ORDER : 1. The present revision petition has been preferred against order dated 24.07.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No. 65/2022 (NCV No. 131/2022) whereby three different applications as filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on behalf of the petitioners-defendants no. 1 and 2 have been rejected. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the respondent no. 1-plaintiff to the effect that one revision petition challenging an order whereby three different applications have been decided is not maintainable and three revision petitions ought to have been filed as vide the order impugned, three different applications have been decided. 3. So far as the above preliminary objection is concerned, the same cannot be sustained for the peculiar facts and manner in which the order impugned has been passed. Vide the order impugned, learned Judge has proceeded on to decide the first application in paras No. 1 to 10 of the order impugned and has even put his signature after para No. 10. But then, the learned Judge has proceeded on to decide the second application in para No. 11 to 20 of the order impugned and has again put his signature after para No. 20. Interestingly, the same manner has been adopted for deciding the remaining two applications also. Meaning thereby, without passing separate order for each application, the learned Judge has passed one common order segregating them into different paragraphs. In the specific opinion of this Court, the alleged separate orders segregated in different paragraphs in a common order cannot be said to be the independent orders. No party can be directed to challenge certain paragraphs of an order in one petition and the other paragraphs in a different petition. Just putting signatures at the end of certain paragraphs would not make the same an independent/separate order. The complete order has to be read as a whole and cannot be treated to be four separate orders. The said logic is also substantiated by the fact that even on behalf of the respondent no. 1-plaintiff, a single caveat has been filed qua the present petition. Had the respondent no. 1-plaintiff treated the order impugned to be four separate orders, four different caveats qua each of them would have been filed. The said logic is also substantiated by the fact that even on behalf of the respondent no. 1-plaintiff, a single caveat has been filed qua the present petition. Had the respondent no. 1-plaintiff treated the order impugned to be four separate orders, four different caveats qua each of them would have been filed. Therefore, in the peculiar manner in which the order impugned has been passed, it could not have been expected from the petitioners to file separate revision petitions qua the alleged separate orders. The objection as raised by learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 hence being not tenable, is rejected. 4. Vide the order impugned, three applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC as preferred by the defendants no. 1 and 2 have been rejected and one application under Order XI Rules 12 & 14, CPC as preferred by the plaintiff has been allowed. The present revision petition has been preferred challenging the order to the extent of rejection of the three applications as preferred by the defendants no. 1 and 2. 5. First application was preferred by defendants no. 1 and 2 on the ground that the plaintiff, who had been residing in America since last 39 years, was never in physical possession of the property sought to be partitioned and hence the Court fee as paid by him ought to have been computed on the market value of his claimed share of the property. As the Court fee of Rs.250/- only had been paid by the plaintiff, he be directed to pay deficit Court fee after valuing the suit on the market value of the property and if the deficit Court fee is not paid, the plaint be rejected. 6. Per contra, the case of the plaintiff is that he being a coparcener, was in joint possession of the property legally and to continue to be in joint possession in law, it is not necessary that he should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Hence, the Court fee was payable in terms of Section 35(2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1961’). In terms of Section 35(2) of the Act of 1961, he had paid appropriate Court fee and hence, there was no question of deficit Court fee. Hence, the Court fee was payable in terms of Section 35(2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1961’). In terms of Section 35(2) of the Act of 1961, he had paid appropriate Court fee and hence, there was no question of deficit Court fee. Further, he undertook to pay the Court fee as directed to be paid by the Court after his share being determined. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the suit was valued by the plaintiff for Rs.5 crores and he claimed his one half of the share in the suit property therefore, on the face of it, he was liable to pay the Court fee on Rs.2.5 crores i.e. Rs.5,52,125/-. Further, the present was not a simplicitor suit for partition but also for rendition of accounts. Hence, the plaintiff was definitely liable to pay the Court fee qua the relief of rendition of accounts. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the judgments rendered in the matters of National Engineering Industries Limited Vs. Union of India, 2012 (2) ILR (Raj.) 653 and Mohkam Chand Dasot & Anr. Vs. Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur, AIR 2006 Raj 156 . 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that firstly, he would be governed by Section 35(2) and not by Section 35(1) of the Act of 1961. Secondly, so far as the relief for rendition of accounts is concerned, the same is an ancillary relief and hence in terms of Section 6(1) of the Act of 1961, he is not liable to pay any Court fee qua the said ancillary relief. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgments passed in the matters of Neelavathi and Others Vs. N. Natarajan and Others, 1980 AIR SC 691, Smt. Meena alias Hema Vs. Smt. Komal Devi and Others, AIR 2004 Rajasthan 77 and Jagannath Amin Vs. Seetharama (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. 2006 AIR SCW 6351. 9. The issue before this Court is whether the finding as arrived by the learned trial Court is correct and in consonance with law. N. Natarajan and Others, 1980 AIR SC 691, Smt. Meena alias Hema Vs. Smt. Komal Devi and Others, AIR 2004 Rajasthan 77 and Jagannath Amin Vs. Seetharama (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. 2006 AIR SCW 6351. 9. The issue before this Court is whether the finding as arrived by the learned trial Court is correct and in consonance with law. The learned trial Court reached to the conclusion that there was no specific averment in the plaint that the plaintiff had been excluded from the joint possession of the property and hence, he could not have been called upon to pay the Court fee under Section 35(1) of the Act of 1961. Further, the reliefs of rendition of accounts and share in movable property, were the ancillary reliefs in a suit for partition of the immovable properties and hence, in terms of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act of 1961, no separate Court fee was required to be paid qua the said ancillary reliefs. The learned trial Court further observed that the valuation of the movable properties is also not ascertainable at this stage and if the suit for partition is decreed in favour of the plaintiff, he could be directed to pay the deficit Court fee. 10. Section 35(1) & (2) of the Act of 1961 provides as under: “35(1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a share in joint family property or of property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiff’s share of the property. (2) In a suit for partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property, fee shall be paid at the following rates, namely: (i) Rupees thirty if the value of plaintiff's share is Rs. 5,000 or less. (ii) Rupees one hundred if the value is above Rs. 5,000 but does not exceed Rs.10,000. (iii) Rupees two hundred if such value exceeds Rs. 10,000.” A bare perusal of the above provisions reflects that the basic ground of distinction in the two is of possession. 5,000 or less. (ii) Rupees one hundred if the value is above Rs. 5,000 but does not exceed Rs.10,000. (iii) Rupees two hundred if such value exceeds Rs. 10,000.” A bare perusal of the above provisions reflects that the basic ground of distinction in the two is of possession. If a suit for partition and possession of a share in a joint family property is preferred by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession of such property, he would be liable to pay the Court fee to be computed on the market value of his claimed share. On the other hand, the plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property and he prefers a suit for partition and possession, the fee payable by him would be as provided under Section 35(2). Therefore, the issue for consideration is whether the plaintiff in the present matter, was in joint possession of the property or not? 11. To determine whether a plaintiff has been excluded from possession, the test as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neelavathi’s case (supra) is that, there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that he had been “excluded” from joint possession to which he is entitled to in law. The above principle had been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jagannath Amin’s case (supra) wherein also the Court specifically held that the averments in the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff was not given any income from the joint family property would not amount to his exclusion from the possession. Testing on the touchstone as laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the pleadings as made by the plaintiff in the present matter becomes relevant. The plaintiff on the issue of possession pleaded as under: Meaning thereby, it was the specific pleading of the plaintiff that he is in joint possession of the property of the joint family property being a coparcener and first class heir of late Shri Paras Singh Bhansali. A bare reading of the complete plaint reflects that it is nowhere the case of the plaintiff that he had been excluded from possession. A bare reading of the complete plaint reflects that it is nowhere the case of the plaintiff that he had been excluded from possession. As laid down in Neelavathi’s case (supra), while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the averments as made in the plaint are only to be read and in the present case, the plea of joint possession has been averred in unequivocal terms. Therefore, the same would definitely be governed by Section 35(2) of the Act of 1961 and not Section 35(1). 12. Along with the reliefs for partition of immovable properties, that for partition of movable properties as well as for rendition of accounts have also been prayed for by the plaintiff. The issue, is whether the plaintiff is required to pay additional Court fee qua the said reliefs? A bare reading of the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint, makes it clear that the relief for rendition of accounts can be granted to the plaintiff only if he is first held entitled for a decree of partition. Meaning thereby, if first and the main relief as prayed for is granted in favour of the plaintiff, the grant of other reliefs in his favour could be considered. If ultimately it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree of partition, he would definitely be not entitled for other relief of rendition of accounts too. The simple conclusion that can be drawn from above facts is that the relief of rendition