide Order dated 03.12.1999, with the following observation: '3. Even though the OMS Rules do not contain a specific provision for revision of the select list, yet there is a provision for relaxation and not to invoke that provision would cause undue hardship to a group of individuals and hence, the above decision of the Apex Court [Ashok Kumar Uppal Vrs. State of J&K, (1988) 1 SCR 164] was squarely applicable to the instant case. Besides, according to the OMS Rules as they stood at the time of advertisement, the select list could include twice the number of the advertised vacancies and the number of persons appointed, including those who are to be included in the revised select list and those who had already been appointed after giving appointment to the candidates of 1986 recruitment, would not exceed double the number of advertised vacancies. It has also come to our notice that about 24 vacancies were available for which no recruitment process had been initiated as reported in the letter of the RDC (CD). It has also come to our notice that about 24 vacancies were available for which no recruitment process had been initiated as reported in the letter of the RDC (CD). Considering all these facts it was directed that Rule 14 of the OMS Rules should be invoked for revising the select list and excluding the vacancies that would be added from the next recruitment. Learned Standing Counsel had submitted in the course of hearing that since the District had not been bifurcated when the recruitment in question was set in motion and which is now bifurcated into two Districts, there would be difficulties in implementing the order. This aspect has also been taken care of in the order sought to be reviewed. Besides, both the Collector, Balasore and the Collector, Bhadrak were the respondents in the O.As. 4. It is, thus, clear that there is no error apparent in the order, it is also not impracticable to implement it. The scope of review is limited. 5. In the above circumstances, we find no justification to modify the order already passed. The review petitions are, therefore, disallowed. ' 2.5. After taking the concurrence from the Finance Department as well as the Revenue Department, the Collector, Balasore-opposite party No.2 appointed the petitioner temporarily as Junior Clerk and posted him to work in the Office of Sub-Collector, Balasore in the scale of pay of Rs.3050/- to Rs.4590/- with usual D.A. against Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992 vide Office Order No.25-IA-5/04/Estt., dated 07.02.2004 (Annexure-5). Accordingly, he joined the service on 09.02.2004. Subsequently, the petitioner got promotion to the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009, which he accepted the promotional post and joined. 2.6. The petitioner made representation dated 20.09.2017 citing that for no fault of his own, he should have been given seniority on the basis of select list prepared enlisting successful candidates of 34 numbers in the year 1997 as against 66 numbers of vacancy advertised in 1990. But for the indulgence of the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal to publish names of 54 successful candidates, the petitioner and others would not have been given appointment in 2004. But for the indulgence of the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal to publish names of 54 successful candidates, the petitioner and others would not have been given appointment in 2004. As the application was for the post of Junior Clerk pertaining to the vacancy advertised in 1990, and the petitioner was found successful in the written test as well as the type test held in the Recruitment Examination during the year 1992, but due to defective publication of select list and the delay being attributable to the opposite parties in appointing the petitioner, he should not be made to suffer. As the opposite party No.2 has issued Office Order appointing the petitioner on 07.02.2004, it does not stand to reason that the seniority would be fixed from the date of joining, i.e., 09.02.2004. So it is contended by the petitioner that his case should have been taken into consideration with that of the candidates who were appointed in the year 1997 in response to the advertisement published in the year 1990. 2.7. As nothing fruitful yielded as submitted through representation to ventilate his grievance, the petitioner moved the Orissa Administrative Tribunal giving rise to O.A. No.1809 of 2017, which got disposed of vide Order dated 07.11.2017 with a direction 'to consider the representation' and 'pass appropriate reasoned orders on merit' within the stipulated period. 2.8. In pursuance thereof, the Collector, Balasore, vide Order dated 09.02.2018 rejected the representation of the petitioner. 2.9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present case before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal questioning the justification of rejection of the representation with respect to seniority and antedating the date of appointment. Counter of the opposite parties: 3. In the counter filed on behalf of the Collector, Balasore, it is pointed out that the petitioner has misrepresented the fact that sixty-six numbers of vacancies were advertised in the year 1990, pursuant to which he was found successful candidate in the revised list published in compliance of Order dated 06.03.1999 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal. On the contrary, sixty-six number of vacancies in the post of Junior Clerk including reserved vacancies was reflected in the Advertisement dated 01.06.1999 (vide Annexure-1), but not in 1990. 3.1. On the contrary, sixty-six number of vacancies in the post of Junior Clerk including reserved vacancies was reflected in the Advertisement dated 01.06.1999 (vide Annexure-1), but not in 1990. 3.1. As was directed in the Order dated 03.12.1999 passed in R.P. No.68 of 1999 read with the Order dated 06.03.1999 in O.A. No.1288 of 1997 by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, the petitioner was given appointment in the year 2004. However, considering his representation dated 20.09.2017 as per direction contained in the Order dated 07.11.2017, the Collector, Balasore has discussed merit of the matter threadbare and passed reasoned order by rejecting the representation, which does not warrant indulgence. Hearing: 4. This matter was on board on 03.05.2024. Since the pleadings are completed and have been exchanged amongst the parties, on consent for disposal, the matter has been finally heard. Heard Mr. Kunal Kumar Swain, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the opposite parties. Contentions of the rival parties: 5. Sri Kunal Kumar Swain, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that as there was delay attributable to the opposite parties in considering the appointment of the petitioner and but for the intervention of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, the opposite parties would not have considered the petitioner for the post of Junior Clerk. Amplifying his argument further he submitted that since the defect in publishing the result of recruitment tests was appreciated by the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal, by Order dated 06.03.1999 direction was issued for publication of revised list of selected candidates restricting it to fifty-six numbers perceiving the fact that ten out of thirty-four selected candidates were appointed under the Orissa Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules, 1990 in connection with the advertisement published in daily Newspaper on 22.10.1990. The name of the petitioner did find place in the revised merit list of fifty-six candidates published pursuant to such direction in the year 2004. Merely because the petitioner was given appointment by Order dated 07.02.2004 of the Collector, Balasore, he cannot be deprived of getting the seniority as other twenty-four out of thirty-four selected candidates got appointment in the year 1997. 5.1. Merely because the petitioner was given appointment by Order dated 07.02.2004 of the Collector, Balasore, he cannot be deprived of getting the seniority as other twenty-four out of thirty-four selected candidates got appointment in the year 1997. 5.1. Highlighting the recital contained in Order dated 07.02.2004 of the Collector, Sri Kunal Kumar Swain, learned counsel submitted that it has candidly been admitted by the opposite parties that the petitioner has been appointed in pursuance of 'recruitment examination held during 1992'. Therefore, it is obvious that had the opposite parties published the result of successful fifty-six candidates in the year 1997, who also did qualify in the said Recruitment Examination of 1992 pertaining to the advertisement of the year 1990, the petitioner would have been placed at appropriate place in the seniority list. In such view of the matter, it is urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the Collector, Balasore, while considering the representation dated 20.09.2017 of the petitioner, in compliance of direction vide Order dated 07.11.2017 passed in O.A. No.1808 of 2017 by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Bhubaneswar, failed to appreciate pertinent fact which is manifest on the face of his order of appointment dated 07.02.2004. 5.2. Mr. Kunal Kumar Swain, learned counsel for the petitioner winding up his argument submitted that the petitioner at the verge of his retirement from service seeks indulgence of this Court for recognizing his seniority antedating his appointment in the post of Junior Clerk to the year 1997, when the other twenty-four selected candidates, who were part of the process of the recruitment in connection with advertisement of the year 1990 got appointed, instead of 2004. He also seeks extension of consequential pensionary benefit on account of such antedating of his appointment. 