JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Akhilesh Chandra Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Sudhir Kumar Chandraul, learned AGA for the State and perused the record. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No.1036 of 2014 (State Vs. Yashpal Chail and others) under sections 18/27 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Muzaffar Nagar pending in the Court of C.J.M., Muzaffarnagar. 3. Facts of the case are that a complaint under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short "Drugs and Cosmetics Act") was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar on 25.02.2014 alleging that while discharging official duties the complainant took samples of three drugs for test and analysis from the premises of M/s Kumar Medicine Distributors and the Government Analyst vide report dated 09.07.2013 declared that the sample of the drug was not of standard quality. For ready reference relevant portion of the report is quoted hereunder:- "Sample No.-GS/MZN/2013/Jan/07 Ofloxacin Tablets I.P. (Eloflox-200) B. No.-B123445, M/D-11/2012, E/D-10/2014, Mfd by - M/s Elmac Remedies Pvt. Ltd., Plot No.-202-3, Vill - Kotha, Post Lalitpur, Kichha Road, Rudrapur, Uttrakhand. "The sample does not conform to the declared formula in respect of Assay." Assa- Content of Ofloxacin 81.56%w/w/ of the stated amount of drug in each tablet of average weight which is less than the minimum I.P. limit of 90% w/w." 4. On being asked he stated that he has purchased medicines from the distributor, M/s Onida Health Care, C-7, Meerut Road, Industrial Estate Ghaziabad and on being asked from this distributor, it was informed that the medicines were manufactured by M/s Elmac Remedies Private Limited. 5. After investigation was completed, the report along with the recommendation of the Drug Licensing Authority was filed. Since there was a breach of Section 18A of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the complaint under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, who took cognizance on the complaint and issued summons on 27.02.2014 against the accused including the applicant. 6. Since there was a breach of Section 18A of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the complaint under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, who took cognizance on the complaint and issued summons on 27.02.2014 against the accused including the applicant. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that, the show cause notice was sent to the manufacturing company on 23.08.2013 but no compliance of Section 23 (3), (4) and 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was made as the Drug Inspector was supposed to make four samples, but he failed to do so. For ready reference Section 23 (3), (4) and 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are quoted hereunder:- "Section 23 (3),[Section 23 (3) (4) and Section 25(3) of The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940] Where an Inspector takes a sample of a drug or cosmetic for the purpose of test or analysis, he shall intimate such purpose in writing in the prescribed form to the person from whom he takes it and, in the presence of such person unless he wilfully absents himself, shall divide the sample into four portions and effectively seal and suitably mark the same and permit such person to add his own seal and mark to all or any of the portions so sealed and marked: Provided that where the sample is taken from premises whereon the drug or cosmetic is being manufactured, it shall be necessary to divide the sample into three portions only: Provided further that where the drug or cosmetic is made up in containers of small volume, instead of dividing a sample as aforesaid, the Inspector may, and if the drug or cosmetic be such that it is likely to deteriorate or be otherwise damaged by exposure shall, take three or four, as the case may be, of the said containers after suitably marking the same and, where necessary, sealing them. Section 23 (4) The Inspector shall restore one portion of a sample so divided or one container, as the case may be, to the person from whom he takes it, and shall retain the remainder and dispose of the same as follows:— (i) one portion or container he shall forthwith send to the Government Analyst for test or analysis; (ii) the second he shall produce to the Court before which proceedings, if any, are instituted in respect of the drug or cosmetic; and (iii) the third, where taken, he shall send to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 18A. Section 25(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a Government Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken or the person whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 18A has, within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report." 7. He further submitted that compliance of this provision is mandatory and thus, any complaint without following the aforesaid provisions would be illegal. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the applicant is relying on the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Medicamen Biotech Ltd. & Anr. vs. Rubina Bose, Drug Inspector, AIR 2008 SC 1939 . For ready reference paragraph nos.6, 9 & 10 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder:- "6. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the applicant is relying on the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Medicamen Biotech Ltd. & Anr. vs. Rubina Bose, Drug Inspector, AIR 2008 SC 1939 . For ready reference paragraph nos.6, 9 & 10 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder:- "6. A reading of the aforesaid provisions would reveal that they lay certain obligations as well as provide safeguards for a person from whom a drug has been seized for analysis or testing as Section 25 (3) specifies that unless such a person controverts the correctness of the report submitted by the Government Analyst within 28 days in writing that he intends to adduce evidence to controvert the report of the Analyst, it would be deemed to be conclusive evidence of the quality of the drug whereas sub-section (4) of Section 25 obliges the Magistrate on the request of the complainant or the accused or on in his own motion to send the fourth sample which has been disputed for fresh testing to the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory. It is the case of the appellant that despite the fact that the appellant had repeatedly controverted the accuracy of the report of the Government Analyst the fourth sample had still not been sent to the Director for re-testing and analysis. We find that the argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant had never expressed a desire to controvert the report of the Drug Analyst is not correct as is clear from the letter dated 28th August 2001 addressed to the Assistant Director General, Government Medical Stores Depot in which it was stated as under: "On receipt of your letter, we have got the control sample of same batch analysed from an approved test house, namely Industrial Testing Laboratory, Delhi. The test house has reported our control samples to be of standard quality and conforming to IP with respect to content of Enalapril Maleate. Copy of test report No. F-405/8-01 dt. 25.8.2001 enclosed. In the light of above facts, we do not agree with the Govt. analyst report that the sample is not of standard quality and request you to kindly get the sample retested at your end." 9. Copy of test report No. F-405/8-01 dt. 25.8.2001 enclosed. In the light of above facts, we do not agree with the Govt. analyst report that the sample is not of standard quality and request you to kindly get the sample retested at your end." 9. In Unique Farmaid's case (supra) which was a case under the Insecticides Act which has provisions analogous to Section 25 (4) of the Act, the court found that the accused had indeed made a request to the Inspector for sending the sample for re-testing within the prescribed time limit and as this request had not been accepted an important right given to an accused had been rendered ineffective on which the proceedings could be quashed. This is what the Court had to say: "It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondents in these appeals have been deprived of their valuable right to have the sample tested from the Central Insecticides Laboratory under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act. Under sub-section (3) of Section 24 report signed by the Insecticides Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein and shall be conclusive evidence against the accused only if the accused do not, within 28 days of the receipt of the report, notify in writing to the Insecticide Inspector or the court before which proceedings are pending that they intend to adduce evidence to controvert the report. In the present cases the Insecticides Inspector was notified that the accused intended to adduce evidence to controvert the report. By the time the matter reached the Court, the shelf life of the sample had already expired and no purpose would have been served informing the Court of such an intention. The report of the Insecticide Analyst was, therefore, not conclusive. A valuable right had been conferred on the accused to have the sample tested from the Central Insecticides Laboratory and in the circumstances of the case the accused have been deprived of that right, thus, prejudicing them in their defence. In these circumstances, the High Court was right in concluding that if will be an abuse of the process of the court if the prosecution is continued against the respondents, the accused persons. The High Court rightly quashed the criminal complaint. We uphold the order of the High Court and would dismiss the appeals." 10. In these circumstances, the High Court was right in concluding that if will be an abuse of the process of the court if the prosecution is continued against the respondents, the accused persons. The High Court rightly quashed the criminal complaint. We uphold the order of the High Court and would dismiss the appeals." 10. We find that this judgment helps the case of the appellant rather than that of the respondent because in spite of two communications from the appellant that it intended to adduce evidence to controvert the facts given in the report of the Government Analyst, the fourth sample with the Magistrate had not been sent for re-analysis. The observations in Amery Pharmaceuticals's case (supra) are also to the same effect. We find that the aforesaid interpretation supports the case of the appellants inasmuch they had been deprived of the right to have the fourth sample tested from the Central Drugs Laboratory. It is also clear that the complaint had been filed on the 2nd July 2002 which is about a month short of the expiry date of the drug and as such had the accused appellant appeared before the Magistrate even on 2nd July 2002 it would have been well nigh impossible to get the sample tested before its expiry. In the affidavit filed to the petition by Dr. D. Rao, Deputy Drugs Controller, and in arguments before us, it has been repeatedly stressed that the delay in sending of the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory had occurred as the appellant had avoided service of summons on it till 9th May 2005. This is begging the question. We find that there is no explanation as to why the complaint itself had been filed about a month before the expiry of the shelf life of the drug and concededly the filing of the complaint had nothing to do with the appearance of the accused in response to the notices which were to be issued by the Court after the complaint had been filed. Likewise, we observe that the requests for retesting of the drug had been made by the appellant in August/September 2001 as would be clear from the facts already given above and there is absolutely no reason as to why the complaint could not have been filed earlier and the fourth sample sent for retesting well within time. Likewise, we observe that the requests for retesting of the drug had been made by the appellant in August/September 2001 as would be clear from the facts already given above and there is absolutely no reason as to why the complaint could not have been filed earlier and the fourth sample sent for retesting well within time. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the facts of the case suggest that the appellants have been deprived of a valuable right under Section 25 (3) and 25 (4) of the Act which must necessitate the quashing of the proceedings against them." 8. Next argument of learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant was not the director of the company at the relevant time (when the drug/medicine was manufactured or supplied) as he had tendered his resignation from the post of directorship of the company on 14.06.2009, which is evident from form-32, hence, he is not responsible for any act done by the company. Further, it cannot be said that the medicines were manufactured while he was director of the company. He further relies on Section 34 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act. For ready reference Section 34 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act is quoted hereunder:- “Section 34 Offences by companies.— (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section— (a) “company” means a body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director” in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm.” 9. Relying on the above-mentioned Section, learned counsel for the applicant submits that only those persons, who at the time of offence was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 10. He further submits that if there is no allegation against the accused-director averred in the complaint, in absence of the same no prosecution can be initiated against such director. To buttress his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgement of Hon'ble Apext Court in State of Rajasthan v. Cadila Health Care Limited, AIR 2018 OnLine 211, relevant paragraphs of which are quoted hereunder:- "2. As regards the second ground which commended to the High Court, the law is well settled. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Medicamen Bioteh Limited and another vs. Rubina Bose, Drug Inspector, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 196 and also in Amery Pharmaceuticals and another vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2001) 4 SCC 382 . It is held in these decisions that the manufacturer should be afforded an opportunity to controvert the correctness of the Government Analyst's report and if objection is raised by the manufacturer within 28 days specified under Section 25 (3) of the Act, the preserved sample is required to be forwarded to the Central Drugs Laboratory for its independent report in terms of Section 25 (4) of the Act. That is a valuable right of the manufacturer. 5. That is a valuable right of the manufacturer. 5. Even on the first ground which weighed with the High Court, we find merit therein, as no averment in the complaint has been brought to our notice, which would even remotely suggest the involvement of the private respondents as in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the Company as such." 11. He further placed reliance on the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Cheminova India Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 2021 OnLine (SC) 473, relevant paragraphs of which are quoted hereunder:- "6. Learned Counsel for the appellants by referring to Section 33 of the Act has submitted that appellants have already filed an undertaking dated 22.01.2013 before the respondents, nominating the incharge and responsible officers of the Company to maintain quality of the pesticides manufactured by the Company along with the resolution of the Company’s meeting held on 28.12.2012. Learned Counsel has submitted that by making vague and bald allegations, the appellants, who were the Company and the Managing Director, are also sought to be prosecuted. 6(a). It is submitted that unless there is a clear and categorical averment in the complaint, indicating the role played by the appellants, there cannot be any vicarious liability on the 1st Appellant – Company and the 2nd Appellant–Managing Director for commission of the alleged offence. In support of his arguments, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Managing Director, Castrol India Limited vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., and also another judgment of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia vs. State of NCT of Delhi. 6(b). It is also further contended by the learned Counsel that before taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint, learned Magistrate has not followed the procedure, contemplated under Section 24 (4) of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that though, the 2018 (17) SCC 275 2019 (17) SCC 193 appellants are not residing within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, without making proper inquiry and ordering investigation, cognizance of the offence is taken. Further, it is submitted that the prosecution against the appellants, is nothing but abuse of the process of law. It is submitted that though, the 2018 (17) SCC 275 2019 (17) SCC 193 appellants are not residing within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, without making proper inquiry and ordering investigation, cognizance of the offence is taken. Further, it is submitted that the prosecution against the appellants, is nothing but abuse of the process of law. The High Court has not considered various grounds raised by the appellants in proper perspective and dismissed their application for quashing the complaint. In support of his argument that the Magistrate has not followed the procedure under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2 of 2020). 