JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application was originally preferred by the petitioners for the following reliefs. (i) For quashing of Letter No. 04/ Mu 1-163/2017-1680 dated 28.08.2018 (Annexure-4) issued by the Respondent No. 1 and addressed to the Respondent No. 4. (ii) Further prays for quashing of Letter bearing Ref. No. SKNU/R-G/713/ 18 dated 08.09.2018 (Annexure-5) issued in pursuance of the aforesaid Letter dated 28.08.2018 of the Respondent No. 1. directing the concerned head of the Departments and the Principal / Professor In charge of the constituent Colleges under the Respondent No. 3 not to pay the salary of teaching employees in the academic Grade Pay of Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 8,000/- until recommended by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission. (iii) For a declaration that the impugned Letter No. 1680 dated 28.08.2018 is wholly illegal, arbitrary and suffers from complete non application of mind. (iv) That during the pendency of the writ petition, the Respondents notified the Statutes for promotion vide letter No.2083 dated 15.12.2022 in the light of UGC Regulations dated 30.06.2010. Hence Petitioners filed I.A. No.4236/2023 for amendment which was allowed and hence the additional prayer was incorporated. (v) Amended Prayer "Quashing of condition prescribed in clause-1.3 of the 'Statute for promotion of Teachers from one Academic Level / Grade Pay to another Academic Level / Grade Pay under the Career Advancement Scheme, 2010' as notified vide letter No.2083 dated 15.12.2022 issued by the respondent No.2, to the extent that the said clause provides that the actual benefits of promotion under the aforesaid statute shall be given from the date of notification of the statute.” In the midst of pendency of the writ petition, the Respondents notified the Statutes by way of Gazette Notification dated 15.12.2022 under University Grant Commission Regulation 2018 (hereinafter to be referred as UGC Regulation); in which vide Clause 1.3, it was stipulated that the monetary benefits accruing out of promotion or otherwise under the statutes will be prospective in nature and admissible on and from the date of Notification i.e., 15.12.2022. Under the aforesaid circumstances the Petitioners preferred an interlocutory application being I.A. No. 4236 of 2023 for amendment of relief in the writ petition, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 12.06.2023 and in compliance thereof, the Petitioners filed the amended writ petition incorporating the amended relief challenging the impugned stipulation under Clause 1.3 of the Statute dated 15.12.2022 which permitted the monetary benefits from the date of notification. During course of hearing, Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his argument only on the issue of clause 1.3 of notification dated 15.12.2022; wherein, in the last sentence it has been stipulated that the monetary benefit under the statutes shall be given from the date of notification i.e. 15.12.2022; which according to him is non-est in the eye of law. Learned Counsel in view of the fact that now Statutes under 2010 UGC Regulations have been notified, submits that the Petitioners are not shy of being assessed under the Statutes for promotion and as such the prayer originally made in the writ petition may only remain as academic issues which may be decided in appropriate case if situation so arises. Accordingly, this Court is proceeding to see the legality of the impugned clause 1.3 to the extent of prospectivity of monetary benefits under the Statutes notified on 15.12.2022. 3. The brief facts as enunciated in the pleadings of the writ application is that the Petitioners No. 1 to 3 were duly appointed as Assistant Professor on 29.02.2008 and petitioner No. 4 was appointed on 03.03.2008 and Petitioner No. 5 on 01.03.2008 in the concerned College under the Respondent No. 3, details of which are indicated hereunder: Petitioner No. Petitioner's Name Date of Appointment Name of College Qualification 1. Dr. Kala Nand Thakur 29.02.2008 S.P. College, Dumka. Dr. of Pholosophy in Psychology. 2. Vivekanand Singh 29.02.2008 Godda Colege. Dr. of Pholosophy in Science. 3. Arvind Kumar Jha 29.02.2008 A.S. College,. Deoghar. Μ.Α. in English + Jharkhand eligibility test. 4. Kishlai Sinha 03.03.2008 R.D.B.M. College, Deoghar. Dr. of Pholosophy in Political Science. 5. Rahul 01.03.2008 S.P. College, Dumka. Philosphy in Economics. 4. University Grants Commission came out with Regulation dated 30.06.2010. The State Government while adopting the said Regulation dated 30.06.2010 did not adopt the age of retirement, vide Memo No. 1188 dated 20.11.2010. 4. Kishlai Sinha 03.03.2008 R.D.B.M. College, Deoghar. Dr. of Pholosophy in Political Science. 5. Rahul 01.03.2008 S.P. College, Dumka. Philosphy in Economics. 