6. Per contra, Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State-opposite parties referring to Annexure-1, advertisement dated 01.06.1999, submitted that the petitioner has misguided by impressing upon the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal as well as this Court that sixty-six numbers of vacancies were published in the year 1990. He submitted by referring to counter filed on behalf of opposite party No.2 that advertisement dated 22.10.1990 inviting applications for the post of 'Junior Clerk' did not specify number of vacancies. Therefore, there was no error committed by the Collector, Balasore in declaring thirty-four eligible selected candidates in the Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992. He submitted by referring to counter filed on behalf of opposite party No.2 that advertisement dated 22.10.1990 inviting applications for the post of 'Junior Clerk' did not specify number of vacancies. Therefore, there was no error committed by the Collector, Balasore in declaring thirty-four eligible selected candidates in the Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992. Laying emphasis on the advertisement dated 01.06.1999 as enclosed as Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition, the vacancy position in respect of the post of 'Junior Clerk' to be filled up was declared as sixty-six. Stemming on observation made at Paragraph-9 of the Order dated 06.03.1999 in O.A. of 1288 of 1997, it is submitted that all the thirty-four eligible selected candidates could not be appointed, as ten candidates out of these selected candidates were given appointment under the Orissa Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules. However, after review petition filed at the behest of the opposite parties before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal being dismissed vide Order dated 03.12.1999, the case of the petitioner was considered after observing due formalities. Accordingly, he was appointed temporarily as Junior Clerk on ad hoc basis. The Learned Government Advocate laid emphasis on the following caption contained in the appointment Order dated 07.02.2004 issued by the Collector, Balasore: 'In pursuance of orders of Hon'ble Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar as detailed below and concurrence of Government in Finance Department, issued vide their U.O.R. No.42/S.S., dated 03.01.2004 communicated vide Letter No.4186/R, dated 31.01.2004 of Under Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Orissa, Bhubaneswar, the following candidates of Recruitment Examination held during, 1992, are hereby appointed temporarily as Junior Clerk, on ad hoc basis without prejudice to the claims of others observing the principles of O.R.V. Act in the time Scale of Pay of Rs.3050-75-3950-80-4590/- with usual D.A. as admissible from time to time and posted as such to the offices as noted against their names in the existing vacancies. The appointment is subject to the following conditions. ***' 6.1. Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate has contended that the Collector, Balasore having considered the representation of the petitioner by applying his mind rationally to comply the direction in the Order dated 06.03.1999 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal passed in O.A. No.1288 of 1997, no infirmity ought to have been imputed against the Order dated 09.02.2018 vide Annexure-8. 6.2. 6.2. He has submitted that the petitioner joined as Junior Clerk way back in the year 2004 in pursuance of the appointment Order dated 07.02.2004, and accepted the promotion in the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009. Having done so, at the belated stage in the year 2017 he made the representation seeking for antedating such appointment for the purpose of consideration of seniority in the level of Junior Clerk. Such a claim has been rightly dispelled by the Collector of Balasore vide Order dated 09.02.2018 by taking into account pertinent facts and evidence available. Therefore, Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate strenuously put forth that considering the plea of the petitioner at this stage would have serious repercussion on the subsequent events that have already taken place. 6.3. Under this scenario, he has made fervent request not to disturb the position of the petitioner in the gradation list which has been crystallised since long. Analysis and discussions: 7. Having heard learned counsel for respective parties and upon careful perusal of record, it transpires that the petitioner did not place appropriate advertisement before the learned Administrative Tribunal nor before this Court. It appears from the Order dated 06.03.1999 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal passed in O.A. No.1288 of 1997 that the petitioner has claimed to have applied for the post of 'Junior Clerk' in response to an advertisement 'issued by the Collector of old Balasore District (Annexure-1 to these applications) which was published in Samaja on 22.10.1990'. As the facts unfurled by the learned Administrative Tribunal it remained undisputed that thirty-four numbers of successful candidates were published in connection with the said advertisement in the year 1997. The said Tribunal, taking cognizance of the power conferred on the Government to relax in terms of the OMS Rules, 1985 and applying the ratio of Ashok. Kumar Uppal Vrs. State ofJ&K, (1988) 1 SCR 164, considered the fact that number of vacancies remained unfilled, and accordingly, directed for publication of revised select list limiting to fifty-six numbers of candidates. It was further directed to appoint the petitioner, if found eligible in the revised list so prepared, against the available vacancies, either in Bhadrak District or Balasore District in respect of Male (General) category. 7.1. It was further directed to appoint the petitioner, if found eligible in the revised list so prepared, against the available vacancies, either in Bhadrak District or Balasore District in respect of Male (General) category. 7.1. It is emanates from the record that after review petition of the opposite parties being dismissed vide Order dated 03.12.1999 against the said Order dated 06.03.1999, the opposite party No.2 issued appointment Order on 07.02.2004 after taking concurrence of competent Departments. 7.2. It is not in dispute that the name of the petitioner was found in the revised select list of candidates in connection with Recruitment Examination held during 1992, conducted in connection with the advertisement inviting applications for the post of 'Junior Clerk' in the year 1990. 7.3. Cursory glance at the appointment Order dated 07.02.2004 vide Annexure-5 ex facie reveals that the petitioner was appointed on being found eligible and selected as per the revised list drawn pursuant to direction of the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal pertaining to the 'Recruitment Examination held during 1992'. There is, thus, justified reason for the opposite party No.2 to have appointed the petitioner in the year 2004 against 'available vacancies' in Balasore District. This Court, hence, finds reason assigned in the impugned Order dated 09.02.2018 by the Collector, Balasore as infallible inasmuch as there was no direction in the Order dated 06.02.1999 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal to fix the seniority of the petitioner treating him as appointee of 1997. It is admitted fact that the Administrative Tribunal has taken into consideration in the Order dated 06.03.1999 that out of thirty-four candidates declared successful as per original select list published in the year 1997, ten candidates were given appointment under the Orissa Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistances) Rules. 7.4. Learned Tribunal at paragraph 4 of Order dated 06.03.1999 observed as follows: 'We are also informed that after this impugned selection no further selection has been conducted either in Bhadrak. or Balasore for appointment in either District. We are also shown a communication by the Collector, Balasore dated 27.11.1997 addressed to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Central Division in which he has mentioned that there are twenty-four posts of Junior Clerks in the Collectorate which occurred after 01.04.1993 and for which fresh recruitment was not possible without exhausting the old select list. We are also shown a communication by the Collector, Balasore dated 27.11.1997 addressed to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Central Division in which he has mentioned that there are twenty-four posts of Junior Clerks in the Collectorate which occurred after 01.04.1993 and for which fresh recruitment was not possible without exhausting the old select list. From this letter it also appears that ten candidates in the select list of thirty-four could not be appointed, because, some of the requisitioning authorities had filled up those vacancies under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme. From this letter it appears that no subsequent recruitment was conducted in Balasore district, after publication of the results of the impugned selection.' 