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2024 DIGILAW 51 (CHH)

Rajesh Kumar S/o Chherkaram banjare v. State of Chhattisgarh

2024-01-15

RAVINDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL

body2024
ORDER : 1. These two appeals arise out of common judgment dated 29.11.2003 passed by Additional Session Judge Korba, District – Korba in Sessions case No. 268/2003 and therefore both these appeals are heard and decided together. By the impugned judgment dated 29.11.2003, the accused Gayatri Bai, Shanti Bai and Chherka Ram have been acquitted from the charges under Sections 304-B/34 and 306/34 of IPC whereas the accused Rajesh has been acquitted from the charge under Section 304 B/34 of IPC whereas he has been convicted for the offence under Section 306/34 of IPC and sentenced for R.I. for 3 years with fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of fine additional simple imprisonment for 10 days. Against the conviction and sentence of the accused Rajesh Kumar the criminal appeal No. 1343 of 2003 has been filed by accused/appellant Rajesh Kumar. Against the insufficiency of sentence, the State has filed a Criminal appeal No. 216 of 2004 under Section 377 of Cr.P.C. for enhancement of sentence imposed upon the accused Rajesh Kumar. Although in the appeal filed by the State they have made acquitted accused persons also as the party respondent but in view of the facts and grounds mentioned in the appeal memo as also the prayer made in the appeal memo, the appeal filed by the State appears to be appeal against insufficiency of sentence and for enhancement of the same against the convicted accused Rajesh Kumar only. 2. Brief facts of the case are that deceased Tarkeshwari was married with the accused Rajesh Kumar Banjare on 28.05.1996. At the time of their marriage the accused Rajesh Kumar and his father Chherka Ram were demanding a color television and Rs. 10,000/- cash. After various request made by the father of the deceased as also his relatives and after giving a Black and white television and Rs. 5,000/- cash they proceeded to perform their marriage. After three-four months of their marriage they again started demanding the same and started assaulting Tarkeshwari. In due course of time, she delivered a child and after some time when she conceived second pregnancy, the accused person thrown her out from there house. When she return back to her parents house she informed her parents that her mother-in-law had tried to poured Kerosine upon her and tried to ignite her by match box. In due course of time, she delivered a child and after some time when she conceived second pregnancy, the accused person thrown her out from there house. When she return back to her parents house she informed her parents that her mother-in-law had tried to poured Kerosine upon her and tried to ignite her by match box. Her family members and her relatives got her convinced and sent her again her matrimonial house after delivery of her second child they started residing at Dohripara and the accused Rajesh started working at a gas agency. After some time they deceased Tarkeshwari has committed suicide by hanging in her matrimonial house. The matter was reported to the police. Inquest of the dead-body of the deceased Tarkeshwari Ex.-P/1 was prepared in presence of the witnesses Rajesh Kumar, Laxmi, Ganeshram, Santram and Rajkumari. The body was sent for its postmortem to Government Indiragandhi District Hospital, Korba for its postmortem where Dr. Veena Agrawal (PW-5) and Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-7) have conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the Tarkeshwari and they gave their postmortem report Ex.P/2 whereby they have not found any external injuries over the body of the deceased Tarkeshwari and opined that the mode of death is asphyxia as a result of antemortem hanging and the nature of death is suicidal. The spot map Ex.P/11 was prepared by the police and Ex.P/3 was prepared by the Patwari. The FIR Ex.P/15 was registered against the accused persons for the offence under Section 304 B/34 of IPC. The accused persons were arrested on 02.04.2003. The statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. have been recorded and after completion of the investigation charge-sheet was filed before the Chief Judicial magistrate, Korba for the offences under Section 304 B/34 of the IPC. 3. The trial Court has framed charges against the accused persons for the offences under Section 304 B/34 and 306/34 of IPC. The accused persons denied their guilt plead innocence and claimed trial. 4. To establish the charge against the accused persons the prosecution has examined 09 witnesses. The statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C has also been recorded in which they denied the material appears against them and plead innocent and submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. The accused persons have examined the 03 defense witnesses in their support. 5. The statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C has also been recorded in which they denied the material appears against them and plead innocent and submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. The accused persons have examined the 03 defense witnesses in their support. 5. After appreciation of the evidence available on record the trial Court has acquitted the other accused persons from all the charges whereas the appellant has also been acquitted from section 304-B/34 of IPC but has convicted and sentenced for Section 306/34 of IPC. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argued that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence. No offence is made out against the appellant as alleged there is no harassment given by the appellant to the deceased Tarkeshwari and was not treated her with cruelty at any point of time. There is no evidence of any instigation to commit suicide by him. The witnesses have admitted that they have not made any complaint to any where when she was being allegedly harassed by the accused persons. There is no harassment to her so as to draw her to commit suicide. He would further submit that she was in tendency to frequently visiting to her parents house and when she was being stopped she became violent. Since the accused has not treated her with the cruelty and since there is no instigation to commit suicide, the offence of abatement of suicide is not made out against him and he is entitled for acquittal. He would further submit that from the same set of evidence the other accused persons have been acquitted and therefore the appellant Rajesh Kumar Banjare is also entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the State vehemently opposes the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the prosecution has proved their case beyond reasonable doubt and within seven years of marriage, the deceased has died in an unnatural circumstances. There is ample evidence on record regarding the harassment given by the accused to the deceased. The accused has failed to give plausible explanation as to the circumstances under which the deceased met with an unnatural death. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly convicted the accused and impugned judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference. 8. There is ample evidence on record regarding the harassment given by the accused to the deceased. The accused has failed to give plausible explanation as to the circumstances under which the deceased met with an unnatural death. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly convicted the accused and impugned judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence available on records. 9. The first question arose in the case as to whether the deceased Tarkeshwari has died within seven years of her marriage. 10. The Ghasiram (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased Tarkeshwari have stated in his deposition that the Tarkeshwari was married with the accused Rajesh on 28.05.1996 at Indira Nagar, Durpa Road, Korba in para 7 of his cross examination he stated that her three daughter have already married. On 22.05.1991 his daughter Rekha has got married. Tarkeshwari was 4 years younger then Rekha, in between Tarkeshwari and Rekha, his another daughter Rakhi was born who was married on 24.05.1993. He further stated that he is not having any invitation card or horoscope of Tarkeshwari with him. He has not got her date of marriage in writing at any place. 11. Geetabai (PW-2), mother of the deceased Tarkeshwari have stated in her deposition that six years back from today her daughter Tarkeshwari was married with Rakesh (her deposition was recorded on 28.08.2003) her elder daughter is name as Rekha, after one year of marriage of Rekha, he another daughter Rakhi got married and after two years of marriage of Rakhi, Tarkeshwari has got married. 12. Santram (PW-3) have stated in his deposition that Tarkeshwari has got married on 28.05.1996, since he was the neighbor of the parents of Tarkeshwari therefore he could remember her date of marriage. 13. Mahendra Kumar (PW-4) who is the brother of the deceased Tarkeshwari have stated in his deposition that Tarkeshwari has got married with Rajesh Banjare in the year 1996. In cross examination he has stated in para 6 that he is having four sisters and two brothers and he is the elderly amongst all. He admitted that his sister Rekha got married in the year 1991. One year thereafter his another sister Rakhi has got married and two years after the marriage of Rakhi, the Tarkeshwari was got married with Rajesh. 14. He admitted that his sister Rekha got married in the year 1991. One year thereafter his another sister Rakhi has got married and two years after the marriage of Rakhi, the Tarkeshwari was got married with Rajesh. 14. The PW-1 Ghasiram have stated that Tarkeshwari have got married in the year 1996. PW-2 have not stated any date on which Tarkeshwari has got married. Ghasiram has not stated as to after how many years of the marriage of Rakhi his daughter Tarkeshwari got married but from the evidence of Geetabai PW-2 it reflects that after two years of marriage of her daughter Rakhi, her another daughter Tarkeshwari has got married. Likewise PW-4 brother of Tarkeshwari have also stated that in the year 1991 his sister Rekha has got married, after one year of marriage of Rekha his another sister Rakhi has got married and two years thereafter Tarkeshwari has got married. 15. From the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 it reflects that in the year 1991 the elder daughter of Ghasiram has got married, after one year of her marriage his another daughter Rakhi has got married and after two years of marriage of Rakhi, the marriage Tarkeshwari was performed and thus the Tarkeshwari got married in the year 1994 reflects from the evidence of these witnesses, although they have also stated that the Tarkeshwari has got married on 28.05.1996. therefore, in view of the above evidence, it is difficult for this court to hold that Tarkeshwari has died within 7 years of marriage in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence of her marriage. The date of her marriage is very relevant in the present case because the wife of the accused Rajesh namely Tarkeshwari has died on 23.02.2003 and to draw the presumption under Section 113 A of Indian Evidence Act, the death of the deceased must have been within seven years of her marriage. Since seven years marriage of the deceased is in border line therefore the same is very relevant to appreciate in the present case. 16. In the case of Harchand Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1974 Vol-III SCC 397 in para 11 Hon’ble Supreme Court has absorbed as under:- “11. The function of the court in a criminal trial is to find whether tile person arraigned before it as the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. 16. In the case of Harchand Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1974 Vol-III SCC 397 in para 11 Hon’ble Supreme Court has absorbed as under:- “11. The function of the court in a criminal trial is to find whether tile person arraigned before it as the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. For this purpose the court scans the material on record to find whether there is any reliable and trustworthy evidence upon the basis of which it is possible to found the conviction of the accused and to hold that he is guilty of the offence with which Ile is charged. If in a case the prosecution leads two sets of evidence, each one of which contradict and strikes at the other and shows it to be unreliable, the result would necessarily be that the court would be, left with no reliable and trustworthy evidence upon which the conviction of the accused might be based. Inevitably, the accused would have the benefit of such a situation.” 