JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J. 1. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Appellant herein has preferred this criminal appeal calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.1.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Baikunthpur at Korea (Chhattisgarh) in Sessions Case No.82 of 2018 by which he has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000 in default of payment thereof additional imprisonment for 6 months Under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years and fine of Rs.2,000 in default of payment thereof additional imprisonment for 6 months The jail sentences are directed to run concurrently 2. Name of deceased is Vinay Prabha Lakda. The Appellant, after death of his first wife Savitri Kujur, made Vinay Prabha Lakda his second wife. From the first wife, the Appellant has two sons, namely, Aman Kujur and Akash Kujur and one daughter Sapna Kujur. Elder son Akash works at Ambikapur and lives there. Daughter Sapna Kujur studies in Navodaya Vidyalaya. Younger son Aman was living along with the Appellant at Village Bade Ani. On 1.7.2018, extremely unpleasant smell started coming out from Quarter No.1100 situated in Vivekanand Colony, Charcha, SECL, where the Appellant and his second wife Vinay Prabha Lakda were living. Nagar Sainik (Home Guard) Afsana Ansari (PW3), who was residing above that quarter informed about it to police. Police found that bedroom of the quarter of the Appellant was locked and the unpleasant smell was coming out from the bedroom. The lock put on the door of the bedroom was broken in which bolt of the door also got detached from the door. A panchnama (Ex.P6) in this regard was prepared. Seizure of that bolt and lock was made vide Ex.P8. Dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was found lying below the bed in that bedroom. A nylon rope was also found in the room. Long hair were stuck at both the ends of that rope. The rope was seized vide Ex.P7. Dehati Morgue Intimation (Ex.P3) was recorded on the basis of information of Afsana Ansari (PW3). The dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was sent for post mortem examination. Spot map (Ex.P4) was prepared. A nylon rope was also found in the room. Long hair were stuck at both the ends of that rope. The rope was seized vide Ex.P7. Dehati Morgue Intimation (Ex.P3) was recorded on the basis of information of Afsana Ansari (PW3). The dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was sent for post mortem examination. Spot map (Ex.P4) was prepared. Another spot map (Ex.P5) was got prepared by Patwari. Dr. G.S. Paikra (PW13) conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda and gave report thereof (Ex.P18) in which he opined that cause of the death was asphyxia resulting in respiratory arrest due to manual strangulation and nature of the death was homicidal. After conducting morgue inquiry, police registered First Information Report (Ex.P25) against the Appellant on 2.7.2018. Memorandum statement (Ex.P15) of the Appellant was recorded and at his instance 3 keys, aadhaar card of the deceased, her voter identity card, her another identity card, her ATM Card of State Bank of India, her Pan Card etc. were seized vide Ex.P16. The seized lock of the door of the bedroom of the Appellant was opened from one of the seized keys, which was of Lark make. The lock opened from that key. A panchnama (Ex.P14) thereof was prepared. In the examination of the seized rope by the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), it was found that the hair stuck in that rope was of the deceased herself. FSL Report is Ex.P22. The Appellant was arrested vide Ex.P28. Statements of witnesses were recorded. On completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the Appellant. The Trial Court framed charges against him under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. 3. To rope in the Appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents. In examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Appellant pleaded false implication. He did not examine any witness in defence. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellant as mentioned in first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the instant appeal. 4. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant argued that the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The Appellant was not present at home, i.e., the place of alleged occurrence from one week before. The dead body was not recovered at his instance. Hence, the instant appeal. 4. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant argued that the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The Appellant was not present at home, i.e., the place of alleged occurrence from one week before. The dead body was not recovered at his instance. No any key or any document relating to the deceased was recovered from him. His son Aman (PW2) has been tutored to depose against him. Statement of Home Guard Afsana Ansari (PW3) is not reliable. The prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the Appellant. Involvement of the Appellant in the crime in question is not proved. