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2024 DIGILAW 509 (JHR)

Suchitra Devi v. State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Jail and Disaster Management (Home)

2024-05-15

RAJESH SHANKAR

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JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo No. 1486 dated 15.03.2019 (Annexure-13 to the present writ petition) passed by the respondent No.1 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected and the order as contained in memo No. 2347 dated 15.05.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority (i.e. the respondent No.2) dismissing the petitioner from service has been affirmed. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo No. 2347 dated 15.05.2017 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the disciplinary authority (i.e. the respondent No.2) whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. The petitioner has also prayed for directing the respondent authorities to reinstate her in service with effect from the date of her dismissal with all consequential benefits. 2. The factual background of the case emanating from the writ petition is that while the petitioner was on deputation as Nurse at Women Probation Home, Namkum, Ranchi, two residents of the said probation home, namely, Punam Kumari and Priya Kumari escaped in the night of 06.08.2016, however, the said incident came to light in the morning of 07.08.2016. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted by the Assistant Inspector General, Jail, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, who submitted the enquiry report vide letter No. 2669 dated 25.8.2016. 3. Subsequently, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondent No.2 vide letter No. 3243 dated 14.10.2016 directing her to submit her explanation within five days. The petitioner submitted reply on 19.10.2016 (received in the office of the respondent No.2 on 21.10.2016), whereafter she was put under suspension in contemplation of departmental proceeding vide order as contained in memo No. 3770 dated 28.11.2016 issued by the respondent No.2 and her headquarter was fixed at the office of the respondent No.3. On the same day, a memo of charge in ‘’Prapatra-KA’’ containing five charges was served to the petitioner. Thereafter, vide office order as contained in memo No. 258 dated 30.11.2016 issued by the respondent No.4, the petitioner was relieved to join in the office of the respondent No.3 during suspension period in order to initiate departmental proceeding against her in which the respondent No.3 was appointed as enquiry-cum-conducting officer and the respondent No.4 as presenting officer. The petitioner gave her joining on 30.11.2016 itself. 4. The petitioner gave her joining on 30.11.2016 itself. 4. The respondent No.3 submitted the enquiry report to the respondent No.2 vide letter No. 1212 dated 02.03.2017 wherein the petitioner was held guilty of the said incident. Subsequently, a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondent No.3 vide letter as contained in memo No. 1397 dated 11.3.2017 in the light of direction given by the respondent No.2 vide letter No. 980 dated 10.3.2017 whereby she was directed to submit her explanation within 15 days through proper channel. The petitioner submitted her reply to the second show cause notice on 23.3.2017 before the respondent No.3-the conducting officer, who submitted the report on 3.4.2017 mentioning that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be true and she was held guilty of the same. 5. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from service vide the order as contained in memo No. 2347 dated 15.5.2017. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Jail and Disaster Management (Home), Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi and during pendency of the said appeal, she was asked to vacate the quarter immediately vide letter No. 353 dated 27.6.2018 issued under the signature of the respondent No.4. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 4033 of 2018 before this Court which was disposed of vide order dated 17.12.2018 directing the appellate authority i.e. the respondent No.1 to dispose of the appeal preferred by the petitioner in accordance with law within a reasonable time preferably within ten weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. Subsequently, the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the respondent No.1 vide the order as contained in memo No. 1486 dated 15.03.2019. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on bare perusal of the enquiry report, it would transpire that out of two escaped residents from Women Probation Home, Namkum, Ranchi, one resident i.e. Poonam Kumari was found after 5-6 days. Poonam Kumari was a deaf and dumb girl, who stated through her signs and gestures that she along with Priya Kumari had escaped in the night of 07.08.2016 at about 2:00 A.M with the help of branches of adjacent ‘Peepal’ tree taking access to the balcony of the said probation home. Poonam Kumari was a deaf and dumb girl, who stated through her signs and gestures that she along with Priya Kumari had escaped in the night of 07.08.2016 at about 2:00 A.M with the help of branches of adjacent ‘Peepal’ tree taking access to the balcony of the said probation home. Further, Priya Kumari was also found after about 4 months and is currently residing safely at Gumla Probation Home. However, without considering the said statement of Poonam Kumari, the enquiry officer concluded that the manner of escape as stated by Poonam Kumari seemed to be improbable. Hence, the respondents proceeded to hold the petitioner guilty of the said charges. The enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of negligence and irregularity while discharging her duty as Nurse deputed at Women Probation Home, Namkum. 