19. Section 33 of the Act deals with ‘offences by companies’. A reading of Section 33 (1) of the Act, makes it clear that whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of, the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that on behalf of the 1st Appellant – Company, 2nd Appellant – Managing Director has furnished an undertaking dated 22.01.2013, indicating that Shri Madhukar R. Gite, Manager of the Company, has been nominated in the resolution passed by the Company on 28.12.2012 to be in charge of and responsible to the said Company, to maintain the quality of the pesticides manufactured by the said Company and he was authorized to exercise all such powers and to take all such steps, as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission of any offence under the Act. Filing of such undertaking with the respondent is not disputed. Even, at Para 5.10 in the counter affidavit filed before this Court, it is pleaded by the Respondents that by appointing persons responsible for affairs of the Company, quality control, etc., 2nd Appellant – Managing Director cannot escape his liability from offences committed by 1st Appellant – Company. Filing of such undertaking with the respondent is not disputed. Even, at Para 5.10 in the counter affidavit filed before this Court, it is pleaded by the Respondents that by appointing persons responsible for affairs of the Company, quality control, etc., 2nd Appellant – Managing Director cannot escape his liability from offences committed by 1st Appellant – Company. In view of the specific provision in the Act dealing with the offences by companies, which fixes the responsibility and the responsible person of the Company for conduct of its business, by making bald and vague allegations, 2nd Appellant – Managing Director cannot be prosecuted on vague allegation that he being the Managing Director of the 1st Appellant – Company, is overall responsible person for the conduct of the business of the Company and of quality control, etc. In the instant case, the Company has passed a resolution, fixing responsibility of one of the Managers namely Mr. Madhukar R. Gite by way of a resolution and the same was furnished to the respondents by the 2nd Appellant in shape of an undertaking on 22.01.2013. When furnishing of such undertaking fixing the responsibility of the quality control of the products is not in dispute, there is no reason or justification for prosecuting the 2nd Appellant – Managing Director, on the vague and spacious plea that he was the Managing Director of the Company at the relevant time. A reading of Section 33 of the Act also makes it clear that only responsible person of the Company, as well as the Company alone shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against. Though, the Managing Director is overall incharge of the affairs of the company, whether such officer is to be prosecuted or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of law. Having regard to specific provision under Section 33 of the Act, and the undertaking filed in the present case, respondent cannot prosecute the 2nd Appellant herein. Thus, we find force in the contention of Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, that allowing the prosecution against 2nd Appellant – Managing Director is nothing but, abuse of the process of law. At the same time, we do not find any ground at this stage to quash the proceedings against the 1st Appellant – Company" 12. Thus, we find force in the contention of Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, that allowing the prosecution against 2nd Appellant – Managing Director is nothing but, abuse of the process of law. At the same time, we do not find any ground at this stage to quash the proceedings against the 1st Appellant – Company" 12. He further submits that the Magistrate while issuing summons has failed to apply its mind as the impugned order is non-speaking order and the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2015 SC 923 deprecated this practice where the summons are being issued in most mechanical manner without applying mind, relevant paragraphs of which are quoted hereunder:- "39. When the company is the offendor, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada (supra), the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one direction namely where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. This very principle is elaborated in various other judgments. We have already taken note of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (supra) and S.K. Alagh (supra). Few other judgments reiterating this principle are the following: 1. Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat “9. This very principle is elaborated in various other judgments. We have already taken note of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (supra) and S.K. Alagh (supra). Few other judgments reiterating this principle are the following: 1. Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat “9. With due respect what the High Court seems to have missed is that in a case like this where there was serious defalcation of the properties of the Sangh, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the dual charges particularly against the appellant (A-1). 47. However, the words “sufficient grounds for proceeding” appearing in the Section are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set-aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex-facie incorrect. 48. However, there has to be a proper satisfaction in this behalf which should be duly recorded by the Special Judge on the basis of material on record. No such exercise is done. In this scenario, having regard to the aforesaid aspects coupled with the legal position explained above, it is difficult to sustain the impugned order dated 19.03.2013 in its present form insofar as it relates to implicating the appellants and summoning them as accused persons. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013 filed by Mr. Sunil Bharti Mittal and Ravi Ruia respectively are, accordingly, allowed and order summoning these appellants is set aside. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.3326-3327 of 2013 filed by Telecom Watchdog are dismissed." 13. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013 filed by Mr. Sunil Bharti Mittal and Ravi Ruia respectively are, accordingly, allowed and order summoning these appellants is set aside. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.3326-3327 of 2013 filed by Telecom Watchdog are dismissed." 13. To further buttress his argument, learned counsel for the applicant relied on the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in Mehmood Ul Rehman, AIR 2015 SC 2195 wherein it has been held there must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 Cr.P.C., if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C., by issuing process for appearance. The application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Birla Corporation Limited vs. Adventz Investments and Holdings Limited and others, AIR 2019 SC (Criminal) 1025 has held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The application of mind has to be indicated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. Considering the duties on the part of the Magistrate for issuance of summons to accused in a complaint case and that there must be sufficient indication as to the application of mind and observing that the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of the complaint. 14. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that the summons have been issued in a very mechanical manner without considering the fact that the applicant, who has resigned way back in 2009. 15. Per contra, learned AGA appears and submits that the complainant was competent to lodge the complaint as per Act and after taking the sample one sample was handed over to the shop keeper and the second sample was sent for testing. He further submits that the averment of non-compliance of Section 23(4) and 25(3) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act was not taken in the pleadings. He further submits that the averment of non-compliance of Section 23(4) and 25(3) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act was not taken in the pleadings. He further submits that the drug was of sub-standard, which would cause great health hazard to the patients, who are taking the medicine. He further submits that when the show cause notice was issued he did not deny that he is no more a director. He further submits that no letter of any competent authority was placed on record to show that the applicant had resigned as a director. He further submits that the directors are responsible for the conduct and act of the company and also for the sub-standard medicines, which were being manufactured and sold by the company. 16. In reply of the argument made by learned AGA, learned counsel for the applicant submits that it is always open for the applicant to raise any legal issues at any point of time. The provisions of Section 23 (4) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act were not followed, its a pure legal issue and it can be raised at any time. He further submitted that no show cause notice was ever upon the applicant and the same was only served upon the company and the company had informed the Drug Inspector that the applicant was no longer a director of the company. 17. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties. With the able assistance, I have perused the pleadings, affidavits and annexures thereto and the reply filed by concerned parties. 18. The plain reading of Section 23 (3) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act clearly shows that when an Inspector takes a sample of a drug or cosmetic for the purpose of test or analysis, he shall intimate such purpose in writing in the prescribed form to the person from whom he takes it and, in the presence of such person unless he wilfully absents himself, shall divide the sample into four portions and effectively seal and suitably mark the same and permit such person to add his own seal and mark to all or any of the portions so sealed and marked. Section 23 (4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act further lays-down that the Inspector shall restore one portion of the sample to the person from whom he takes and the second sample should be sent to the Government and third should be produced in the Court before which the proceedings are initiated and the fourth would be sent to a person who are defined under Section 18 A of the Act. 19. It is evidently clear that the Inspector while taking the sample has not followed the mandatory provisions of Section 23 (3) and (4) of the Act. Moreover, from the record of the ROC it is clear that the applicant had resigned from the post of directorship of the company, M/S Elmac Remedies Pvt. Ltd. with effect from 01.06.2009. Since the alleged offence is said to have been committed and the samples were collected on 21.01.2013, at that point of time the applicant had nothing to do with the company neither he was involved in the affairs of the company nor was the in-charge or key personnel running the company. The applicant has no difficulty if the prosecution is continued against the company or the directors, who were responsible for the day to day affairs of the company. As far as the applicant is concerned, he was not a director, and hence, cannot be fastened with the liability of the company. 20. Considering the above facts and circumstances, it is clear that the proceeding initiated against the applicant under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is a pure abuse of legal process, and to secure ends of justice the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No.1036 of 2014 (State Vs. Yashpal Chail and others) under Sections 18/27 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Muzaffar Nagar pending in the Court of C.J.M., Muzaffarnagar are hereby quashed. 21. The instant Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.