ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief (s):- “10.1 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records leading to passing of the impugned order Annexure P/1 for the kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2 The Hon’ble Court may further kindly be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 22.08.2013 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent District Education Officer, Durg (C.G.). 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice. 10.4 Cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner.” 2. Mr. Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that respondent No. 5 was appointed as a teacher under the petitioner/Institution. He further argued that she tendered her resignation on 31.12.2011 but in the absence of a report from the University concerning her educational qualification, she was permitted to work till the report was received. He also argued that a complaint was made by respondent No. 5 before the Chhattisgarh Rajya Mahila Ayog, Raipur (C.G.) making various allegations with regard to harassment including forceful resignation etc. The cognizance was taken by the Commission and finally, an order was passed on 05.02.2013 therein directing the petitioner to make payment of salary from January, 2012 to January, 2013 and her reinstatement in the services. He further submitted that pursuant to the order passed by the Commission, the District Education Officer, Durg (C.G.) vide order dated 22.08.2013 directed the petitioner/Institution to reinstate respondent No. 5 in service and make payment of salary. Mr. Tiwari also submitted Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Mahila Ayog Adhiniyam, 1995 (for short ‘the Adhiniyam,1995’) deals with the composition of the Commission and according to this Section, there shall be one President and six members in the Commission. He further contended that though the cognizance was taken by the Commission, the order was passed by one member of the Commission only, therefore, the order is liable to be quashed. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsels appearing for the respective respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Tiwari. He further contended that though the cognizance was taken by the Commission, the order was passed by one member of the Commission only, therefore, the order is liable to be quashed. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsels appearing for the respective respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Tiwari. They submitted that the cognizance was taken by the majority of the members of the Commission and even order-sheet would show that the final arguments were heard by the President and the other members of the Commission but due to mistake, the order was signed by one member of the Commission only. It is also argued that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing and thus, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 5. Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, 1995 provides as under:- ^^3- jkT; efgyk vk;ksx dk xBu%&¼1½ jkT; ljdkj] jkti= esa vf/klwpuk }kjk ,d fudk; dk xBu djsxh tks** e/;izns'k jkT; efgyk vk;ksx** ds uke ls tkuk tk,xk tks bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu mls iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx rFkk mls lkSais x, d`R;ksa dk ikyu djsxkA ¼2½ vk;ksx fuEufyf[kr ls feydj cusxk%& ¼d½ ,d v/;{k ¼psvjilZu½ tks dksbZ fo[;kr efgyk lkekftd dk;ZdrkZ gksxh ;k dksbZ o`fRr djus okyh ,slh fo[;kr efgyk gksxh tks efgykvks ds fgr ds fy, izfrc} gks] ftls jkT; ljdkj }kjk uke funsZf'kr fd;k tk,xkA ¼[k½ Ng lnL;] tks ;ksX;rk] fu"Bk rFkk izfr"Bk izkIr O;fDr;ksa ess ls jkT; ljdkj }kjk uke funsZf'kr fd, tk,axs ftuesa ls& ¼,d½ ljdkjh vf/kdkjh gksxkA ¼nks½ ,d fo[;kr vf/koDrk gksxkA ¼rhu½ nks [;krh izkIr lkekftd dk;ZdrkZ gksaxs vkSj ¼pkj½ f’k{kk rFkk LokLF; ds {ks= ds nks fo'ks"kK gksaxsA ijarq Ng lnL;ksa esa vuqlwfpr tkfr;ks] vuqlwfpr tutkfr;ksa rFkk vU; fiNM+s oxksZ esa ls izR;sd dk ,d&,d lnL; gksxkA ¼3½ ,d vf/kdkjh] tks e/;izns'k ljdkj ds milfpo ls fuEu in Js.kh dk ugha gksxk] vk;ksx dk lnL;&lfpo gksxkA** 6. From a bare reading of Section 3 of the Adhiniyam,1995, it is quite vivid that there shall be one President and six members in the Commission. A perusal of the order passed by the Commission dated 05.02.2013 would show that it is signed by only one member of the Commission. 7. From a bare reading of Section 3 of the Adhiniyam,1995, it is quite vivid that there shall be one President and six members in the Commission. A perusal of the order passed by the Commission dated 05.02.2013 would show that it is signed by only one member of the Commission. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal vs. Parkash Wanti (Smt) (Dead) and Another, (1995) 5 SCC 159 , wherein the issue of constitution of the Tribunal under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was involved, held as under:- “6.A conspectus of the above provisions would give us unerring indication of the legislative animation that the Tribunal shall consist of three members, namely, the President and two assessors and each is co-existent with the others. The Tribunal is a civil court and the President is the Presiding Judge of the court. Being a judicial member, undoubtedly, he has been conferred with power to preside over the Tribunal, summon the witnesses, secure the evidence and decide on questions of law and title and procedure. If he considers necessary he may also do so in association with other members. Even in matters of procedure to a limited extent, namely, in summoning the witnesses who would be competent or necessary or material witnesses to unfold the measurement of the land or the value thereof, the views of the assessor-members may be relevant, germane and sometimes necessary, as being local persons. It is true that no qualifications have been prescribed for appointment of an assessor, while qualifications for the member-President stood prescribed. The reason appears to be that the assessor being a local member, obviously, having had personal knowledge of the local conditions of the land and its prevailing value, the legislature appears to have intended that opinion of men of common experience, perhaps, would be more appropriate to determine compensation. That would not elevate the position of the President to be pivotal and relegate the assessors to be adjuncts or ancillary to the President. If it were to be otherwise, the legislature would have employed the language that the President, with the assistance of the assessors, would determine the compensation or have the lands measured etc. etc. That would not elevate the position of the President to be pivotal and relegate the assessors to be adjuncts or ancillary to the President. If it were to be otherwise, the legislature would have employed the language that the President, with the assistance of the assessors, would determine the compensation or have the lands measured etc. etc. The power to decide on question of law and title and in some cases the procedure solely given to the President, is obviously for the reason that the President has had judicial or legal experience on questions, relating to disputes of title and also conversant with the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 59 (c) amplifies that scope and gives power to the presiding member the status of Civil Judge to summon the witnesses, enforce their evidence and to compel production of the documents as is provided in CPC. 9. Admittedly, the assessors did not take any active part in the cases at hand in hearing the argument and the President has recorded that “they told the undersigned that I should hear the arguments by myself. Today neither of theses two assessors is present. It appears they are not interested in hearing the arguments”. This is dereliction of the statutory duty enjoined by the Act defeating the purpose of the Act. The award prepared and signed by the President is that of the President, as he says, it is not an award of the Tribunal. Thus the decree is not that of the Tribunal, which alone is executable in a Court of Small Causes or Senior Sub-Judge. 12. The question thus arises whether the function by the Tribunal as a body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of the duties under the Act are quasi-judicial. The power to determine compensation and other questions involves adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal being quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine compensation etc. and designates the award as judgment and decree of a civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. and designates the award as judgment and decree of a civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication by the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory. Determination of the compensation in disregard thereof renders the adjudication void, invalid and inoperative.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 while dealing with the rights and obligations created by Act held as under:- “23.When a statute gives a right and provides a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act. When an Act creates a right or obligation and enforces the performance thereof in a specified manner, “that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner”. Thus for enforcement of a right/obligation under a statute, the only remedy available to the person aggrieved is to get adjudication of rights under the said Act. (See Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges, (1831) 1 B & AD 847, B & AD p. 859, Barraclough v. Brown, 1897 AC 615, Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 and Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 .)” 9. Taking into consideration the facts of the present case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karnal Improvement Trust (supra) and Kanwar Singh Saini (supra), the order passed by respondent No.2/Commission dated 05.02.2013 and consequently, the order issued by respondent No.3/District Education Officer, Durg (C.G.) dated 22.08.2013 are not sustainable in the eyes of law, therefore, both the orders dated 05.02.2013 and 22.08.2013 are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the concerned Commission to decide it afresh strictly in accordance with law after affording the due opportunity of hearing to the interested parties. 10. With the aforesaid observations, this petition stands disposed of.