JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. Since similar facts and common issues are involved in both writ petitions, they are heard together and are being disposed of analogously. 2. Heard the parties. Prayers 3. In W.P.(S) No. 1298 of 2013, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 09.03.1998 passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security Police Force, CTPS, Chandrapura (respondent no.2) by which the petitioner was dismissed from service. The appellate order dated 20.10.1998 passed by respondent no.2 affirming the dismissal order is also under challenge. 4. In W.P.(S) No. 3831 of 2012, the petitioner has thrown challenge to the order dated 28.07.1998 passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, CTPS, Chandrapura (respondent no.2) whereby he was dismissed from service. He has also challenged the order dated 28.04.1999 by which the respondent no.2 being the appellate authority has rejected the appeal preferred against the punishment order dated 28.07.1998. The revisional order dated 29.06.2004 is also under challenge. The facts 5. The petitioners, while posted at CISF Unit, FCI Sindri, were put under suspension with the allegation of involvement of theft along with outsiders in SAP crossing area. Altogether, three charges were leveled against petitioner Raj Pal and four charges were levelled against petitioner Tarlok Singh. In nutshell, Charge No. 1 against both the petitioners are that they were involved in theft of FCI plant property along with outsiders in SAP crossing area at about 11.50 pm on 13.7.1996, which amounts to misconduct under the provisions of Section 18 of the CISF Act. Similar nature of allegation is leveled as per Charge No.2 against both the petitioners, i.e. while they were under suspension, they did not mark their attendance regularly at Shaharpura Main Gate in the register, which amounts to neglect of Govt. duty within the meaning of Section 18 of the CISF Act. The further allegation as against Charge No.3 is that both the petitioners during suspension period went to Domgarh Gate and abused/ threatened the constable posted at Domgarh Gate for not allowing exist to one civilian. Charge No. 4 against petitioner Tarlok Singh is that during suspension period, he threatened, used filthy languages and snatched spectacles of one SI/Ex-U.K. Basak on 1.10.1996 at Dhanbad Court premises. 6. With the aforesaid charges, the petitioners were proceeded departmentally by framing memo of charge on 27.11.1996 and a criminal case was also lodged against them. Charge No. 4 against petitioner Tarlok Singh is that during suspension period, he threatened, used filthy languages and snatched spectacles of one SI/Ex-U.K. Basak on 1.10.1996 at Dhanbad Court premises. 6. With the aforesaid charges, the petitioners were proceeded departmentally by framing memo of charge on 27.11.1996 and a criminal case was also lodged against them. The petitioners submitted their written statement of defence to the charges leveled against them, wherein they have denied the charges aforesaid and claim to be innocent. As the defence taken by the petitioners was not found satisfactory, enquiry proceeding was started. After considering the entire evidences oral as well as documentary, the inquiry officer proved the charge no.II with respect to disobeying the order to put their attendance during suspension period. However, charge nos. I and III, as also charge no. IV (only petitioner Tarlok Singh) were found to be not proved and they were exonerated from the charges. The disciplinary authority having disagreed with the findings returned by the inquiry officer with regard to Charge No.I and III issued show cause notices to the petitioner Raj Pal on 21.01.1997 and on 27.03.1998 to the petitioner Tarlok Singh against charge nos. I, III and IV explaining the reasons for his disagreement and extending them an opportunity to give their show causes. Upon receipt of the replies, the disciplinary authority passed the order of removal from service against the petitioners. Aggrieved thereby, they preferred appeals, but the same were also rejected. It is further case of petitioner Tarlok Singh that earlier he approached this Court in CWJC No. 10588 of 1999 challenging the penalty order as well as appellate order. The said writ petition was disposed of on 25.11.2003 giving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the dismissal order as well as appellate order before the revisional authority. The petitioner filed the revision, but the same was also rejected by order dated 29.6.2004. Challenging the said orders, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petitions. Argument advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner. 7. Mr. Brij Bihari Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the impugned orders passed against the petitioners are not sustainable in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, the disciplinary authority just to punish the petitioners has tried to unsettled the law already settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. 