JUDGMENT : MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. C.R.P. No. 684 of 2024 arises out of an order dated 18.12.2023 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the petitioners’ application for condonation of delay in filing a petition to set aside the order dated 06.12.2021 passed by the Trial Court and to restore the Arbitration Original Petition (A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016) filed by the petitioners. 2. C.M.A. No. 110 of 2024 arises out of an order dated 18.12.2023 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the appellants’ application for restoration of A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016, filed by the appellants under Order IX Rule 9 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The impugned order in the C.M.A. was passed consequent to the impugned order passed in the C.R.P. 3. The A.O.P. referred to above was filed by the petitioners/appellants for setting aside an Arbitral Award dated 28.09.2015 under Section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The C.R.P. and the C.M.A. arise out of the 2 orders passed on the same date i.e. 18.12.2023 dismissing the petitioners’ applications for condonation of delay in filing a petition for setting aside the order dated 06.12.2021 and for restoration of the Arbitration Original Petition (Section 34 Application) to its original file. 4. A brief statement of the admitted facts is necessary for understanding the factual matrix relevant to these matters. 5. The respondent No. 2 in A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016 made an Arbitration Award dated 28.09.2015 in favour of the respondent No. 1 and against the petitioners amounting to a money decree for an amount of Rs.35,10,750/- along with interest @ 9% p.a. from 07.11.2009 till the date of realization. The petitioners filed the A.O.P. under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside of the Award dated 28.09.2015. The A.O.P. could not be adjudicated during the Covid-19 pandemic period but was taken up for hearing by the Trial Court on 17.11.2021. On 17.11.2021, the Trial Court passed a conditional order wherein it was recorded that counsel for both the petitioners and the respondents were absent and the matter would be listed on 06.12.2021 for final hearing failing which the O.P. would be dismissed. On the returnable date i.e. 06.12.2021, the petitioners remained unrepresented and so was the respondent No. 1 (Award Holder). On the returnable date i.e. 06.12.2021, the petitioners remained unrepresented and so was the respondent No. 1 (Award Holder). The Trial Court passed over the matter and called the matter again at 4:00 P.M. Recording that the petitioners were not represented in spite of the conditional order passed on 17.11.2021, the Trial Court dismissed the A.O.P. for default. 6. The respondent No. 1 filed an Execution Petition vide E.P. No. 2970 of 2021 with regard to the Award, on 31.12.2021 before the XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. A notice was issued to the petitioner No. 1 in the said E.P. but it was returned as “Unclaimed. Return to Sender.” 7. On 28.04.2023, the petitioners filed I.A. No. 766 of 2023 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 478 days in filing of the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the A.O.P. for default dated 06.12.2021. The petitioners also filed I.A. No. 767 of 2023 under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C for setting aside the order of dismissal dated 06.12.2021 and for restoring the A.O.P. to its file and number. Both I.A. Nos. 766 and 767 of 2023 were dismissed by the Trial Court by the impugned orders dated 18.12.2023. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed the present C.R.P. and the C.M.A on 21.02.2024 and 23.02.2024, respectively. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners seeks to explain the delay in pursuing the A.O.P. on account of the Covid-19 pandemic. Counsel submits that the petitioners came to know of the conditional order dated 17.11.2021 and the order of dismissal of the A.O.P for default dated 06.12.2021 only in January, 2023 and filed the 2 I.As. for condonation of the delay and for setting aside the order of dismissal, on 28.04.2023. Counsel further submits that the petitioner No. 1 received the notice in E.P. No. 2970 of 2021 only in June, 2023 and engaged a new counsel on 19.09.2023 for opposing the E.P. taken out by the respondent No. 1. Counsel submits that the XI Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, dismissed the E.P. for want of jurisdiction by an order dated 21.03.2024. 9. Counsel submits that the XI Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, dismissed the E.P. for want of jurisdiction by an order dated 21.03.2024. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 opposes the contentions made on behalf of the petitioners primarily on the ground that the petitioners were aware of the conditional order dated 17.11.2021 and the order of dismissal of the A.O.P. for default dated 06.12.2021 much prior to January, 2023. Counsel submits that the Award became enforceable as a decree from December, 2021 onwards and the respondent No. 1 accordingly filed Execution Petition in the District Court, Ranga Reddy. Counsel places the returned postal cover to refute the factual allegations made on behalf of the petitioners. 10. The Execution Petition filed by the respondent No. 1 for enforcement of the Award dated 28.09.2015 cannot be called into question after dismissal of the petitioners’ Section 34 Application for setting aside of the Award, for default. 11. Admittedly, the petitioners did not proceed with A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016 filed for setting aside of the Award for 6 years even though the said A.O.P. was filed on 29.12.2015. The petitioners may only be given the benefit of the Covid-19 pandemic period and the orders passed by the Supreme Court w.e.f. 20.03.2020 which would still translate to a delay of about 4½ years. 12. Moreover, the Executing Court issued notices to the petitioner No. 1 by registered post, evidence of which is on record. The petitioner No. 1 however refused to accept the registered post sent by the Trial Court and the notice was returned with the endorsement “Unclaimed. Return to Sender” on 27.01.2022. 