4. University Grants Commission came out with Regulation dated 30.06.2010. The State Government while adopting the said Regulation dated 30.06.2010 did not adopt the age of retirement, vide Memo No. 1188 dated 20.11.2010. Thus, the age of retirement of the teaching employees under the Colleges and Universities of the State of Jharkhand remained as 62 years under Memo dated 20.11.2010. On 18.09.2010, Clause-6.80 of UGC Regulation dated 30.06.2010 published in the official gazette of Union of India read with the Schedule appended thereto clearly indicates that persons entering in the service as a teaching employee in Universities and Colleges shall be as Assistant Professor and placed in the pay band-III of Rs. 15,600/- to 39,100/- with AGP of Rs. 6,000/-. The UGC Regulation prescribes that an Assistant Professor having Ph.D. Degree with Four years of service shall be eligible for AGP of Rs. 7,000/-, an Assistant Professor without Ph.D. Degree shall be eligible for AGP of Rs. 7,000/- upon Five years of service and an Assistant Professor who does not possess either Ph.D. or M.Phil shall be eligible for AGP of Rs. 7,000/- on 6 years of service as Assistant Professor. The aforesaid Regulation dated 30.06.2010 and the Memo No. 1188 dated 20.11.2010 also indicates that enhancement of AGP of an Assistant Professor from Rs. 6,000/- to Rs. 7,000/- and from Rs. 7,000/- to Rs. 8,000/- is intra-cadre automatic enhancement of Grade Pay upon acquisition of prescribed length of service with prescribed qualifications. Since it was not a post-based promotion and therefore it does not require the formality of obtaining any recommendation from the State Public Service Commission in exercise of powers of University Service Commission and College Service Commission. 5. On 15.05.2012, the Respondent-University i.e. Respondent No. 3 vide Notification as contained in Memo No. 456/12 dated 15.05.2012 notified for grant of AGP of Rs. 7,000/- to the teaching employees under the University in the light of Memo No. 1188 dated 20.11.2010. On 19.03.2012, a similar notification to that extent was also issued vide Memo No. 239/12 dated 19.03.2012 in the light of the decision of "Pay Fixation, Seniority and Approval Committee which accorded grant of AGP of Rs. 8,000/- to all such Assistant Professor who have completed Five years of service in the scale of Rs. On 19.03.2012, a similar notification to that extent was also issued vide Memo No. 239/12 dated 19.03.2012 in the light of the decision of "Pay Fixation, Seniority and Approval Committee which accorded grant of AGP of Rs. 8,000/- to all such Assistant Professor who have completed Five years of service in the scale of Rs. 15,600/- to 39,100/- in AGP of Rs. 7,000/-. Thereafter, one Ram Pyare Misra had moved before this Court vide W.P.(S) No. 5841 of 2016 challenging the recovery of AGP from his pension. This Court in the said writ petition after hearing the parties allowed the said writ petition partly vide Order dated 03.07.2018, inter alia holding that since the petitioner was never promoted to the post of Lecturer (Senior Scale) hence he remained in the basic Grade of Assistant Professor and thus was not entitled for the AGP of Rs. 8,000/-. As per the petitioners, the Respondent No. 1 completely misunderstood and misinterpreted the order of this Court and issued Letter No. 1680 dated 28.08.2018, thereby prohibiting the respective Universities in the State of Jharkhand under Jharkhand Universities Act from granting the AGP of Rs. 7,000/- to Assistant Professors in the absence of recommendation of the said Public Service Commission. In the light of the aforesaid impugned Letter No. 1680 dated 28.08.2018, the Respondent No. 3 under the signature of Respondent No. 5 issued Letter No. 713/18 dated 08.09.2018 whereby the benefit of AGP of Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 8,000/- to the teaching employees has been stopped in absence of recommendation by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission. 6. In the instant case, the petitioners were appointed in the pre-revised scale of Rs. 8,000/- to Rs. 13,500/- corresponding to the revised scale of Rs. 15,600/- to 39,100/- for AGP of Rs. 6,000/- and the petitioners upon fulfilling the requisite length of service and other qualifications were granted the AGP of Rs. 7,000/- by the Respondent No. 3 by a concerted decision of the statutory committee i.e. Seniority and Pay Fixation Committee dated 10.04.2012. The case of the petitioners is that the grant of AGP of Rs. 7,000/- to Assistant Professor was never a post-based promotion as is in the case of grant of AGP of Rs. 7,000/- by the Respondent No. 3 by a concerted decision of the statutory committee i.e. Seniority and Pay Fixation Committee dated 10.04.2012. The case of the petitioners is that the grant of AGP of Rs. 7,000/- to Assistant Professor was never a post-based promotion as is in the case of grant of AGP of Rs. 8,000/- (replacement of Lecturer Senior Scale) which is equivalent to AGP of Reader / Associate Professor as per Serial No. 3 & 4 of the chart to Para 7 of the resolution dated 20/11/2010. The aforesaid discussions are not germane to the issue on validity of Clause 1.3 of 15.12.2022 Notification and has been noted by this Court for brief synopsis of the claim made in the original (unamended) writ petition. 