7. Mr. Brij Bihari Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the impugned orders passed against the petitioners are not sustainable in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, the disciplinary authority just to punish the petitioners has tried to unsettled the law already settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Mishra, reported in 1998(6) Supreme 486 : (1998) 7 SCC 84 . Learned counsel further submits that though the disciplinary authority is empowered to differ with the findings arrived at by the inquiry officer, but at the same time, law has been laid down that if the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the inquiry officer on any article of charge, then before it records its own finding on such charge, records its own findings for such disagreement, on which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that the delinquent is guilty of the charges. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, though the disciplinary authority having disagreed with the findings arrived at by the inquiry officer, issued show cause notices and recorded his findings, but the findings returned by the disciplinary authority are perverse on record. Learned counsel submits that in the enquiry proceeding, prosecution witness no.1 has deposed that he had seen the petitioner-Tarlok Singh at his bed in barrack just after the alleged occurrence. Similarly, P.W.5 (R.P. Singh), who was posted at Domgarh Line Gate as Guard, has deposed that he never seen the petitioner Tarlok Singh coming out from the barrack. Learned counsel also submits that the evidence of the witnesses are not corroborative and none of them have identified the petitioner-Tarlok Singh to be the accused. Learned counsel submits that on the basis of conjecture and surmises, the petitioners have been implicated in the case. Law is well settled that mere suspicion whatsoever may be high cannot take place of proof and from the evidence of witnesses, it is evident that save and except suspicion; nothing is shown to implicate the petitioners. Learned counsel submits that taking every aspect of the matter, the inquiry officer exonerated the petitioners from all the charges, except charge no. II. Learned counsel submits that charge no. Learned counsel submits that taking every aspect of the matter, the inquiry officer exonerated the petitioners from all the charges, except charge no. II. Learned counsel submits that charge no. II is trivial in nature, which does not warrant inflicting the capital punishment against the petitioners and thus, the impugned orders are contrary to the settled propositions of law, which requires interference by this Court. Learned counsel also points out that the petitioners were acquitted in the criminal case by the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction and hence, on this ground also, the impugned orders are not tenable. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Respondents 8. Refuting the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prabhat Kumar Singh, learned counsel representing the respondents submits that it is crystal clear from perusal of the second show cause notices issued to the petitioners that the disciplinary authority while differing with the findings arrived at by the inquiry officer gave its tentative reasons for such disagreement and provided adequate opportunity to the petitioners to represent their cases against the findings of such disagreement. Learned counsel submits that the disciplinary authority upon perusal of the enquiry report as well as evidence of the witnesses came to the conclusion that the charges are proved against the petitioners and recorded his findings, to which a reasonable/prudent person could come to the conclusion of involvement of the petitioners in the present crime. The impugned orders were passed by the disciplinary authority on the proved charges in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners were charge-sheeted for grave charges of theft in the premises of FCI plant in connivance with other criminals, which has tarnished the image of the central police personnel like CISF. Learned counsel submits that though the inquiry officer has found the charges not proved against the petitioners, but the disciplinary authority exercising his jurisdiction, disagreed with the findings of the inquiry officer and tentatively came to the conclusion of guilt of the petitioners, issued second show cause notices, giving opportunity to the petitioners for making a representation/reply thereon, in consonance with the spirit of the law laid down in Punjab National Bank and Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Mishra (supra). vs. Kunj Behari Mishra (supra). Learned counsel submits that the petitioners submitted detailed representations thereon, which were duly considered by the disciplinary authority, and finally the impugned punishment orders were passed. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred appeal against the dismissal order before the appellate authority, but they could not succeed. The petitioner-Tarlok Singh has also gone upto the revisional authority, but he again failed to establish his defence. Thus, no prejudice has been occasioned to the petitioners whilst passing the dismissal order, affirmed upto to the appellate authority/revisional authority. The act of the respondent-authorities is in consonance with the principles of natural justice and hence the writ petitions are, thus, liable to be dismissed. 