of accounts is clearly an ancillary relief to the main relief of decree for partition. Proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act of 1961 provides that if a relief is sought only as ancillary to the main relief, the plaint shall be chargeable only on the value of the main relief. So far as the main relief in the present suit is concerned, as held above, the same would be governed by Section 35(2) of the Act of 1961 and hence as rightly held by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff would not be liable to pay any Court fee qua ancillary relief at this stage. He can definitely be called upon to pay the same if the reliefs as prayed for are granted in his favour. He can definitely be called upon to pay the same if the reliefs as prayed for are granted in his favour. The order impugned to the extent of dismissal of the application dated 05.05.2022 preferred under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, pertaining to issue of the Court fee does not deserve any interference and is hereby affirmed. 13. Coming on to the second application wherein it has been averred that the suit is barred in terms of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 2019’), the only issue for consideration is whether the suit is barred in terms of Rule 24(c) of the Rules of 2019 as averred by defendant No. 1. Rule 24(c) of the Rules of 2019 provides for the conditions when an NRI or an OCI can acquire any immovable property in India by way of inheritance from a person resident outside India. The said Rule nowhere prohibits the acquisition of a property by way of inheritance from a resident of India. The provision, instead of limiting the scope of acquisition of property by inheritance, rather widen the scope by providing for acquisition of the property by way of inheritance even from a person resident outside India. Section 6(5) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1999’) provides that a Non Resident Indian may hold or own any immovable property situated in India if such property was inherited from a person who was resident of India. Meaning thereby, the Act of 1999 specifically provides that a Non Resident Indian can acquire a property in India by way of inheritance. As rightly held by the learned trial Court, firstly, Rule 24 of the Rules of 2019 nowhere prohibits the acquisition of land by inheritance by a Non Resident Indian and secondly, even if it is assumed so, no rule can supersede the Act. Admittedly, the Act of 1999 provides/permits for holding of any land by a Non Resident Indian by way of inheritance. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Regional Transport Authority Vs. Shaju, 2022 INSC 196, the rules, if inconsistent with the Act, cannot override the Act or restrict the ambit of the Act. Admittedly, the Act of 1999 provides/permits for holding of any land by a Non Resident Indian by way of inheritance. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Regional Transport Authority Vs. Shaju, 2022 INSC 196, the rules, if inconsistent with the Act, cannot override the Act or restrict the ambit of the Act. In view of the specific provision and settled position of law, the plaint in question cannot be termed to be barred by any law and hence the order rejecting the application dated 12.07.2022 as preferred by defendant No. 1 under Order VII Rule 11, CPC also does not deserve any interference. 14. Coming on to the third application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC as preferred by defendant No. 1 on the ground that the suit is not maintainable as it was clear on record that late Shri Paras Singh Bhansali did not die intestate but had executed a Will in favour of defendant No. 1. There being a Will in existence, the suit for partition at the behest of the plaintiff could not have been maintained. Further, the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and hence, the same deserves to be rejected on the said ground also. So far as the above issue is concerned, this Court is of the clear opinion that the finding as recorded by the learned trial Court is totally in consonance with the basic principle of law. Herein is a case where the plaintiff has prayed for partition on the ground that the father of the plaintiff and the defendants No. 1 & 5 died intestate. The defendant No. 1 on the other hand alleged a Will to have been executed by his father in his favour which the plaintiff averred to be forged. Therefore, it is prima facie clear that the factum of the Will having been executed is yet to be proved/disproved on record. The same can be proved only after the issue being framed qua the same and evidence being led on the same. As rightly held by the learned trial Court, no finding qua the alleged Will could have been recorded at this stage and that too, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. The rejection of the application by the learned trial Court therefore, does not deserve any interference. As rightly held by the learned trial Court, no finding qua the alleged Will could have been recorded at this stage and that too, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. The rejection of the application by the learned trial Court therefore, does not deserve any interference. Further, the ground that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action is also totally misplaced. A bare perusal of the plaint makes it clear that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that a cause of action has arisen to him after denial of the defendant to divide/partition the property amicably. 15. As a conclusion, rejection of all the three applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC as preferred by the defendants no. 1 & 2/defendant no. 1 does not deserve any interference and the revision petition is therefore, dismissed. 16. Stay petition and the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.