ORDER : 1. The present Revision Petition is filed questioning the Order in CMA No. 4 of 2008 dated 20.04.2018 passed by the X Additional District Judge, Tirupati in setting aside the Order passed in E.A. No. 91 of 2015 in E.P. No. 172 of 2011 in O.S. No. 77 of 1994, dated 06.12.2017 by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, Chittoor District. 2. The petitioner is the decree holder and the respondent No. 1 is the claim petitioner while the respondent No. 2 is the judgment debtor. 3. The facts leading to the present case are as follows: The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance against the respondent No. 2 on the basis of agreement of sale dated 29.10.1992 and the trial Court after consideration passed Judgment and Decree in favour of the petitioner on 14.08.2000. Consequently, the registered sale deed dated 21.11.2002 was executed in favour of the petitioner. When the petitioner sought to take possession of the suit schedule property, the respondent No. 1 filed claim petition under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC claiming right in the schedule property. The claim petition was filed by the third party through GPA holder. 4. It was pleaded in the claim petition that the respondent No. 1 had executed a registered GPA dated 24.01.2015 vide document No. 385/2015 in favour of K. Sunil Kumar to look after and manage the schedule property. It is the case in the claim petitioner that the schedule property originally belonged to one Agarala Eswar Reddy, former Speaker in the Andhra Pradesh Assembly. The said Agarala Eswar Reddy had executed a registered sale deed in respect of the schedule mentioned property in favour of one N. Parameswar Nair on 12.04.1977 vide document No. 693/1977. The said N. Parameswar Nair sold a part of the schedule property to one Chanda Murali by way of a registered sale deed dated 01.05.1993 vide document No. 1722/1993. The said Chanda Murali after purchasing the site applied for building plan to Gram Panchayat, Renugunta and the plan was approved vide Proceedings No. 28/1995-96, dated 03.06.1995. In accordance with the approved plan, the said Chanda Murali constructed a house and the property tax was being levied by the Gram Panchayat in Assessment No. 2970 bearing D. No. 14-62-5, Panchali Nagar, Renigunta. Electricity service connection as also the water tap connection also provided to the said house. 5. In accordance with the approved plan, the said Chanda Murali constructed a house and the property tax was being levied by the Gram Panchayat in Assessment No. 2970 bearing D. No. 14-62-5, Panchali Nagar, Renigunta. Electricity service connection as also the water tap connection also provided to the said house. 5. The said Chanda Mohan sold the schedule property to the claim petitioner i.e. S.Parvathi under a registered sale deed on 22.11.2000 vide document No. 2834/2000 and delivered possession to the claim petitioner. Subsequently, the name of the claim petitioner was mutated in the Gram Panchayat records and in the Property Tax Register with new Assessment No. 1899 and door number was changed from 14-62-5 to 14-355, Panchali Nagar, Renigunta. The application was filed along with the documents referred supra. The petitioner has sought to take possession of the property pursuant to the specific performance Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 77 of 1994 against the respondent No. 2. 6. The petitioner filed counter contending that the petition under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and Rule 47 CPC has no application and that the applications filed by the respondent No. 1 are to be rejected. The petitioner denied the contents of the claim petition, but did not explain as to the source of title of Respondent No. 2 for execution of the sale deed. 7. In the course of enquiry, PW-1 K. Sunil Kumar was examined as PW-1 and P. Lakhsminarayana was examined as PW-2. The claim petitioner filed Exs.P.1 and P.12 i.e. documents referred in the claim petition. No oral or documentary evidence was let in by the judgment debtor. The trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that PW-1 has no personal knowledge of survey number, boundaries and the extent of the suit property and that he does not know the consideration amount even though PW-2 was cross examined. Aggrieved thereby, the claim petitioner filed C.M.A. No. 4 of 2018 before the X Additional District Judge, Tirupati and the Lower Appellate Court allowed the C.M.A taking into consideration the scope of enquiry under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and the documentary evidence filed by the claim petitioner. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition. 8. Heard the Respective counsels. 9. Aggrieved thereby, the claim petitioner filed C.M.A. No. 4 of 2018 before the X Additional District Judge, Tirupati and the Lower Appellate Court allowed the C.M.A taking into consideration the scope of enquiry under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and the documentary evidence filed by the claim petitioner. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition. 8. Heard the Respective counsels. 9. The only argument, which was made by the learned counsel, was that the application filed by the claim petitioner under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is not maintainable as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is maintainable only by a decree holder and not by a third party. 10. In support of his contention, the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Ltd. vs. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust, 2022 (9) Scale 716 rendered by a Bench of two Judges. In the above Judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that only the decree holder can maintain an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and not by a person other than a decree holder. 11. In the above referred case, the appellant who filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC was a purchaser from J.Dr pendente lite and it was in that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the application so filed. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Verma vs. Jagat Singh Singhi, 1996 (8) SCC 47 at Para 5 held that application by a person in possession can also be maintained under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. The relevant portion of Para 5 reads as under: “5. In the compromise decree, ultimately, the High Court granted possession of the premises in occupation of the appellant. The appellant having been found in possession, he is entitled to obstruct execution defending his illegal dispossession in execution proceedings and he is also independently entitled to file application under Order 21 Rule 97 claiming his possession.” 12. The Sriram Housing Finance case cited by the petitioner, though considered Order 21 Rule 97 CPC in detail did not refer to the earlier judgment. The Sriram Housing Finance case cited by the petitioner, though considered Order 21 Rule 97 CPC in detail did not refer to the earlier judgment. It is to be noted that the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nooruddin vs. K.L. Anand, 1995 (2) SCC 242 and Samir Sobhan Sanyal vs. Trade Tracks (P) Ltd. 1996 (4) SCC 144 were also on an application filed by third party under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. 