7.5. As a matter of fact the learned Tribunal has also observed that prior to the amendment Rules of 1991, the OMS Rules, 1985, Rule 11 provided that the select list was to include twice the number of vacancies. After excluding the number of vacancies utilised for appointment under the Orissa Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules and complying with the earlier order of the Tribunal and keeping in view unfilled vacancies, the select list could be more than thirty-four but within fifty-six. Accordingly, direction was issued for appointment of the petitioner 'against the available vacancies' after drawing revised select list. 7.6. In the aforesaid backdrop, as the petitioner was appointed 'against the available vacancies' in the year 2004 consequent upon preparation of the revised list in compliance of direction contained in Order dated 06.03.1999 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, and subsequent thereto, as is clearly admitted in the rejoinder filed on 10.11.2021 by the petitioner by asserting that he was 'promoted to the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009 and continuing as such till date', the contention of Sri Kunal Kumar Swain, learned Advocate to acknowledge the seniority of the petitioner by antedating the date of appointment in the post of Junior Clerk, as if he was appointed in the year 1997 along with other selected candidates as per original selection list that was published in the year 1997, cannot be accepted. Doing so in the level of Junior Clerk would unsettle the position of many others who were placed in the seniority list in the post of Senior Clerk. Delay, laches and lack of diligence in pursuing the matter by the petitioner: 8. Doing so in the level of Junior Clerk would unsettle the position of many others who were placed in the seniority list in the post of Senior Clerk. Delay, laches and lack of diligence in pursuing the matter by the petitioner: 8. With the aforesaid background facts, it is rightly pressed by the learned Additional Government Advocate referring to paragraph 1 of the counter that after lapse of thirteen years the petitioner approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.1809 of 2017 for fixing his seniority in the year 1997' in connection with the select list of that year. As against this, it seems at paragraph 5 of the rejoinder, the petitioner has offered the following explanation: 'In this context, it is humbly submitted that the petitioner submitted his joining report with protest as he has no other option than to accept the same. Therefore, the fault or laches cannot be attributed to the petitioner as due to the lackadaisical approach of the authorities the petitioner has subjected to suffer. Therefore, necessary direction may be made to the opposite parties to antedate the appointment of the petitioner from 1997, i.e., from the date other similarly situated persons were given appointment as Junior Clerks pursuant to the advertisement of 1990 at least on notional basis and all consequential benefit may be made available to him'. 8.1. Except the above statement, there is no explanation whatsoever to citing as to why there was delay in submitting the representation dated 20.09.2017 (Annexure-6) and approaching the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal by way of Original Application being O.A. No.1809 of 2017 claiming for fixation of seniority in the post of Junior Clerk, even as the petitioner has accepted the promotional post of Senior Clerk way back in the year 2009. 8.2. It is not pleaded nor could it be pleaded that the petitioner was unaware of the position in the seniority list treating him as appointee of 2004, but not of the year 1997, as claimed to be at par with the twenty-four candidates who were appointed in 1997 as disclosed in the original select list of successful candidates in the Recruitment Examination held during 1992. 8.3. In this connection it cannot be gainsaid that lack of diligence or belated approach to the authority, the Tribunal or the Court may entail rejection of claim. In K.R. Mudgal Vrs. 8.3. In this connection it cannot be gainsaid that lack of diligence or belated approach to the authority, the Tribunal or the Court may entail rejection of claim. In K.R. Mudgal Vrs. R.P. Singh, (1986) 3 SCR 993 reference to the following observation made way back in 1975, in the case of Maloon Lawrence Cecil D'souza Vrs. Union of India, (1975) Supp. SCR 409 (pp. 413-414): 'Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult to doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects. It should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.' 8.4. This Court refers to the case of B.S. Bajwa Vrs. State of Punjab, (1997) Supp.6 SCR 451, wherein it has been laid down that in service matters the question of seniority should not be re-opened after the lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition. 8.5. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vrs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 2 SCR 356 , the claim of the writ petitioner was rejected on the ground that it had the effect of unscrambling the scrambled egg, for he had approached the Court after nearly 14 years and observed that: 'It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dimissed in limine. ' 8.6. In connection with direction to dispose of representation to without considering the merit of matter, in the case of Union of India Vrs. M.K. Sarkar, (2009) 16 (Addl.) SCR 249, it has been observed as follows: '9. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob Vrs. Director of Geology and Mining, (2009) 10 SCC 115 : 'The Courts/Tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the exemployee files an application/ writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. ' When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. A Court or Tribunal, before directing consideration' of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue or dispute, the Court/ Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the Court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the Court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect. 10. Even on merits, the application has to fail. In Krishena Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 , a Constitution Bench of this Court considering the options given to the Railway employees to shift to pension scheme, held that prescription of cut off dates while giving each option was not arbitrary or lacking in nexus. This Court also held that provident fund retirees who failed to exercise option within the time were not entitled to be included in the pension scheme on any ground of parity. This Court also held that provident fund retirees who failed to exercise option within the time were not entitled to be included in the pension scheme on any ground of parity. Therefore, the respondent who did not exercise the option available when he retired in 1976, was not entitled to seek an opportunity to exercise option to shift to the pension scheme, after the expiry of the validity period for option scheme, that too in the year 1998 after 22 years. ***' 8.7. Conspectus of aforesaid decisions would indicate that the Court should not embark upon enquiry into the merits of the case, when the writ petition has been filed with delay and the same should be dismissed on the ground of laches alone. If anyone feels aggrieved by an administrative decision affecting one's seniority, the employee should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the matter. Merits need not be examined when a belated challenge is made to seniority and antedating the date of appointment, as that would create a sense of uncertainty and insecurity amongst employees. A person, feeling aggrieved, must approach the Court at the earliest. However, where there arises question whether disposal of a belated representation in regard to a stale or dead issue/dispute in compliance with the direction given by the Tribunal can be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action, it cannot be gainsaid that neither a Court or Tribunal's direction to consider a representation without examining merits, nor a decision made in compliance with such direction, will extend the period of limitation or erase the delay and laches. A Court or Tribunal before directing consideration of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation was with reference to a live issue or pertained to a dead or stale claim. It is, thus, unequivocal from the aforesaid referred case laws that the Court or Tribunal should clarify that such consideration would be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the Court or Tribunal does not expressly say so, the same will be the legal position. 8.8. It is, thus, unequivocal from the aforesaid referred case laws that the Court or Tribunal should clarify that such consideration would be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the Court or Tribunal does not expressly say so, the same will be the legal position. 8.8. It is the case of the petitioner in the instant case that the representation dated 20.09.2017 (Annexure-6) has not been considered with due weight by the Collector, Balasore, which was taken up pursuant to direction of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal contained in Order dated 07.11.2017 (Annexure-7) to the effect that: 'On the basis of the submission of the learned counsel for both sides and without going into the merit of the case, a copy of the paper book, be forwarded to respondent No.2 at the cost of the applicant with a direction to consider the representation of the applicant at Annexure-8 and pass appropriate reasoned orders on merit within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.' 8.9. It is, thus, apparent on the face of the order that the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal having not delved into merit of the matter merely directed the Collector, Balasore to consider the representation which is stated to be of the year 2017. The petitioner having not explained with respect to reason for the delay in its approach even though in the year 2004 when he joined in service on receiving the appointment Order dated 07.02.2004 (Annexure-5) was well aware of the fact that certain candidates declared successful in the Recruitment Examination held during 1992 were appointed in the year 1997. There is no iota of evidence placed on record by the petitioner to suggest that such joining was under protest, though he made such claim at paragraph 5 of the rejoinder to the effect that 'the petitioner submitted his joining report with protest as he has no other option than to accept the same'. Further, he has accepted the promotion to the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009, but remained silent to put forth his grievance regarding his seniority till 2017. 