JUDGMENT : RAKESH MOHAN PANDEY, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred this petition seeking the following reliefs: “10.1. Call for the entire records pertaining to the petitioner for perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash the impugned orders dated 06/09/2016 (Annexure P-1) and 29/03/2017 (Annexure P-2) by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari. 10.3. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondents to treat the petitioner in service for all practical purposes and also direct them to grant all consequential and pecuniary benefits thereof. 10.4. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fir under the facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of the petitioner against the respondents. 10.5. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondents to pay a compensation to the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000 (Rs. Five Lakhs only) for harassing him by reviving the resignation request which was already turned down on 29/03/2016. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to award costs of the proceedings.” 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the petitioner was initially appointed on daily wages as an Assistant in the then Madhya Pradesh State Civil Supplies Corporation on 11.11.1985. After about two years, the services of the petitioner were regularized on the said post vide order dated 10.11.1987 and he was posted at the District Office of the Corporation, Jabalpur. One of the conditions of the order dated 10.11.1987 specifically states that after two years’ service, the petitioner would be entitled to leave the Corporation's services after depositing three months’ salary with the Corporation. Later, the petitioner was promoted to Senior Assistant in the year 1997, Assistant Manager in the year 2013 and to the post of Deputy Manager in the year 2013. Vide letter dated 26.03.2016; the petitioner tendered his resignation via e-mail to the Managing Director of the Corporation citing some personal reasons. After the receipt of the resignation tendered by the petitioner, he was transferred to the Head Office, Raipur vide order dated 29.03.2016. Vide letter dated 26.03.2016; the petitioner tendered his resignation via e-mail to the Managing Director of the Corporation citing some personal reasons. After the receipt of the resignation tendered by the petitioner, he was transferred to the Head Office, Raipur vide order dated 29.03.2016. Thereafter, on 29.03.2016 itself, the petitioner was informed that since his resignation letter was incomplete, was not in the prescribed format, the date was also not specifically mentioned from which he intended to proceed on resignation and he also did not deposit three months’ salary as per the condition of the appointment order, therefore the petitioner was directed to submit his resignation along with the aforesaid requisites. After that, the petitioner never submitted any other resignation request nor did he deposit three months’ salary. 3. Further facts of the case are that vide order dated 20.04.2016, the petitioner was handed over the charge of the Legal Section of the Corporation. Vide order dated 07.05.2016, the petitioner was posted in the establishment of the Corporation. Thereafter, vide letter dated 05.07.2016, the petitioner was asked to deposit three months’ salary in pursuance of his resignation letter dated 26.03.2016. Vide order dated 07.07.2016, the petitioner was given the charge of Districts Sukma and Bijapur as the Area Officer for the purposes of inspection. Thereafter, vide impugned order dated 06.09.2016 the resignation request was accepted by the Corporation which was already turned down by the authorities on 29.03.2016. Again, vide letter dated 16.09.2016, the petitioner was asked to deposit three months’ salary for taking further action. On 11.08.2016, the petitioner made a representation and requested the authorities to adjust three months' salary from his dues/salary but when no action was taken, he made a representation on 13.10.2016 for cancellation of acceptance of his resignation. Thereafter, he again requested for reconsideration of his resignation on 30.01.2017, 03.03.2017 and 09.03.2017. 4. Vide the impugned order/letter dated 29.03.2017 the representation/request for cancellation of the acceptance of resignation moved by the petitioner was rejected stating that his resignation has been accepted vide Agenda No. 56.11 (3) on the 56th meeting of the Board of Directors held on 11.08.2016 and there are no rules that provide for reinstatement in service after acceptance of resignation. The petitioner has assailed the orders dated 06.09.2016 and 29.03.2017 in the instant petition. 5. Mr. The petitioner has assailed the orders dated 06.09.2016 and 29.03.2017 in the instant petition. 5. Mr. Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently argued that the orders impugned are absolutely illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, and irrational and have been issued without application of mind. He further argued that once the respondent authorities had turned down the resignation request of the petitioner on 29.03.2016, there was no reason or occasion for the authority to revive it again and accept the same. He also argued that the petitioner did not fulfill the Condition No. 6 of the appointment order dated 10.11.1987 whereby the petitioner was required to deposit three months’ salary, his resignation request was also not in the prescribed format, and the date was also not specifically mentioned from which he intended to proceed on resignation, therefore, the resignation request/letter of the petitioner was incompetent. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the letter dated 11.08.2016 submitted by the petitioner was not actually placed before the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 11.08.2016 itself as the application bears the seal/receiving date of 11/12.08.2016, therefore it is highly improbable that the aforesaid application was placed before the Board of Directors. As regards the aforesaid application dated 11.08.2016, the learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that vide letter dated 16.09.2016, the petitioner was again asked to deposit three months’ salary immediately i.e. after the acceptance of the resignation request of the petitioner. He also stated that such an act of the respondents/Corporation was to hide its illegal act of acceptance of the resignation request of the petitioner. He thus prayed that the impugned orders dated 06.09.2016 and 29.03.2017 may kindly be quashed and the petitioner may kindly be reinstated in the service with full back wages. 7. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Prabha Atri vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 701 and the order passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Rakesh Kumar Bhartiya vs. Union of India and Another, 2024 SCC Online Del 1621. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Animesh Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 would oppose the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Animesh Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 would oppose the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. He argued that the petitioner submitted a letter on 11.08.2016 referring to earlier letters dated 29.03.2016 and 05.07.2017 whereby he requested to adjust the three months’ salary from his dues/salary for the months of April, 2016; July, 2016 and August, 2016. The petitioner further requested to accept his resignation with effect from 1st September, 2016. He also argued that upon receipt of the aforesaid application, the same was placed before the Board of Directors of the Corporation in the 51st meeting held on 11.08.2016 and vide agenda No. 51.5, after due consideration, the resignation tendered by the petitioner was accepted with effect from 11.07.2016. He further contended that the application submitted by the petitioner for resignation was duly considered and decided by the respondents/Corporation as per the approval of the Board of Directors, thus there is no illegality or arbitrariness in the same. As regards the representation submitted by the petitioner for cancellation of the acceptance of the resignation, he contended that the representation of the petitioner was duly placed before the Board of Directors of the Corporation in its meeting held on 21.03.2017 vide agenda No. 56.11 (3) and after due consideration, the same was rejected. In this regard, a communication dated 29.03.2017 was sent to the petitioner. He further submitted that after submission of the application dated 26.03.2016, the petitioner submitted the application dated 11.08.2016 in reference to the orders/letters dated 29.03.2016 and 05.07.2016 where the petitioner stated in unequivocal terms that his resignation be accepted with effect from 1st September, 2016 and the three months’ salary be adjusted from the dues/salary of the petitioner. He also submitted that thus the respondents/Corporation have duly acted upon the application of the petitioner after obtaining approval from the Board of Directors of the Corporation. He lastly stated that the instant petition preferred by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed. 9. Ms. Sonkar, the learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would state that the dispute involved in the present petition is between the petitioner and the Corporation and the State is a formal party. 10. Indisputably, the petitioner tendered his resignation out of some personal and family issues on 26.03.2016 which was turned down on 29.03.2016 by respondent No. 4. Ms. Sonkar, the learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would state that the dispute involved in the present petition is between the petitioner and the Corporation and the State is a formal party. 10. Indisputably, the petitioner tendered his resignation out of some personal and family issues on 26.03.2016 which was turned down on 29.03.2016 by respondent No. 4. Vide a separate order dated 29.03.2016; respondent No. 4 transferred the services of the petitioner from District Balrampur to Headquarters, Raipur. Vide order dated 29.03.2016, the resignation request submitted by the petitioner was turned down by respondent No. 4 on the ground that the resignation application/request was not in the prescribed format, did not contain the date from which the petitioner intended to proceed on resignation and also was not accompanied with 3 months’ salary as provided under Condition No. 6 of the appointment order dated 10.11.1987. The petitioner was advised to revive his resignation request after fulfilling the aforesaid requisites, though the petitioner never submitted any request/application afresh. Thereafter, the petitioner was handed over the charge of the Legal Section of the Corporation on 20.04.2016. On 07.05.2016, the petitioner was posted in the establishment of the Corporation from the Legal Section. 11. Vide order dated 05.07.2016, respondent No. 4 directed the petitioner to deposit three months’ salary pursuant to his resignation request dated 26.03.2016. It is pertinent to note here the fact that when the petitioner’s application dated 26.03.2016 was already turned down on account of incompetency of the application/request; there was no reason for respondent No. 4 to direct the petitioner to deposit three months’ salary. After that, on 07.07.2016, the petitioner was given the charge of the Districts Sukma and Bijapur as Area Officer (Deputy Manager). On 11.08.2016, the petitioner submitted a letter referring to earlier letters dated 29.03.2016 and 05.07.2016 whereby he requested to adjust the three months’ salary from his dues/salary for the months of April, 2016; July, 2016 and August, 2016 and sought resignation w.e.f. 1st September, 2016. 