JUDGMENT : Gopinath, J. The appellants are the petitioners in W.P (C) No.4947/2024. That writ petition was filed by the appellants/petitioners praying inter alia that an award of the Arbitrator under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 (In short 'the NH Act, 1956) should be set aside as certain crucial aspects which were statutorily required to be considered were not so considered by the Arbitrator. 2. It is the case of the learned counsel for the appellants that the acquisition of the portion of the building including the staircase and the lift room has resulted in a situation where the appellants will have to suffer substantial costs for relocating the said facilities which will also result in the usable area of the hotel coming down. It is her case that the damages so suffered by the appellants is also a matter that should have been taken into consideration by the Arbitrator while determining the compensation payable under the provisions of the NH Act, 1956. The appellants also have a case that they have not been paid any interest in terms of the provisions contained in the NH Act, 1956. 3. It is thus that the appellants were before this Court seeking to set aside the award of the Arbitrator and seeking a writ of Mandamus directing the Arbitrator to re-consider the matter taking note of Exts P5 and P6 reports and the provisions of the NH Act, 1956. The learned Single Judge on a consideration of the matter held as follows:- “The contention of the petitioner is that while issuing Ext P7 order, the arbitrator did not look into Ext P5 and P6 valuation reports submitted by the Executive Engineer of the PWD. I am of the view that these are all matters which could be agitated by the petitioner by filing appropriate petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. So as to facilitate the petitioner to initiate proceedings as per Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the interim order granted in the case on 12.02.2024 will continue for a period of two weeks from today. Reserving such right of the petitioner, the writ petition is disposed of.” 4. Sri. K.P. Satheesan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the National Highways Authority of India on the instructions of Adv. Reserving such right of the petitioner, the writ petition is disposed of.” 4. Sri. K.P. Satheesan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the National Highways Authority of India on the instructions of Adv. P. Mohandas would submit that the reliefs sought for in W.P (C) No.4947/2024 cannot be granted. It is submitted that the remedy of the appellants against the award of the Arbitrator under Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956 is to file an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before a competent court. It is submitted that it is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sterling Industries v. Jayprakash Associates Ltd and others; AIR 2019 SC 3558 , that a writ petition was not maintainable challenging the award of the Arbitrator under Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956. The learned Senior Counsel points out that the appellants have already received the compensation amount awarded by the Arbitrator. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that it is clear from Ext.R1 (a) that the appellants had already handed over the possession of the acquired property to the National Highway Authority. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in reply would submit that where the award of the Arbitrator is not in consonance with the provisions of the NH Act, 1956, it is open to the appellants to challenge the award by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel would submit that this court by judgment in Ammankovil Narayanan v. District Collector, Kannur; 2023 (7) KHC 655 had set aside the award of the Arbitrator in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Samudram S.V. v State of Karnataka and another; (2024) 3 SCC 623 , to contend that the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act does not have the power to modify the award and therefore the only remedy available with the appellants is to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also placed reliance on paragraph 52 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mukand Ltd v. Mukand Staff and officers' Association; (2004) 10 SCC 460 to contend that where there is an error apparent on the face of record even an award by the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act can be interfered with in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and learned Senior Counsel appearing for the National Highways Authority of India, we believe that no case has been made out for interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is trite that the proceedings before the Arbitrator under the provisions of the NH Act, 1956 is a proceeding under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 except to the extent that there are any contrary provisions in the NH Act, 1956. The learned counsel is right in contending that the Arbitrator appointed under the NH Act, 1956 is to exercise jurisdiction strictly in terms of the provisions contained in the Act. However, the question as to whether the compensation awarded was sufficient or not and whether the appellants were entitled to any additional compensation is not a ground upon which the award of the Arbitrator can the challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The remedy lies in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court in Ammankovil Narayanan (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. In Ammankovil Narayanan (supra) the Arbitrator had dismissed the application filed under Section 3G on the ground that a copy of the award of the competent authority had not been produced along with the application filed before him. That was a case where the Arbitrator had failed to exercise his jurisdiction and committed an error outside the limits of his jurisdiction. An arbitration under Section 3G of the NH Act 1956 is no doubt an arbitration by a statutory authority (as distinct from arbitration under an arbitration clause in an agreement between individuals) and, the use of the word ‘arbitration’ in the provision need not deter this Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where the situations warrants it. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1967) 3 WLR 382 the concept of errors within jurisdiction and errors outside jurisdiction was developed by the House of Lords to overcome the finality clause (clause excluding review of the decision of the Foreign Compensation Commission by Courts). Though the distinction between the errors within jurisdiction and errors outside jurisdiction have almost been obliterated we believe that, in a case like this, when we are called upon to examine whether this Court must exercise its jurisdiction to set aside an award of the Arbitrator under the provisions of the NH Act, 1956 the rule of errors within jurisdiction and errors outside jurisdiction can be a safe guide to determine whether the award should be interfered with or not. In Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju, (1974) 3 SCC 415 a Constitution Bench held as under:- “28. …….. Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, [ (1967) 3 WLR 382 ] we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has arisen because the word “jurisdiction” is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context, (see per Diplock, J., at p. 394 in the Anisminic case). Whereas the “pure” theory of jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control to a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower meaning might result in a more useful legal concept even though the formal structure of law may lose something of its logical symmetry. “At bottom the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for purpose of judicial review has been one of public policy rather than one of logic”. “At bottom the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for purpose of judicial review has been one of public policy rather than one of logic”. [ S. A. Smith : “Judicial Review of Administrative Action”, 2nd Edn., p. 98] And viewed from the aspect of public policy as reflected in the provisions of the 1950 and 1951 Acts, we do not think that a wrong decision on a question of ordinary residence for the purpose of entering a person's name in the electoral roll should be treated as a jurisdictional error which can be judicially reviewed either in a civil court or before an election tribunal.” Ammankovil Narayanan (supra) is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that the award of the Arbitrator can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even in a case where the quantum of compensation fixed by the Arbitrator is under dispute. 7. The decision in Samudram (supra) deals with the power of the Court in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It holds that the Court cannot modify an award of the Arbitrator. Paragraph 18 of the decision in Samudram (supra) reads thus:- “18. On the exact same issue we may also note another opinion rendered by this Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant Technologies (P) Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 657 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 157 (two-Judge Bench)] in the following terms : (SCC pp. 676-77, para 44)” “44. In law, where the court sets aside the award passed by the majority members of the Tribunal, the underlying disputes would require to be decided afresh in an appropriate proceeding. Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the court may either dismiss the objections filed, and uphold the award, or set aside the award if the grounds contained in sub-sections (2) and (2-A) are made out. There is no power to modify an arbitral award. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 208, para 52) ‘52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it.’ ” It is clear from a reading of paragraph 18 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Samudram (supra) that even while an award cannot be modified by the Court in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 it can set aside the award, in which case the matter will have to be adjudicated afresh. Therefore, the decision in Samudram (supra) does not compel us to hold that the award (in the facts of this case) must be examined on its merits and must be set aside in the exercise of Writ jurisdiction. 8. The decision in Mukand Ltd (supra) also does not aid the case of the appellants. That was a case where the Supreme Court clearly found that the award of the Industrial Tribunal was ‘without jurisdiction’ (see paragraph 52 of the report). As already observed the award in this case cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or outside the limits of jurisdiction. Moreover, the appellants have obtained the compensation awarded by the learned Arbitrator. Further it is clear from Ext.R1 (a) that the appellants had already handed over the possession of the acquired property to the National Highway Authority and it does not lie in their mouth to contend that they should be allowed to continue in possession of the portion that has already been acquired. For all these reasons we find no ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. For all these reasons we find no ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the fact that the learned Single Judge had granted time to the appellants to file an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, we direct that the time already granted by the learned Single Judge will stand extended till 05-06-2024 to enable the appellants to avail statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Further, on the request of the learned counsel of the appellants we grant 2 days to the appellants to vacate the acquired property. It is made clear that under no circumstances will any application for an extension of time be entertained in this matter.