JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has filed this petition with the following prayers:- 22(A) Quash an set aside the order dt.14.9.2004 and appellate order dt.7.3.2005 and reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits excluding the back wages for the period of delay in filing the petition. (B) During the pendency and final disposal of this petition, respondent may be directed to reinstate the petitioner. (C) To grant such other and further relief as may be deemed fit. 2. The facts of the present case are as under:- 2.1 It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was initially appointed as Supervisor/Additional Assistant Engineer on 21.11.1977 in the State Government in the Health and Family Welfare Department. From 1981, the petitioner was sent on deputation to the respondent Board wherein he was promoted to the post of Deputy Executive Engineer on 19.6.2008 and worked as such till he was dismissed from service by the order dated 14.9.2004. 2.2 That A charge-sheet dated 21.4.1997 was issued to the petitioner for holding a departmental inquiry into 6 charges regarding alleged misappropriation and irregularities during the period he worked at Palitana. That the petitioner did not give any reply to the above charge-sheet. 2.3 The respondent-board by the order dated 30.05.2000 decided to hold a common departmental inquiry against 8 persons including the petitioner. That an Inquiry Officer was appointed to hold the common Departmental Inquiry, who, as per his report found all the charges proved against the petitioner. A copy of the portion of Inquiry report has been supplied to the petitioner. 2.4 By the letter dated 20.09.2001, the petitioner was called upon to make his representation. Accordingly, the petitioner made his representation on 09.10.2001. After referring to the above representation, the Respondent no.1 by the order dated 14.09.2004 dismissed the petitioner from service and also treated the period of suspension from 26.07.1996 to 09.12.1998 as spent under suspension. 2.5 Against the above order, the petitioner filed appeal dated 20.09.2004 before the Appellate Authority, Respondent no.2. This appeal was supplemented by the letter dated 11.10.2004 addressed to many persons including Respondent no.2. By the letter dated 07.03.2005, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed and the penalty of dismissal as well as the suspension period as such has been maintained. Hence, the present petition filed by the petitioner against order of dismissal as well as appellate order. 3. By the letter dated 07.03.2005, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed and the penalty of dismissal as well as the suspension period as such has been maintained. Hence, the present petition filed by the petitioner against order of dismissal as well as appellate order. 3. Ms. Vacha Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petition is disproportionate to the charge levelled against the petitioner. She has submitted that since there were eight persons, who charge-sheeted for the offence and out of eight persons, only three persons were punished. She has submitted that so far as other two delinquents are concerned, they were faced the similar charges who have imposed minor penalties and the petitioner was imposed major punishment and therefore, there is discriminatory treatment on the part of the respondent – authorities. 3.1 In support of her contention, the learned advocate for the petitioner submits that since the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority relying upon the Inquiry Office’s report without applying independent mind and without recording any findings on the charge, the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order, whereby, the petitioner was dismissed from the service and therefore, this order is without there being any reason, without considering the settled principle of law and without going through the rules and regulations of the Gujarat Civil Services Rules, more particularly, while imposing the major penalty under Rule-6, the principle of natural justice is required to be followed. 3.2 In support of the submission, the learned advocate for the petitioner has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2177. Emphasized upon the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-19, 22, 23 and 24 are as under:- “19. The Disciplinary Authority did not arrive at any independent finding for passing the order of dismissal dated 8.4.1997. He, as indicated hereinbefore, proceeded on the basis that as the Appellant had not filed a show case, he must be held to have accepted the points on the basis whereof the Disciplinary Authority recorded his disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. He, as indicated hereinbefore, proceeded on the basis that as the Appellant had not filed a show case, he must be held to have accepted the points on the basis whereof the Disciplinary Authority recorded his disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority, however, failed to consider that the grounds on which he had disagreed with the Inquiry Officer forming the basis for issuing the show cause notice dated 17.2.1997, was a tentative one. Only because the Appellant did not file a show cause, the same would not mean that he was not required to consider the materials brought on records by the parties before the Disciplinary Authority, afresh. He was obliged to do so. 22. In view of the aforementioned decisions of this Court, it is now well settled that the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority. He was also required to apply his mind to the materials on record. The Enquiry Officer arrived at findings which were in favour of the Appellant. Such findings were required to be over turned by the Disciplinary Authority. It is in that view of the matter, the power sought to be exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, although not as that of an appellate authority, but akin thereto. The inquiry report was in favour of the Appellant but the Disciplinary Authority proposed to differ with such conclusions and, thus, apart from complying with the principles of natural justice it was obligatory on his part, in absence of any show cause filed by the Appellant, to analyse the materials on records afresh. It was all the more necessary because even the CBI, after