JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking the criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, Kishore Rajwade (A-1) has preferred Cr.A. No.1050/2018 and Sarita Rajwade (A-2) has preferred Cr.A. No.1115/2018 calling in question legality, validity and correctness of judgment of conviction & order of sentence dated 30-6-2018 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur, in Sessions Trial No.65/2017 by which the two appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: - Conviction Sentence Sec. 302 read with Sec. 120B of the IPC Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.50/-, in default, additional rigorous imprisonment for three months Sec. 201 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.50/-, in default, additional rigorous imprisonment for three months Both the sentences shall run concurrently Sarita Rajwade (A-2) Conviction Sentence Sec. 302 read with Sec. 120B of the IPC Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.50/-, in default, additional rigorous imprisonment for three months 3. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 7-7-2017 at 9.30 p.m. near Anrokha Road, Police Station Odgi, District Surajpur, accused Sarita Rajwade (A-2) & accused Kishore Rajwade (A-1) along with two other juvenile co-accused namely, Yogesh Rajwade & Rajesh Rajwade conspired together and in furtherance of their common intention, assaulted Jugeshwar – husband of accused Sarita Rajwade (A-2), by axe by which he suffered grievous injuries and died, and in order to screen themselves from the offence, dead body of Jugeshwar, his motorcycle & his mobile-phone were hidden in various places at Odgi forest and thereby committed the offence. It is the further case of the prosecution that accused Sarita Rajwade (A-2) had relationship outside of marriage with one Devpal (PW-5) and deceased Jugeshwar has seen the same on 7-7-2017 pursuant to which it is also the case of the prosecution that Jugeshwar started harassing her and in order to get rid of her husband, Sarita (A-2) conspired with Kishore (A-1) and two other juvenile co-accused and contracted with them for Rs. 50,000/- to kill her husband Jugeshwar and in advance, she had given her tops valuing Rs. 5,000/- to Yogesh – one of the juvenile co-accused and thereafter, in order to give effect to their conspired plan, Kishore A-1, Sarita A-2 and two juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh administered liquor to Jugeshwar and committed marpit with him by axe and other offences. 5,000/- to Yogesh – one of the juvenile co-accused and thereafter, in order to give effect to their conspired plan, Kishore A-1, Sarita A-2 and two juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh administered liquor to Jugeshwar and committed marpit with him by axe and other offences. Parshottam (PW-2) reported the matter to the police on 13-7-2017 vide morgue intimation Ex.P-3. Spot map was prepared by the Investigating Officer vide Ex.P-4 in the form of Crime Details Form. Nazri naksha was prepared by the Patwari vide Ex.P-8. FIR was registered vide Ex.P-27. Inquest over the dead body of the deceased was conducted vide Ex.P-2. Dead body of the deceased was sent for autopsy to Community Health Centre, Odgi vide Ex.P-26. Autopsy was conducted by Dr. Manish Mishra (PW-3) vide autopsy report Ex.P-5 in which cause of death was stated to be due to shock and haemorrhage and death was homicidal. It was further opined that the injuries suffered by the deceased may have been caused by axe. Memorandum statement of juvenile co-accused Yogesh was recorded vide Ex.P-10 pursuant to which seizure of motorcycle, mobile phone and tops/ear wrings were made vide Exs.P-11, P-12 & P-13 in presence of Baleshwar Rajwade (PW-9) & Keshwar Rajwade (PW-19). Similarly, memorandum statement of another juvenile co-accused Rajesh was also recorded vide Ex.P-14 pursuant to which seizure of axe, clothes and mobile phone were made vide Exs.P-15, P-16 & P-17 in presence of Baleshwar Rajwade (PW-9) & Keshwar Rajwade (PW-19). Memorandum statement of accused Sarita (A-2) was recorded vide Ex.P-18, but nothing was seized pursuant to her memorandum statement. Identification of seized articles from the body of deceased Jugeshwar was proved by Sarita (A-2) vide Ex.P-21. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the FSL, Ambikapur from where the FSL report Ex.P-36 was received according to which human blood was found on axe. 4. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC and after usual investigation, the appellants herein were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 302, 120B & 201 of the IPC and the case was committed to the Court of Session, Surajpur from where the learned Additional Sessions Judge received the case on transfer for trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law where the trial was conducted. 5. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove the offence against the appellants, examined as many as 21 witnesses and brought on record 36 documents Exs.P-1 to P-36 apart from Arts.12 to 16. The defence has not examined any witness, however, brought on record one document Ex.D-1 i.e. the statement of Keshwar Rajwade recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. The accused/appellants were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them and pleaded innocence and false implication. 6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence on record, proceeded to convict the appellants herein in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment against which they have preferred these appeals. 7. Mr. Surfaraj Khan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that as per the confessional statements made by juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh, the two appellants herein have been convicted, but as per Section 30 of the Evidence Act, juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh were not tried along with these two appellants and therefore Section 30 of the Evidence Act would not be attracted at all and furthermore, confessional statement is a very weak piece of evidence and unless it is corroborated on material particulars by other pieces of evidence, direct or circumstantial, the two appellants could not have been convicted. Even nothing has been seized from the present appellants except the self-serving statements of prosecution witnesses. He would further submit that it is a case of no evidence and therefore the appellants are liable to be acquitted. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of A.T. Mydeen and another v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department, (2022) 14 SCC 392 and would further rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Yedala Subba Rao and another v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 65 to buttress his submissions. 8. Mr. Ankur Kashyap, learned State counsel, would submit that this case is based on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has relied upon memorandum & seizure made from juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh which is duly proved by seizure witnesses Baleshwar Rajwade (PW-9) & Keshwar Rajwade (PW-19). 8. Mr. Ankur Kashyap, learned State counsel, would submit that this case is based on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has relied upon memorandum & seizure made from juvenile co-accused Yogesh & Rajesh which is duly proved by seizure witnesses Baleshwar Rajwade (PW-9) & Keshwar Rajwade (PW-19). He would further that statements of prosecution witnesses particularly PW-3 to PW-6, PW-10 & PW-11 would show that chain of circumstances is complete and the two appellants are guilty of the offences for which they have rightly been convicted by the trial Court, as such, the two appeals deserve to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the record thoroughly and carefully. 10. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in holding that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature? 11. The trial Court after relying upon the statement of Dr. Manish Mishra (PW-3) and also taking into consideration the postmortem report Ex.P-3, clearly came to the conclusion that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. In our considered opinion, such a finding recorded by the trial Court that death was homicidal in nature is the correct finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court. 12. There is no direct evidence in this case to hold the appellants guilty, but the case is based on circumstantial evidence and the incriminating circumstances are mainly that accused Sarita (A-2) was in relationship outside of marriage with Devpal (PW-5) which her husband deceased Jugeshwar has noticed and seen them on the date of offence pursuant to which he started harassing her and out of frustration and harassment, she contacted accused Kishore (A-1) and two other juvenile co-accused to murder her husband for which she had given her tops valuing Rs. 5,000/- to Yogesh – one of the juvenile co-accused, which have been recovered from him vide seizure memo Ex.P-13 pursuant to the memorandum statement Ex.P-10 in presence of Baleshwar Rajwade (PW-9) & Keshwar Rajwade (PW-19) and the weapon of offence axe has also been seized from the possession of another juvenile co-accused Rajesh vide Ex.P-15 pursuant to the memorandum statement Ex.P-14 on which human blood was found. 13. 13. The prosecution was required to establish the five golden principles which constitute the panchsheel of a case based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which it has been held in paragraph 153 as under: - “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 14. Now, the trial Court has relied upon memorandum and confessional statements of Yogesh Rajwade & Rajesh Rajwade – juvenile co-accused persons whose trial has been conducted separately by the Juvenile Justice Board, Surajpur. Since the trial Court has also relied upon the confessional statements of Yogesh Rajwade & Rajesh Rajwade – co-accused who were not tried along with the present appellants, as they being juveniles, it would be appropriate to notice Section 30 of the Evidence Act, which states as under: - “30. Since the trial Court has also relied upon the confessional statements of Yogesh Rajwade & Rajesh Rajwade – co-accused who were not tried along with the present appellants, as they being juveniles, it would be appropriate to notice Section 30 of the Evidence Act, which states as under: - “30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence.—When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Explanation.—“Offence”, as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence.” 15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that the object of this provision is that where an accused person unreservedly confesses his own guilt, and at the same time implicates another person who is jointly tried with him for the same offence, his confession may be taken into consideration against such other person as well as against himself, because the admission of his own guilt operates as a sort of sanction, which, to some extent, takes the place of the sanction of an oath and so affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one. When a person admits his guilt to the fullest extent, and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided therefor, there is a guarantee for his truth. The Court could use the confession of one accused against another accused only if the following two conditions are fulfilled: - 1. The co-accused should have been charged in the same case along with the confessor. 2. He should have been tried together with the confessor in the same trial. 16. However, Section 30 of the Evidence Act would also show that in order to attract Section 30 it must be proved that there must be joint trial for the same offence; it must be a confession; the confession of guilt must implicate substantially to the same extent as the other accused; and the confession of guilt must be duly proved. It is not sufficient that the co-accused should be tried jointly; in fact, they must be legally tried jointly. 17. It is not sufficient that the co-accused should be tried jointly; in fact, they must be legally tried jointly. 