8.10. Further, he has accepted the promotion to the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009, but remained silent to put forth his grievance regarding his seniority till 2017. 8.10. Therefore, even if the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.1809 of 2017 vide Order dated 07.11.2017 directed for consideration of the representation of the petitioner, such stale claim should have been rejected in limine in view of ratio laid down in Union of India Vrs. M.K. Sarkar, (2009) 16 (Addl.) SCR 249 and the delay and lack of diligence could not be ignored. Non-joinder of necessary and proper parties: 9. It is asserted by the petitioner at paragraph 3 of the petition that 'Out of thirty-four candidates empanelled for the post of Junior Clerks only twenty-four candidates were given appointment as Junior Clerks in the year 1997'. At paragraph 4 of the said rejoinder, it has been conceded that 'the petitioner was promoted to the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009 and continuing as such till date'. Claiming as if right survives, the petitioner at paragraph 5 has attacked the objection of the opposite parties and made statement that 'The plea taken in the counter affidavit that there is no provision for antedating the appointment and counting the seniority of the petitioner from 1997 is not legally tenable'. It has, therefore, been contended in the same breath that 'In this context, it is humbly submitted that for the fault of the authorities the petitioner was not given appointment from 1997 whereas his counterparts were given appointment in 1997 and after succeed in the Tribunal having been given appointment in 2004, his appointment ought to have been antedated on notional basis from 1997 for the purpose of seniority and other benefits'. 9.1. Such being the pleading, if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it would be quite obvious that the persons already placed in the list of seniority since 1997 and subsequent thereto would be disturbed. Nonetheless, the petitioner appears to have avoided impleading such affected employees as the necessary party and the proper party to this proceeding. 9.2. It is, thus, felt expedient to notice the concept of 'necessary' and 'proper' party vis-a-vis principles of natural justice as summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Poonam Vrs. State of U.P., (2015) 14 SCR 565: ' 14. 9.2. It is, thus, felt expedient to notice the concept of 'necessary' and 'proper' party vis-a-vis principles of natural justice as summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Poonam Vrs. State of U.P., (2015) 14 SCR 565: ' 14. First, it is necessary to understand about the concept of necessary and proper party. A Four-judge Bench in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vrs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar and another, AIR 1963 SC 786 has observed thus: '7. *** it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in this proceeding. ' 15. In Vijay Kumar Kaul and others Vrs. Union of India and others, (2012) 7 SCC 610 the court referred to the said decision and has opined thus: '36. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. Neither before the Tribunal nor before the High Court, Parveen Kumar and others were arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over the factum that they are senior to the appellants and have been conferred the benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In their absence, if any direction is issued for fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise their interest. When they have not been impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult to grant. 37. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision in Indu Shekhar Singh Vrs. State of U.P., (2006) 8 SCC 129 wherein it has been held thus: (SCC p. 151, para 56) '56. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the respondents. In their absence, the High Court could not have determined the question of inter se seniority. ' 38. In Public Service Commission Vrs. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204 this Court while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-impleadment of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed observed thus: (SCC pp. 207-08, paras 9-10) '9. ' 38. In Public Service Commission Vrs. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204 this Court while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-impleadment of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed observed thus: (SCC pp. 207-08, paras 9-10) '9. *** in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vrs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1965 SC 786, wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and proforma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called 'CPC') provides that nonjoinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vrs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vrs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 and Sarguja Transport Service Vrs. STAP., (1987) 1 SCC 5 ). 10. In Prabodh Verma Vrs. State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 251 and Tridip Kumar Dingal Vrs. State of W B., (2009) 1 sec 768, it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates B or at least some of them are necessary parties. ' 16. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that in Udit Narain (Supra) question arose whether a tribunal is a necessary party. Recently a two-Judge Bench in Asstt. G.M., State Bank, of India Vrs. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2015 (3) SCALE 39 referred to Hari Vishnu Kamath Vrs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233 and adverted to the concept of a tribunal being a necessary party and in that context ruled that: 'In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger Bench was dealing with a case that arose from Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and expressed the view how it is a proper party. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233 and adverted to the concept of a tribunal being a necessary party and in that context ruled that: 'In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger Bench was dealing with a case that arose from Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and expressed the view how it is a proper party. In Udit Narain Singh (supra), the Court was really dwelling upon the controversy with regard to the impleadment of parties in whose favour orders had been passed and in that context observed that tribunal is a necessary party. In Savitri Devi (supra), the Court took exception to courts and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite to note here that propositions laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before the superior court it does not contest. If the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls for the records, the same can always be called for by the High court without the Court or the Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party. Similarly, with the passage of time there have been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and they have nothing to do with the lis. We may cite few examples; the tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, the Sales Tax Tribunal and such others. Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authorityfies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank, he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank, he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the Court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such Tribunals need not be arrayed as parties.' The principle that has been culled out in the said case is that a Tribunal or authority would only become a necessary party which is entitled in law to defend the order. 17. The term entitled to defend' confers an inherent right to a person if he or she is affected or is likely to be affected by an order to be passed by any legal forum, for there would be violation of natural justice. The principle of audi alteram partem has its own sanctity but the said principle of natural justice is not always put in strait .jacket formula. That apart, a person or an authority must have a legal right or right in law to defend or assail. 18. We may first clarify that as a proposition of law it is not in dispute that natural justice is not an unruly horse. Its applicability has to be adjudged regard being had to the effect and impact of the order and the person who claims to be affected; and that is where the concept of necessary party become significant. In The General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad and another Vrs. Its applicability has to be adjudged regard being had to the effect and impact of the order and the person who claims to be affected; and that is where the concept of necessary party become significant. In The General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad and another Vrs. A.V.R. Siddhantti and Others, (1974) 4 SCC 335 the Court was dealing with an issue whether the private respondent therein had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the General Manager, South Central Railway and the Secretary, Railway Board to fix the inter se seniority as per the original proceedings, dated 16.10.1952, of the Railway Board and to further direct them not to give effect to the subsequent proceedings dated 2.11.1957 and 13.01.1961 of the Board issued by way of 'modification' and 'clarification' of its earlier proceedings of 1952. The High Court accepted the contentions of the private respondent and struck, down the impugned proceedings. A contention was canvassed before this Court that the writ petitioners had not impleaded about 120 employees who were likely to be affected by the decision and, therefore, there being non-impleadment despite they being necessary parties, it was fatal to the decision. Rejecting