JUDGMENT : Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, C.J. 1. Instant appeal is directed against the order dated 18.03.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby writ petition filed by the appellant-company, in the matter of challenge to the order dated 12.01.2009 of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as ‘AAIFR’) as also the order dated 21.05.2007 passed by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as ‘BIFR’), has been dismissed. Relevant factual matrix of the case: 2. Relevant facts for adjudication of the controversy involved in this case are that the appellant No.1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and appellant No.2 is the promoter. The case of the appellant/writ petitioner was that the appellant-company was incorporated in joint sector with the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘RIICO’) for manufacturing and sale of cement. For the purposes of incorporation and commencement of the production of cement, appellant-company availed financial facilities by way of common loan from the financial institutions namely, IFCI, ICICI and IDBI. For various reasons, as detailed in the writ petition, the appellant-company became sick leading to reference made to the BIFR for framing of the scheme for rehabilitation under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SICA’). The BIFR appointed an operating agency (for short, ‘O.A.’) to prepare rehabilitation scheme after declaring appellant-company as sick company. A draft scheme was prepared by the O.A., which was sanctioned by the BIFR on 26.02.1990. The case of the appellant is that though by virtue of rehabilitation scheme prepared by O.A., a mining lease was to be transferred in favour of the appellant-company, the State cancelled the lease granted in favour of RIICO on 06.11.1990, which was challenged before the Mining Tribunal. The Mining Tribunal set aside the said order. 3. In the on-going proceedings before the BIFR, an order was passed on 06.01.1994, whereby the BIFR, upon reviewing progress of implementation of the scheme, directed the appellant No.2-promoter to deposit a sum of Rs.2.00 crore in the lien account with the Punjab National Bank by 31.01.1994, failing which proceedings for winding up of the appellant-company would be initiated. The said amount having not been deposited, eventually BIFR issued a notice on 16.02.1994 for winding up of the appellant-company. The said amount having not been deposited, eventually BIFR issued a notice on 16.02.1994 for winding up of the appellant-company. A writ petition was filed, in which a restraint order was passed against publication of the notification for liquidation of the appellant-company. The said writ petition, however, was dismissed on 05.10.2004. However, even before that, the BIFR cancelled its notice dated 18.02.1994 vide its order dated 07.04.1994. Later on, the writ petition filed by the appellant-company, which was dismissed in default, was restored. The BIFR, however, passed an order dated 10.10.2003 directing the District Magistrate, Kotputali to take possession of the land admeasuring 554 hectare. As some other cement companies were involved in the matter of grant of lease for the purpose of mining limestone, one M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd. filed an appeal against the order dated 10.10.2003 before the AAIFR. The AAIFR set aside the order passed by the BIFR, due to which the order of the BIFR, directing the District Magistrate to take possession of the land, could not be given effect to. 4. In the meanwhile, the lead financial institution i.e. IDBI assigned the entire debts owned by the appellant-company to M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited under two separate loan agreements in the month of January, 2007. On 01.03.2007, the BIFR issued a fresh show cause notice for winding up of the appellant-company. M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited also moved an application before BIFR for substitution in place of IDBI. M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited filed an appeal before the AAIFR, wherein an interim order was passed on 18.09.2007. In that appeal, appellant-company moved an affidavit in support of the appeal and prayed for restraining BIFR to take steps towards winding up of the appellant-company. 5. At this stage, an application was moved for abatement of reference in view of the provisions under Section 15(1) of the SICA, which was allowed vide impugned order dated 12.01.2009 declaring that the proceedings, in the matter of rehabilitation of the appellant-company pending before the BIFR, had abated per force law. The aforesaid order came to be challenged by filing writ petition. 6. The aforesaid order came to be challenged by filing writ petition. 6. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant-company assailed legality and validity of the order passed by the AAIFR mainly on the ground that once the matter of sick company is taken up for preparation and sanction of scheme under Sections 16 to 18 of the SICA, provisions of Section 15 of that SICA are not attracted. An alternative submission was made that even if third proviso to Section 15(1) of the SICA is attracted, then also, such provisions could be pressed into service only when secured creditor, representing not less than 3/4th value of the amount outstanding against financial institutions, has initiated proceedings for recovery of secured debt under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SARFAESI Act’). For the reasons that respondent M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited cannot be said to be representing 3/4th value of outstanding amount as M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited was holding 60% of the secured debt, under no circumstance, abatement of reference proceedings would follow by operation of law. Therefore, allowing an application and declaring that reference proceedings before the BIFR had abated, is in violation of the statutory scheme. An issue was also raised that the BIFR was not authorised to issue notice for winding up as earlier notice dated 16.02.1994 issued by the BIFR was subject matter in the writ petition pending before the Court, wherein interim order was passed and operating. The BIFR issued new notice for winding up only for the reason that the writ petition stood dismissed due to non-appearance of the counsel. However, once an order was passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court resulting in restoration of the petition, interim order also stood automatically revived. 7. Another argument was raised that even if the order of abatement was allowed to stand, that would only result in abatement of the BIFR proceedings but not appeal itself. 8. The respondents in the writ petition placed reliance upon third proviso to Section 15(1) of the SICA by submitting that M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited held more than 3/4th of the amount outstanding and had taken recourse to provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the proceedings before the BIFR stood abated by operation of law. 8. The respondents in the writ petition placed reliance upon third proviso to Section 15(1) of the SICA by submitting that M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited held more than 3/4th of the amount outstanding and had taken recourse to provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the proceedings before the BIFR stood abated by operation of law. Therefore, no illegality was committed by the AAIFR in allowing the application and declaring the entire reference proceedings as abated. It was also submitted that the sick company had been given repeated chance of revival, but as it failed to fulfill the condition, an order for liquidation was passed and therefore, notice towards winding up was issued. As M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited was the secured creditor as defined under Section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act, the application filed under Section 15(1) of the SICA was maintainable under the law. M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited was the only secured creditor, which initiated proceedings to recover the debt under the SARFAESI Act. M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited was not the secured creditor as defined under Section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act. It was also the case of the respondent that as the writ petition was filed challenging the show cause notice dated 16.02.1994, but that notice was not acted upon and a fresh show cause notice was issued for winding up of the company on 01.03.2007, therefore, revival of the writ petition in the matter of challenge to the show cause notice dated 18.02.1994 in which an interim order was passed, would not affect the proceedings initiated on the basis of winding up notice dated 01.03.2007, which was not even challenged. An objection to maintainability of the writ petition was also raised on the submission that when the BIFR passed order 21.05.2007, the appellant-company did not prefer appeal and it was only M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited who preferred an appeal. If any order is passed in that appeal, it was only M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited which could maintain the writ petition. The said company preferred a writ petition, but the same was withdrawn. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellant-company (writ petitioner) was not maintainable. 9. If any order is passed in that appeal, it was only M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited which could maintain the writ petition. The said company preferred a writ petition, but the same was withdrawn. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellant-company (writ petitioner) was not maintainable. 9. After considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge was of the view that M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited (respondent in the writ petition) was a secured creditor as defined under Section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act and further the learned Single Judge opined in view of the provisions contained under Section 15 of the SICA that under the law, M/s. Asset Care Enterprises Limited was the only secured creditor as the loan was taken by the appellant-company and financial assistance was taken by the appellant-company from IFCI, ICICI, IDBI and PNB and the debts of IFCI and ICICI were taken over by M/s. Asset Care Private Limited. Though, the debts of PNB and IDBI were taken over by M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited, but that company did not fall within the definition of secured creditor. The learned Single Judge recorded a finding that this was an admitted factual position on record. 10. The learned Single Judge also held that revival of Writ Petition No.1071/1994 would not come in the way of proceedings inasmuch as the BIFR had not acted upon the notice, which was assailed in the writ petition but had issued fresh notice dated 01.03.2007 followed by order dated 21.05.2007. As notice dated 01.03.2007 and order dated 21.05.2007 of the BIFR were not subject matter in the pending Writ Petition No.1071/1994, any order including interim order passed therein did not affect the subsequent order passed by the BIFR for winding up of the company. 11. The learned Single Judge held that the only secured creditor being M/s. Asset Care Private Limited had taken recourse to proceeding of recovery of debt under the SARFAESI Act and was holding 3/4th of the outstanding amount due and payable by the appellant-company, the order passed by the AAIFR declaring that reference proceedings pending before BIFR had abated, is in accordance with law. 12. Assailing correctness and validity of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the instant appeal has been filed. Submissions on behalf of appellant: 13. 12. Assailing correctness and validity of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the instant appeal has been filed. Submissions on behalf of appellant: 13. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would argue that the appellant had filed Writ Petition No.1071/1994 assailing notice dated 16.02.1994 regarding winding up proceedings wherein interim order was passed on 25.02.1994. Though, the writ petition was dismissed in default on 30.01.2004 and restoration application had also been rejected on 01.03.2007, on SLP being filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court while issuing notice on 30.03.2007, notice on interim relief was also issued which was duly communicated to BIFR to stay hand till decision in the SLP, but that prayer was illegally rejected. As Hon’ble Supreme Court passed order dated 06.08.2007 restoring the writ petition, interim order, which was earlier passed on 25.02.1994, stood revived. He would further point out that in view of the interim order which was passed on 25.02.1994 in Writ Petition No.1071/1994, in any case, the impugned notice dated 16.02.1994 was also cancelled. Therefore, on the face of the interim order passed in the writ petition, which stood revived, the BIFR acted in complete contravention and violation of the orders and proceedings in the pending writ petition and formed an opinion on 21.05.2007 that the appellant-company could not be revived and, therefore, it was liable to be wound up. 14. Another submission is that M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited, who acquired appellant’s debts of PNB, challenged the order dated 21.05.2007 of the BIFR by filing appeal before the AAIFR and therefore, application could not be directly filed before the AAIFR seeking declaration of abatement of reference proceedings, particularly when the AAIFR itself has passed an interim order on 18.10.2007. 15. Further submission is that the respondent No.1 M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Ltd. had acquired the debt liabilities of the IFCI and Kotak Mahindra Bank. It gave notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act to the appellant only in respect of debts of IFCI which is less than 3/4th of the debts of the borrower. As such, it is contended that the abatement clause as incorporated in third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, as amended, is not attracted and there is no abatement. As such, it is contended that the abatement clause as incorporated in third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, as amended, is not attracted and there is no abatement. It is also submitted that specific ground was raised by the appellant on categoric pleadings giving clear break up with regard to the amount of debt acquired by respondents M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Ltd. and M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited, which was not disputed in return filed by the respondents in the writ proceedings. That being admitted factual position, it could not be said that respondent M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Ltd. is a secured creditor represented not less than 3/4th in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the appellant of such secured creditor. Therefore, the AAIFR in passing the impugned order committed grave illegality and perversity. 16. Next submission is that without first issuing notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, it was not open for the secured creditor to take recourse to proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. On rational construction, the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, as amended, would be attracted only when secured creditors have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act as per law. Where measure under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 has been taken in violation of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the consequence of abatement as provided under the law would not ensue. The AAIFR, while declaring that the reference proceedings have abated, failed to properly construe the provisions contained in the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA. 17. Next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the AAIFR, while deciding the application, did not decide specific objection taken by the appellant that AAIFR could not have undertaken the exercise of examining whether reference proceedings have been abated or not. In fact, application for declaration that the reference proceedings have abated was not maintainable directly before the AAIFR as that aspect could be examined only by the BIFR. Objections in this regard were not examined by the AAIFR. The AAIFR usurped the jurisdiction of the BIFR in deciding that the reference proceedings have abated thereby depriving the appellant of its valuable right of appeal to AAIFR. 18. Objections in this regard were not examined by the AAIFR. The AAIFR usurped the jurisdiction of the BIFR in deciding that the reference proceedings have abated thereby depriving the appellant of its valuable right of appeal to AAIFR. 18. Last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that on proper construction to advance the object of SICA, which was intended to revive sick company, it is the entire amount borrowed from financial institutions by a sick company which is required to be taken into consideration and it could not be restricted to amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower. It is argued that such interpretation would frustrate the object of the enactment. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon several authorities. Submissions on behalf of respondents: 19. Per contra, learned counsel appearing respondent No.8 namely, M/s. Mansoon Trading Company (which purchased the assets of M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited) opposed relief sought in the appeal and supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge by submitting that having purchased the assets of M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited, it seeks to defend the order passed by the AAIFR declaring reference proceedings as having abated. It is contended that in view of definition of a secured creditor as contained under Section 2(zd) of the SARFAESI Act, M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited was the only secured creditor which gave a valid notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act to the appellant and having acquired the debt of various financial institutions, in the eyes of law, it was a secured creditor representing not less than 3/4th in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditor. He would further argue that the word ‘outstanding’ as occurs in the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA manifests legislative intention that once a secured creditor representing 3/4th in value of the amount outstanding, as distinguished from total amount borrowed, takes any measure to secure its secured debt under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, statutory consequence of abatement of reference proceedings in the matter of revival and rehabilitation of a sick company, would come to an end by operation of law. In his submission, any interpretation against clear words of the statute manifesting legislative intention, is impermissible in law and that