ORDER : Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J. The instant petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, [for short ‘Cr.P.C’] is filed by the Petitioner/Accused No.7 respectively, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.553 of 2020 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 138, 141, 142-A and 143 of Negotiable Instruments Act,1881, [for short ‘N.I. Act’]. 2. The facts which led to the filing of this petition : a. The complainant is a partnership firm, represented by its Partner Jamili Tirumaleswara Rao, doing business in Cotton and Cotton products under the name and style “M/s.Lakshmi Cotton Traders” at Guntur. Whereas, Accused No.1 is the Company, Accused No.2 is the Managing Director, Accused Nos.3 to 7 are the Directors of A.1-Company, situated at Mangalagiri, doing business in Cotton and allied products. b. At the request of all the accused, the complainant had supplied cotton on credit basis under different invoices on different dates, for the business of A.1-Company. All the accused agreed to make payment within three days from the date of invoice failing which they also agreed to pay the interest on unpaid sale consideration @ 24% per annum. The total amount due to the complainant by A.1-Company is Rs.1,22,78,584/-. c. On repeated demands by the complainant, Accused No.2 with the consent of Accused Nos.3 to 7 issued five cheques bearing Nos.,679478 dated 04.06.2019 for Rs.15,00,000/-, 679479 dated 06.06.2019 for Rs.15,00,000/-, 240284 dated 10.06.2019 for Rs.10,00,000/-, 769352 dated 24.06.2019 for Rs.15,00,000/- and 769342 dated 26.06.2019 for Rs.10,00,000/-, drawn on State Bank of India, Grand Trunk Road, Mangalagiri, Guntur District towards part payment of the amount due under the Khata. d. Out of the said cheques, when the complainant presented cheque bearing No.769342 dated 26.06.2019 for collection through its banker i.e., State Bank of India, Sreenivasaraopeta, G.T. Road, Guntur, it was returned as “Funds Insufficient”. e. The complainant sent a registered legal notice to all the accused on 15.07.2019 and the accused having received the same, gave a reply with false allegations. Hence, the complainant filed the complaint against all the accused for the alleged offences, which was numbered as C.C.No.553 of 2020 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur. f. The said C.C is sought to be quashed by Petitioner/Accused No.7 vide this petition. Hence, the complainant filed the complaint against all the accused for the alleged offences, which was numbered as C.C.No.553 of 2020 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur. f. The said C.C is sought to be quashed by Petitioner/Accused No.7 vide this petition. Hence, the Crl.P. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 3. Heard Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Ms. D. Prasanna Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State/Respondent No.1. The memo of proof of service dated 25.01.2022 indicates that the notice returned with an endorsement “Respondent No.2, refused to receive the notice”. This Court, vide order dated 17.08.2023, observed the service as sufficient. None entered appearance for Respondent No.2. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.7 in elaboration to what was stated in the petition, would submit that the Petitioner has never been into the affairs of the accused company since 2016 respectively as he had given resignation for their post on 29.02.2016. It is also submitted that the Petitioner has no relation with the cheques issued by Accused No.2. It is also urged that the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose any offence against the Petitioner and therefore prayed to quash the proceedings. To buttress his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anita Malhotra v. Apparel Export Promotion Council and another, (2012) 1 SCC 520 , and Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Anu Mehta & Others, (2015) 1 SCC 103 . 5. Refuting the arguments referred to above, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that there are factual aspects, which are to be considered by the trial Court during trial and that this Court cannot consider the said defence in a petition filed under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, she would pray to dismiss the petition. Point for Determination 6. Having heard the submissions, the point that would emerge for determination is : Whether there are any justifiable grounds for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.7 in C.C.No.553 of 2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 138, 141, 142-A and 143 of Negotiable Instruments Act? Determination by the Court 7. Point for Determination 6. Having heard the submissions, the point that would emerge for determination is : Whether there are any justifiable grounds for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.7 in C.C.No.553 of 2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 138, 141, 142-A and 143 of Negotiable Instruments Act? Determination by the Court 7. A bare perusal of Section 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that the inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Section 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a trial court or a court of appeal or a court of revision. These powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles established in the criminal jurisprudence. 8. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provision must be present. To identify these specific circumstances, it is essential to discuss some precedents. To cite a few, State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604 at paras 102 and 103, Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 10 SCC 118 at para 57. 9. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., this Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations levelled. It is for the Court to see whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence, or not. While performing this exercise, it may sometimes be necessary for the Court to take into special features of a particular case. Ultimately, the conscience of the Court should permit it to quash the criminal proceedings at the nib, after satisfaction of due care and caution, in the light of relevant statute and precedential law. 10. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the Petitioner are under Sections 138 and 141 of the N.I. Act. The intention behind fastening liability in the instances of cheque dishonor is to inculcate faith in the efficacy of financial operations, that are based on negotiable instruments. 10. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the Petitioner are under Sections 138 and 141 of the N.I. Act. The intention behind fastening liability in the instances of cheque dishonor is to inculcate faith in the efficacy of financial operations, that are based on negotiable instruments. In effect, Section 138 of the N.I. Act clothes criminality to a civil transaction by fiction of law. It contains the essential ingredients necessary to tap in the offence, followed by a proviso that contains three clauses viz., (a), (b), and (c). It is a settled principle that the offence under Section 138 is said to have been committed only on the combined fulfillment of the main provision, and eventualities in the proviso clauses. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578 detailed the ingredients essential to attract the offence under Section 138 at para 11. 11. The Act incorporates a specific provision in the form of Section 141 in the case of “Offences by Companies”. This Court in Konala Bhavani v. State of A.P. and others, 2023 SCC OnLine AP 3605 outlined the crux of Section 141 as follows; “9. Section 141 of the N.I. Act deals with “Offences by Companies”. A bare perusal of the provision indicates its primary ingredient is to establish that the commission of offence under Section 138 is by a juristic person i.e., company, firm, or association of individuals. This provision in its all its clauses places “deemed” liability. The entire exercise contemplated by the Section 141(1) is to find out and fix liability on the person/s whose conduct resulted the bouncing of the cheque. The proviso carves out the situations wherein the criminal liability would not be fastened, to avoid undue harassment to such persons. Section 141(2) paints the larger picture in fastening criminal liability as it includes the concepts of "consent", "connivance" "neglect" of various categories of officers like director, manager, secretary, or other officer of the company.” 12. The two fragments involved in Section 141 must be understood to analyse the aspect of liability, when offence is committed by companies. In the first limb i.e., 141(1), the Act fixes deemed liability on the company and on “every person” in charge of, and responsible to the company’s business conduct, at the time the offence was committed. The two fragments involved in Section 141 must be understood to analyse the aspect of liability, when offence is committed by companies. In the first limb i.e., 141(1), the Act fixes deemed liability on the company and on “every person” in charge of, and responsible to the company’s business conduct, at the time the offence was committed. Offence committed without such person’s knowledge and despite such person’s due diligence are the exceptions are available to escape the liability. The second limb i.e., Section 141 (2) starts with a non-obstante clause indicating its difference from that of Section 141(1). In this limb, liability is fixed on any Director, Manager, Secretary, or other officer of the company, when it is proved that the offence under the Act, was committed with their consent or connivance or was attributable to their neglect. The Hon’ble Apex Court in S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 emphasized on this subtle difference in the following terms; “28…….Thus, the important and distinguishing feature in sub-section (1) is the control of a responsible person over the affairs of the company rather than his holding of an office or his designation, while the liability under sub-section (2) arises out of holding an office and consent, connivance or neglect.” (emphasis supplied) 13. Further, elaborating the liability of a Director or a Manager, the Apex Court in S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy (supra) also observed as follows; “31. A Director or manager can be arraigned and proved to be guilty as the person in charge of and responsible to the company as well as the Director of the company who, as such, might have consented to, connived at or been negligent in respect of the offence of dishonour of cheque, be logically deduced that a person can be arraigned in a complaint as the accused along with the company if it prima facie appears that he was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, although he may or may not be or may not have continued to be a Director or other officer of the company, as mentioned in sub-section (2). …..” (emphasis supplied) 14. …..” (emphasis supplied) 14. It is not out of place, at this juncture, to state the principles of law postulated on Section 141 N.I.Act by the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 , which reads thus; “10. … What is required is that the persons who are sought to be made criminally liable under Section 141 should be, at the time the offence was committed, in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director of a company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under the provision. The liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company may be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of a company at the relevant time. Liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs of a company and not on designation or status. If being a director or manager or secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of "every person" the section would have said "every director, manager or secretary in a company is liable" …, etc. The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action.” (emphasis supplied) 15. The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In the petitions filed by Directors/Partners seeking to quash the proceedings under Sections 138 and 141 of N.I. Act, the Apex Court in Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 915 emphasized that it would be proper for a High Court to exercise its jurisdiction, vide Section 482 to quash, only when there is unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence beyond suspicion or circumstances that are totally acceptable to conclude that putting such Petitioner to a criminal trial would be a matter of abuse of process of court. At para 28, it was held thus; “23. In the light of the ratio in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and later judgments of which a reference has been made what is to be looked into is whether in the complaint, in addition to asserting that the appellants are the Directors of the Company and they are incharge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company and if statutory compliance of Section 141 of the NI Act has been made, it may not open for the High Court to interfere under Section 482 CrPC unless it comes across some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of process of Court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the particular Director for which there could be various reasons.” (emphasis supplied) 16. In Anita Malhotra (supra), the disputed cheques were issued in the year 2004, a non-executive Director of the company who resigned from the Company in 1998 was the Appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, aggrieved by the non-quashment of complaint for cheque dishonor. The Appellant therein placed the certified copy of the annual return to show that she was not the Director of the company. The Appellant therein placed the certified copy of the annual return to show that she was not the Director of the company. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Appellant, having resigned way prior to the date of issuance of the cheques, cannot be made liable for the offence, that too with bald allegations, in the following terms; “20. As rightly stated so, though it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or conduct a roving enquiry in respect of merits of the accusation, but if on the face of the document which is beyond suspicion or doubt, placed by the accused and if it is considered that the accusation against her cannot stand, in such a matter, in order to prevent injustice or abuse of process, it is incumbent on the High Court to look into those document/documents which have a bearing on the matter even at the initial stage and grant relief to the person concerned by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. 21. Inasmuch as the certified copy of the annual return dated 30-9-1999 is a public document, more particularly, in view of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Section 74(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872, we hold that the appellant had validly resigned from the Directorship of the Company even in the year 1998 and she cannot be held responsible for the dishonour of the cheques issued in the year 2004.” (emphasis supplied) 17. In Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley, (2011) 3 SCC 351 , similar to the facts of the case on hand, the Appellant before the Hon’ble Apex Court was Director, whose resignation was accepted and notified to the Registrar of Companies. He was named in the complaint as being responsible for the day-to-day affairs and that based on his and other Directors’ assurances, demand drafts were issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court taking note of the Form 32 issued much prior to the date of the issuance of the cheque, quashed the criminal proceedings. A plea was taken that the documents furnished by the Accused could not be taken into account in a Section 482 petition. This plea was negated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following terms; “24. A plea was taken that the documents furnished by the Accused could not be taken into account in a Section 482 petition. This plea was negated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following terms; “24. In Awadh Kishore Gupta [State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353 : 2003 Supp (5) SCR 672] this Court while dealing with the scope of power under Section 482 of the Code observed : (SCC p. 701, para 13) '13. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge.' 25. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents — which are beyond suspicion or doubt — placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 26. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 26. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd., (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the positions laid down in the decisions of Anita Malhotra (supra), and Harshendra Kumar (supra) and held that though a mini trial or a roving inquiry ought not be conducted in Section 482 proceedings, it would be justified to decide based on material that is convincing or uncontroverted to establish the innocence of a Director without requiring him to face a criminal trial. The Apex Court had summarized the conclusions derived from the catena of decisions at para 34, of which para 34.3 holds specific relevance to the present case of hand, which reads; “34.3. In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about the role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of process of court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm-twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed. (emphasis supplied) 19. In the instant case, the plea of the Petitioner/Accused No.7 is that, he used to be a Director of A.1-Company and subsequently on 29.02.2016 he resigned and since then he was not part of the affairs of the said Company. To substantiate the same, the relevant forms from ROC have been placed to indicate resignation. The said contention was not denied by Respondent No.2, as none appeared, despite service. This would essentially indicate as an acceptable circumstance to conclude that the Petitioner herein resigned at the period in issue. Admittedly, the five cheques were issued in the year 2019, which were alleged to have been signed by Accused No.2, and the same were subsequent to the date of resignation of the Petitioner. Be that as may, no specific allegations are made against the Petitioner herein. The judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anita Malhotra, and Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd., (referred supra) which were relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 20. In Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., 2023 (1) INSC 683 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while reiterating position laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC made a comprehensive analysis on the application of the Section 482. The Apex Court stressed on the necessity to arrive at a balance between the law enforcement power of the State and the protection of citizens from unjust criminal proceedings. (1) SCC made a comprehensive analysis on the application of the Section 482. The Apex Court stressed on the necessity to arrive at a balance between the law enforcement power of the State and the protection of citizens from unjust criminal proceedings. It was observed that the right not to be disturbed without sufficient grounds is one of the mandates under Art 21 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, as referred in Harshendra Kumar D, the initiation of criminal proceedings against an individual is capable of yielding severe ramifications on a person and it would not be just to not consider the supporting documents placed by the Petitioner indicating his resignation. 21. The Petitioner is no longer associated with A.1-Company from the date of his resignation to the post of Director. Therefore, it can be said that the allegations mentioned in the complaint do not disclose any offence against the Petitioner herein. Viewed from any angle, continuation of proceedings against him, is an abuse of process of law. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that it is a fit case to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.7 in C.C.No.553 of 2020. 22. Accordingly, this criminal petition is allowed. The proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.7 in C.C.No.553 of 2020 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 138, 141, 142A and 143 of Negotiable Instruments Act, are hereby quashed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.