the said submission the court held: 'As regards the second objection, it is to be noted that the decisions of the Railway Board impugned in the writ petition contain administrative rules of general application, regulating absorption in permanent departments, fixation of seniority, pay etc. of the employees of the erstwhile Grain Shop Departments. The respondents-petitioners are impeaching the validity of those policy decisions on the ground of their being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The proceedings are analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule regulating seniority of Government servant is assailed. In such proceedings the necessary parties to be impleaded are those against whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the Court. In the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railway which has been impleaded through, its representative. No list or order fixing seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis particular individuals, pursuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. In the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railway which has been impleaded through, its representative. No list or order fixing seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis particular individuals, pursuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Board's decision of October 16, 1952, were, at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition. ' 19. The Court further agreed with the principle stated in B. Gopalaiah and Ors Vrs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1969 AP 204 , J.S. Sachdev and Ors. Vrs. Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi, ILR (1973) 2 Delhi 392 and Mohan Chandra Joshi Vrs. Union of India and Ors., C.W. No. 650 of 1970, decided by Delhi High Court. In this context reference to the authority in State of Himachal Pradesh and another Vrs. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Others, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 251 would be appropriate. In the said case a contention was raised that non-impleadment of the necessary party was fatal to the writ petition. In support of the said stand reliance was placed upon two decisions of two different High Courts; one, State of Kerala Vrs. Miss Rafia Rahim, AIR 1978 Ker 176 and the other in Padamraj Vrs. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 Pat 266 . The Court distinguished both the decisions by holding thus: The contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the failure to implead Chauhan will be fatal to the writ petition does not seem to be correct. He relies on State of Kerala Vrs. Miss Rafia Rahim. That case related to admission to medical college whereby invalidating the selection vitally affected those who had been selected already. Equally, the case Padamraj Samarendra Vrs. State of Bihar, has no application. This was a case where the plea was founded in Article 14 and arbitrary selection. The selectees were vitally affected. The plea that the decision of the court in the absence of Chauhan would be violative of principle of natural justice as any adverse decision would affect him is not correct. ' The Court placed reliance on A. Janardhana Vrs. This was a case where the plea was founded in Article 14 and arbitrary selection. The selectees were vitally affected. The plea that the decision of the court in the absence of Chauhan would be violative of principle of natural justice as any adverse decision would affect him is not correct. ' The Court placed reliance on A. Janardhana Vrs. Union of India, (1983) 3 SCC 601 and ultimately did not accept the submission that the writ petition was not maintainable because of non-impleadment of the necessary party. 20. In this context the authority in Sadananda Halo and Others Vrs. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 619 is quite pertinent. The Division Bench referred to the decision in All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. Vrs. A. Arthur Jeen, (2001) 6 SCC 380 wherein this court had addressed the necessity in joining the necessary candidates as parties. The Court referred to the principle of natural justice as enunciated in Canara Bank Vrs. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557 . We may profitably reproduce the same: 'Natural justice has been variously defined. It is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.' And again: 'Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance. ***' 21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state the basic principle behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is, no order should be passed behind the back, of a person who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle behind proviso to Order 1, Rule 9 that the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins it and the said principle is also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate challenging the selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned is bound to make the selected candidates parties. 22. In J.S. Yadav Vrs. State of U.P. & Anr., (2011)6 SCC 570 in Paragraph 31 it has been held thus: 'No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles enshrined in the proviso to Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provide that impleadment of a necessary party is mandatory and in case of non-joinder of necessary party, the petitioner-plaintiff may not be entitled for the relief sought by him. The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In service jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity. The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In service jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity. In case the services of a person are terminated and another person is appointed at his place, in order to get relief, the person appointed at his place is the necessary party for the reason that even if the petitioner-plaintiff succeeds, it may not be possible for the Court to issue direction to accommodate the petitioner without removing the person who filled up the post manned by the petitioner-plaintiff. (Vide Prabodh Verma Vrs. State of U.P, Ishwar Singh Vrs. Kuldip Singh, Tridip Kumar Dingal Vrs. State of W.B., State of Assam Vrs. Union of India and Public Service Commission Vrs. Mamta Bisht). More so, the public exchequer cannot be burdened with the liability to pay the salary of two persons against one sanctioned post. ' *** 37. In Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal Vrs. Mamta Bisht and Others, (2010) 12 SCC 204 it was held by a two-Judge Bench that the first respondent therein wanted her selection against a reserved category vacancy and, therefore, the last selected candidate in that category was a necessary party and without impleading her the writ petition could not have been entertained by the High Court, for if a person challenges a selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are to be arrayed as parties they being necessary parties. *** 38. The said decision, as we understand, clearly spells out that in the absence of a necessary party, no adjudication can take place and, in fact, the nonjoinder would be fatal to the case. ' 9.3. Having undertaken analysis of the instant matter in the above perspective, it is observed that the petitioner, by way of Original Application being O.A. No.1288 of 1997 before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, pleaded that certain successful candidates have been appointed pursuant to the Recruitment Examination held on 05.01.1992. The petitioner, thus, was well aware of his position in the list of seniority. The petitioner, thus, was well aware of his position in the list of seniority. It is also noteworthy that the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal while disposing of said original application on 06.03.1999 was conscious of such factual details and, hence, directed that the petitioner would be given appointment against 'available vacancies'. 9.4. Consequently, the petitioner was appointed against the available vacancy in the year 2004 in the district of Balasore. There is no denial that during the period from 1997 to 2004 many others would have been appointed in the post of Junior Clerk have been placed appropriately in the list of seniority. Further during the year 2009 when the petitioner has accepted the promotion in the post of the Senior Clerk, the position of employees in gradation list would also have suffered change. This apart, from 2009 till 2017 the petitioner kept silent without questioning his seniority. True it is that the law does not protect the indolent. 9.5. Under the above perspective, there is no other option left than to reject the claim of the petitioner for antedating his appointment so as to make him avail the benefit since 1997 instead of 2004. Claim of parity with the employees who were declared SUCCESSFUL and WERE GIVEN APPOINTMENTS IN 1997: 10. It is the grievance of the petitioner that thirty-four candidates were declared successful in connection with Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992 pertaining to the advertisement of 1990 and twenty-four amongst them were given appointment in the year 1997, as noted down by the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal that ten vacancies were filled up by the persons under the Orissa Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules. Nevertheless, the petitioner having questioned such declaration of successful candidates, the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Order dated 06.03.1999 directed for publication of fifty-six candidates. In pursuance thereof the name of the petitioner found place in the revised select list and given appointment in the year 2004 against 'available vacancies' either in Balasore district or Bhadrak district. Therefore, it is claimed that the date of appointment of the petitioner ought to have been made effective from the date other thirty-four candidates were appointed. 