would amount to substituting the word ‘outstanding amount’ with the word ‘total borrowed amount’. He would next contend that though M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited had filed petition against the order dated 12.01.2009 of the AAIFR, by which declaration of abatement of reference proceedings were ordered, later on, it withdrew its petition. As the impugned order dated 12.01.2009 was passed by the AAIFR in an appeal filed by M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited, the writ petition filed by the appellant was not maintainable as appellant had not preferred any appeal against the order dated 21.05.2007 of the BIFR. Referring to possession notice (Annexure-R/8 filed with return), it is submitted that the outstanding amount is clearly stated as Rs.52,84,08,000/- as on 30.09.2007. He would submit that M/s. Asset Case Enterprise Limited having acquired the debts of various financial institutions, thus, acquired the legal status of a secured creditor representing not less than 3/4th in value of the amount outstanding against the financial assistance disbursed to the appellant by financial institutions. He would further submit that M/s. Assets Care Enterprise Limited had also issued demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act clearly stating that the account has become N.P.A. on 05.06.2008 as debt payable by the appellant had swollen to Rs.52,84,08,000/-. It is only thereafter that it had taken measures for taking possession under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act by issuing possession notice on 26.10.2008. Possessed of the said legal status, M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited having acquired the debt of IFCI and Kotak Mahindra Bank, preferred application in the pending appeal filed by M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited pending before BIFR for abatement of the reference proceedings. Learned counsel further submitted that in another proceedings before the Delhi High Court, challenge to Section 13(2) and measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act were repealed and petition filed by the appellant had already been dismissed on 30.04.2010. He would next submit that in fact, certificate of sale of various movable and immovable assets was issued by M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited in favour of respondent No.8 M/s. Mansoon Trading Company on 17.05.2010, which is on record. He would next submit that in fact, certificate of sale of various movable and immovable assets was issued by M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited in favour of respondent No.8 M/s. Mansoon Trading Company on 17.05.2010, which is on record. This fact has been mentioned in I.A. No.29884/2010 filed in the present case and this Court also observed this fact recorded in the order dated 28.05.2010 that M/s. Asset Care Enterprise Limited had sold its assets to M/s. Mansoon Trading Company. Thereafter on 18.10.2010, it was observed that the affect of such sale shall be considered at the time of final hearing. He would also submit that in any case, challenge to notice under Section 13(2) and measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is no longer maintainable as the said challenge though initially made in the petition, was withdrawn while making an application which was allowed on 10.12.2009. Therefore, arguments to assail the correctness and validity of the notice under Section 13(2) and measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are liable to be rejected at the threshold. 20. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.4, while making similar submissions as advanced by learned counsel for respondent No.8, would add by submitting that while restoring Writ Petition No.1071/1994 vide order dated 06.08.2007, Hon’ble Supreme Court did not interfere with the order passed by the BIFR on 21.05.2007, which was passed during pendency of the writ petition. He would further highlight that as order dated 21.05.2007 passed by the BIFR was challenged only by M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited by filing an appeal before AAIFR and no appeal was filed by the appellant-company, it could neither challenge the winding up order nor any other order passed in appeal including an order declaring abatement of reference proceedings. His argument is that the appellant having not challenged the winding up order dated 21.05.2007, it is precluded from assailing order passed by the AAIFR in appeal, more so when M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited withdrew its petition in the matter of challenge to AAIFR order dated 12.01.2009. He would further submit that interpretation of third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA assailed by the appellant is against the express provision of law. He would further submit that interpretation of third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA assailed by the appellant is against the express provision of law. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4 further argued that in any case, in view of repeal and saving clause as contained under Section 42 of the SARFAESI Act, any pending reference, as also, reference proceedings before the BIFR attained its natural demise. Referring to provisions of Section 4(b) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SIC Repeal Act of 2003’), he would submit that all reference proceedings irrespective of whether any measure had been taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act by secured creditor, would come to an automatic end. Rejoinder submissions on behalf of appellant: 21. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in his rejoinder submission would argue that the issue of abatement was neither raised nor decided by the Delhi High Court while dismissing the appellant’s petition vide order dated 30.04.2010. Replying to the objections with regard to maintainability of the appeal, learned counsel has submitted that once the learned Single Judge has examined the case on merits, the objection of maintainability is liable to be rejected. Analysis and Conclusion: 22. One of the foremost submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant is that upon revival and restoration of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 as also interim order dated 25.02.1994 passed therein, the BIFR could not have reinitiated winding up proceedings by forming an opinion and issuing notice dated 01.03.2007, nor could the BIFR draw any proceedings. Both the BIFR and the AAIFR ought to have stayed their hands in view of the interim order passed in Writ Petition No. 1071/1994. Therefore, the order passed by the AAIFR, declaring the proceedings as having abated, is nullity. Undisputed facts extracted from the chequered history of the present case are that the appellant-company, namely, M/s. Swadeshi Cement Limited, became sick and for its revival and rehabilitation, the BIFR sanctioned rehabilitation scheme on 26.02.1990. It, however, appears that the measures taken under the revival scheme did not yield desired result showing any sign of revival of the company. It is also on record that the company was required to deposit Rs. It, however, appears that the measures taken under the revival scheme did not yield desired result showing any sign of revival of the company. It is also on record that the company was required to deposit Rs. 2.00 crores in “No Lien Account” in Punjab National Bank by 31.01.1994 and submit revised proposal without altering the basic framework/parameters of the sanctioned scheme to IDBI, which was directed to examine the proposal and confirm the receipt of Rs. 2.00 crores by Punjab National Bank in the first week of February, 1994. The BIFR vide its detailed resolution-cum-order dated 16.02.1994 noted failure on the part of the appellant-company and recording that the promoters are not in a position to infuse requisite funds for revival of the company and that no alternative proposal was submitted, a prima facie conclusion was arrived at that the company had become non-viable in the long run and it is not possible to rehabilitate. The BIFR, therefore, opined that it would be just, equitable and in public interest that the appellant-company should be wound up. The next meeting was fixed on 30.05.1994 for hearing objections/suggestions, if any, against the proposed action of winding up of the company. Accordingly, notices were issued. At this stage, the appellant-company and its promoter, Mr. U.S. Sitani, filed Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 wherein an interim order came to be passed on 25.02.1994 that notification for liquidation of the company shall not be published. However, the writ petition was, later on, dismissed for want of prosecution. Application for restoration of the writ petition was also dismissed for want of prosecution vide order dated 01.03.2007, which order was assailed by filing SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23. The undisputed facts on record are that in the interregnum period, notice issued on 16.02.1994 was also subsequently cancelled by the BIFR on 07.04.1994. The BIFR, however, again proceeded with the matter and in its hearing on 01.03.2007, it formed an opinion that the proceedings are required to be drawn for winding up of the company under Section 20(1) of the SICA Act followed by show cause notice dated 01.03.2007. The BIFR again considered the entire case of the appellant in its meeting dated 21.05.2007. The BIFR again considered the entire case of the appellant in its meeting dated 21.05.2007. The BIFR noted that on 03.05.2007, operating agency, IDBI submitted that it had not received