17. In view of the above and also considering the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the view which in favor of the accused is taken here and hold that the prosecution has failed to prove that the Tarkeshwari has died within seven years of her marriage and therefore the presumption under Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act is not attracted in the present case. 18. Now the second question of abetment of suicide by the appellant to the deceased is concerned I have gone throw the evidence against laid by the prosecution. 19. (PW-1) Ghasiram who is the father of the deceased Tarkeshwari have stated in his deposition that after the marriage his daughter resided in her matrimonial house at village Arjuni for about four years and thereafter at Korba for about one and half year. Whenever his daughter came to his house she disclosed that her husband demanding a color television and Rs. 5,000/- cash. She also disclosed her that mother-in-law has poured Karosine oil upon her and all the family members in her matrimonial house have assaulting her. Whenever his daughter came to his house she disclosed that her husband demanding a color television and Rs. 5,000/- cash. She also disclosed her that mother-in-law has poured Karosine oil upon her and all the family members in her matrimonial house have assaulting her. In the month of June, 2001 by the harassment given by the accused persons she came to his house and thereafter with the help of panchayat members he has got convinced his daughter and pacify her and send her back to her matrimonial house she stayed there for about 7-8 months thereafter she again came back to his house. In the year 2002 when she conceived pregnancy she again came to his house and she delivered a child in the hospital and again came to his house. On 22.02.2003 his son has informed him about the incident. When they reached there in her matrimonial house, they found that the room was closed and after opening the room he saw that his daughter has committed suicide by hanging. In cross examination he stated that the accused persons were earned their livelihood by agriculture and laborer. At the time of marriage the accused persons were residing at Arjuni. He further admits that the marriage expenses were to be shared by both the parties as per their social and custom. He admitted that during the lifetime of Tarkeshwari, he has not made any report to the police and considered the complaint of his daughter to be the routine and petty quarrel in nature. He admitted that whenever Tarkeshwari came to his house, her husband came to his house for bringing her back and they sent her along with him. He sent his daughter after convincing them. He has further stated that in the month of June 2002 the compromise between the parties have taken place which was the last occasion and thereafter they have sent their daughter alongwith accused to her matrimonial house and ultimately he received the information about her death in the month of March, 2003. 20. PW-2 Geetabai, who is the mother of the deceased Tarkeshwari stated in her deposition that after two-three months of her marriage when she return back to her house she has not disclosed anything. When she conceived pregnancy which was after about a year of marriage, she disclosed about the harassment. 20. PW-2 Geetabai, who is the mother of the deceased Tarkeshwari stated in her deposition that after two-three months of her marriage when she return back to her house she has not disclosed anything. When she conceived pregnancy which was after about a year of marriage, she disclosed about the harassment. She has stated that her daughter has informed her that her in-laws have taken heavy work from her and she does not want to go there. In cross examination she has stated that she has not lodged any report against the accused persons with respect to the harassment given by the accused persons and never convened any Panchayat meeting. She admitted in para 10 in her cross examination that she was happy in her matrimonial life therefore she has not made any report to the police. A month prior to her death, at the time of birth of the son of her daughter Rekha, Tarkeshwari and her husband came to their house and after spending time happily, and stayed there for two days and return back. She has not stated anything when the deceased Tarkeshwari came to her house on the occasion of six day celebration after birth of the son of her daughter Rekha about any harassment given by the accused persons. 21. PW-4 who is the brother of the deceased Tarkeshwari have also deposed the same version as the PW-1 and PW-2 have deposed. There is no allegation that the appellant has instigated the deceased Tarkeshwari to commit suicide. She regularly used to go to her parents house and return back to her matrimonial house which give conclusion that whatever dispute was there between them was a petty dispute and domestic quarrel which happen routinely in married life of the appellant and deceased. 22. From the close scrutiny of the evidence available on the record makes it clear that the parents and brother of the deceased Tarkeshwari were not in regular contact with her since a long time and just before her death there is no allegation against the appellant by the deceased regarding any harassment from him. It appears from evidence laid by the prosecution that neither there is any evidence of harassment given by the accused/appellant nor any evidence of abatement to commit suicide. 23. It appears from evidence laid by the prosecution that neither there is any evidence of harassment given by the accused/appellant nor any evidence of abatement to commit suicide. 