17. The Supreme Court in A.T. Mydeen (supra) relying upon the earlier decision in the matter of Raja v. State of T.N., (2020) 5 SCC 118 held that Section 30 of the Evidence Act would not be attracted when a joint trial could not be held on account of accused being absconding, and observed in paragraph 31 as under: - “31. In Raja v. State of T.N. [ (2020) 5 SCC 118 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 863], this Court was dealing with a case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and was confronted with the issue in respect of admissibility of confession of co-accused against another co-accused in a separate trial, when a joint trial could not be held on account of him absconding. Abdul Nazeer, J., concluded the issue in the following terms : (SCC p. 130, paras 31-33) “31. In the instant case, no doubt, the appellant was absconding. That is why, joint trial of the appellant with the other two accused persons could not be held. As noticed above, Section 15 of the TADA Act specifically provides that the confession recorded shall be admissible in trial of a co-accused for offence committed and tried in the same case together with the accused who makes the confession. We are of the view, that if for any reason, a joint trial is not held, the confession of a co-accused cannot be held to be admissible in evidence against another accused who would face trial at a later point of time in the same case. We are of the further opinion that if we are to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent State, it is as good as re-writing the scope of Section 15 of the TADA Act as amended in the year 1993. 32. In Ananta Dixit v. State [1984 SCC OnLine Ori 131], the Orissa High Court was considering a similar case under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. The appellant, in this case, was absconding. The question for consideration was whether a confession of one of the accused persons who was tried earlier, is admissible in evidence against the appellant. The Court held that the confession of the co-accused was not admissible in evidence against the present appellant. The appellant, in this case, was absconding. The question for consideration was whether a confession of one of the accused persons who was tried earlier, is admissible in evidence against the appellant. The Court held that the confession of the co-accused was not admissible in evidence against the present appellant. The Court held : (SCC OnLine Ori para 8) ‘8. As recorded by the learned trial Judge, the accused Narendra Behera, whose confessional statement had been relied upon, had been tried earlier and not jointly with the appellant and the co-accused person Baina Das. A confession of the accused may be admissible and used not only against him but also against a co-accused person tried jointly with him for the same offence. Section 30 applies to a case in which the confession is made by an accused tried at the same time with the accused person against whom the confession is used. The confession of an accused tried previously would be rendered inadmissible. Therefore, apart from the evidentiary value of the confession of a co-accused person, the confession of Narendra Behera was not to be admitted under Section 30 of the Evidence Act against the present appellant and the co-accused Baina Das.’ We are in complete agreement with the view of the High Court. 33. We are of the view that since the trial of the other two accused persons was separate, their confession statements (Exts. P-26 and P-27) are not admissible in evidence and the same cannot be taken as evidence against the appellant.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In the matter of Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 , the Supreme Court has clearly held that in order to attract Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the confessional statement of accused may be taken into consideration against the other accused if it fulfills the conditions laid down in Section 30 of the Evidence Act and the confessional statement must implicate the maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. It has been observed in paragraph 14 as under: - “(14) … So far as the confessional statement of Jagir Singh is concerned, it may be taken into consideration against the appellant if it fulfils the conditions laid down in Section 30 of the Evidence Act. It has been observed in paragraph 14 as under: - “(14) … So far as the confessional statement of Jagir Singh is concerned, it may be taken into consideration against the appellant if it fulfils the conditions laid down in Section 30 of the Evidence Act. One of the conditions is that the confession must implicate the maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. On reading Jagir Singh's confession as a whole, it appears that he was really trying to throw the main blame on the appellant, though he admitted that he entered into the house of Mst. Chinti, brought out a Kirpan lying there, and took some silver ornaments from that house. He denied that he had anything to do with the murder of Mst. Chinti or even the murder of the two boys; he more or less tried to make out that he was an unwilling spectator of the crime committed by the appellant. In these circumstances, the utmost that can be submitted on behalf of the appellant is that the confession of Jagir Singh should not be used at all against the appellant. At one stage of his argument Mr Sethi did submit that the confession of Jagir Singh should be excluded altogether from consideration against the appellant; later, however, he submitted that both the confessions should be read together in order to condemn both as untrue on the ground of the differences between the two confessions. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr Sethi. We have pointed out that some of the differences are immaterial; some are due to the desire of Jagir Singh to throw the blame on the appellant — a circumstance of which the benefit has been given to the appellant, and some other differences are clearly resolved by other evidence on the record. We do not think that in these circumstances the confessional statements can be condemned out of hand or in limine as untrue.” 