ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the Commissioner/respondent No. 3 whereby revision filed by petitioner came to be dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was an elected Sarpanch. She was elected in the year 2020. Based on some complaint, an inquiry was conducted against her, inquiry report was submitted on 18.05.2022 opining that the petitioner has committed financial irregularities in discharging her official duties. Based on the inquiry report, a show cause notice was issued to her on 09.06.2022 to which she submitted reply on 20.07.2022. Sub Divisional Officer only on the basis of reply submitted by the petitioner has passed the order on 21.09.2022 removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch under Section 40 of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam,1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1993”) and further passed the order for recovery of the amount after evaluating all the works done by her. He contended that the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Prescribed Authority without following due procedure of law as provided under Section 40 of the Act of 1993 i.e. issuing charge memo along with supporting documents, providing opportunity to lead evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, has passed an order, therefore, the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer is bad in law. Petitioner aggrieved with order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer-Cum-Prescribed Authority has preferred an appeal as provided under Rule 3 of the Panchayat Raj (Appeal & Revisions) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 1995”) before the Collector which came to be dismissed and thereafter the revision application submitted under Rule 5 of the Rules of 1995 also came to be dismissed by the impugned order. Appellate and Revisional Authority have not considered the ground raised in the appeal and revision that the order of removal passed under Section 40 of the Act of 1993 is in violation of the principles of natural justice as it was passed without following due procedure of law. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Kamti Bai vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others in WPC No. 2675 of 2017, decided on 11.12.2017. 3. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Kamti Bai vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others in WPC No. 2675 of 2017, decided on 11.12.2017. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondents No. 1, 3, 4 & 5 opposes the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that after receipt of inquiry report, petitioner was served with show cause notice mentioning the notice to be issued under Section 40 (1) (c) of the Act of 1993, the petitioner submitted reply and only thereafter the order has been passed and, therefore, there is compliance of the procedure provided under Section 40 of the Act of 1993. Hence, there is no error in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority. 4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 also supports the submission of learned counsel for the State. Similar submission is made by learned counsel for the respondents No. 6 & 7 also. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with writ petition. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner was an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat-Kapatbahri, Janpad Panchayat- Batauli. A complaint was filed by respondent No. 6 against the petitioner, before respondent No. 4/Sub Divisional Officer alleging that the petitioner has committed financial irregularities during her tenure as Sarpanch and tried to provide financial benefit to her husband. After receipt of complaint, statements of witnesses were recorded. A report was called by respondent No. 4 from the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchyat, Batauli, who, in turn, submitted report stating that allegation made against the Sarpanch was found to be proved. Thereafter, proceedings under Section 40 of the Act of 1993 was registered and a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 40 (1) (c) of the Act of 1993. Petitioner submitted a detailed reply to show cause notice. Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Prescribed Authority vide its order dated 21.09.2022 has passed the order removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch with immediate effect. 7. Section 40 of the Act of 1993 deals with removal of office bearers of Panchayat. It is relevant, hence, extracted below for ready reference: “40. Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Prescribed Authority vide its order dated 21.09.2022 has passed the order removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch with immediate effect. 7. Section 40 of the Act of 1993 deals with removal of office bearers of Panchayat. It is relevant, hence, extracted below for ready reference: “40. Removal of office-bearers of Panchayat: (1) The State Government or the prescribed authority may after such enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove an office-bearer: (a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties. (b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public: Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section “Misconduct” shall include: (a) any action adversely affecting: (i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. (ii) the harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of State transcending religious, linguistic, regional, caste or sectional diversities. (iii) the dignity of women. (b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under this Act. (c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly to secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits to any relative, such as giving out any type of lease, getting any work done through them in the Panchayat by an office-bearer of Panchayat. Explanation - For the purpose of this clause, the expression ‘relative’ shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law: Provided that the final order in the inquiry shall as far as possible be passed within 90 days from the date of issue of show cause notice to the concerned office-bearer. (2) A person who has been removed under sub-section (1) shall forthwith cease to be a member of any other Panchayat of which he is a member, such person shall also be disqualified for a period of six years to be elected under this Act.” 8. Section 40 (1) of the Act of 1993 provides that the removal of the office bearer of the Panchayat would be only after conducting the enquiry by the Prescribed Authority. Section 40 (1) of the Act of 1993 provides that the removal of the office bearer of the Panchayat would be only after conducting the enquiry by the Prescribed Authority. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 40 of the Act of 1993 clearly provides that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. It is implicit in the provision that the officer-bearer who is sought to be removed will be given a fair hearing and real opportunity to meet the charges levelled against him. It is well settled law that removal of elected office-bearer from his office is a serious matter, as disqualification or removal not only affects the particular office- bearer but it affects the entire constituency as well. Therefore, the law relating to disqualification or removal has to be construed strictly. 