any rehabilitation proposal from the date of publication of show cause notice dated 01.03.2007 regarding winding up of the company either from any of the promoters or any other party. It also placed on record information given by the appellant-company regarding filing of SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme against the order passed by the High Court rejecting the application for restoration of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 wherein notices were issued. It also recorded that no order staying the proceedings was passed, but a prayer was made for adjourning the case. The BIFR also took into consideration the submission of the appellant-company that unless mining lease was granted in its favour, it was not possible to revive the company. Representatives of M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited, which had acquired a part of company’s debt, were also heard. Representatives of the Department of Central Excise, RIICO, Punjab National Bank and consultants representing others were also heard. It was finally observed that the unit had been lying closed for the past 18 years which was permanent closure and, therefore, the company ceased to be an industrial undertaking. The company did not have any mining lease. It was also observed that no draft of rehabilitation scheme has been submitted to the operating agency, namely, IDBI. The BIFR, therefore, came to a conclusion that despite having allowed enough time and opportunity to all concerned, it had not been possible to formulate any acceptable revival scheme for the company enabling it to meet its net worth exceeding the accumulated losses within a reasonable time, while meeting all its due financial obligations and that the company, as a result thereof, was not likely to become viable in future and, therefore, it was just, equitable and in public interest that the company should be wound up under Section 20(1) of the SICA. The prima facie opinion, which was formed on 01.03.2007 for winding up the appellant-company, was confirmed and it was directed to forward the said opinion to the High Court along with copy of all orders and proceedings. 24. The prima facie opinion, which was formed on 01.03.2007 for winding up the appellant-company, was confirmed and it was directed to forward the said opinion to the High Court along with copy of all orders and proceedings. 24. Though, Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 was dismissed for want of prosecution and restoration application was also rejected on 01.03.2007, the appellant-company approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP. The said SLP was finally allowed on 06.08.2007 and Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 was restored and the case was remanded back for reconsideration. It appears that the fact that in the meantime, notice dated 16.02.1994 was itself cancelled on 07.04.1994 and the aforesaid writ petition had otherwise become infructuous, was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that issuance of fresh notice on 01.03.2007 and its confirmation on 21.05.2007 for proceeding to wind up the company was informed to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also not in dispute that in the pending Writ Petition No. 1071/1994, neither notice dated 01.03.2007, nor order dated 21.05.2007 were assailed. The aforesaid writ petition came to be finally dismissed on 03.04.2018 by clearly observing that notice dated 16.02.1994 having already been cancelled by the BIFR on 07.04.1994 and subsequent notice dated 01.03.2007 and order dated 21.05.2007 having not been assailed, relief sought in the writ petition had been rendered infructuous. It was observed as below: “Learned counsel for the petitioner company has failed to appreciate that when, subsequently, a show cause notice followed by an order dated 21st May, 2007 was passed by the BIFR for winding up, the question of revival of scheme does not arise. It goes with the subsequent orders. What was required to challenge is the subsequent proceedings by the BIFR but the petitioner company failed to do so. It is, however, a fact that subsequent orders have been challenged by the other company namely Raghupati Cement Limited and is pending consideration before the Division Bench. The outcome of the pending appeal before the Division Bench would decide inter se dispute between the parties therein. Learned counsel for the petitioner company, however, made a reference of the order passed by the Apex Court after dismissal of the application by this Court for restoration of the writ petition. The outcome of the pending appeal before the Division Bench would decide inter se dispute between the parties therein. Learned counsel for the petitioner company, however, made a reference of the order passed by the Apex Court after dismissal of the application by this Court for restoration of the writ petition. It was at the stage when after the interim order, not of the status quo, as stated by learned counsel for the petitioner company, the writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. The restoration application thereupon was also dismissed by this Court. On an appeal before the Apex Court, the application for restoration was allowed vide order dated 06th August, 2007. On the restoration of the petition, it has been heard by this Court. In absence of challenge to show cause notice and subsequent order, the adjudication of the issue in reference to it cannot be made. It cannot be on the stay application without a challenge to it in the writ petition. In view of the above, what we find is that the relief claimed in the writ petition has rendered infructuous in view of the subsequent developments and, for that, interim order passed by this Court has no effect either for the cancellation of order dated 16th February, 1994 by the BIFR or for passing subsequent order otherwise the petitioner company could have preferred a contempt petition. Taking into consideration the aforesaid, this writ petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that dismissal of this writ petition would not affect any other proceedings, which includes, the appeal bearing No.281/2010. This judgment would, however, not curtail rights of the petitioner company, if wants to challenge the show cause notice and the order dated 21st May, 2007.” It is not the case of the appellant that order dated 03.04.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 was assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court or any review petition was filed. Therefore, order dated 03.04.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 1071/1994, having attained finality, in these proceedings, the appellant cannot be heard saying that revival of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 and interim order dated 25.02.1994 had the effect of restraining the BIFR or the AAIFR to proceed further in the matter. Therefore, order dated 03.04.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 1071/1994, having attained finality, in these proceedings, the appellant cannot be heard saying that revival of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 and interim order dated 25.02.1994 had the effect of restraining the BIFR or the AAIFR to proceed further in the matter. As a matter of fact, order dated 21.05.2007 passed by the BIFR was assailed by filing an appeal, not by the appellant-company, but by M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited before the AAIFR. The proceedings before the AAIFR were appellate proceedings wherein legality and validity of order dated 21.05.2007 passed by the BIFR were assailed. If notice dated 01.03.2007 and order dated 21.05.2007 were not eclipsed by pendency of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994, it is difficult to accept that appellate proceedings arising out of the said notice and proceedings could not be maintained or no effective order could be passed by the AAIFR. 25. If we look into the order passed by the AAIFR on 12.01.2009, which was assailed in the writ petition, out of which present appeal arises, we find that the AAIFR has taken into consideration the subsequent developments/legal consequences flowing from the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act by secured creditors and its effect on pending proceedings before the BIFR and even before the AAIFR. 26. The proceedings before the AAIFR were continuation of the proceedings before the BIFR and the issue was whether winding up proceedings initiated by the BIFR were in accordance with law or not. However, when an application was moved before the AAIFR that the proceedings before the BIFR arising out of a reference in the matter of sanction of rehabilitation scheme and rehabilitation stood abated by operation of law, nothing prevented the AAIFR from examining this pure legal issue as to whether the reference proceedings at all could continue further after secured creditors having taken measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. To say that such application could be filed only before the BIFR and the AAIFR could not have examined this legal issue, is misconceived in law as it ignores the principle that the appeal is continuation of original proceedings. The application could be filed either before the BIFR or it could be brought to the notice of the AAIFR or the BIFR regarding abatement of the proceedings. The application could be filed either before the BIFR or it could be brought to the notice of the AAIFR or the BIFR regarding abatement of the proceedings. Since an appeal was pending before the AAIFR, the application was moved before the AAIFR which was considered and opinion rendered. The aforesaid consideration incidentally answers the other objection raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the AAIFR usurped the jurisdiction of the BIFR in considering the application and declaring that reference proceedings have abated. Therefore, impugned order dated 12.01.2009 passed by the AAIFR cannot be held illegal either on the ground that no proceedings could be drawn because of restraint order dated 25.02.1994 passed in Writ Petition No. 1071/1994 or that the AAIFR could not have taken up the application for determination as to whether reference proceedings have abated in view of the provisions contained in third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, as amended. 