ORDER : (Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J.) 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated 18.5.2015 as also against the order dated 9.6.2015, passed by respondent No.2, with regard to the eviction of the petitioner. 2. The Appellate Authority under M.P. (Now CG) Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adiniyam, 1974 (in short “the Act, 1974”) entertained an appeal (Appeal Case No.347/c-121 Year 2013-14) filed by respondent No.4 i.e. Chhattisgarh Infrastructure and Development Corporation against the order dated 14.2.2014 passed by the competent authority i.e. the SDO, Raipur for eviction of the present petitioner under the said Act. By the aforesaid order dated 14.2.2014, the competent authority dismissed the application filed by respondent No.4 – Department, However, in the appeal filed by respondent No.4, the Appellate Authority, by the order dated 18.5.2015, remitted the matter to the competent authority -SDO, Raipur to decide the same on merits and thereafter, the Review Petition filed by the present petitioner was also dismissed by the order dated 9.6.2015. 3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the petitioner was originally employed by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (MPSRTC) in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and after the reorganisation of the State of Madhya Pradesh, MPSRTC was abolished and the employees of the said Department were amalgamated in the Chhattisgarh Infrastructure and Development Corporation (CIDC). Thereafter, the petitioner was sent on deputation to the State Warehousing Corporation, Raipur and he was was allotted Government Quarter No.A-5, Sector 1, Shankar Nagar, Raipur. After the superannuation of the petitioner, he was reappointed on contractual basis in Naya Raipur Development Authority. However, at present, as informed by learned counsel for the petitioner, his contractual tenure has completed and he is not engaged in any service of the Government. Inspite of his completion of tenure, the petitioner retained Government Quarter No. A-5 Sector 1, Shankar Nagar, Raipur, on account of which, the office of respondent No.4 moved an application before the competent authority for eviction of the petitioner from the Government Quarter and in this regard, a show cause notice was also issued to him. Nevertheless, after considering the reply filed by the petitioner, as he was working on contractual basis , the competent authority dropped the proceeding by the order dated 14.2.2014 and thereby, rejected the application filed by the respondent No.4 -Department. Nevertheless, after considering the reply filed by the petitioner, as he was working on contractual basis , the competent authority dropped the proceeding by the order dated 14.2.2014 and thereby, rejected the application filed by the respondent No.4 -Department. Against the said order, the Department has preferred an Appeal and the same was allowed by the impugned order dated 18.5.2015, against which, the petitioner has filed a review petition and the same was also dismissed by the impugned order dated 9.6.2015. Hence, this Petition. 4. Mr. CJK Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no order has been passed in terms of Section 5 of the Act, 1974 and when no orders pertaining to eviction are passed under Section 5, an appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1974 is not maintainable. This proposition has been clarified and interpretated in the matter of Khushal Chand Vs. State of MP reported in 2001 (1) MPLJ 680 . The orders for eviction or orders passed under Section 5 or 7 alone are appealable under Section 9 of the Act, 1974. He submits that as no such order has been passed, the appeal entertained by the Appellate Authority would itself be bad in law. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner prays to allow the petition and set-aside the impugned orders. 5. On the contrary, Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate for Respondent No.4 would submit that the issue involved in the present matter directly came up before the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra Vs. Marwanjee F. Desai and others, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 318 , which is pari materia with regard to enactment of Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 (in short “the Act, 1955”). Section 7 of the said Act, deals with appeals, and it is pari materia to Section 9 of the Act, 1974. He would submit that in the said matter, the issue pertained to scope and ambit of Section 7 of the Act 1955 and its applicability therefor vis-à-vis an order of ‘dropping of proceedings’ in terms of a notice issued under Section 4 of the Act, 1955 and resultant dismissal of the proceedings initiated for dispossession from the government premises. In the said matter, the High Court answered it in the negative and in favour of the occupants. In the said matter, the High Court answered it in the negative and in favour of the occupants. However, while allowing the appeal filed by the State, the Supreme Court observed that the word ‘every’ appearing in Section 7 of the Act, 1955 has to be interpretated in its proper perspective and not in a manner restrictive. The relevant para 8 reads thus : 8. While it is true, that the High Court placed reliance on the factum of the competent authority being an arm or wing of the Government and as such the latter cannot be permitted to lodge a protest against its own order — this, however, in our view is a total misreading of the statute and even in the event the same stands accepted, it will lead to a dangerous proposition having far-reaching consequences. We, however, hasten to add that in the event the statute desired it to be so then and in that event, consequences irrespective, we could have lent our concurrence to the view expressed by the High Court — unfortunately, however, the statute does not affirm such an interpretation, rather negates it. The language used as noticed above in Section 7 containing the provision of appeal has to be interpreted in its proper perspective and not in a manner restrictive. If the reasoning provided by the High Court is to be accepted then in that event the statute shall have to be given a go-by and to be rendered a complete otiose. The word “every”, appearing in Section 7 immediately before the word “order”, stands out to be extremely significant so as to offer an opportunity of appeal in the event of there being an order against the Government. 6. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4 further submits that in the said matter, it was lastly held at 11 that a statute cannot be read in the manner as it has been by the High Court. True intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4 further submits that in the said matter, it was lastly held at 11 that a statute cannot be read in the manner as it has been by the High Court. True intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction and a useful guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have to be gathered from the entirety of the statute and when the language of the sections providing an appeal to a forum is clear and categorical no external aid is permissible in interpretation of the same. The legislature has deliberately used “every order” and if the restrictive meaning is attributed, as has been so done by the High Court, then the word “every” in any event becomes totally redundant but since the legislature avoids redundancy every word used in the particular provision shall have to be attributed a meaning and attribution of any meaning to the word “every” by itself would negate the interpretation as found favour with the High Court. The word “every” has been totally ignored, which is neither permissible nor warranted. 7. Be that as it may, now, as per the instructions obtained by learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner has completed his contractual tenure of service and despite his completion of tenure, the petitioner has not vacated the Government Quarter. It is pertinent to mention that even a retired Government Servants are expected to behave in a disciplined manner and they are not supposed to violate the rules since they are enjoying the perks and benefits granted them. It is very unfortunate that the State Machinery has to forcefully evict a Government Employee by taking recourse to the Act, 1974. 8. When the competent authority did not exercise its powers, dropped the proceedings against the petitioner and found no merit in the case of the Department and consequently, passed a wrong order, the same was challenged in the appeal by Respondent4 -Department. In Appeal, the Appellant Authority, after evaluating all the material on record, remanded the matter to the competent authority for deciding the same afresh. In Appeal, the Appellant Authority, after evaluating all the material on record, remanded the matter to the competent authority for deciding the same afresh. Therefore, a restrictive interpretation cannot be construed under Section 9 of the Act, 1974 and the ratio laid down in the matter of Marwanjee F. Desai (supra) categorically guides the interpretation in respect of the present controversy. 9. For the foregoing reasons, at this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the competent authority to proceed in the matter and decide the pending case, which has been remitted by the Appellate Authority, in accordance with law i.e. under the Act, 1974, in an expeditious manner, preferably within an outer limit of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Ordered accordingly. 10. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the petition is disposed of.