12. On 11.08.2016, the petitioner submitted a letter referring to earlier letters dated 29.03.2016 and 05.07.2016 whereby he requested to adjust the three months’ salary from his dues/salary for the months of April, 2016; July, 2016 and August, 2016 and sought resignation w.e.f. 1st September, 2016. 12. Surprisingly, the resignation request of the petitioner was accepted by the respondents/ Corporation vide order dated 06.09.2016 which was effective from 11.07.2016 even though the petitioner neither submitted the application/request in the prescribed format nor deposited three months’ salary, though vide letter dated 11.08.2016 he specified the date from which he intended to proceed on resignation, meaning thereby the stale resignation request/application of the petitioner dated 26.03.2016 was revived by the respondents/ Corporation and was accepted from a date other than prescribed by the petitioner vide his letter dated 11.08.2016. Even it is very much clear from the record that the letter dated 11.08.2016 submitted by the petitioner was actually not placed before the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 11.08.2016 itself. Thereafter, vide letter dated 16.09.2016 the petitioner was again directed to deposit 3 months’ salary. 13. In Dr. Prabha Atri (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that “To constitute a ‘resignation’ it must be unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office.” It reads thus: 7. The only question that mainly requires to be considered is as to whether the letter dated 9-1-1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably. Rule 9 of the Hospital Service Rules provided for resignation or abandonment of service by an employee. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to give three months' notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority or three months' salary in lieu of notice and that he/she may be required to serve the period for such notice. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to give three months' notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority or three months' salary in lieu of notice and that he/she may be required to serve the period for such notice. In case of non-compliance with the above, the employee concerned is not only liable to pay an amount equal to three months' salary but such amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of the employee lying with the hospital. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) Vol. 37, at p. 476, it is found stated that: “To constitute a ‘resignation’ it must be unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office.” At p. 474 of the very same book, it is found stated: “Statements by club's President and corresponding Secretary that they would resign, if constant bickering among members did not cease, constituted merely threatened offers, not tenders, of their resignations.” It is also stated therein that “A ‘resignation’ of a public office to be effective must be made with an intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment.” In the ordinary dictionary sense, the word “resignation” was considered to mean the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right, as conveyed by the maxim: Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn.). In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77, p. 311, it is found stated: “It has been said that ‘resignation’ is a term of legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under duress and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position.” 8. It is characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under duress and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position.” 8. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214 this Court had an occasion to consider the nature and character of a letter written by one of the petitioners in that case who after stating in the letter that he has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal of his grievance, yet justice has not been done to him and “as such, after showing so much patience in the matter, I am sorry to decide that I should resign from the membership of the Faculty in protest against such a treatment and against the discrimination and victimization shown to me by the Head of the Division in the allotment of students of 1968 and 1969 batches and departmental candidates.” (SCC p. 172, Para 34) In that context, this Court observed that the callous and heartless attitude of the Academic Council in seizing an opportunity to get rid of him by treating the said letter to be a letter of resignation when really he was all along making representations seeking justice to him and out of exasperation the said person wrote that letter stating that the only honourable course left open to him was to resign rather than suffer (SCC p. 173, Para 34). In Moti Ram vs. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725 this Court observed as hereunder: (SCC pp. 735-736, Para 16) “16. As pointed out by this Court ‘resignation’ means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. [See: Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in praesenti. A resignation may also be prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g., acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and the conditions governing it.” 10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, in the light of the materials and principles, noticed supra. This is not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated 9-1-1999 could be treated or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to sever her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a “resignation” it must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a “resignation” it must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214 it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9-1-1999 does not seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being scrapped as a sequel to her so-called resignation. The words “with immediate effect” in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the hospital took up such action forthwith, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on 9-1-1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case reported in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214 the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9-1-1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the writ petition. 