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. Reliance was placed on Dhaneshwar Verma alias Nanu S/o Devsharan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LawSuit(Chh) 421. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/State supported the impugned judgment and submitted that considering the entire evidence available on record the Trial Court has rightly convicted the Appellant. 6. We have heard the rival contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the entire evidence available with utmost circumspection. 7. The first question for consideration is whether the death of Vinay Prabha Lakda was homicidal in nature? 8. In the post mortem report (Ex.P18), which is proved by Dr. G.S. Paikra (PW13), who conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda, it is opined by him that cause of the death was asphyxia resulting in respiratory arrest due to manual strangulation and nature of the death was homicidal. The statement of Dr. G.S. Paikra (PW13) has remained unrebutted. In the FSL Report (Ex.P22) placed against examination of the seized rope, it was found that the hair stuck in the rope was of the deceased herself. That rope was recovered from beside the dead body. This proves that the death of the deceased was caused by strangulating her neck with the seized rope. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the death was homicidal in nature and, therefore, we hereby affirm the finding of homicidal death arrived at by the Trial Court. 9. The next question for consideration is whether the Appellant is the person who committed the crime in question? 10. The case of the prosecution is not based on the direct evidence. It is based on the circumstantial evidence and the Trial Court has found incriminating circumstances established. 9. The next question for consideration is whether the Appellant is the person who committed the crime in question? 10. The case of the prosecution is not based on the direct evidence. It is based on the circumstantial evidence and the Trial Court has found incriminating circumstances established. The five golden principles, which constitute panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 11. In the instant case, the main circumstantial evidence against the Appellant is that dead body of his second wife Vinay Prabha Lakda was found below the bed of his bedroom. In this regard, statement of Home Guard Afsana Ansari (PW3) needs to be appreciated. In the instant case, the main circumstantial evidence against the Appellant is that dead body of his second wife Vinay Prabha Lakda was found below the bed of his bedroom. In this regard, statement of Home Guard Afsana Ansari (PW3) needs to be appreciated. She has stated that on coming out of extremely unpleasant smell from the house of the Appellant she tried to know about it in the neighbourhood, but, nothing came to her knowledge. Having seen the house of the Appellant locked, a doubt arose in her mind. She found that rear door of the house was open. She entered the house and found that the bedroom was locked and flies were roaming around windows and unpleasant smell was coming out. On making a telephonic call to Police Station Charcha, police came and broke the lock of the door of the bedroom. Dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was found lying below the bed. The dead body was covered by a cover of gas cylinder. On the information of Afsana Ansari (PW3), police recorded Dehati Morgue Intimation (Ex.P3). This witness has remained firm and unrebutted in her statement. 12. Investigating Officer Sub-Inspector S.K. Singh (PW15) has supported the incidents of breaking of the lock and finding of dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda below the bed. Statements of Umesh Das (PW4), Birendra Rajwade (PW9) and Ankit Kumar (PW10) also support the incident of breaking of the lock. Thus, it is established that dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was found lying below the bed kept in the bedroom of the house which was in possession of the Appellant. This circumstantial evidence goes against the Appellant. 13. Another circumstantial evidence is that the Appellant used to suspect character of his wife Vinay Prabha Lakda and, therefore, there was a reason for him to cause her death. In this regard, Victoria Khalkho (PW5), sister of the deceased has deposed that the deceased had told her that she had performed love marriage with the Appellant and they were living together in Charcha. The deceased used to visit this witness on intervals and she had told her that the Appellant used to suspect her character and for this reason he used to abused and beat her. The above statement of this witness has not been challenged in her cross-examination. The deceased used to visit this witness on intervals and she had told her that the Appellant used to suspect her character and for this reason he used to abused and beat her. The above statement of this witness has not been challenged in her cross-examination. In the circumstance, from the statement of this witness, in the case of a circumstantial evidence, it establishes that for committing the crime in question the Appellant had a reason of suspecting character of his wife. This circumstantial evidence also goes against the Appellant. 