a thorough investigation in the matter, did not find any case against the Appellant and thus, filed a closure report. It is, therefore, not a case where the Appellant was exonerated by a criminal court after a full fledged trial by giving benefit of doubt. It was also not a case where the Appellant could be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. The Disciplinary Authority in the aforementioned peculiar situation was obligated to apply his mind on the materials brought on record by the parties in the light of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. He should not have relied only on the reasons disclosed by him in his show cause notice which, it will bear repetition to state, was only tentative in nature. As the Appellate Authority in arriving at his finding, laid emphasis on the fact that the Appellant has not filed any objection to the show cause notice; ordinarily, this Court would not have exercised its power of judicial review in such a matter, but the case in hands appears to be an exceptional one as the Appellant was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer. He filed a show cause but, albeit after some time the said cause was available with the Disciplinary Authority before he issued the order of dismissal. Even if he had prepared the order of dismissal, he could have considered the show cause as it did not leave his office by then. The expression "communication" in respect of an order of dismissal or removal from service would mean that the same is served upon the delinquent officer. [See State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 ] 23. Even otherwise also the jurisdiction of a Disciplinary Authority to consider the matter would remain with him till it goes out of his hands which would mean the order is dispatched, as in the case of order of suspension. [See Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba and Others, (2004) 2 SCC 377 ] 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that interest of justice will be sub- served if the Disciplinary Authority is directed to consider the matter afresh in the light of the show cause filed by the Appellant herein before him. It will be desirable that an opportunity of personal hearing is also given to the appellant herein. We make it clear that although we are setting aside the order of Disciplinary Authority and consequently all other orders, we direct that the Appellant shall be deemed to be under suspension till an appropriate order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority. It will be desirable that an opportunity of personal hearing is also given to the appellant herein. We make it clear that although we are setting aside the order of Disciplinary Authority and consequently all other orders, we direct that the Appellant shall be deemed to be under suspension till an appropriate order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The question of payment of backwages, it is directed, would depend upon the ultimate order that may be passed by the Disciplinary Authority. For the views we have taken, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contentions raised by Mr. Tripathi.” 3.3 Ms. Nanavati, learned advocate has also referred to and relied upon one another unreported decision of this Hon’ble Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1798 of 2004 in the case of State of Guajrat & Ors. Vs. Tushar C. Shah and also relied upon Para-2.14 of the Guidelines under the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The Hon’ble Court in the case of State of Guajrat & Ors. Vs. Tushar C. Shah observed as under:- “We had dictated this part of the order on 18.8.2005, but did not record the operative part because Smt. Manisha L. Shah, Assistant Government Pleader, during the midst of dictation sought adjournment to seek instructions. Therefore, completion of the judgment was deferred and the case was adjourned to 23.08.2005. On the next date of hearing, Smt. Manisha L Shah, on instructions from Shri S.K. Bhavsar, Deputy Secretary, Education Department who was present in person made a statement that the competent authority is inclined to consider the possibility of modifying the order of punishment. On her request, the case was adjourned to 14.09.2005. However, due to reconstitution of the Bench, the case was not listed on 14.09.2005. On the next date i.e. 13.10.2005 the case was listed before the Bench consisting of one of us G.S.Singhvi, J. and P.B. Majmudar, J. That Bench directed the case to be listed before this Bench because the matter had already been heard by this Bench. In our opinion, once the penalty of dismissal imposed on the appellant is substituted with that of compulsory retirement, he would become entitled to pension and other retiral benefits. Today, Shri S.P. Hasurkar, Assistant Government Pleader gave out that the Government is prepared to substitute the penalty of dismissal with that of compulsory retirement. In our opinion, once the penalty of dismissal imposed on the appellant is substituted with that of compulsory retirement, he would become entitled to pension and other retiral benefits. Today, Shri S.P. Hasurkar, Assistant Government Pleader gave out that the Government is prepared to substitute the penalty of dismissal with that of compulsory retirement. However, he could not say whether this would entitle the respondent to get pensionary benefit as a matter of course. Learned counsel for the respondent says that the Court may pass appropriate order on the merits of the case. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the direction that the State Government shall now pass fresh order keeping in view the statement made by learned Assistant Government Pleader. As a sequel to the passing of order of punishment of compulsory retirement, the respondent shall become entitled to pensionary benefit in accordance with Rule 186 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules as applicable to the State of Gujarat. The needful be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.” 