13. The returned postal endorsement would show that service was attempted on the petitioner No. 1 on 27.01.2022. More significantly, the sender’s name i.e. the XIII Additional District Judge as well as E.P. No. 2970 of 2021 are mentioned on the postal cover. Further, the address of the petitioner No. 1 shown in the Cause Title of the present C.R.P. and C.M.A. and the address on the returned postal cover dated 27.01.2022 is one and the same. More significantly, the sender’s name i.e. the XIII Additional District Judge as well as E.P. No. 2970 of 2021 are mentioned on the postal cover. Further, the address of the petitioner No. 1 shown in the Cause Title of the present C.R.P. and C.M.A. and the address on the returned postal cover dated 27.01.2022 is one and the same. The affidavit filed before the Trial Court for condonation of delay and for setting aside of the order of dismissal as well as the affidavit supporting the C.R.P. and C.M.A. sworn by the petitioner No. 1 reflect the same address i.e. Villa No. 8, Meenakshi Bamboos, Gachibowli, Ranga Reddy District. Hence, there can be no dispute with regard to the address mentioned in the postal cover which was returned as unclaimed on 27.01.2022. 14. Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless the contrary is proved, service by post shall be deemed to have been properly effected if the address, pre-payment and posting by registered post is in order. In other words, Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897 contemplates deemed proper-service where service has been effected by registered post with the attending requirements being in order. 15. The Supreme Court contemplated the effect of Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897 in Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 to conclude that the notices issued by the respondent to the appellant must be presumed to have been served as contemplated under Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897. In that case, notices had been returned unserved. 16. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to dispute the postal endorsement bearing the petitioners’ address or the fact that the petitioners have used the same address in other proceedings before the Court including in the present C.R.P. and the C.M.A. 17. If the postal cover dated 27.01.2022 is accepted as deemed service for the reasons as stated above, it would follow that the petitioners had knowledge of the Execution Petition for enforcement of the Award which was the subject matter of the petitioners’ A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016. It would further imply that the petitioners were aware of the dismissal of the A.O.P. for setting aside of the Award as far back as on 27.01.2022 as opposed to January, 2023 as contended by the petitioners. It would further imply that the petitioners were aware of the dismissal of the A.O.P. for setting aside of the Award as far back as on 27.01.2022 as opposed to January, 2023 as contended by the petitioners. The petitioners, as interested parties in having the Award set aside, should certainly have been more vigilant in claiming the postal cover with the contents. The petitioners have also not made any attempt to explain the delay from 27.01.2022 to January, 2023. 18. Further, the petitioners filed the 2 I.As for condonation of the delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dated 06.12.2021 and for restoration of the A.O.P. on 28.04.2023, which was after 1 year 3 months from their date of the knowledge (27.01.2022 as alleged by the respondent No. 1) of the dismissal of the A.O.P. for default and the Execution Petition filed by the respondent No. 1. 19. The petitioners’ unaccounted-for delay does not stop here. Even if the petitioners’ claim of knowledge from January, 2023 is accepted, the I.As for condonation of delay and for setting aside the order of dismissal of the A.O.P were filed only after three months i.e. on 28.04.2023. 20. The petitioners have attributed the entire blame for the delay on their counsel. The postal cover returned on 27.01.2022 would however belie this contention since the notice was issued directly to the petitioner No. 1 and not to their counsel. The E.P. number as well as the Executing Court being mentioned on the postal cover is self-incriminatory and raises the presumption of service on the petitioners. 21. The point in issue in Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 relied on by the petitioners, was the inaction and deliberate omission of the Agent (Advocate). This decision does not apply to the facts of this case. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123 also relied on by the petitioners, held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and the Court must accept the explanation for the delay to be sufficient. This Court holds that apart from the explanation not being sufficient, the petitioners have also suppressed use of the same address on the postal cover with the other proceedings as stated in the paragraphs above. 22. The petitioners have not shown any compelling circumstances to dispute the presumption of deemed service as of 27.01.2022. This Court holds that apart from the explanation not being sufficient, the petitioners have also suppressed use of the same address on the postal cover with the other proceedings as stated in the paragraphs above. 22. The petitioners have not shown any compelling circumstances to dispute the presumption of deemed service as of 27.01.2022. The petitioners have obviously not been diligent in pursuing A.O.P. No. 682 of 2016 filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the Award dated 28.09.2015 and have slept over their rights until the respondent No. 1 took steps for enforcement of the Award. The impugned orders dated 18.12.2023 may be cryptic but do not call for any interference given the petitioners’ tardiness and complete lack of diligence in pursuing their application for setting aside of the Award. The petitioners were in fact given a second opportunity to represent themselves on 06.12.2021 which the petitioners failed to take advantage of. 23. The answering respondent has been deprived of the fruits of the Award for the last 9 years. The petitioners have not even deposited a part of the awarded amount till date for stay or otherwise. The petitioners’ entire case is built on the alleged absence of notice/knowledge. 24. Once the condonation of delay application was dismissed, there was no justification in keeping the petitioners’ application for restoration of the A.O.P to its original file. Hence, we also do not find any reason to interfere with the order dismissing the petitioners’ application for setting aside of the order dated 06.12.2021. 25. Further, it is difficult to believe that the petitioners, having suffered an Award and having challenged the same by way of an A.O.P. would be oblivious of the pending proceeding and wake up from their slumber 8 years after filing of the A.O.P. and that too, after being put on notice of the Execution Petition filed by the respondent No. 1. 26. The above reasons persuade this Court to dismiss the C.R.P. and the C.M.A. by holding that the impugned orders dated 18.12.2023 are not liable to be interfered with or set aside. 27. C.R.P. No. 684 of 2024 and C.M.A. No. 110 of 2024, along with all connected applications, are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.