7. On 15.12.2022, the Respondents came out with Statute for promotion of Teachers from one Academic Level/Grade Pay to another Academic Level/Grade Pay under the Career Advancement Scheme, 2010 as notified vide letter No.2083 dated 15.12.2022 issued by the respondent No.2, providing that the actual benefits of promotion under the aforesaid statute shall be given from the date of notification of the statute which as per the petitioners is illegal and arbitrary. The said Notification has a condition vide Chapter 1 para 1.3, that the monetary benefits will be payable after its Notification although it shall operate retrospectively. It also indicates the date of operation ranging from 01.01.2009 to 05/06.08.2021. 8. The specific case of the petitioner is that it is completely absurd that the statutes for the purpose of consideration for promotion shall operate retrospectively and for the purpose of grant of monetary benefits in the event of promotion, it will be prospective in nature. The contention of the petitioners is that when the Statute dated 06.08.2021 in light of UGC Regulation 2018 has already been notified and made effective from the date of notification i.e., 06.08.2021, the Petitioners are already placed under the replacement / revised scale. Additionally, the 6th CPC provided for Pay Band and Academic Grade Pay but the 7th CPC has been followed by providing for Academic Pay structure. Hence the entire system of pay fixation has been replaced by a totally new pay fixation system. Additionally, the 6th CPC provided for Pay Band and Academic Grade Pay but the 7th CPC has been followed by providing for Academic Pay structure. Hence the entire system of pay fixation has been replaced by a totally new pay fixation system. As per the petitioners, the respondents are trying to take advantage of their own latches, inasmuch as, it was for the Respondents to frame the statutes within time (preferably six months) but they failed to do so. It is a strange action of the Respondents that Statute under 2018 UGC Regulations were framed but statutes under 2010 UGC Regulations were not framed. Never in the history of University/College Service, has such a condition ever been put in the promotional statutes. If the Statute under Notification dated 15.12.2022 ceases its force from 06.08.2021 by virtue of Statute under 2018 UGC Regulations, the Respondents cannot justify as to how monetary benefits will be paid from the date of Notification, where it is non-operational and lost its force. 9. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioners submits that vide notification contained in letter no. 2083 dated 15.12.2022 (Anenxure-7), the Director Higher Education notified the statutes under Career Advancement Scheme 2010 in the light of UGC Regulation dated 30.6.2010 (Annx-1). The statutes under CAS 2010 notified on 15.12.2022 and vide clause 1.3; in the last sentence has prescribed that the monetary benefit under the statutes shall be given from the date of notification i.e. 15.12.2022. The said statute notified on 15.12.2022 has been made subject to Government notification issued under memo no. 1188 dated 20.11.2010 and UGC Regulation dated 30.6.2010. He further submits that the Government notification vide memo no. 1188 dated 20.11.2010 vide para 2 is an undertaking by the government that financial benefits under the UGC Regulation 2010 shall be fully borne by the Government with effect from 1.4.2010 and for the period prior to 1.4.2010 the financial burden of 20% by the State Government shall be borne only on receipt of 80% of the Central Government share. He further submits that UGC Regulation 2010 dated 30.6.2010 provides at para 1.3 that it shall come into force with immediate effect and vide para 2.1.0 provides that the revised scales for pay, service conditions including the age of superannuation shall be strictly in accordance with the decision of Central government MHRD. 10. Mr. He further submits that UGC Regulation 2010 dated 30.6.2010 provides at para 1.3 that it shall come into force with immediate effect and vide para 2.1.0 provides that the revised scales for pay, service conditions including the age of superannuation shall be strictly in accordance with the decision of Central government MHRD. 10. Mr. Singh contended that a conjoint reading of the impugned clause vide para 1.3 read with para 2.2 and para 2.3 of the