23. Having gone through the evidence available on records I am satisfied that the prosecution sought to improve its case at the trial by introducing the fact of instigation to commie suicide. The mother of the deceased PW-2 have stated that she has not made any complaint to anyone because she was residing happily in her married life therefore this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has not been able to establish his case beyond reasonable doubts except to the extent that there may be some quarrel between them in daily routine life. Beyond this I find that other allegation made by the prosecution to be unacceptable. 24. In the matter of Hansraj Vs. State of Haryana, 2004 Vol.XII SCC 257 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in para 12 to 15 that- 12. The question then arises as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant can be convicted of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act. Any person who abets the commission of suicide is liable to be punished under Section 306 I.P.C. Section 107 I.P.C. lays down the ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing or engaging with one or more person in any conspiracy for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal omission to the doing of that thing. In the instant case there is no direct evidence to establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide. In the absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act under which the Court may presume on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the accused. In the absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act under which the Court may presume on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the accused. The explanation to Section 113-A further clarifies that cruelty shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which means:- "(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand". 13. Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113- A of the Indian Evidence Act. Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act the prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498- A I.P.C. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 wherein this Court observed : “12 This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression "the other circumstances of the case" used in Section 113- A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says "Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it". 14. The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 . 15. In the State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr. (1994) 1 SCC 73 this Court observed : "We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater [(1950) 2 All ER 458,459] has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject- matter". 25. In the matter of Gurucharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2017 Vol-1 SCC 433, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 20 to 30 that- 20. . Section 306 of the Code prescribes the punishment for abetment of suicide and is designed thus: “Abetment of suicide. – If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 21. It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of this constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualize the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide. 22. Section 107 IPC defines abetment and is extracted hereunder: “107. Abetment of a thing. – A person abets the doing of a thing, who – First – Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly – Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly – Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1 – A person, who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing. Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” Not only the acts and omissions defining the offence of abetment singularly or in combination are enumerated therein, the explanations adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct of the offender relatable thereto. 23. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a presumption as to the abetment of suicide by a married woman by her husband or any relative of his, if it is proved that she had committed the act within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of his had subjected her to cruelty. The explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” to have the same meaning as attributed to this expression in Section 498A IPC. For ready reference, Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1882 is quoted hereunder as well. “113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 24. In the legislative backdrop outlined hereinabove, Section 498A of the Code also demand extraction. “498A. Explanation—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 24. In the legislative backdrop outlined hereinabove, Section 498A of the Code also demand extraction. “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 25. This provision, as the quote hereinabove reveals, renders the husband of a woman or the relative of his, punishable thereby with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also fine, if they or any one of them subject her to cruelty. The explanation thereto defining “cruelty” enfolds: any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or harassment of the woman, where it is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her, to meet such demand. 26. Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the first limb of the explanation is otherwise germane, proof of the willful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental of physical, is the sine qua non for entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged. 27. 27. The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2004)13 SCC 129 , and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder. “12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 , this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 28. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal (supra) that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 . 29. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 . 29. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190 . 30. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48 , this Court, with reference to Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as ingrained therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised. 26. After considering the evidence on record and also the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in above mentioning Judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that the evidence on record does not demonstrate the unqualified clarity and conviction and role of the appellant as contemplated by the above provision so as to hold an unassailable findings of his culpability under Section 306 of IPC. The material on record do not suggest any act of cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to provoke or compel the deceased to commit suicide with no alternative. No such continuous and proximate conduct of the appellant with the required provocative culpability is proved by the prosecution to infer that the deceased has been put in such a condition either physically or mentally that she had chosen to commit suicide. 27. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. The judgment and conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2003 is set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from the charge of Section 306/34 of IPC. The appellant is on bail. 27. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. The judgment and conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2003 is set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from the charge of Section 306/34 of IPC. The appellant is on bail. His bail bond shall continue for the further period of six months as provided under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. 28. The lower court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. CRA No. 216 of 2004 1. This is an appeal filed by the State of Chhattisgarh under Section 377 of Cr.P.C. for enhancement of sentence. 2. In the present case four accused persons namely Rajesh Kumar, Gayatri Bai, Shanti Bai and Chherkaram have been charge-sheeted and tried for the offences of section 304-B/34 and 306/34 of IPC. After conclusion of the trial, the trial Court has acquitted the accused Gayatribai, Shanti Bai and Chherka Ram from all the charges of Section 304 B/34 and 306/34 of IPC whereas the accused Rajesh Kumar has been convicted for the offence of Section 306/34 of IPC and has been acquitted from 304-B/34 of IPC. 3. The State has filed the appeal under Section 377 of Cr.P.C. in the array of memo of appeal, it is mentioned that the appeal under Section code of criminal procedure, 1973 for enhancement of sentence. In the memo of appeal just above the grounds urge, it has been mentioned that this appeal for enhancement of sentence on the following grounds other and further in the prayer column the prayer has been made as under:- Prayer:- “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to enhanced the sentence awarded to the respondents. This Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.” 4. Section 377 of Cr.P.C. provides that appeal by the State Government against sentenced which reads as under- 377. This Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.” 4. Section 377 of Cr.P.C. provides that appeal by the State Government against sentenced which reads as under- 377. Appeal by the State Government against sentence- (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the State Government may, in any case of conviction on a trial held by any Court other than a High Court, direct the Public Prosecutor to present [an appeal against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy- (a) to the Court of session, if the sentence is passed by the Magistrate and (b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by any other Court (2) If such conviction is in a case in which the offence has been investigate of by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under the Delhi Spec Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Cote [the Central Government may also direct] the Public Prosecutor to present appeal against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy- (a) to the Court of session, if the sentence is passed by the Magistrate and (b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by any other Court] (3) When an appeal has been filed against the sentence on the ground of inadequacy, [the Court of Session or, as the case may be, the High Court shall not enhance the sentence except after giving to the accused a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement and while showing in cause, the accused may plead for his acquittal or for the reduction of the sentence. (4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence passed under section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1986) the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of six months from the date filing of such appeal.] 5. There is no appeal filed by the state against acquittal of three accused persons Gayatri Bai, Shanti Bai and Cherkaram and also against acquittal of Rajesh from the charge of Section 304-B/34 of IPC. There is no appeal filed by the state against acquittal of three accused persons Gayatri Bai, Shanti Bai and Cherkaram and also against acquittal of Rajesh from the charge of Section 304-B/34 of IPC. Yet all the accused person have been made as the party respondent in the memo of appeal in the criminal appeal filed by the State. Since there is no sentenced awarded to the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 in Sessions Case No. 268 of 2003, there is no question of enhancement of sentence against them and also that there is no appeal against accused Rajesh from his acquittal of Section 304-B of IPC, there is no question of enhancement of sentence for that also. 6. So far as enhancement of sentence against the respondent No. 1 Rajesh Kumar is concerned, since he has been acquitted from the charge of 306/34 of IPC by judgment passed in Criminal appeal No.1343 of 2003, the appeal of the State for enhancement of sentence of the accused Rajesh Kumar would become redundant. 7. In the result the appeal filed by the State for enhancement of the sentence is hereby dismissed.