ORDER : 1) The first petition (WPC No. 131 of 2024), has been filed against the notice dated 08.01.2024 (Annexure-P/1), issued by the prescribed Authority/Collector, whereby cognizance was taken and the date was fixed for the meeting on the ‘no-confidence motion’ on 17.01.2024 at the Office of Janpad Panchayat, Aarang at 12:00 PM. 2) The Second Petition (WPC No. 170 of 2024), has been filed by members of Janpad Panchayat on the ground that the notice dated 08.01.2024, issued by the prescribed authority/Collector to convene the no-confidence motion was not signed by them, and this way, they are supporting the case of the petitioners of WPC No.131 of 2024. The members who have filed WPC No.170 of 2024 are not before this Court against any specific order and they cannot be held aggrieved party, therefore, the petition filed by the members is not maintainable and the same is hereby dismissed at this stage. 3) Now coming to the facts of WPC No.131 of 2024, the election for 25 members of Janpad Panchayat, Arang was held in the month of January-February 2019. After the election, from the elected members of Janpad Panchyat, one of them was elected as President. During these four years, one of the members expired and at present, there are 24 members only. An application/complaint was moved before the prescribed authority/Collector, Raipur on 05.01.2024 making certain allegations which are reproduced herein below:- 4) The authorities recorded their satisfaction according to the provisions of Rule 3(3) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994 (in short, the Rules, 1994). Thereafter, the members were directed to appear for the no-confidence motion meeting on 17.01.2024 at about 12 noon at Janpad Panchayat, Aarang and the Sub-Divisional Officer was appointed as the presiding officer. 5) Mr. Thereafter, the members were directed to appear for the no-confidence motion meeting on 17.01.2024 at about 12 noon at Janpad Panchayat, Aarang and the Sub-Divisional Officer was appointed as the presiding officer. 5) Mr. S.C. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioners would argue on the following four points :- (i) The prescribed authority/Collector has not recorded its satisfaction according to Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994; (ii) The allegations made in the complaint are frivolous and the same were not enquired into by the authority while recording its satisfaction; (iii) The petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan is an elected President of Janpad Panchayat and he cannot be removed from office without following due process of law; and (iv) The Prescribed authority/Collector cannot delegate its power to the Sub-Divisional Officer to conduct the meeting of no-confidence motion. He argues that no prudent person can reach the conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint are true because no description concerning the allegations were put forth by the members. He also contends that the provisions of Section 44(4) of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam were not followed. In support thereof, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and others reported in AIR 2001 SC 2524 , the order passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Satya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others in Writ Appeal No. 284 of 2022, and the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of Sandeep Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No. 1931 of 2011. 6) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. They would submit that the prescribed authority has recorded its satisfaction according to the provisions of Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994. With regard to the next submission, they would submit that there is no requirement to ascertain the veracity of the allegations made by the members. They would further submit that the President is an elected president of Janpad Panchayat, whose work was not found satisfactory, therefore, according to the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, the members opted for the no-confidence motion and there is no illegality in the procedure adopted by the prescribed authority. They would further submit that the President is an elected president of Janpad Panchayat, whose work was not found satisfactory, therefore, according to the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, the members opted for the no-confidence motion and there is no illegality in the procedure adopted by the prescribed authority. With regard to the delegation of power, they would submit that the authority has not delegated its power to any of the authorities. They would submit that the Presiding Officer was appointed according to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 and there is no illegality in the decision taken by the Collector. With regard to the argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel concerning Section 44(4) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, counsel for the respondents would submit that there is no requirement for the Collector to delve into the allegations made against the President. 7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the documents placed on the record. 8) From a perusal of the documents, it appears that the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan is an elected member of Janpad Panchayat, Arang and he was elected as President among the 25 members of Janpad Panchayat. Out of 24 members of Janpad Panchayat, 19 members moved the no-confidence motion against the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan and a requisition in this regard was moved before the Collector/Prescribed Authority on 05.01.2024 with the aforesaid allegations. 