19. Similarly, in the matter of Suresh Budharmal Kalani alias Pappu Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 3258 , the Supreme Court with regard to admissibility of confession under Section 30 of the Evidence Act has held that self-exculpatory confession by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. 20. Similarly, in the matter of Suresh Budharmal Kalani alias Pappu Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 3258 , the Supreme Court with regard to admissibility of confession under Section 30 of the Evidence Act has held that self-exculpatory confession by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. 20. Section 30 of the Evidence Act came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 in which their Lordships have considered the probative value of confession of co-accused and its use how to be made in joint trial. In Haricharan Kurmi (supra), their Lordships clearly held that though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act and observed as under: - “11. … The basis on which this provision is founded is that if a person makes a confession implicating himself, that may suggest that the maker of the confession is speaking the truth. Normally, if a statement made by an accused person is found to be voluntary and it amounts to a confession in the sense that it implicates the maker, it is not likely that the maker would implicate himself untruly, and so, S. 30 provides that such a confession may be taken into consideration even against a co-accused who is being tried along with the maker of the confession. There is no doubt that a confession made voluntarily by an accused person can be used against the maker of the confession, though as a matter of prudence criminal courts generally require some corroboration to the said confession particularly if it has been retracted. With that aspect of the problem, however, we are not concerned in the present appeals. When S. 30 provides that the confession of a co-accused may be taken into consideration, what exactly is the scope and effect of such taking into consideration is precisely the problem which has been raised in the present appeals. It is clear that the confession mentioned in S. 30 is not evidence under S. 3 of the Act. ... 12. When S. 30 provides that the confession of a co-accused may be taken into consideration, what exactly is the scope and effect of such taking into consideration is precisely the problem which has been raised in the present appeals. It is clear that the confession mentioned in S. 30 is not evidence under S. 3 of the Act. ... 12. … It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in S. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the Court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of S. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by S. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained is S. 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 526 : ( AIR 1952 SC 159 ) where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu's case, 76 Ind App 147 ( AIR 1949 PC 257 ) has been cited with approval. 16. … As we have already indicated, it has been a recognised principle of the administration of criminal law in this country for over half a century that the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible, from the said evidence. In criminal trials, there is no scope for applying the principle of moral conviction or grave suspicion. In criminal trials, there is no scope for applying the principle of moral conviction or grave suspicion. In criminal cases where the other evidence adduced against an accused person is wholly unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what has happened in these appeals.” 21. The principle of law laid down in Haricharan Kurmi (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 2019 SC 3363 . It has also been held by their Lordships that confession of an accused person is not evidence, it cannot be made tile foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence (see Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 , Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 56 and Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Jaspal Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 586 .) 22. In the matter of Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2018) 8 SCC 271 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have summarised the law relating to scope of Section 30 of the Evidence Act and observed as under: - “11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh (supra) was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (supra) wherein it was observed: (Haricharan case (supra), AIR p.1188, para 12) “12. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588 a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused”. In Periaswami Moopan, In re, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77 Reilly, J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: (SCC OnLine Mad) ‘… where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence’. In Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155 the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that: (SCC OnLine PC) ‘… a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of “evidence” contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence’. It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. (supra) where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case (supra) has been cited with approval.” 12. The law so laid down has always been followed by this Court except in cases where there is a specific provision in law making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused.[For example: State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 , paras 424 and 704 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691] 23. Similarly, in the matter of Mohd. The law so laid down has always been followed by this Court except in cases where there is a specific provision in law making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused.[For example: State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 , paras 424 and 704 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691] 23. Similarly, in the matter of Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that confession of the co-accused is not to be treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 30 of the Evidence Act against the non-maker co-accused and its use depends on finding other evidence so as to connect the co-accused with the crime and that too as a corroborative piece. The principle of law laid down in Kashmira Singh (supra) and Haricharan Kurmi (supra) were relied upon in Mohd. Khalid (supra) and it has been held in paragraph 31 as under: - “31. A confessional statement is not admissible unless it is made to the Magistrate under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act is that before it is made to operate against the co-accused the confession should be strictly established. In other words, what must be before the court should be a confession proper and not a mere circumstance or an information which could be an incriminating one. Secondly, it being the confession of the maker, it is not to be treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act against the non-maker co-accused and lastly, its use depends on finding other evidence so as to connect the co-accused with the crime and that too as a corroborative piece. It is only when the other evidence tendered against the co-accused points to his guilt then the confession duly proved could be used against such co-accused if it appears to effect (sic) him as lending support or assurance to such other evidence. To attract the provisions of Section 30, it should for all purposes be a confession, that is a statement containing an admission of guilt and not merely a statement raising the inference with regard to such a guilt. To attract the provisions of Section 30, it should for all purposes be a confession, that is a statement containing an admission of guilt and not merely a statement raising the inference with regard to such a guilt. The evidence of the co-accused cannot be considered under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, where he was not tried jointly with the accused and where he did not make a statement incriminating himself along with the accused. As noted above, the confession of a co-accused does not come within the definition of evidence contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is only when a person admits guilt to the fullest extent, and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for his guilt, there is a guarantee for his truth. The legislature provides that his statement may be considered against his fellow accused charged with the same crime. The test is to see whether it is sufficient by itself to justify the conviction of the person making it of the offence for which he is being jointly tried with the other person or persons against whom it is tendered. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence. ...” 24. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence. ...” 24. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that in the instant case, admittedly and undisputedly, co-accused persons namely, Yogesh & Rajesh, being juveniles, were not tried along with the two appellants herein and the two appellants herein were separately tried in Sessions Trial No.65/2017 as the juvenile accused persons were triable by the Juvenile Justice Board and therefore the requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act that co-accused persons must be tried jointly for the same offence, is not fulfilled and as such, the alleged confessions made by co-accused Yogesh vide Ex.P-10 and Rajesh vide Ex.P-14 cannot be used against the present appellants in light of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Khalid (supra) and A.T. Mydeen (supra). Consequently, seizure made from the juvenile co-accused persons is of no use to the prosecution qua the present appellants. Though the jewellery has been identified by accused/appellant Sarita (A-2), but that alone would not complete the chain of circumstances to implicate her as it was not recovered from her and recovered from juvenile co-accused Yogesh. Therefore, these two appellants could not have been convicted on the basis of confessional statement and recovery made from the juvenile co-accused who were not tried along with the appellants. Furthermore, there is no other corroborative piece of evidence to implicate the present appellants in the offence in question. In that view of the matter, the two appellants herein are entitled for acquittal on the principle of benefit of doubt. 25. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are unable to sustain conviction and sentences imposed upon the appellants under Sections 302 read with Section 120B & 201 of the IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 30-6-2018 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur, in Sessions Trial No.65/2017, is hereby set aside. The appellants stand acquitted of the charges framed against them for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 120B & 201 of the IPC on benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 30-6-2018 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur, in Sessions Trial No.65/2017, is hereby set aside. The appellants stand acquitted of the charges framed against them for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 120B & 201 of the IPC on benefit of doubt. Accused/appellant Sarita Rajwade (A-2) is in jail since 19-7-2017. She shall be forthwith set at liberty, unless she is required in connection with any other case. Accused/appellant Kishore Rajwade (A-1) is on bail. He need not surrender. However, his bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437A of the CrPC. 26. Both the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 27. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein appellant No.2 Sarita is suffering the jail sentence.