14. To constitute a ‘resignation’ it must be unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office. 14. To constitute a ‘resignation’ it must be unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office. ‘Resignation’ means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in praesenti. 15. In Rakesh Kumar Bhartiya (supra), a division bench of the Delhi High Court more or less on somewhat under similar circumstances observed and held as under: 23. In the case in hand, for the reasons best known to the respondents they did not act upon the resignation request and rather directed the petitioner to submit application afresh while mentioning specific date from which he intended to proceed on resignation and also asked him that such application should reach them 30 days before to the intended date of resignation so as to process the resignation case with MHA in time. 24. As noted already, the petitioner did not choose to submit any application afresh. He rather decided to continue in service and made twin request i.e. personal hearing from DG, Sashastra Seema Bal, and also transfer on compassionate grounds. 25. In such a peculiar backdrop, the respondents were estopped from taking any further action, unless they had received a fresh request. Thus, they had no reason/cause to process his previous application which had, obviously, become stale and non-est. 25. In such a peculiar backdrop, the respondents were estopped from taking any further action, unless they had received a fresh request. Thus, they had no reason/cause to process his previous application which had, obviously, become stale and non-est. Such action of respondents is, therefore, totally impermissible in the eyes of law. 26. Things would have been different had the respondents, in their communication, stated that in case no fresh application was received, they would process the previous one. 27. Moreover, the earlier resignation request, being turned down, albeit, for want of certain particulars, it was no longer obligatory for the petitioner to have submitted any formal application seeking withdrawal of his resignation request. 16. In the present case, for the reasons best known to the respondents/Corporation, they did not act upon the resignation request and rather directed the petitioner to submit the application afresh in the prescribed format while mentioning the specific date from which he intended to proceed on resignation and also asked him to deposit three months’ salary. As observed earlier, the petitioner did not choose to submit any application afresh. He was rather transferred to various places and given different responsibilities. The petitioner was asked twice to deposit his three months’ salary, firstly, before the acceptance of his resignation request, and lastly, after the acceptance of his resignation. The petitioner wrote a letter dated 11.08.2016 to adjust his salary from his dues/salary but the same was never taken into consideration by the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 11.08.2016 as is evident from a perusal of the record. Even otherwise, had the above application been placed before the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 11.08.2016, the scenario would not have changed. 17. Under such circumstances, the respondents/Corporation were estopped from taking any further action, unless they had received a fresh resignation request. Thus, they had no reason/cause to proceed with the petitioner’s previous application which had, obviously, become stale and non-est. Such an action of the respondents/Corporation is, therefore, totally impermissible in the eyes of the law. Also, the respondents/Corporation did not specify that no fresh application is required further from the petitioner’s end. Moreover, the earlier resignation request, being turned down, albeit, for want of certain particulars, it was no longer obligatory for the petitioner to have submitted any formal application seeking withdrawal/cancellation of his resignation. 18. Also, the respondents/Corporation did not specify that no fresh application is required further from the petitioner’s end. Moreover, the earlier resignation request, being turned down, albeit, for want of certain particulars, it was no longer obligatory for the petitioner to have submitted any formal application seeking withdrawal/cancellation of his resignation. 18. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case in hand and the proposition of law laid down by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Rakesh Kumar Bhartiya (supra), in the considered opinion of this Court, the orders dated 06/09/2016 (Annexure P-1) and 29/03/2017 (Annexure P-2) issued by respondent No. 4 are liable to be and are hereby quashed/set-aside. 19. It is informed by Mr. Paranjpe, learned counsel for the petitioner that around 10 months are still left for the petitioner to serve the Corporation; therefore, the petitioner is reinstated in service with full back wages. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits attached to his post. The respondents/Corporation are directed to comply with this order within a period of 45 days. 20. As a result, the instant petition is hereby allowed.