9) The Prescribed Authority/Collector vide order dated 08.01.2023 took cognizance of the matter, recorded its satisfaction according to the provisions of Rule 3(3) of Rules, 1994 and specified the date for the no-confidence motion on 17.01.2024 at 12 PM at the Office of Janpad Panchayat, Aarang and the Collector appointed the Sub-Divisional Officer to preside over. 10) With regard to satisfaction, Section 28 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 provides as under:- “28. No-confidence motion against President or Vice-President. - (1) On a motion of no-confidence being passed by Janpad Panchayat by resolution passed by a majority of not less than three-fourth of the elected members present and voting and such majority is more than two-third of the total number of elected members constituting the Janpad Panchayat for the time being, the President or the Vice-President against whom such resolution is passed shall cease to hold office forthwith. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the Rules made thereunder, a President or a Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no-confidence is discussed against him. Such meeting shall be convened in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be presided over by an officer of the Government as the prescribed authority may appoint. The President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, shall have a right to speak at or otherwise to take part in the proceeding of the meeting. (3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against the President or Vice-President within a period of,- (i) one year from the date on which the President or Vice-President enter their respective office; (ii) six months preceding the date on which the term of office of the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, expires; (iii) one year from the date on which previous motion of no-confidence was rejected. (4) If the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, desires to challenge the validity of the motion carried out under sub-section (1), he shall, within ten days from the date on which such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the [Director, Panchayat], who shall decide it, as far as possible, within thirty days from the date on which it was received by him, and his decision shall be final.” 11) From a bare reading of the above provision, it is crystal clear that a motion of no-confidence can be passed by Janpad Panchayat by resolution passed by a majority of not less than three-fourth of the elected members present and voting and such majority is more than two-third of the total number of elected members constituting the Janpad Panchayat for the time being, the President or the Vice-President against whom such resolution is passed shall cease to hold office forthwith. The Collector has to record satisfaction with regard to Section 28(3) of the Act. 12) In the present case, the Prescribed Authority/Collector has recorded its satisfaction in the opening para of the order (Annexure-P/1). Further, it is not necessary for the Collector to record each and everything in detail. Also, the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan has not produced any document to prove the contrary. 12) In the present case, the Prescribed Authority/Collector has recorded its satisfaction in the opening para of the order (Annexure-P/1). Further, it is not necessary for the Collector to record each and everything in detail. Also, the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan has not produced any document to prove the contrary. Therefore, the first ground raised by the counsel for the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan that the satisfaction was not recorded according to Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994 is misconceived and is hereby rejected. 13) There are various allegations against the President in the complaint made by 19 members of the Janpad Panchayat, Aarang before the Prescribed Authority/Collector. The Rules, 1994, does not provide for any scheme to enter into allegations made by the members against the office bearer against whom the no-confidence motion is proposed. Further, the Division Bench in the matter of Satya Gupta (supra), in para 26 categorically held that “No power is vested on the Collector to examine the allegations, if any, made in the requisition notice and if a notice expressing no-confidence is signed by not less than one-sixth of the total number of elected Councilors constituting the Council, he has no option but to convene a meeting forthwith. Therefore, the veracity of allegations made in the complaint by the members cannot be enquired into by the Collector and the argument in this regard is baseless. 14) Undisputedly, the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan is an elected president of Janpad Panchayat against whom the serious allegations have been levelled by 19 members before the Collector and it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan that he cannot be removed by the authorities or by the Members of Jappad Panchayat without following the due process of law. 15) In this case, a complaint was made according to the provisions of the Rules, 1994 before the Prescribed Authority, who after recording its satisfaction fixed the date of the ‘no-confidence motion’ and till today, the ‘no-confidence motion’ has not been passed. The entire exercise is being carried out by the Prescribed Authority strictly in accordance with Section 28 of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, and it cannot be said that the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan is being removed from the office contrary to the Rules, 1994 or without following the due process of law. The entire exercise is being carried out by the Prescribed Authority strictly in accordance with Section 28 of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, and it cannot be said that the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan is being removed from the office contrary to the Rules, 1994 or without following the due process of law. 16) In the present case, the Collector has not delegated his power conferred to him according to the provision of Section 28 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam and the Rules of 1994, instead he has appointed a presiding officer according to Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 to conduct the no-confidence motion and there is no infirmity. 