7. It is further submitted that the petitioner had diligently rendered her services in the Women Probation Home as Daily Wage Nurse for 22 years and thereafter on the post of Nurse in the regular establishment for 9 years and during that period, no disciplinary proceeding was ever initiated against her, except the present case. The impugned order of dismissal is too harsh and disproportionate to the charges. It is also submitted that ‘’negligence simpliciter’’ and ‘’error of judgement per se’’ do not amount to misconduct. Moreover, the findings of the enquiry officer are based on surmises and conjectures and hence the same are liable to be set aside. 8. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner has failed to point out any flaw in the departmental proceeding or to show any perversity in the impugned orders of dismissal passed by the disciplinary as well as the appellate authorities. The petitioner has also failed to indicate any illegality in the enquiry conducted against her. There is no procedural error in conducting the departmental proceeding. The petitioner has been served with the memo of charge, show cause notice, enquiry report and second show cause notice in accordance with law and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was also given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, however, she did not choose to cross-examine them. 9. The petitioner has been served with the memo of charge, show cause notice, enquiry report and second show cause notice in accordance with law and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was also given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, however, she did not choose to cross-examine them. 9. It is further submitted that a preliminary enquiry was conducted by a Committee of Assistant Inspector General, Prison and Prisoner Welfare Officer and the said Committee prima-facie found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against her. The explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory and hence she was put under suspension and the departmental proceeding was initiated against her. The disciplinary authority, after considering the entire materials available on record including the enquiry report, found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against her and accordingly dismissed her from service. The appellate authority also, after going through the entire materials available on record, found the petitioner guilty of the charges and therefore upheld the punishment of dismissal from service. Hence, the impugned orders passed by the disciplinary as well as appellate authorities do not warrant interference of this Court. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. Prime argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against her. The impugned order of dismissal from service is too harsh for the charge of negligence and irregularity in duty and hence the same is liable to be set aside. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 has held as under: “14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.’’ 12. Thus, the High Court, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has the power to interfere with the quantum of punishment which appears to be shocking to its conscience and the same is disproportionate to the alleged charges. 13. In the case in hand, both the residents who were missing from the Women Probation Home, Namkum, Ranchi, were subsequently found. It has not come in the evidence that the petitioner had helped the said residents in fleeing away from the probation home, rather one of the missing girls, namely, Poonam Kumari (deaf and dumb) stated through signs and gestures that she had escaped from the probation home with the help of the branches of the adjacent ‘Peepal’ tree taking access to the balcony of the said probation home. The main charge against the petitioner is that during her duty period, two residents were found missing from the probation home and she had not counted the residents before taking charge of her duty. The petitioner has asserted that during her entire service period, she has performed her service diligently and the same has not been controverted by the respondents. Thus, this Court is of the view that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against her. 14. In view of the afoersaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order as contained in memo No. 1486 dated 15.03.2019 passed by the respondent No.1 as well as the order as contained in memo No. 2347 dated 15.05.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. the respondent No.2 are hereby quashed. 14. In view of the afoersaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order as contained in memo No. 1486 dated 15.03.2019 passed by the respondent No.1 as well as the order as contained in memo No. 2347 dated 15.05.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. the respondent No.2 are hereby quashed. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority i.e. the respondent No.2 to take appropriate decision on the point of quantum of punishment and to award any other lesser punishment to the petitioner, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order and in the meantime, to reinstate her in service. 15. The present writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the afoersaid observation and direction.