Statutes notified on 15.12.2022; when read along with (A) para 2, (B) para 19 and (C) last line of the opening paragraph of memo no, 1188 dated 20.11.2010; and also along with (A) para 1.3 and (B) 2.1.0 of UGC regulation 2010, clearly demonstrates the illegality regarding the impugned clause in para 1.3 of notification dated 15.12.2022. As a matter of facts, the respondents have sub-classified the employees of the university in extending the financial benefits for 'pensioners' from 1.4.2010 and 'in service employees' from 15.12.2022. Mr. Singh reiterated that the respondents do not have the freedom of introducing the impugned condition in the light of UGC regulation 2010 and their own undertaking vide Memo dated 20.11.2010. In order to buttress his argument, learned counsel referred to two judgments; (i) MRF Ltd., Kottayam versus Asstt. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and Ors. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 702 para 30, 35 and 38; (ii) Basudeo Tiwary Versus Sido Kanhu Univeristy & Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 194 at para 9; 11. Per contra; Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, learned AAG-I representing the State respondents submits that as per clause 16 of the departmental resolution no. 1188 dated 20.11.2010, any promotion after 31.12.2008 shall be given in light of the UGC Regulation 2010. In this regard it is pertinent to mention here that promotion under the 2010 Regulation could only have been granted after formulation of statute for promotion. However, the same could not have been framed at that time and in absence of any such statute, no enhancement in Grade Pay could have been granted to the Petitioners by the University. Thus, when such irregularity was brought to the knowledge of the departmental authorities, necessary instruction were issued vide letter dated 28.08.2018 which is just and proper. She further submits that now the State Government vide its letter no. Thus, when such irregularity was brought to the knowledge of the departmental authorities, necessary instruction were issued vide letter dated 28.08.2018 which is just and proper. She further submits that now the State Government vide its letter no. 2083 dated 15.12.2022 has communicated to all the concerned that "Statutes for Promotion of Teachers from one Academic Level/Grade Pay to another Academic Level/Grade Pay under the Career Advancement Scheme, 2010" has been framed and the same has received assent of the Hon'ble Governor -cum-Chancellor, vide its letter no. 3426 dated 13.12.2022. As such, necessary steps for granting promotion in light of the provisions of the said statute be processed. She further submits that Para 2.1.0 provides that the revised scales of pay and other service conditions including age of superannuation in central universities and other institutions maintained and/or funded by the University Grants Commission (UGC), as such the said clause does not apply to petitioners since it is related to either central universities or to other institutions maintained and/or funded by UGC to which the petitioners do not belong. 12. The ground of discrimination/ sub-classification which the petitioners are making regarding pensioners and teachers in service relying on clause (19) of the notification dated 20.11.2010 also has no substance since the said clause provides for pension which shall be notionally from 1.1.2006 and actual financial benefit from 1.4.2010 as per the UGC Regulations which were in vogue then. The UGC Regulations could have been adopted by the State Government only through statutes, provisions for which are in Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 (Adapted). Mrs. Mishra further contended that the statutes as per UGC Regulation, 2018 came into force from 06.08.2021 and covered all areas of the UGC Regulations, 2018 whereas from 1.1.2009 till 6.8.2021 there were no statutes to guide the promotion and other service conditions of teachers as per UGC Regulations, 2010 and there was a vacuum in this regard. To fill this gap the statutes were framed which was notified on 15.12.2022 only to cover the in-between period. 13. To fill this gap the statutes were framed which was notified on 15.12.2022 only to cover the in-between period. 13. As far as the grievance of the petitioners regarding clause 1.3 is concerned, which states that the actual financial benefit shall be given from the date of notification of this Statute is concerned; it has been submitted by learned AAG-1 that since no benefits of Academic Grade Pay/ Promotion to the teachers could be given in absence of any Statute from 1.1.2009 till 6.8.2021, it was the policy decision of the State that to cover that period, notional promotion be given and AGP as and when enhanced be given so that calculation of Basic Pay can be as per the enhanced Grade Pay and the monetary benefit be given from the date of the notification i.e. 15.12.2022. Since arrears could not be given in absence of any statute or in absence of any law to that effect, the notional benefit only could be extended for that period and the monetary benefit could be given only upon framing of statute/law to that effect i.e. 15.12.2022. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyani Mahtivanan vrs. K.V. Jeyaraj reported in (2015) 6 SCC 363 wherein the Apex Court, interalia, held as under:- “The UGC Regulations, 2010 are directory for the universities, colleges and other higher educational institutions under the purview of the State legislation as the matter has been left to the State Government to adopt and implement the Scheme. Thus, the UGC Regulations, 2010 are partly mandatory and is partly directory.” 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits and the averments made therein, it appears that vide notification as contained in letter no. 2083 dated 15.12.2022, the Director Higher Education notified the statutes under Career Advancement Scheme 2010 (in short CAS) in the light of UGC Regulation dated 30.6.2010. The statutes under CAS 2010 notified on 15.12.2022 and vide clause 1.3 in the last sentence it has been prescribed that the monetary benefit under the Statute shall be given from the date of notification i.e. 15.12.2022. The said Statute notified on 15.12.2022 has been made subject to the Government notification issued under memo no. 1188 dated 20.11.2010 and UGC Regulation dated 30.6.2010. The said Statute notified on 15.12.2022 has been made subject to the Government notification issued under memo no. 1188 dated 20.11.2010 and UGC Regulation dated 30.6.2010. It further transpires from record that the Government notification issued under memo no.1188 dated 20.11.2010; vide para 2 there was a sort of an undertaking by the government, that financial benefits under the UGC Regulation 2010 shall be fully borne by the government with effect from 1.4.2010 and for the period prior to 1.4.2010 the financial burden of 20% by the State Government shall be borne only on receipt of 80% of the Central Government share. Thus, this Court is having no hesitation in holding that the said memo dated 20.11.2010 at para-1 is a clear undertaking by the Government to give financial benefit to the serving employees w.e.f. 1.1.2006. 15. Further, the UGC Regulation 2010 dated 30.6.2010 provides at para 1.3 that it shall come into force with immediate effect and vide para 2.1.0 provides that the revised scales for pay, service conditions including age of superannuation shall be strictly in accordance with the decision of Central government MHRD. 16. Thus, a conjoint reading of the impugned clause vide para 1.3 read with para 2.2 and para 2.3 of the Statutes notified on 15.12.2022; read along with (A) para 2, (B) para 19 and (C) last line of the opening paragraph of memo no, 1188 dated 20.11.2010; and also along with (A) para 1.3 and (B) 2.1.0 of UGC regulation 2010, clearly demonstrates the illegality regarding the impugned clause in para 1.3 of notification dated 15.12.2022 and clearly demonstrates the illegality regarding the stipulation of prospectivity in the impugned clause-para 1.3 of notification dated 15.12.2022. The same can be summarized as under: (i) The impugned clause runs counter to and in violation of (i) last line of opening para; (ii) para 2 and (iii) para 19 of notification 1188 dated 20.11.2010. (ii) The respondents by the impugned clause have violated their undertaking vide para 2 of memo dated 20.11.2010. On this issue, reference may be made to the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/S MRF Ltd. (Supra). The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below: 30. The High Court in its judgment has recorded a finding that the notifications being statutory “no plea of estoppel will lie against a statutory notification”. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below: 30. The High Court in its judgment has recorded a finding that the notifications being statutory “no plea of estoppel will lie against a statutory notification”. This finding of the High Court is erroneous. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been repeatedly applied by this Court to statutory notifications. Reference may be made to Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala. In the said case the Government of Kerala by an order dated 11-4-1979 invited small-scale units to set up their industries in the State of Kerala and with a view to boost industrialisation, exemption from sales tax and purchase tax was extended as a concession for a period of five years, which was to run from the date of commencement of production. By a subsequent notification dated 29-9-1980, published in the gazette on 21-10-1980, the State of Kerala withdrew the exemption relating to the purchase tax and confined the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso of the said notification. While quashing the subsequent notification, it was observed: “If in response to such an order and in consideration of the concession made available, promoters of any small-scale concern have set up their industries within the State of Kerala, they would certainly be entitled to plead the rule of estoppel in their favour when the State of Kerala purports to act differently. Several decisions of this Court were cited in support of the stand of the appellants that in similar circumstances the plea of estoppel can be and has been applied and the leading authority on this point is the case of M.P. Sugar Mills. On the other hand, reliance has been placed on behalf of the State on a judgment of this Court in Bakul Cashew Co. v. STO this Court found that there was no clear material to show any definite or certain promise which had been made by the Minister to the persons concerned and there was no clear material also in support of the stand that the parties had altered their position by acting upon the representations and suffered any prejudice. On facts, therefore, no case for raising the plea of estoppel was held to have been made out. On facts, therefore, no case for raising the plea of estoppel was held to have been made out. This Court proceeded on the footing that the notification granting exemption retrospectively was not in accordance with Section 10 of the State Sales Tax Act as it then stood, as there was no power to grant exemption retrospectively. By an amendment that power has been subsequently conferred. In these appeals there is no question of retrospective exemption. We also find that no reference was made by the High Court to the decision in M.P. Sugar Mills case. In our view, to the facts of the present case, the ratio of M.P. Sugar Mills case directly applies and the plea of estoppel is unanswerable. … Such exemption would continue for the full period of five years from the date they started production. New industries set up after 21-10-1980 obviously would not be entitled to that benefit as they had notice of the curtailment in the exemption before they came to set up their industries.” (emphasis supplied) 35. Besides, a plea of promissory estoppel is in the nature of an equitable plea and must be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case where it is raised. In Rom Industries the deciding factor was that the exemption notification in question had been itself held to be unconstitutional in an earlier case as violative of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, could not form the basis of any right. The observation made in para 8 of that judgment has to be read in that context. Besides, the State Government in that case had no option except to withdraw the notification. It is so observed in that judgment in para 9: “The State Government, in view of the decision of this Court had no other option but to place edible oils in the Negative List. The questions whether Shree Mahavir Oil Mills has been rightly decided or not and whether it is in conflict with the principles enunciated in Video Electronics are moot. But while the decision stands, the State Government is bound to comply with it.” 38. The principle underlying legitimate expectation which is based on Article 14 and the rule of fairness has been restated by this Court in Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO . It was observed in paras 8 and 9: “8. But while the decision stands, the State Government is bound to comply with it.” 38. The principle underlying legitimate expectation which is based on Article 14 and the rule of fairness has been restated by this Court in Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO . It was observed in paras 8 and 9: “8. A person may have a „legitimate expectation? of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that „legitimate expectation? gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. 9. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.” (emphasis supplied) (iii) The respondents have sub-classified the employees of the university in extending the financial benefits for 'pensioners' from 1.4.2010 and 'in service employees' from 15.12.2022. (iv) The respondents do not have the freedom of introducing the impugned condition in the light of UGC regulation 2010 and their own undertaking vide Memo dt. 20.11.2010. (v) The impugned condition is not workable or practical; rather irrational and arbitrary because of the fact that the statute has been notified to fill in the vacuum/gap period from 01.01.2009 to 06.08.2021. The date 06.08.2021 is the date when statutes under UGC regulation 2018 was notified and is currently governing the employees and pensioners of the university. 