9. Furthermore, the word ‘enquiry’ used in Section 40 of the Act of 1993 is with purpose. In common parlance, the word ‘enquiry’ means the office bearer should be allowed to inspect documents, which are to be relied upon against him and further he should have right to adduce his own evidence. Further, ‘enquiry’ means enquiry before the office bearer and not behind his back. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Kailash Kumar Paramanand Dangi vs. State of M.P. and Others, MANU/MP/0253/1999 : 1999 (2) MPLJ 722 , has observed in Para-7 & 9 thus: “7. Removal and disqualification of an office-bearer of a Panchayat under Section 40 of the Act on the ground of misconduct is not less injurious and stigmatic as the removal of a civil servant under Article 311 of the Constitution of India or a workman under the industrial law. Article 311 also envisages an ‘inquiry’ in which the delinquent employee is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The celebrated rule of audi alteram partem has been incorporated therein. What principles of natural justice should be applied depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Article 311 also envisages an ‘inquiry’ in which the delinquent employee is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The celebrated rule of audi alteram partem has been incorporated therein. What principles of natural justice should be applied depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Broadly stated a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. Union of India v. T.R. Verma, MANU/SC/0121/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 882 and Khemchand v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0120/1957 : AIR 1958 SC 300 . 9. H.W.R. Wade in his book on Administrative Law, 7th Edition at page 521 has quoted a passage in the speech of Lord Bridge in the House of Lords in Lloyd v. Mcmahon, MANU/UKHL/0024/1987 : (1987) AC 625: “My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other frame-work in which it operates. In particular, it is well-established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness.” 10. In the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector, Raigad and Others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 . In the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector, Raigad and Others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 . Their Lordships in the Supreme Court have considered that removal of elected office-bearer from office on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature and therefore the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same and observed as under: “30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab and Union of India v. H.C. Goel. Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer. 31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self- government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry. 32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required. xxx xxx xxx 34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. xxx xxx xxx 34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed.” 11. Reverting back to the facts of the case in hand, order- sheets of the proceedings under Section 40 of the Act of 1993 before Sub Divisional Officer/respondent No. 4 reflect that on 09.06.2022, show cause notice was directed to be issued to petitioner under Section 40 of the Act of 1993. Reply to show-cause notice was submitted on 20.07.2022. Thereafter, the case was fixed for final orders. 12. Perusal of the order-sheet of the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Prescribed Authority does not reveal that the petitioner was provided with any charge memo and relevant documents based upon which the order of removal has been passed against the petitioner. Neither evidence of complainant or his witnesses were recorded nor the petitioner was granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Even the petitioner herself was not examined nor she was provided an opportunity to adduce evidence in her defence. It has also not come in the order sheet that the petitioner/Sarpanch stated anywhere that she does not want to examine herself or cross-examine the complainant witnesses. However, vide order dated 21.09.2022 the Prescribed Authority/Sub Divisional Officer ignoring the above crucial aspects has removed the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch only observing that reply to show cause notice filed by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. 13. Granting proper opportunity of hearing to the office bearer is an important facet of an inquiry to be held in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Order passed against the office bearer is having civil consequences. It is expected of the authority to provide full opportunity to defend the charges/allegations against him/her. 14. Depriving of proper opportunity to defend will lead to violation of the principles of natural justice. Order passed against the office bearer is having civil consequences. It is expected of the authority to provide full opportunity to defend the charges/allegations against him/her. 14. Depriving of proper opportunity to defend will lead to violation of the principles of natural justice. In the present case, there is no clarity in the proceedings recorded by the Prescribed Authority/Sub Divisional Officer with regard to providing opportunity to lead evidence to petitioner/Sarpanch. The important fact of not providing proper opportunity to bring evidence also escaped consideration of the Appellate Authority as also the Revisional Authority. 15. For the foregoing discussions, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer/Prescribed Authority removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch, affirmed by the Collector and then by the Commissioner is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 16. In the matter of Managing Director, ECII, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that if proceeding is set aside on the ground of technical defect, then it is to be remitted to the concerned authority to start the proceedings afresh from the stage where the defect occurred. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Allahabad Bank and Others vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 , while considering issue with respect to remand of case to the Enquiry Officer/Competent Authority has observed as under: “8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo the same afresh. That Course have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order.........” 18. For the aforementioned reason, writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed in part. Impugned order passed by the Commissioner is set aside and the case is remitted back to the Prescribed Authority-cum-Sub Divisional Officer (R)/respondent No. 4 to pass an order afresh after providing full opportunity to the petitioner/Sarpanch, in accordance with the law.