17) In the matter of Sandeep Shukla (supra), the issue was entirely different. In that case, the power under Section 28 was exercised by the Additional Collector whereas according to Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994, the prescribed authority is the Collector. Therefore, this Court held that the power which is conferred under the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam cannot be sub-delegated to any other authority. Therefore, the contention in this regard is of no help to the petitioner/Khileshwar Dewangan. 18) With regard to Section 44(4) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhinyam, it has been argued that the provisions of Section 44(4) with regard to calling a meeting of Panchayat have not been complied with and the same was not enquired into by the prescribed authority or and this ground, a no-confidence motion cannot be brought or passed against the petitioner. It is already held by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Satya Gupta (supra) that the Collector is not required to ascertain the veracity of the allegations made in the requisition; therefore, this argument is also of no help to the petitioner. 19) In the matter of Trilochan Dev Sharma (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 6, 9, 10, 12 and 15 held as under:- “6. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within Section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of Section 22, on the ground of abuse of his powers (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 9. To find the meaning of a word or expression not defined in an enactment the courts apply the subject and object rule which means __ ascertain carefully the subject of the enactment where the word or expression occurs and have regard to the object which the Legislature has in view. Forego the strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, even its popular use; let the subject or the context in which they are used and the object which the Legislature seeks to attain be your lenses through which look for the meaning to be ascribed. In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. Therefore when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.. Therefore when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.. Judge Learned Hand cautioned not to make a fortress out of the dictionary but to pay more attention to the sympathetic and imaginative discovery of the purpose or object of the Statute as a guide to its meaning (See __ Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, 7th Edition 1999, pp. 258-259). 10. The expression abuse of powers in the context and setting in which it has been used cannot mean use of power which may appear to be simply unreasonable or inappropriate. It implies a willful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. In as much as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in Section 22 is abuse of his powers or habitual failure to perform his duties. The use of plural - powers, and the setting of the expression in the framing of Section 22 is not without significance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. The phrase abuse of powers must take colour from the next following expression - or habitual failure to perform duties. A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is abuse of powers within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision. 12. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision. 12. The show cause notice alleged only this much that the Municipal Council had purchased a fogging machine of which payment was to be made but the appellant (as President of the Municipality) instructed the Executive Officer not to make the payment and this resulted in the working of the Municipal Council having been obstructed. The finding arrived at in the impugned order dated 1.10.1999 is different. There is no finding arrived at that the working of the Municipal Council was in any manner obstructed by the appellant having instructed the Executive Officer not to make the payment. The specific stand taken by the appellant in his reply was that the machine had certain inherent defects and was not working properly and hence it was on the advice of the Municipal Council that the appellant had desired the payment not to be made. The finding as to abuse of power is based mainly on the fact that the Executive Officer had prepared a cheque and signed the same on 20.11.1998 and yet the cheque was not presented to the bank resulting in delayed payment to the supplier of the fogging machine. The impugned order also states that the cheque was kept by the appellant in his custody for over two months. These events are subsequent to the date of the show cause notice, i.e. 19.8.1998 as also to the date of appellants reply i.e. 8.9.1998. Thus, briefly stated, the content of abuse of power, as stated in the notice dated 19.8.1998 was-asking the Executive Officer not to make payment while the order dated 1.10.1999 is founded on a subsequent event that in spite of the Executive Officer having prepared and signed the cheque on 20.11.1998, the appellant detained the cheque in his custody for about two months resulting payment being delayed and this amounted to abuse of power. There is no finding recorded in the impugned order that the explanation furnished by the appellant was factually incorrect. A President is supposed