13. The genesis for the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Verma vs. Jagat Singh Singhi, 1996 (8) SCC 47 and the ones cited in the preceding paragraph can be traced to judgment of this court rendered by Justice K. Ramaswamy in Tahera Sayeed vs. M. Shanmugam and Others, AIR 1986 A.P. 206 where the downside of Order 21 Rule 97 CPC in restricting the right to file application only to the Decree holder and the right of the third party to file application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC only on dispossession was considered in a similar fact situation. 14. This court held that the remedy to third party to file application under order 21 Rule 99 CPC only after dispossession is unfair and the application filed by the third party under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC to be treated as a complaint or a counter in Rule 98 or 101 CPC. The paragraph 8 of the judgment reads as under: “8. Though R. 99 of O. 21 gives right to file an application by a person dispossessed of the immovable property, it is a poor consolation to him to be asked to approach the Court after dispossession when he lays bear the facts in advance and seeks assistance to protect his possession. In Savamma v. Radhakrishna Moorty, (1985) 1 Andh LT 436. I held that the faith of the people is the saviour and succour for the sustenance of the rule of law and any weakening link in this regard would rip apart the edifice of justice and cause disillusionment to the people in the efficacy of law. The acts of the Court should not injure a party. When the stains on the purity of fountain of justice is apparent, it is but the duty of the Court to erase the stains at the earliest. It is well settled that right to an adjudication is a procedural right. The acts of the Court should not injure a party. When the stains on the purity of fountain of justice is apparent, it is but the duty of the Court to erase the stains at the earliest. It is well settled that right to an adjudication is a procedural right. The procedure has been devised as handmaid to advance justice and not to retard the same. The primary object for which the Court exists is to do justice between the parties. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic or rigmarole. Considered from this perspective, I have no hesitation to hold that when the third party, not bound by the decree approaches the Court to protect his independent right, title or interest before he is actually dispossessed from immovable property and files an application under O. 21, R. 97, it must be treated to be an intimation to the Court as caveat to the decree-holder or purchaser or a person claiming through him that “look here, your fraud would be exposed and collusion uncovered; I am not a pretender for judgment-debtor. I have my own just right, title or interest in the immovable property in my possession and I am not bound by your decree” and the Court is to treat it as a complaint or a counter in opposition as an application for the purpose of O. 21, R. 97 and to adjudicate it under R. 98 or R. 101 which shall be final and conclusive between the parties and it shall be treated to be a decree for the purpose of R. 103 and it is subject to appeal and further subject to the result in the prior pending suit under R. 104. This approach is consistent with Ubi jus ubi remidium, shortens the litigation, prevents needless protraction and expenditure and affords expeditious quietus to execution apart from assuaging fair justice. Accordingly, I hold that the application under O. 21, R. 97 of the petitioner or the counter of respondent 1, Narasimha, be treated as an application under O. 21, R. 97 and it is maintainable.” 15. This Hon’ble Court in the same Judgment also held that in a situation that where decree holder insists for execution under Order 21 Rule 35 CPC without filing application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and abuse the process. This Hon’ble Court in the same Judgment also held that in a situation that where decree holder insists for execution under Order 21 Rule 35 CPC without filing application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and abuse the process. The relevant part of paragraph 9 thereof is extracted as hereunder: “9..........Order 21, Rule 97, if interpreted strictly, could be available only when the decree-holder or purchaser chooses to make avail of. Instead, if he persists in execution under O. 21, R. 35 against a third party not bound by the decree, on issue of Warrant in Form XI of Appendix E of the Schedule to the Code, the bailiff is bound to execute the decree and deliver physical possession under relevant Clause (1) to (3) thereof; if necessary by assault or by use of criminal force. Thereby the procedure aids abuse of the process enabling the decree-holder or the purchaser to overreach his object to saddle himself in possession of the immovable property depriving the person in possession but not bound by the decree of his valuable right to property. Procedure is but the machinery of law - the channel and means whereby law is administered and justice reached. All procedure, therefore, is an armour to effectuate the right to property. Procedural safeguard is an ingrained facet of fair play in action to sub-serve the legal right and not to extinguish it. The highest duty of a Court is to take care that its act does not injure a suitor. Thus, in a given situation, as stated earlier, if inherent power is not exercised by the Court to modulate its procedure, it would facilitate heaping injustice upon a rightful person.” 16. Therefore, the application filed by the respondent is treated as counter or complaint against illegal attempt to dispossess, and therefore, the application is in order. Even otherwise, the contention of the petitioner to set-aside the order of the lower courts as application by the third party/respondent under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC is not maintainable at this length of time on the basis of the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court cited supra, when all the evidence and pleadings of the respective parties is on record cannot be acceded to, as that would only lead to duplication of adjudication and colossal wastage of judicial time. Therefore, this court is not inclined to set-aside the orders of the courts below on that ground. 17. Coming to the facts of this case, as narrated above, the plea of the Respondent herein is that the right to the suit schedule property is independent of the Judgment debtor and the plea is backed up by all necessary registered link documents which were marked in evidence. It is to be noted that there is absolutely no evidence anterior to the decree establishing the prior right of the petitioner or his predecessor in title. 18. An ex-parte specific performance decree passed within one year of filing of suit against a person whose source of title is not known, followed by sale deed executed by court and then the present litigation. The narration is sufficient for the decree to be termed as a suspect decree. Therefore, there is absolutely no merit in the case of the petitioner. 19. Therefore, Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.