10.1. In pursuance thereof the name of the petitioner found place in the revised select list and given appointment in the year 2004 against 'available vacancies' either in Balasore district or Bhadrak district. Therefore, it is claimed that the date of appointment of the petitioner ought to have been made effective from the date other thirty-four candidates were appointed. 10.1. Refuting such contention, the opposite parties have set forth through the learned Additional Government Advocate that the delay with which the appellant has raised such grievance cannot be condoned and the claim of the petitioner has been rightly rejected, more so as the petitioner has accepted the post of Senior Clerk in the year 2009 and did not question his seniority in the post of Junior Clerk till 2017. The Collector, Balasore having rightfully considered the representation of the petitioner stated to have been submitted in the year 2017, the Order dated 09.02.2018 does not require indulgence. 10.2. In the case of Ram Janam Singh Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1994) 1 SCR 316 it has been laid down that the date of entry into service is relevant factor for consideration of seniority. The following is the observation made in the said reported case: 'It is now almost settled that seniority of an officer in service is determined with reference to the date of his entry in the service, which will be consistent with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Of course, if the circumstances so require a group of persons, can be treated a class separate from the rest, for any preferential or beneficial treatment while fixing their seniority. But, whether such group of persons belong to a special class for any special treatment, in matters of seniority, has to be decided on objective consideration and on taking into account relevant factors which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ' 10.3. This Court takes note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 . After examining a catena of decisions on the question whether similarly situated Government employees should be granted the benefit of an order passed by a Court in another case, had examined the issue in the context of discrimination and equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 . After examining a catena of decisions on the question whether similarly situated Government employees should be granted the benefit of an order passed by a Court in another case, had examined the issue in the context of discrimination and equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution. Reference therein was made to the principles of delay and laches. In the said context, an issue also arose as to whether the Government, being an ideal employer, in fairness, should grant similar relief to other similarly situated employees. Elucidating aforesaid aspect, it was held as under: '20. The Court also quoted the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England (para 911, p. 395): (U.P. Jal Nigam Vrs. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 ): '12. *** 'In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though, not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. ' ***' *** 22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service .jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma Vrs. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. ' 10.4. ' 10.4. Such being the legal propositions propounded by the Court, in the instant case, the petitioner having not proffered any explanation with respect to delay in approaching the learned Tribunal to question his position in the seniority list vis-a-vis antedating his appointment to be made effective since 1997 instead of 2004, the parity claimed with those of the twenty-four candidates stated to have been given appointment in the year 1997 in connection with Recruitment Examination held during the year 1992 in response to advertisement of 1990, cannot be extended. Element of fraud or misguidance perceived by this Court on THE AVAILABLE MATERIAL ON RECORD: 11. The following text is reproduced as enumerated by the petitioner at paragraph 6.2 of the petition: 'That the application having qualification of M.A. and in pursuance of advertisement issued by the Collector, Balasore in the undivided Balasore Distirct in the year 1990 for filling up sixty-six posts of Junior Clerk applied for the said post as he is eligible in all respect. The said advertisement was published in the daily newspaper 'The Samaja' of dated 22.10.1990. *** The copies of the Advertisement dated 22.10.1990 and the Select List dated 17.09.1997 are annexed herewith as Annexures-1 and 2.' 11.1. Perusal of Annexure-1, as enclosed to the petition by the petitioner, it is apparent that the advertisement bears the date 01.06.1999', but not 22.10.1990'. It is unascertainable whether the same was published in the daily newspaper 'The Samaja'. Assuming the same to be true as asserted by the petitioner on 'Verification', careful reading of the text of said Annexure-1 would reveal that by way of advertisement dated 01.06.1999, applications were invited from eligible candidates 'for the post Junior Clerk in scale of pay of Rs.3050-753950-80-4590/- per month for all the District Offices and Offices Sub-ordinate thereto in the Revenue District of Bhadrak'. 11.2. It is, thus, apparent that the petitioner has made attempt to misguide and misdirect the process of the Court. It appears the petitioner has made attempt to demonstrate by misrepresenting the fact that the advertisement in response to which he had appeared in the Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992 did publish sixty-six vacancy position of Junior Clerks in the district of Balasore in the year 1990. It appears the petitioner has made attempt to demonstrate by misrepresenting the fact that the advertisement in response to which he had appeared in the Recruitment Examination held in the year 1992 did publish sixty-six vacancy position of Junior Clerks in the district of Balasore in the year 1990. It is apt to quote from the counter of the opposite parties that 'It is a fact that advertisement for recruitment of Junior Clerks for undivided Balasore district was published on dated 22.10.1990. But the vacancy position was not reflected in the advertisement'. 11.3. Be that as it may, from the present petition itself it appears from the documents enclosed by the petitioner, it was given to understand that sixty-six numbers of vacancies in the post of Junior Clerk was published in the newspaper- 'The Samaja'- dated 22.10.1990, but no document to this effect has been furnished by the petitioner. This Court is, therefore, constrained to observe that withholding vital document relevant for adjudication of the lis does tantamount to playing fraud on Court. 11.4. It is pertinent to have reference to the proposition contained in Badami Vrs. Bhali, (2012) 6 SCR 75 , which reads thus: '21. In the said case [S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vrs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1994 SC 853 ] it was clearly stated that the Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties and one who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. A litigant who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If a vital document is withheld in order to gain advantage on the other side he would be guilty of playing fraud on Court as well as on the opposite party.' 11.5 An Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar Vrs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 7 SCC 605 it was held that: 'Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the Court. Although, negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (see, Gowrishankar Vrs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 and S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 = (1994) 1 SCC 1 ).' 11.6. Although, negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (see, Gowrishankar Vrs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 and S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 = (1994) 1 SCC 1 ).' 11.6. Regard may be had to the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Oswal Fats and Oils Limited Vrs. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly, (2010) 5 SCR 927 with respect to requirement of correct disclosure of facts in order to be granted with relief sought for: '15. It is settled law that a person who approaches the Court for grant of relief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn obligation to candidly disclose all the material/important facts which have bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in the case. In other words, he owes a duty to the Court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/ suppressing any material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the Court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such person. In one of the earliest decisions on the subject i.e., R. Vrs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, (1917) 1 KB 486, Viscount Reading, Chief Justice of the Divisional Court observed: 'Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the applicant was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit. ' 16. The above extracted observations were approved by the Court of Appeal in the following words: 'It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction: and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any facts which he has omitted to bring forward. If an applicant does not act with uberrima fides and put every material fact before the Court it will not grant him an injunction, even though, there might be facts upon which the injunction might be granted. ' His Lordship rightly pronounced: 'The Court, for its own protection, is entitled to say: We refuse this writ ... without going into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant in bringing the case before us.' Warrington, L.J. was also of the same opinion. In a concurring judgment His Lordship observed: 'It is perfectly well settled that a person who makes an ex parte application to the Court- that is to say, in absence of the person who will be affected by that which the Court is asked to do- is under an obligation to the Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge, and if he does not make that fullest possible disclosure, then he cannot obtain any advantage from the proceedings, and he will be deprived of any advantage he may have already obtained by means of the order which has thus wrongly been obtained by him. ' *** 17. ' *** 17. This Court and different High Courts have repeatedly invoked and applied the rule that a person who does not disclose all material facts has no right to be heard on the merits of his grievance. State of Haryana Vrs. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 431 , Vijay Kumar Kathuria Vrs. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 333 , Welcome Hotel and others Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc., (1983) 4 SCC 575, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by LRs. Vrs. Government of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261 , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vrs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs., (1994) 1 SCC 1 , Agricultural and Processed Food Products Vrs. Oswal Agro Furanes, (1996) 4 SCC 297 , Union of India Vrs. Muneesh Suneja, (2001) 3 SCC 92 , Prestige Lights Ltd. Vrs. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 , Sunil Poddar Vrs. Union Bank of India, (2008) 2 SCC 326 , K.D. Sharma Vrs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayshree Vrs. Bhagwandas S. Patel, (2009) 3 SCC 141 and C.A. No. 5239/2002: Dalip Singh Vrs. State of U.P. and others, decided on 03.12.2009 = (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 18. In Hari Narain Vrs. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 , this Court revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making following observations: 'It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. ' 19. In Dalip Singh's case, the appellant's grievance was that before finalizing the case under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, the prescribed authority did not give notice to the tenure holder Shri Praveen Singh (predecessor of the appellant). On a scrutiny of the records, this Court found that the prescribed authority had issued notice to Shri Praveen Singh, which was duly served upon him and held that the appellant is not entitled to relief because he did not approach the High Court with clean hands inasmuch as he made a misleading statement in the writ petition giving an impression that the tenure holder did not know of the proceedings initiated by the prescribed authority. The preface and paragraph 21 of that judgment read as under: 'For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e., 'Satya' (truth) and 'Ahimsa' (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court proceedings. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court proceedings. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that in this case efforts to mislead the authorities and the Courts have transmitted through, three generations and the conduct of the appellant and his son to mislead the High Court and this Court cannot, but be treated as reprehensible. They belong to the category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed in polluting the course of justice. Therefore, we do not find any justification to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the appellant's prayer for setting aside the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority.' ***' 11.7. The conspectus of District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram Vrs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655 ; Union of India Vrs. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 100; Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vrs. Girdharilal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325 ; State of Maharashtra Vrs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar, (2007) 1 SCC 80 ; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vrs. Coal Tar Refining Company, (2007) 8 SCC 110 = AIR 2007 SC 2798 ; and Mohammed Ibrahim Vrs. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 ) lays emphatically that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit cannot be extended to the persons whose action before the Court was devised to play fraud and derive benefit out of it by making misrepresentation. In such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. 11.8. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 ) lays emphatically that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit cannot be extended to the persons whose action before the Court was devised to play fraud and derive benefit out of it by making misrepresentation. In such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. 11.8. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression 'fraud' involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Reference may be had to Dr. Vimla Vrs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 ; Indian Bank. Vrs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 ; State of Andhra Pradesh Vrs. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 = AIR 2005 SC 3110 ; Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vrs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir, (2008) 13 SCC 170 . 11.9. It is trite that he who seeks equity must do equity. Said principle can be noticed in the case of Arunima Baruah Vrs. Union of India, (2007) 5 SCR 904 , wherein the following observation has been made: '13. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 16, pages 874-876, the law is stated in the following terms: '1303. He who seeks equity must do equity. In granting relief peculiar to its own jurisdiction a court of equity acts upon the rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. By this it is not meant that the court can impose arbitrary conditions upon a plaintiff simply because he stands in that position on the record. The rule means that a man who comes to seek, the aid of a Court of equity to enforce a claim must be prepared to submit in such proceedings to any directions which the known principles of a court of equity may make it proper to give; he must do justice as to the matters in respect of which the assistance of equity is asked. In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed. *** 1305. In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed. *** 1305. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A Court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject matter of the litigation has been improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim hie who has committed iniquity shall not have equity', and relief was refused where a transaction was based on the plaintiff's fraud or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a security improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy for a breach of trust which he had himself procured and whereby he had obtained money. Later it was said that the plaintiff in equity must come with perfect propriety of conduct, or with clean hands. In application of the principle a person will not be allowed to assert his title to property which he has dealt with so as to defeat his creditors or evade tax, for he may not maintain an action by setting up his own fraudulent design. The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor deprives him of his right to equitable relief notwithstanding his disability. Where the transaction is itself unlawful it is not necessary to have recourse to this principle. In equity, just as at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by reason of the plaintiffs demerits. ' [See also Snell's Equity, Thirtieth Edition, Pages SO-32 and Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) and Ors. Vrs. Pushpa Devi Sarafand Ors., [2006] 7 SCC 756]. 11.10. In K.D. Sharma Vrs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 10 SCR 454 , it has been articulated as follows: '26. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. 11.10. In K.D. Sharma Vrs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 10 SCR 454 , it has been articulated as follows: '26. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating 'We will not listen to your application because of what you have done'. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. 27. In R. Vrs. General Income Tax Commissioners for Kensington, Ex Parle Polignac, (1917) 1 KB 486 = 86 LJ KB 257 = 116 LT 136 Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: 'Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the applicant was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit. ' 28. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit. ' 28. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick, and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to dis close (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, 'the Court knows law but not facts'. 29. If the primary object as highlighted in R. Vrs. General Income Tax Commissioners for Kensington, Ex Parle Polignac, (1917) 1 KB 486 = 86 LJ KB 257 = 116 LT 136 is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the Court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.' 11.11. It is pertinent to refer to Kishore Samrite Vrs. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.' 