to act in the best interests of the Municipality which he is heading. There is no finding recorded in the impugned order that the explanation furnished by the appellant was factually incorrect. A President is supposed to act in the best interests of the Municipality which he is heading. In spite of fogging machine worth lakhs having been found by the Executive Officer to be okay in its trial run, if the President was informed of the machine having certain inherent defects, there was nothing wrong in his asking the Executive Officer not to make the payment unless he was satisfied that the machine was fit for the purpose for which it was being purchased, all the more, when the funds for purchasing the machine were made available to the Municipality by the District Planning Board. Even accepting the allegations made against the appellant, as contained in the show cause notice, to be correct, his decision to withhold the payment may be said to be an erroneous or unjust decision. For this reason alone the appellant cannot be said to be guilty of an abuse of his powers. If any one suffered by delay in payment it was the supplier and not the Municipality. There is nothing in the show cause notice or the ultimate order to hold how the act of appellant had obstructed the working of Municipal Council or was against the interest of council. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that not only the principles of natural justice were violated by the factum of the impugned order having been founded on grounds at variance from the one in the show cause notice, of which appellant was not even made aware of let alone provided an opportunity to offer his explanation, the allegations made against the appellant did not even prima facie make out a case of abuse of powers of President. The High Court was not right in forming an opinion that the appellant was persuading the High Court to judicially review like an appellate court the finding arrived at by the competent authority. The present one is a case where the impugned order is vitiated by perversity. A conclusion of abuse of powers has been drawn from such facts wherefrom such conclusion does not even prima facie flow. The impugned order is based on non-existent grounds. The present one is a case where the impugned order is vitiated by perversity. A conclusion of abuse of powers has been drawn from such facts wherefrom such conclusion does not even prima facie flow. The impugned order is based on non-existent grounds. It is vitiated by colourable exercise of power and hence liable to be struck down within the well settled parameters of judicial review of administrative action. 15. In the system of Indian Democratic Governance as contemplated by the Constitution senior officers occupying key positions such as Secretaries are not supposed to mortgage there own discretion, volition and decision making authority and be prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead at the behest of politicians for carrying out commands having no sanctity in law. The Conduct Rules of Central Government Services command the civil servants to maintain at all times absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant. No Government servant shall in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of power conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja (1995) 5 SCC 302 , this court has held that a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction must exercise it according to its own discretion; discretion exercised under the direction or instruction of some higher authority is failure to exercise discretion altogether. Observations of this court in The Purtabpur Company Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1896 , are instructive and apposite. Executive officers may in exercise of their statutory discretions take into account considerations of public policy and in some context policy of Minister or the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but they are not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for instructions by a superior to bind them. As already stated we are not recording, for want of adequate material, any positive finding that the impugned order was passed at the behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays utter non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the relevant law. As already stated we are not recording, for want of adequate material, any positive finding that the impugned order was passed at the behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays utter non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the relevant law. The manner in which the power under Section 22 has been exercised by the competent authority is suggestive of betrayal of the confidence which the State Government reposed in the Principal Secretary in conferring upon him the exercise of drastic power like removal of President of a Municipality under Section 22 of the Act. To say the least what has been done is not what is expected to be done by a senior official like the Principal Secretary of a wing of the State Government. We leave at that and say no more on this issue.” 20) It is true that an elected person cannot be removed from office undemocratically. In the present case, there are allegations against the petitioner, and on that basis, a complaint was made to the Collector to bring a no-confidence motion; the prescribed authority took cognizance and fixed the date and place for the no-confidence motion, thus, the entire scheme given in the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam in this regard has been followed, therefore, the judgment cited by the learned Senior Counsel is also of no help. 21) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court, no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, the petition (WPC No.131 of 2024), is hereby dismissed.