ORDER : K. Sreenivasa Reddy, J. This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has been filed by the petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6, seeking to quash the proceedings in SC.SPL.No.19 of 2017 on the file of learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District for the offences punishable under Sections 323 read with 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SCs & the STs (PoA) Act, 1989. 2. It is represented that the parties have settled the dispute amicably out of the Court at the intervention of their elders and well wishers. In view of the settlement arrived between the parties, they filed IA Nos.2 of 2024 and 3 of 2024 seeking to permit them to compound the offences and to record the compromise. 3. Today, when the matter is taken up, petitioners and 2nd respondent herein are present before this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for 2nd respondent have identified the parties in the open Court. They produced their respective aadhar cards in proof of their identity. This Court has questioned the de facto complainant with regard to compromise and he has categorically stated to that extent that he has voluntarily entered into compromise with the accused. 4. In a decision in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi & another (2022) 8 Supreme 341 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: “12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh v. State of Punjab, which read thus: “29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship. 14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power. 15. The facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove are peculiar in the present case. Respondent No. 2 is a young lady of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is a complainant and in the other case, wherein she is the accused would rob the prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face the trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing the trial. 16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No. 2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts. 17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succor to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings.” 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mandar Deepak Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & another 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 649 , wherein it was held thus: “The appellant and respondent No.2 were undisputedly in a consensual relationship from 2009 to 2011 (or 2013 as stated by the respondent No.2). The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mandar Deepak Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & another 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 649 , wherein it was held thus: “The appellant and respondent No.2 were undisputedly in a consensual relationship from 2009 to 2011 (or 2013 as stated by the respondent No.2). It is the say of the respondent No.2 that the consensual physical relationship was on an assurance of marriage by the appellant. The complaint has been filed only in 2016 after three years, pursuant whereto FIR dated 16.12.2016 was registered under Section 376 and 420, IPC. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we find ex facie the registration of FIR in the present case is abuse of the criminal process. The parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time. For some reason, the parties fell apart. It can happen both before or after marriage. Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR. The facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid by us that we have no hesitation in quashing the FIR dated 16.12.2016 and bringing the proceedings to a close. Permitting further proceedings under the FIR would amount to harassment to the appellant through the criminal process itself. We are fortified to adopt this course of action by the judicial view in (2019) 9 SCC 608 titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. wherein the factual scenario where complainant was aware that there existed obstacles in marrying the accused and still continued to engage in sexual relations, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR. A distinction was made between a false promise to marriage which is given on understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. This was in the context of Section 375 Explanation 2 and Section 90 of the IPC, 1860. The Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and the proceedings in pursuance to FIR dated 16.12.2016 stand quashed, leaving parties to bear their own costs.” 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramawatar Vs. This was in the context of Section 375 Explanation 2 and Section 90 of the IPC, 1860. The Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and the proceedings in pursuance to FIR dated 16.12.2016 stand quashed, leaving parties to bear their own costs.” 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramawatar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC Online SC 966, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the offence under special statute including SC/ST Act, though the offence is against society, can also be quashed in exercise of power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. in certain cases on the basis of compromise, but this power should be exercised during pendency of trial or appeal not thereafter. Paragraph-10 of the above Judgment is quoted as below:- "10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.1489 of 2012 decided 29th September, 2021, wherein, a two Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/ compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers." 7. This Court is satisfied with the identification of the parties and voluntariness in arriving at the compromise. As the parties have entered into a compromise and compounded the offences, the chance of conviction is bleak and remote. Therefore, in view of the compromise between the parties, continuation of the impugned proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of Court. 8. This Court is satisfied with the identification of the parties and voluntariness in arriving at the compromise. As the parties have entered into a compromise and compounded the offences, the chance of conviction is bleak and remote. Therefore, in view of the compromise between the parties, continuation of the impugned proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of Court. 8. Accordingly, IA Nos.2 of 2024 and 3 of 2024 and the Criminal Petition are allowed and the proceedings in SC.SPL.No.19 of 2017 on the file of learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District, against the petitioners/ Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6 are hereby quashed. As a sequel thereto, the miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this Criminal Petition shall stand closed.