27. We shall now advert to the main submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, as amended, is not attracted and, therefore, there was no abatement of the proceedings of reference followed by sanction of rehabilitation scheme. To appreciate this submission, we consider it apposite to refer to the relevant provision, which is extracted hereinbelow: “15. To appreciate this submission, we consider it apposite to refer to the relevant provision, which is extracted hereinbelow: “15. Reference to Board.-(1) Where an industrial company has become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors of the company shall, within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year as at the end of which the company has become a sick industrial company, make a reference to the Board for determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company: Provided that if the Board of Directors had sufficient reasons even before such finalisation to form the opinion that the company had become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors shall, within sixty days after it has formed such opinion, make a reference to the Board for the determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company: [Provided further that no reference shall be made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction after the commencement of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, where financial assets have been acquired by any securitisation company or reconstruction company under sub-section (1) of section 5 of that Act: Provided also that on or after the commencement of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, where a reference is pending before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, such reference shall abate if the secured creditors, representing not less than three-fourth in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors, have taken any measures to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of that Act.] (2) xxxxxx” It is relevant to mention here that second and third provisos to Section 15(1) of the SICA were introduced vide Act 54 of 2002, S.41 and Sch. with effect from 21.06.2002. It would not be out of place to further mention that the SARFAESI Act was enacted by the Parliament and as provided under Section 1(3) thereof, it was deemed to have come into force on 21st day of June, 2002. with effect from 21.06.2002. It would not be out of place to further mention that the SARFAESI Act was enacted by the Parliament and as provided under Section 1(3) thereof, it was deemed to have come into force on 21st day of June, 2002. The SARFAESI Act was enacted to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and to provide for a central database of security interests created on property rights and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act provides for enforcement of security interest, which inter alia, provides that any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act provides for a remedy to secured creditor to take recourse to measures to recover the secured debt. Second and third provisos were added in sub section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA to give overriding effect to provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA provides that no reference shall be made to the BIFR after the commencement of the SARFAESI Act where financial assets have been acquired by any securitisation company or reconstruction company under sub-section (1) of Section (5) of that Act. Third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA provides that on or after the commencement of the SARFAESI Act, where reference is pending before the BIFR, such reference shall abate if the secured creditors, representing not less than threefourth in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such creditors, have taken any measures to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. 28. A close analysis and interpretation of third proviso to subsection (1) of Section 15 of the SICA would reveal that where secured creditors take any measure to recover their secured debt under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, as provided therein, the reference shall abate by operation of law. The abatement would follow as necessary consequence under the law where the secured creditors represent not less than three-fourth of the amount outstanding. The abatement would follow as necessary consequence under the law where the secured creditors represent not less than three-fourth of the amount outstanding. Therefore, it is vividly clear that such a provision has been made for the benefit of a secured creditor. Secured creditor has been defined under Section 2(1), clause (zd) of the SARFAESI Act as below: “2. Definitions.-(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) xxxxxx (b) xxxxxx [(zd) “secured creditor” means— (i) any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions holding any right, title or interest upon any tangible asset or intangible asset as specified in clause (l); (ii) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or financial institution; or (iii) an asset reconstruction company whether acting as such or managing a trust set up by such asset reconstruction company for the securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may be; or (iv) debenture trustee registered with [the Board and appointed] for secured debt securities; or (v) any other trustee holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution, in whose favour security interest is created by any borrower for due repayment of any financial assistance.;]” In view of the aforesaid wide definition, secured creditors are not only any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions, but also debenture trustees, asset reconstruction company and class of trustees as mentioned in sub-clauses of the definition clause of secured creditor. 29. The other important provision is that the creditors must represent not less than three-fourth in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors. On rational construction of the aforesaid expression in the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, if there are more than one secured creditor, they all must represent not less than three-fourth in value of the amount which is outstanding against the financial assistance which has been disbursed to the borrower and must be of such creditors. Once those secured creditors have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the legal consequence of abatement by operation of law would ensue. 30. Once those secured creditors have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the legal consequence of abatement by operation of law would ensue. 30. Insofar as present case is concerned, it is an admitted fact that the respondent-M/s. Asset Care Enterprises Ltd. (ACE) had acquired debt liability of IFCI and ICICI. Though M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited has also purchased loan liability of the appellant-company insofar as financial assistance provided by IDBI and PNB is concerned, there is nothing on record, much less, established from any pleadings or documents of the appellant that M/s. Raghupati Cement Private Limited is covered by the definition of secured creditor as defined in clause (zd) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the SARFAESI Act. This is because it is neither bank or financial institution, nor an asset reconstruction company, nor debenture trustees appointed by any bank or financial institution, much less, covered under the definition of trustees holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution. It was admittedly only an asset reconstruction company which, for the purpose of third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, is included in the definition of secured creditor. Now, if we look into the provisions contained in third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, what is of significance is that secured creditors must be representing not less than three-fourth in value of the amount which was outstanding against financial assistance and which was disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors. Therefore, it is the outstanding amount which has to be taken into consideration. Further, this outstanding amount is with respect to financial assistance provided to the borrower by such secured creditors. The expression, “such secured creditors” clearly manifests legislative intention that the outstanding amount must be of such secured creditors who have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under subsection (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. Further, this outstanding amount is with respect to financial assistance provided to the borrower by such secured creditors. The expression, “such secured creditors” clearly manifests legislative intention that the outstanding amount must be of such secured creditors who have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under subsection (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. To put it differently, if there are number of secured creditors who have taken any measure to recover their secured debt under subsection (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act and the secured debt, which is outstanding, is not less than three-fourth of the outstanding amount which was disbursed to the borrower by those secured creditors, third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA would be attracted to result in abatement of the proceedings by operation of law. 31. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the word, “outstanding” as mentioned in third proviso to subsection (1) of Section 15 of the SICA is required to be interpreted liberally, so as to include the entire amount of financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors. We are unable to accept this submission as it would do violence to the rule of literal construction, but also of the legislative intent behind introduction of an overriding clause in favour of secured creditors by adding third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA. The object of the legislation was to allow the secured creditors to recover their outstanding amount standing against the borrower and there is no warrant for substituting the word, “outstanding” by expression, “entire amount borrowed”. Moreover, it is important to note that the expression, “such secured creditors”, also manifests the legislative scheme of linking the outstanding amount which has been disbursed to the borrower by such secured creditors who have taken measures to recover their secured debt under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. There may be a case where there can be more than one secured creditor. If some of them or anyone of them has any outstanding amount payable to it/them which is not less than three-fourth in value, the moment such secured creditor or creditors takes/take measures to recover their secured debt, abatement of the proceedings would follow. 32. There may be a case where there can be more than one secured creditor. If some of them or anyone of them has any outstanding amount payable to it/them which is not less than three-fourth in value, the moment such secured creditor or creditors takes/take measures to recover their secured debt, abatement of the proceedings would follow. 32. The legislative scheme, after enactment of the SARFAESI Act and consequential amendment by addition of two provisos in subsection (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, reveals interplay between the scheme of revival of a sick company and at the same time, protecting the interest of secured creditors. The legislative scheme seeks to strike balance between the interest of a borrower and the interest of a secured creditor. The scheme of revival through reference proceedings under the SICA has to yield to interest of the secured creditors in certain circumstances and on fulfillment of certain conditions expressly mentioned in the third proviso to subsection (1) of Section 15 of the SICA. The legislative scheme is, thus, clear that in certain circumstances and on fulfillment of certain conditions, overriding effect has been given to enforce secured interest of secured creditors. Interpretation of the provisions as suggested by learned counsel for the appellant would frustrate the object of the enactment and will not only be against literal construction, but also frustrate the object of the legislation as well. Therefore, on application of principle of literal construction of statute as also purposive construction of statute, the submission of leaned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Rather, submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the expression, “outstanding” could not be stretched to include, “entire amount of financial assistance taken by a borrower”, has to be accepted. 33. In fact, there is no scope for giving a different meaning to the expression “amount outstanding”. This is for the reason that though in Section 15 of the SICA or any other part of the provisions of the SICA, expression, “amount outstanding” has not been defined or explained, the expression, “amount outstanding” finds an explanation in Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act. Explanation appended to Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act clearly provides as below: “13. This is for the reason that though in Section 15 of the SICA or any other part of the provisions of the SICA, expression, “amount outstanding” has not been defined or explained, the expression, “amount outstanding” finds an explanation in Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act. Explanation appended to Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act clearly provides as below: “13. Enforcement of security interest.—(1) xxxxx (2) xxxxx (3) xxxxx (9) [Subject to the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of] financing of a financial asset by more than one secured creditors or joint financing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights conferred on him under or pursuant to sub-section (4) unless exercise of such right is agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than [sixty per cent.] in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date and such action shall be binding on all the secured creditors: Provided that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956): Provided further that in the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act, the secured creditor of such company, who opts to realise his security instead of relinquishing his security and proving his debt under proviso to subsection (1) of section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), may retain the sale proceeds of his secured assets after depositing the workmen's dues with the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of that Act: Provided also that liquidator referred to in the second proviso shall intimate the secured creditor the workmen's dues in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and in case such workmen's dues cannot be ascertained, the liquidator shall intimate the estimated amount of workmen's dues under that section to the secured creditor and in such case the secured creditor may retain the sale proceeds of the secured assets after depositing the amount of such estimated dues with the liquidator: Provided also that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of workmen's dues, such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited by the secured creditor with the liquidator: Provided also that the secured creditor shall furnish an undertaking to the liquidator to pay the balance of the workmen's dues, if any. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section — (a) “record date” means the date agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than [sixty per cent.] in value of the amount outstanding on such date; (b) “amount outstanding” shall include principal, interest and any other dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor in respect of secured asset as per the books of account of the secured creditor. (10) xxxxxx” Thus, the expression, “amount outstanding” includes principal, interest and any other dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor in respect of secured assets as per the books of account of the secured creditor. That means what is payable to the secured creditor as per the books of account would be the amount outstanding. Therefore, it is not the financial assistance, as a whole which was borrowed by the borrower, but the amount which remains payable to the secured creditor by the borrower, as per books of account which has to be understood as “amount outstanding”. The aforesaid explanation to the expression, “amount outstanding” as provided in Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act bears a direct correlation with the same expression used in third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA as the proviso essentially lays down statutory scheme with regard to interplay between the SICA and the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the expression, “amount outstanding” as occurring in third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA is the amount which is explained in Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act and no other amount, nor can it be read as total amount of financial assistance disbursed to the borrower by the secured creditors. Such an interpretation goes completely against the meaning of expression “amount outstanding” as per explanation appended in Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act. 34. In the case of Madras Petrochem Limited & Another Vs. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction & Others (2016) 4 SCC 1 , the interplay of the SICA and the SARFAESI Act was examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was pertinently observed as below: “44. 34. In the case of Madras Petrochem Limited & Another Vs. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction & Others (2016) 4 SCC 1 , the interplay of the SICA and the SARFAESI Act was examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was pertinently observed as below: “44. It will, thus, be seen that notwithstanding the non obstante clauses in Sections 22(1) and (4), read with Section 32, Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will have to give way to the measures taken under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, more particularly referred to in Section 13 of the said Act, and that this being the case, the sale notices issued both in 2003 and 2013 could continue without in any manner being thwarted by Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.” 