9. To demolish and frustrate the very challenge of the impugned dismissal order as well as appellate/revisional authority, learned counsel appearing for the respondents takes a plea of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in preferring the instant writ petitions at this belated stage. To demonstrate his argument, learned counsel submits that impugned dismissal order and appellate order were passed in the year 1998 and the petitioner Raj Pal has challenged the same in the year 2013. The petitioner-Tarlok Singh after approaching the revisional authority in the year 2004, has approached this Court in the year 2012. Therefore, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are also liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches. Findings of the Court 10. Perused the entire documents available on record and heard the parties at length. The petitioners were charge-sheeted with the main allegation of involvement in theft of FCI plant property along with other criminals at SAP crossing area at CISF Unit Sindri, Dhanbad. It is not in dispute that Charge No. II regarding non-marking of attendance regularly by the petitioners during suspension period at the headquarters is proved by the inquiry officer and affirmed upto the appellate/revisional authority. Thereby proving of Charge No.II amounts to violation of Section 8 of the CISF Act, which provides the penalties for neglect of duty and the delinquent may be taken into custody and may be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. Thus, it can safely be said that the petitioners were rightly punished so far as the Charge No. II is concerned. 11. Thus, it can safely be said that the petitioners were rightly punished so far as the Charge No. II is concerned. 11. Assailing the other charges leveled against the petitioners, the argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the findings of the disciplinary authority while differing with the finding of exoneration of the petitioners by the inquiry officer are perverse and beyond the record. It is pleaded by the petitioners that the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the inquiry officer based on the evidence of witnesses, including P.W.1. It is further pleaded that contrary to that, P.W.1 has deposed before the inquiry officer that he had seen the petitioner Tarlok Singh sleeping in his barrack. It is also pleaded that merely on the basis of suspicion; the petitioner has been made the accused. The plea of non-supportive and non-corroborative evidence of each and other witnesses has also been raised. 12. To examine the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, the findings returned by the inquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority has to be looked into. As per the prosecution story, it revealed that on 13.07.1996 at SAP crossing of CISF Unit, Sindri, some unknown persons entered in the campus and began to start theft. After chase, two of them were arrested. At the same time, the petitioners were seen at about 23.50 hours coming on cycle towards SAP crossing area. The CISF personnel started assaulting the cyclist with lathi and then, one of them stated that I am Tarlok Singh from CISF unit and do not beat me. Thereafter, the matter was reported to the In-charge of the CISF unit and a FIR to that effect was also lodged and the petitioners were proceeded departmentally with the allegations of their involvement in the said theft. 13. The deposition of P.W.1 that he saw the appellant Tarlok Singh sleeping in the barrack is not a sufficient ground to falsify the charge for the simple reason that presence of the petitioner was checked after the occurrence and it was stated in the prosecution case that on being identified by the petitioner-Tarlok Singh, he was left scot free. This evidence of P.W.1 does not establish that the petitioner was not present at SAP crossing while the outside criminals were looting the plant property. This evidence of P.W.1 does not establish that the petitioner was not present at SAP crossing while the outside criminals were looting the plant property. In the preliminary enquiry, which was one of the documentary evidence brought on record to prove the charge, all the witnesses have clearly deposed that they have seen the petitioners on 13.07.1996 at 23.50 hours and same evidence has been deposed by them in regular departmental proceeding. Though there was slightly changed version in regular departmental proceeding and based on the moulded version of the witnesses, the inquiry officer exonerated the petitioners by developing his findings. The disciplinary authority upon perusal of the evidence of witnesses came to the guilt of the petitioners to be involved in theft activity in connivance with outside criminals in the FCI plant. The charge of assaulting and threatening to the Constable deputed at the main gate was also proved on the basis of the evidence. The exhaustive replies of the petitioners were considered by the disciplinary authority and thereafter only, the order of dismissal has been passed. The petitioner-Tarlok Singh tested the dismissal order before the appellant authority as well as revisional authority raising all his pleas. The appellate authority considering the every aspect of the matter came to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority rightly imposed the order of dismissal against the petitioners. The revision filed by the petitioner Tarlok Singh also got dismissed on the same ground. 