3.4 Ms. Nanavati, learned advocate has also referred to and relied upon one another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ministry of Finance and Another Vs. S.B. Ramesh reported in AIR 1998 SC 853 , in which, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in Para-14 as under:- “14. On a careful perusal of the above findings of the Tribunal in the light of the materials placed before it. we do not think that there is any case for interference, particularly in the absence of full materials made available before us in spite of opportunity given to the appellants. On the facts of this case, we are of the view that the departmental Enquiry conducted in this case is totally unsatisfactory and without observing the minimum required procedure for proving the charge. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in rendering the findings as above and setting aside the order impugned before it.” 3.5 On relying upon the above judgment, the learned advocate for the petitioner prayed that the present petition be allowed and impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority be quashed and set aside and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner be quashed and set aside. 4. As against that, the respondent appeared through the learned advocate Mr. 4. As against that, the respondent appeared through the learned advocate Mr. R.C. Jani, who has filed the affidavit-in-reply and objected the present petition on the ground that since the order impugned under challenge is after almost three years from the date of imposing of the punishment and there was a delay on the part of the present petitioner in challenging the impugned order. 4.1 In support of his submission, Mr. Jani, the learned advocate has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. Director General, SSB reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 478, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “8. On the judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to: i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as ‘Wednesbury principles’. In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co- delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 9. In the present case, the appellant was imposed the penalty of ‘removal from service’ after the charges levelled against him stood proved by the disciplinary authority in an enquiry held against him after following the procedure prescribed under the SSB Rules. The nature of allegations against the appellant are grave in nature. He entered the Mahila Barrack in the midnight at around 00:15 hours, may be to meet his alleged friend Rupasi Barman, but such an indisciplined conduct leading to compromising the security of the occupants of the Mahila Barrack cannot be tolerated. As a member of the disciplined force – SSB, he was expected to follow the rules. He was apprehended inside the Mahila Barrack by six female constables. As observed by this Court in the case of Diler Singh (supra), a member of the disciplined force is expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in a fancy. The nature of misconduct which has been committed by the appellant stands proved and is unpardonable. Therefore, when the disciplinary authority considered it appropriate to punish him with the penalty of ‘removal from service’, which is confirmed by the appellate authority, thereafter it was not open for the learned Single Judge to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.” 4.2 He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. Vs. Vs. Ex- Constable Ram Karan reported in ( 2022) 1 SCC 373, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held and observed in Paragraphs – 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27 as under:- “22. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. 23. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.” 24. The principles have been culled out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], wherein it was observed as under:- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 25. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another vs. Rajendra Singh [(2013) 12 SCC 373] as under:- “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co- delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 26. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the High Court, in our considered view, fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could lawfully be imposed by the departmental authorities for his proven misconduct. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and the interference made by the High Court is in a cavalier manner while recording the finding of penalty to be disproportionate without taking into consideration the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the respondent which is unpardonable and not sustainable in law. 27. Before we may conclude, we would like to observe that the employees who are in civil services, their disciplinary matters are being governed by their respective services (classification, control and appeal) rules and for the sake of instance, we take note of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965(hereinafter being referred to as the “Rules 1965”). The nature of penalties has been provided under Part V and removal and dismissal from service are in the category of “Major penalties”. The nature of penalties has been provided under Part V and removal and dismissal from service are in the category of “Major penalties”. If the misconduct is found proved, looking into the gravity and the nature of misconduct, either of the punishment, i.e., removal or dismissal from service, could be inflicted upon the civil servant after holding disciplinary enquiry for imposing major penalties if held guilty as provided under Part IV of the Rules 1965 and this what being ordinarily understood.” 4.3 He has submitted that in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the submissions made in the affidavit-in- reply, the petition is not required to be entertained as this is against the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Inquiry Officer and relying upon the same, the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order of dismissal and the same is confirmed by the Appellate Authority and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in the present petition. 5. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 6. The issue involved in the present petition is that whether the Court can interfere in the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in disciplinary proceedings and confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the punishment and subsequently, confirmed by the Appellate Authority while exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. This Court is of the opinion that in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority has framed as many as six charges against the present petitioner alongwith the other persons, which are serious in nature and out of all these six charges, only two charges were proved against the delinquent – petitioner though he was given an opportunity to examine the witnesses, but he has not chosen to examine any witnesses nor he has produced any satisfactorily explanation to the extent before the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, the Disciplinary Authority relying upon the report of the Inquiry Officer, observed that since the charges were proved against the petitioner, which are serious in nature and for that, there was no satisfactorily explanation tendered by the present petitioner and therefore, the respondent – Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order of imposing major punishment, which is subsequently confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 8. 8. Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the scope of interference in the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is very limited in view of the settled legal position and in view of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.B.I. Vs. A.G.D. Reddy reported in 2023 (3) SCC 117, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “Scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings 32. From the above discussion, it is clear that it could not be said that the Enquiry Report, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appointing Authority are based on no evidence or are perverse. Even if we eschew the report insofar as the aspect of non- submission of control form, the transgression of the area of operation and non-declaration of the immovable property and certain other charges are concerned, the order of penalty can be sustained. 33. As has been demonstrated above, the aspects of failure to conduct periodic inspection and the negligence in not stipulating the taking of immovable property as collateral security in the case of M/s Saraswathi Fabricators in spite of the party offering it, constrain us to conclude that there was material on record for the appellant to pass the order of penalty. 34. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the judgments of this Court in Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1978) 3 SCC 366 and Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 contends that the Disciplinary Authority should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence with some degree of definiteness pointing to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. He would contend that a suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof and scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished by recording findings merely based on ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. We are unable to accept the contention that the principles laid down in the above judgments are attracted to the present case. The judgments cited are clearly distinguishable, for the reasons that we have set out herein-above, while analyzing the facts of the present case. 35. We are unable to accept the contention that the principles laid down in the above judgments are attracted to the present case. The judgments cited are clearly distinguishable, for the reasons that we have set out herein-above, while analyzing the facts of the present case. 35. Shri Sanjay Kapur, learned counsel for the Bank relies on State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 249 . In that judgment the scope of judicial review of departmental proceedings was set out and the principle laid down in State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , was reiterated, which reads as follows:- "This Court has held in State of A.P. and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 , para 7): "7. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." 13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against the respondent no.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of any misconduct." 36. It is now well settled that the scope of judicial review against a departmental enquiry proceeding is very limited. It is not in the nature of an appeal and a review on merits of the decision is not permissible. The scope of the enquiry is to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and to ensure that the findings are not bereft of any evidence. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognized and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court. 37. In the present case, it could certainly not be said that the report is based on no evidence or that it is perverse. The learned Single Judge transgressed the limits of judicial review in setting aside the enquiry proceedings and the punishment imposed. The Division Bench, in a short order has, after extracting a part of the learned Single Judge's judgment, gone on to hold that having perused the records of the enquiry they do not find that the charges have been dealt with in any manner of specificity. Thereafter they conclude that the learned Single Judge was justified in arriving at its conclusion. We are not able to sustain the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Severability of charges 38. The question that remains is, in the light of the findings above, does the order of penalty imposed call for any interference? 39. The law is well-settled that if in a disciplinary proceeding, the order of penalty can be imposed on the charges proved and the punishment imposed is lawfully sustainable on those charges, it is not for the Court to consider whether those grounds alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. 39. The law is well-settled that if in a disciplinary proceeding, the order of penalty can be imposed on the charges proved and the punishment imposed is lawfully sustainable on those charges, it is not for the Court to consider whether those grounds alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. No doubt, on the facts of the present case, on some aspects of the charge, the proof may have been found wanting. However, since the law laid down by this Court is that unless punishment imposed is only co-relatable to any of those charges found not proved, the penalty cannot be set aside. In this case, the punishment can be sustained even if the charges held not proved are severed. [See State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 648 and Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 ]. 