35. Another submission of learned counsel for the appellant that third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA would be attracted only when rehabilitation scheme has been framed and not when the proceedings have travelled beyond the stage of reference and the rehabilitation scheme is sanctioned, cannot be accepted and has to be rejected in view of what has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Madras Petrochem Limited & Another Vs. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction & Others (supra). The observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard read thus: “49. Question 2 arises on the facts of this case because of a conflict between the High Courts on the interpretation of Section 15(1) proviso 3. A large number of High Courts have, in judgments differing in detail only, taken the broad view that the expression “where a reference is pending” under Section 15(1) proviso 3 would include all proceedings before BIFR right till the stage of the successful culmination of a scheme for reconstruction or the recommendation for winding up of the sick industrial company. These High Courts are Madras, Delhi, Bombay, Kerala, Punjab, Gujarat and Calcutta. All these judgments are referred to in an exhaustive Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Salem Textiles Ltd. V. Authorised Officer 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 1450. These High Courts are Madras, Delhi, Bombay, Kerala, Punjab, Gujarat and Calcutta. All these judgments are referred to in an exhaustive Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Salem Textiles Ltd. V. Authorised Officer 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 1450. The only dissenting voice is that of the Orissa High Court in a judgment reported in Noble Aqua (P) Ltd. V. SBI 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 7, which has held that the expression “reference” would only refer to the initial stage of filing a reference before BIFR and not to subsequent stages thereof, namely inquiry, preparation and sanction of schemes. It has to be determined as to which of these two sets of judgments is a correct exposition of the law. 50. It is clear that a purely literal interpretation of the expression “where a reference is pending” can yield the result that the Orissa High Court reached. In fact, Chapter III of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 specifically refers, in the Chapter heading, to references, inquiries and schemes. While Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 deals with references, Section 16 deals with inquiries into the working of sick industrial companies. Section 18 then deals with preparation and sanction of schemes. 51. What has to be examined is whether this purely literal rendering of the expression “where a reference is pending” is correct or not. First and foremost, it is important to note that the third proviso to Section 15(1) uses the words “is pending”. A reference has been held to be pending the moment it is received by the Board. In Real Value Appliances Ltd. V. Canara Bank (1998) 5 SCC 554 , this Court had to decide whether the mere registration of a reference by BIFR would result in the automatic cessation of all proceedings which are pending in civil courts and the company court against its assets. It was argued that in order that Section 22 of the Act can come into operation, BIFR must, subsequent to the registration of the reference under Section 15, apply its mind and consider whether it is necessary under Section 16 to make an inquiry. Unless an inquiry is pending, the provisions of Section 22 of the Act do not get attracted. Unless an inquiry is pending, the provisions of Section 22 of the Act do not get attracted. It was held that once the reference is registered after a preliminary scrutiny, it is mandatory for BIFR to conduct an inquiry. This being so, it is in furtherance of the legislative intention to see that no proceedings against the assets are taken before BIFR decides, after the inquiry, to continue with the reference. It was thus held, having particular regard to Section 16(3) Explanation, that an inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced upon the receipt by the Board of any reference or information or upon its knowledge reduced to writing by the Board. This being the case, this Court held that once the reference is registered and once it is mandatory to simultaneously call for information/documents from the informant, then an inquiry under Section 16 must be deemed to have commenced. In that view of the matter, Section 22 would immediately come into play. It is clear, therefore, that if a literal meaning were to be applied to the expression “where a reference is pending”, the third proviso to Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 would be rendered otiose and the purpose for which it was inserted would completely fail. On a literal reading of the provision, such reference shall abate on steps being taken by the secured creditors to recover their secured debts under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the moment a reference is registered. And this Court has held that the moment the reference is registered, an inquiry as contemplated by Section 16 shall be deemed to commence. If that is so, then a reference can never be said to be pending after an inquiry commences, if the learned counsel for the appellants is correct. This can never be the case. It is clear, therefore, that the expression “where a reference is pending” would necessarily include the inquiry stage before the Board under Section 16 of the Act. If this be the case, then the reference can be said to be pending not only when an inquiry is instituted, but also after preparation and sanction of a scheme right till the stage the scheme has worked out successfully or till BIFR gives its opinion to wind up the company. 52. If this be the case, then the reference can be said to be pending not only when an inquiry is instituted, but also after preparation and sanction of a scheme right till the stage the scheme has worked out successfully or till BIFR gives its opinion to wind up the company. 52. The expression “reference” used in Section 15(1) proviso 3 is used in contradistinction to the expression “proceedings” in Section 22. “Proceedings” under Section 22 are actions taken against the sick company, whereas “references” are actions initiated by a sick company–it is perhaps for this reason that the third proviso to Section 15(1) uses the expression “reference” instead of the expression “proceedings”.” In the aforesaid decision, third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA was also analysed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “53. Another important aspect as to the construction of the third proviso to Section 15(1) is the meaning of the expression “such reference shall abate”. One of the meanings of the expression “abate” is “to put an end to; to curtail; to come to naught”. (See Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon). A reference can be said to abate in one or several ways. One obvious way that a reference abates is where the Board, after inquiry, rejects the reference for the reason that the Board is satisfied that the Company is not a sick industrial company as defined under the Act. Another way in which a reference can abate is where a scheme is implemented successfully, and the sick industrial company is taken out of the woods successfully. A third manner in which a reference can abate is when a scheme or schemes have failed in respect of the sick industrial company, and in the opinion of the BIFR, the said Company ought to be wound up. A fourth instance of abatement is provided by the third proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. And that is that a reference which is pending in the sense understood hereinabove shall abate if the secured creditors of not less than 3/4th in value of the amount outstanding against the financial assistance disbursed to the borrower, have taken measures to recover secured debts under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. It is clear that the third proviso to Section 15(1) seeks to strike a balance between getting a sick industrial company out of the woods and secured creditors being able to recover the debt owed to them by such company. The legislature has thought it fit to annul all proceedings before BIFR only when at least 3/4th of the amount outstanding against financial assistance disbursed to the borrower of such secured creditors have taken the measures listed in Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The balance is, therefore, struck by the figure of “not less than 3/4th”. The legislature has inserted this provision so that, if 3/4th or more of the secured creditors get together to take measures under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, they will not be thwarted by the provisions of Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and it will not be necessary for them to obtain BIFR permission before taking any such measures. This construction of the third proviso to Section 15(1) is in keeping with the march of events post 2002, when the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 came to be enacted pursuant to various committee reports, and for the reasons outlined hereinabove.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court finally summed up the legal position with regard to interplay of the statutory provisions of the SICA and the SARFAESI Act as below: “57. The resultant position may be stated thus: 1. Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will continue to apply in the case of unsecured creditors seeking to recover their debts from a sick industrial company. This is for the reason that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 overrides the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 2. This is for the reason that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 overrides the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 2. Where a secured creditor of a sick industrial company seeks to recover its debt in the manner provided by Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, such secured creditor may realise such secured debt under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 3. In a situation where there are more than one secured creditor of a sick industrial company or it has been jointly financed by secured creditors, and at least 60% of such secured creditors in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date do not agree upon exercise of the right to realise their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will continue to have full play. 4. Where, under Section 13(9) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, in the case of a sick industrial company having more than one secured creditor or being jointly financed by secured creditors representing 60% or more in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date wish to exercise their rights to enforce their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, being inconsistent with the exercise of such rights, will have no play. 5. Where secured creditors representing not less than 75% in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance decide to enforce their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, any reference pending under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 cannot be proceeded with further–the proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will abate.” Therefore, the view which we have taken hereinabove finds full support from the discussions, analysis and conclusion drawn by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madras Petrochem Limited & Another Vs. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction & Others (supra). 36. One of the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant was that since before taking measures under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, the so-called secured creditors had not complied with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case where the secured creditors have taken measures to recover their secured debt in accordance with law. This submission of learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be rejected at the threshold. Though the appellant, while filing the writ petition had also laid challenge to notice dated 05.06.2008 issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act as also the action for taking possession under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, but later on withdrew challenge to those reliefs by making specific application which was also allowed vide order dated 10.12.2009. This fact has been clearly mentioned by the learned Single Judge in the opening paragraph of the impugned order. Therefore, such submission made before this Court has no legs to stand and deserves outright rejection. Though, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents have also brought on record certain notices purporting to be under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, we are not inclined to dwell into that aspect as the same is outside the scope of challenge in the present appeal. 37. In view of above discussion, the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as also Delhi High Court cited by learned counsel for the appellant at the Bar rendered in the cases of Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram & Others (Appeal (Civil) 1998 of 2008 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 14.03.2008); Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Others (SLP (C) No. 25043-25045 of 2008 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 06.09.2010); Vareed Jacob Vs. Sosamma Geevarghese & Others (Appeal (Civil) 2634 of 2004 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 21.04.2004); Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 ; Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1857; Asset Reconstruction Co. India P. Ltd. Vs. Shamken Spinners Ltd. & Ors. Union of India & Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 ; Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1857; Asset Reconstruction Co. India P. Ltd. Vs. Shamken Spinners Ltd. & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 9557/2007 decided by Delhi High Court on 22.11.2010); and Global Infrastructure Technologies Limited v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited & Others, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1502 do not come to the aid of the appellant to support its case. 38. In the cases of Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (supra) and Asset Reconstruction Co. India P. Ltd. Vs. Shamken Spinners Ltd. & Ors. (supra), Delhi High Court dealt with interpretation of second proviso to Section 15(1) of the SICA. Order passed in the case of Global Infrastructure Technologies Limited v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited & Others (supra) was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram & Others (supra), the issue which arose for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with regard to execution of an ex-parte decree. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (supra) also does not support the case of the appellant insofar as issue of abatement under the scheme of third proviso to Section 15(1) of the SICA is concerned. In the case of Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review under the garb of clarification, modification or correction is not permissible. The principal of law based on the maxim, “Actus Curiae neminem gravabit” was explained. It was also held that no litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a Court, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. The principle of legal malice was also explained. The aforesaid decision does not come to the aid of the appellant in support of its case to say that the abatement of the reference proceedings does not ensue in the present case. In the case of Vareed Jacob Vs. The principle of legal malice was also explained. The aforesaid decision does not come to the aid of the appellant in support of its case to say that the abatement of the reference proceedings does not ensue in the present case. In the case of Vareed Jacob Vs. Sosamma Geevarghese & Others (supra), the issue which arose for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was as to whether on restoration of a suit, an order of injunction passed is automatically revived or not. In the case in hand, this Court has examined the facts of the case and taken note that notice dated 16.02.1994, which was subject matter of Writ Petition No. 1071/1994, was otherwise cancelled subsequently and while the writ petition stood dismissed, fresh proceedings were initiated and opinion was formed on 21.05.2007 which was subjected to challenge by an appeal before the AAIFR and at that stage, application seeking declaration of abatement of reference proceedings was filed on the basis of subsequent event that the secured creditors had taken measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, the aforesaid decision also does not come to the aid of the appellant in the present case. 39. An argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondents that in any case, the SICA having been repealed vide the SIC Repeal Act of 2003 (Act No. 1 of 2004), reference proceedings would otherwise abate. The SIC Repeal Act of 2003 came into force with effect from 25.11.2016 vide Notification No. S.O. 3568(E), dated 01.12.2016 published in Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II. With the repeal of the SICA, the appellate authority, i.e., the AAIFR and the Board, i.e., the BIFR also stood dissolved. Section 4, clause (b) of the SIC Repeal Act of 2003 provides that any appeal preferred to the Appellate Authority or any reference made or inquiry pending to or before the Board or any proceeding of whatever nature pending before the Appellate Authority or the Board under the SICA shall stand abated. Section 4, clause (b) of the SIC Repeal Act of 2003 provides that any appeal preferred to the Appellate Authority or any reference made or inquiry pending to or before the Board or any proceeding of whatever nature pending before the Appellate Authority or the Board under the SICA shall stand abated. Third proviso appended to clause (b) of Section 4 of the SIC Repeal Act of 2003, however, provides that any scheme sanctioned under sub-section (4) or any scheme under implementation under subsection (12) of Section 18 of the SICA shall be deemed to be an approved resolution plan under sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the same shall be dealt with, in accordance with the provisions of Part II of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. However, as we have already held that even before repeal of the SICA vide the SIC Repeal Act of 2003, the reference proceedings abated in view of the provisions contained in third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the SICA, the third proviso to clause (b) of Section 4 of the SIC Repeal Act of 2003 is not attracted. 40. As an upshot of the above discussion, the appeal fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.