14. Thus, from bare perusal of the article of charges as well as difference of opinion given by the disciplinary authority, it appears that the disciplinary authority has acted in accordance with law and no folly was committed, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Mishra (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court propounded the law on the subject as follows: "20. ....It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be over-turned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the inquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. The first stage of the inquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the inquiring officer holds the charges to be proved then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the inquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer, but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. 21.........When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed." 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its earlier judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed." 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its earlier judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. M.C. Saxena, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 385 held that if the disciplinary authority thinks it proper to disagree with the findings arrived by the enquiring officer and act upon his own conclusion, the only requirement as per law is that the disciplinary authority must record reasons for his disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer. In the present case, this requirement of recording reasons for his disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer has fully been complied with. Therefore, it can comfortably be said that no folly has been committed by the respondents in awarding the punishment impugned against the petitioners. 16. This Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has limited scope of interference in a regular domestic enquiry and can interfere only if there are some procedural lapses or violation of principle of natural justice. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to point out any procedural lapse which may have caused any prejudice to petitioners. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the impugned orders. 17. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners have been acquitted in the criminal case, which has been lodged for the same set of allegations, evidences and witnesses, as were there in the departmental proceeding, is of no help to the petitioners for setting aside the dismissal order, inasmuch as, the acquittal in the criminal case has no bearing in the regular departmental proceeding, as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objects, as has been held in plethora of judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 . However, it is not in dispute that after acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioners have not represented before the respondents for reconsideration of their cases. 18. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 . However, it is not in dispute that after acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioners have not represented before the respondents for reconsideration of their cases. 18. Additionally, the challenge thrown upon the impugned dismissal order by way of the present writ petitions seems to be pitiable on the ground of delay and laches. Admittedly, petitioner-Raj Pal has rushed to this Court challenging the impugned orders dated 10.03.1998 and 20.10.1998 in the year 2013, after lapse of 15 years that too without availing the alternative remedy of revision. Similarly, petitioner-Tarlok Singh has challenged the order of dismissal, which has been affirmed by the revisional authority vide order dated 29.06.2004 in the year 2012, i.e. after lapse of eight years. In the matter of delay and laches, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1979 , observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily” 19. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has held as under: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 20. No plausible explanation has been given in the entire writ petitions and as such, on this ground also, the writ petitions are not maintainable. 21. As a sequitur to the aforesaid rules, regulations, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, this Court is of the view that no interference is warranted in the impugned orders dated 09.03.1999 and 20.10.1998 challenged in W.P.(S) No. 1298 of 2013 and the impugned orders dated 28.07.1998, 28.04.1999 and 29.6.2004 challenged in W.P.(S) No. 3831 of 2012. 21. As a sequitur to the aforesaid rules, regulations, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, this Court is of the view that no interference is warranted in the impugned orders dated 09.03.1999 and 20.10.1998 challenged in W.P.(S) No. 1298 of 2013 and the impugned orders dated 28.07.1998, 28.04.1999 and 29.6.2004 challenged in W.P.(S) No. 3831 of 2012. However, considering the fact that the petitioners have been acquitted in the criminal case, liberty is reserved with them to prefer representation before the respondents with a copy of the judgment of acquittal along with the copy of this judgment. Needless to say that upon receipt of such representation, the respondents may pass reasoned order thereon within twelve weeks thereafter in accordance with law and communicate the same to the petitioner within the aforesaid time. 22. With the aforesaid observations and direction, this writ petition stands disposed of.