11.11. It is pertinent to refer to Kishore Samrite Vrs. State of U.P., (2013) 2 SCC 398 , wherein it has been held as follows: '32. With the passage of time, it has been realised that people used to feel proud to tell the truth, in the Courts, irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in all cases. The Court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is the foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the Courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to become active seekers of truth.. To enable the Courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with.. The parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant must approach the Court with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of the Court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the Court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs. 33. The party not approaching the Court with clean hands would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the Court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. While approaching the Court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. A litigant is bound to make 'full and true disclosure of facts'. (Refer : Tilokchand H.B. Motichand Vrs. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 ; A. Shanmugam Vrs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, (2012) 6 SCC 430 ; Chandra Shashi Vrs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 ; Abhyudya Sanstha Vrs. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 145 ; State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 ; Kalyaneshwari Vrs. Union of India, (2011)3 SCC 287 ). 34. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of the Court should not become a source of abuse of the process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the Court with clean hands. *** 36. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) V.K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 ).' 11.12 . In Vijay Syal Vrs. Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) V.K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 ).' 11.12 . In Vijay Syal Vrs. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed thus: 'In order to sustain and maintain sanctity and solemnity of the proceedings in law Courts it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly, inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit at the hands of the Court, when a Court is considered as a place where truth and justice are the solemn pursuits. If any party attempts to pollute such a place by adopting recourse to make misrepresentation and is concealing material facts it does so at its risk and cost. Such party must be ready to take consequences that follow on account of its own making. At times lenient or liberal or generous treatment by Courts in dealing with such matters are either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning proper lesson. Hence there is a compelling need to take serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice. ' 11.13 . It is at this juncture, this Court takes note of the fact, as adumbrated by the opposite parties in the counter, which reads as follows: 'Documents submitted by the applicant at Annexure-1 that Advertisement was issued for filling up 66 posts is purely imaginary, baseless and to misguide the Hon'ble Court. From the Annexure-1 attached with the application it is crystal clear that the Advertisement was published on 01.06.1999 by the Chairman, Board of Examiner & Collector, Bhadrak for the post of Jr. Clerk, 1999 (Bhadrak District). Thus at the initiation submitting false documents the applicant has misguided the Court. It is a fact that the select list was published on 14.5.1997 vide Order No.79/Estt. dated 14.05.1997 for 34 candidates. At the time of advertisement there were 50 number of vacancies in the post of Junior Clerk for undivided Balasore district in the year 1990. Out of the 50 numbers of vacancies, 23 related to Collectorate and its Sub-ordinate Offices and 27 requisitional of vacancies related to other departments. dated 14.05.1997 for 34 candidates. At the time of advertisement there were 50 number of vacancies in the post of Junior Clerk for undivided Balasore district in the year 1990. Out of the 50 numbers of vacancies, 23 related to Collectorate and its Sub-ordinate Offices and 27 requisitional of vacancies related to other departments. Out of 23 vacancies relating to Collectorate and its Subordinate Offices, 9 vacancies were filled up by way of absorption from the panel list made in the year, 1986 pursuant to the Order of Hon'ble Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Odisha, Bhubaneswar in O.A.No.1045 of 1988 and 13 vacancies were filled up under Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme. Thus the vacancy reduced to 1 (One) & further 18 vacancies occurred till 01.04.1993 making total 19 vacancies. As regards 27 vacancies relating to other departments of the district, 12 vacancies were filled up from the previous Recruitment panel of 1986 pursuant to Order of Hon'ble Orissa Administrative Tribunal in the aforesaid O.A. case reducing the vacancy to 15. Hence total vacancy comes to 34 (19 + 15 of other Department) as on 01.04.1993. As such at the time of publication of merit list a merit list of 34 candidates, i.e., equal to the number of vacancies as was drawn up on 14.05.1997 was published. ' 11.14 . As against such objection of the opposite party, the rejoinder filed by the petitioner merely reiterated what had been agitated before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, but there is no denial that the opposite parties have made wrong statement that Annexure-1 as enclosed to the writ petition is to misguide this Court. It is well established canon that 'fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however higher degree of solemnity'; vide, Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) Vrs. Aafloat Textiles India Private Limited, (2009) 11 SCC 18 . 11.15 . Such unclean approach and depravity with which the petitioner has approached the Tribunal/Court tend to contumacious conduct. This writ Court does not, therefore, deem it fit case to show indulgence in the Order of the Collector, Balasore vide Annexure-8 and, thereby suffice it to observe that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for in the present writ petition. Conclusion & decision: 12. This writ Court does not, therefore, deem it fit case to show indulgence in the Order of the Collector, Balasore vide Annexure-8 and, thereby suffice it to observe that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for in the present writ petition. Conclusion & decision: 12. In view of the aforesaid analysis of fact and keeping in view the law laid down by the Courts as referred to supra the writ petition does not deserve consideration and is liable to be dismissed. 12.1. The document enclosed to writ petition does not countenance the factual narration in the pleading. The petitioner has also not disputed or denied in the rejoinder with respect to the objection raised by the opposite parties in the counter. It appears such document is furnished by the petitioner only to misguide this Court to proceed on erroneous notion that the advertisement dated 01.06.1999 is of the year 1990 and such advertisement available at Annexure-1 depicted invitation was made to apply for the post of Junior Clerk having sixty-six vacancies in the district of Balasore. As already observed, the said advertisement at Annexure-1 bearing the date as 01.06.1999', was meant to fill up sixty-six number of vacancies in the district of Bhadrak. 12.2. Be that be, this Court on the basis of factual scenario as discussed above comes to the conclusion that there has been delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Orissa Administrative Tribunal to fix his seniority by antedating his date of appointment in the post of Junior Clerk, as such, the petitioner is not entitled to be granted relief in exercise of power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 12.3. In view of material fact pleaded by the opposite parties in the counter as extracted in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no doubt in mind that number of vacancy was not disclosed in the advertisement published in the year 1990 and the petitioner has misguided this Court by placing reliance on the advisement dated 01.06.1999 by misrepresenting it to be of 22.10.1990'. This Court in view of proposition of law as enunciated by the Court(s) desists from granting relief by issuing writ. 12.4. On the merit of the matter also the petitioner would not succeed, inasmuch as there has been non-joinder of necessary and proper parties, in whose absence no effective adjudication can possibly be made. This Court in view of proposition of law as enunciated by the Court(s) desists from granting relief by issuing writ. 12.4. On the merit of the matter also the petitioner would not succeed, inasmuch as there has been non-joinder of necessary and proper parties, in whose absence no effective adjudication can possibly be made. Further, this Court declines to consider the plea of fixing the date of appointment notionally relating back to the year 1997' instead of 2004' and place his position at appropriate position in the seniority list in order to avail the benefit of pension (full) and other retiral benefits, as doing so would disturb entire staff structure for the reason that since 2009 the petitioner has joined in the promotional post of Senior Clerk. 13. In furtherance to what has been observed above, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner for the inordinate delay in approaching the Tribunal/Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority based on appointments made in the year 1997 vis-a-vis his appointment in 2004, but the representation was submitted in the year 2017. No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. 14. In the aforesaid perspective, this Court declines to interfere with the Order dated 09.02.2018 passed by the Collector, Balasore pursuant to direction vide Order dated 07.11.2017 passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Bhubaneswar in O.A. No. 1809 of 2017. 15. In the result, the writ petition, sans merit, is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to cost.