17. Thus, on the one hand, it is evident that the statute has a retrospective effect for the gap period and on the other hand, prospectivity is being given with respect to actual financial benefits from the date of notification (15.12.2022); interestingly, the statute has lost its force in view of statute dated 6.8.2021 under UGC Regulation 2018. Further, the Statute is like a 'still born child' of the respondents as it cannot breathe on and from 15.12.2022 because of Statute dated 06.08.2021 governing the service conditions prospectively. As a matter of fact, the respondents are trying to take advantage of their own latches in not notifying the statute within time and putting the petitioners at loss. 18. Further, the Statute is like a 'still born child' of the respondents as it cannot breathe on and from 15.12.2022 because of Statute dated 06.08.2021 governing the service conditions prospectively. As a matter of fact, the respondents are trying to take advantage of their own latches in not notifying the statute within time and putting the petitioners at loss. 18. Thus, it can safely be held that the impugned condition is arbitrary, inasmuch as, when notification dated. 15.12.2022 was issued, the statute dated 06.08.2021 had already came into force and was governing the field. Hence the statute dated 15.12.2022 although subsequently promulgated but stands superseded by Statute dated 06.08.2021 from 06.08.2021. Under such condition financial benefits cannot be worked out prospectively. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MRF Ltd. (supra) has categorically held that the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammeled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play and non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. In the sphere of public employment, it is well settled that any action taken by the employer against an employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are the components of fair treatment. In the case of Basudeo Tiwary (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 9. The law is settled that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram partem facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. The law is settled that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram partem facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. In the sphere of public employment, it is well settled that any action taken by the employer against an employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are the components of fair treatment. The conferment of absolute power to terminate the services of an employee is an antithesis to fair, just and reasonable treatment. This aspect was exhaustively considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress. 19. The respondents being a welfare state; by the impugned condition are indulging in mistreatment of its own citizen (Petitioners), behaving like a colonial employer which is impermissible in a democratic setup where the Constitution in its Preamble guarantees social, economic and political justice and equality of status, amongst other guarantees. 20. The contention of the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the discussions made hereinabove. It is now well settled that arbitrariness goes against the fundamental right of equality before law under Article 14 as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments. The right to life under Article 21 of Constitution of India includes right to livelihood and just not mere animal existence but right to lead a life of dignity, honour and commensurate to the social strata of the citizen. By the impugned condition, Article 21 of petitioners stands violated without any fault on their part. 21. Having regards to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned condition in Clause 1.3 of Statute Dated 15.12.2022 stipulating that the monetary benefits accruing under it will be actually paid from the date of Notification i.e., will be prospective; cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is quashed and set-aside. It is thus held that the Petitioners are entitled for the monetary benefits from their due dates of entitlement; be it by way of promotion or otherwise, as per the UGC Regulations. It is thus held that the Petitioners are entitled for the monetary benefits from their due dates of entitlement; be it by way of promotion or otherwise, as per the UGC Regulations. Consequently, the Respondents are directed to consider the cases of the respective Petitioners for promotion under the Statutes notified on 15.12.2022 and if found entitled for the same, the monetary benefits shall be extended to them from their due dates of entitlement. 22. It is made clear that the aforesaid exercise be completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed in the manner indicated herein above.