40. Then the only question is does the penalty imposed shock the conscience of the Court? In the oral arguments as well as in the written submissions, the respondent contended that there was no charge of financial misappropriation or of causing any financial loss to the Bank. This submission was countered by the appellant by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum- Regional Manager and Others vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , particularly, the holding of the Court in para seven thereof to contend that the test is really not of loss having been resulted or profit having been made. The test is whether the delinquent employee, has observed the prescribed norms of the Bank. The penalty imposed in this case is "reduction in basic pay to the lowest stage in Scale-I" as envisaged under Rule 49 (e) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules and further, to treat the period spent by the delinquent officer under suspension from 18.08.1990 till the date of his reinstatement as suspension only. Since the charge of not conducting periodical inspection and the failure to complete the formalities for creating equitable mortgage with regard to M/s Saraswathi Fabricators are supported by evidence, we do not think that the penalty as imposed is disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. Since the charge of not conducting periodical inspection and the failure to complete the formalities for creating equitable mortgage with regard to M/s Saraswathi Fabricators are supported by evidence, we do not think that the penalty as imposed is disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. We maintain the penalty as imposed in the order of the Appointing Authority dated 31.01.1995 and as confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 41. For the reasons stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were in error in allowing the writ petition and interfering with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the order of the Appointing Authority and the decision of the Appellate Authority. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench and dismiss the Writ Petition No. 29547 of 1997 filed by the respondent. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs. 9. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is well discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court relying upon the earlier decision in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Muralibabu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government servant, expressed the afore-stated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is willful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorized absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla the Court, dealing with unauthorized absence, has stated thus: - “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: - “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorized absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this regard a passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ashok Kumar Arora is worth reproducing: - “20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee.” 29. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, the Court analysed the conception of proportionality in administrative law in England and India and thereafter addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary matters and opined that unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. 30. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, the Court, after analyzing the doctrine of proportionality at length, ruled thus: - “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well- recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision- maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his absence by stating that he did not have intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded to say that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment is whether any reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances taking into consideration the major, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances after excluding irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 31. 31. It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the court at his own will. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India and another v. George Philip: - “18….In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.” We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and re- state with the hope that employees in any organization should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organization. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organization develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development. 34. Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid premises, the irresistible conclusion is that the interference by the High Court with the punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable, and further the High Court was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the High Court are set aside leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.” 10. In Para-28 of the above-referred judgment in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that whether the High Court was justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. In the facts of the present case, this court is of the opinion that no interference is required to be called for in the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority while passing the order and affirmed by the Appellate Authority. This Court cannot seat in appeal and go in the evidence, which is recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiry Officer. This Court cannot interfere in the findings recorded by the authority while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. 11. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that no interference is required in the present petition and the present petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith. No order as to cost.