14. Another circumstantial evidence against the Appellant is that at the time when dead body of his wife Vinay Prabha Lakda was lying below the bed of the bedroom of his house he was present in that house. This circumstance has been proved by the Appellant’s son Aman (PW2) himself. Aman (PW2), who was aged about 13 years, has stated that his elder brother Akash worked at Ambikapur. His sister Sapna was studying in Navodaya Vidyalaya. Aman (PW2) has further stated that he was living along with his father/Appellant. This witness has stated that when he had gone to the houses of his Bua-Fufa (aunts) situated at Jalbhattapara, Kudeli, Afsana Ansari (PW3), who was living above their quarter, had telephonically informed that unpleasant smell was coming out from their quarter. Then he returned and asked the Appellant about where was mother Vinay Prabha Lakda. The Appellant had not told him anything. Then he had gone for playing. Later, when dead body of the mother was being taken out, he had reached back home. This witness was declared hostile. When he was questioned further, he stated that when he had asked the Appellant about the mother, the Appellant had told him that she had gone somewhere and will return. But, till the evening, the mother had not returned. Then he had again asked the Appellant about the mother, but, he had not replied. The Appellant had locked the bedroom from outside. Later, he stated that lock was not put. When he woke up in the next morning, he had gone towards the jungle along with a grandmother of the neighbourhood. When he returned at 11 a.m., the Appellant was lying in the house and unpleasant smell was coming out from the house. The Appellant had locked the bedroom from outside. Later, he stated that lock was not put. When he woke up in the next morning, he had gone towards the jungle along with a grandmother of the neighbourhood. When he returned at 11 a.m., the Appellant was lying in the house and unpleasant smell was coming out from the house. Thus, this witness has made it evident that at the last time he had found the Appellant present in their house, but, the mother was not present in the house and unpleasant smell was coming out from the house. Even on being asked by this witness, the Appellant did not give him a clear answer that where did his mother go. 15. Aman (PW2), accepting suggestions of the defence in his cross-examination, which was done after 10 months after again obtaining permission by the Appellant, has stated that one week before finding of dead body of his mother he had asked the Appellant about his mother and the Appellant had told him that she had gone to her maternal house. Thereafter, he had gone to Village Ani along with the Appellant. Then they were called on a telephonic call from the colony. Due to rear door of the house remaining open, anybody can enter and exit from the house. The statement given by him regarding coming out of unpleasant smell was regarding the day when dead body of the deceased was being taken out by police. This witness has further stated on the suggestion of the defence that from one week before finding of the dead body he was living along with the Appellant in Village Ani. On being questioned by the Court that what is the distance between their quarter situated in Charcha where dead body of his mother was found and Village Ani, he, stating that the distance is 10 kilometres and 10 minutes are spent in going by an auto. He has admitted that while living in Village Ani, he did not always stay along with the Appellant. 16. Thus, the defence has taken plea of alibi. It is notable that at the relevant time age of Aman (PW2) was 13 years and the Appellant is none other than but his father. In the circumstance, being influenced of this witness by his father/Appellant is natural. 16. Thus, the defence has taken plea of alibi. It is notable that at the relevant time age of Aman (PW2) was 13 years and the Appellant is none other than but his father. In the circumstance, being influenced of this witness by his father/Appellant is natural. This witness was examined on 13.3.2019 and at that time no defence was taken during his cross-examination that the father and son had been living in Village Ani from before one week. After obtaining permission, when this witness was again cross-examined by the defence on 6.1.2020, i.e., after 10 months of his earlier cross-examination, he accepted almost all the suggestions made by the defence. From this it appears that this witness who is son of the Appellant has been influenced to prepare basis for defence. In the earlier statement of this witness there was no explanation that on being asked by this witness the Appellant had told him that his mother had gone to her maternal house. This witness had also not offered any explanation that from before one week of finding of the dead body this witness and the Appellant had already gone to Village Ani. This witness had also not explained that his statement regarding coming out of unpleasant smell from their house was regarding the day on which the dead body was found in the house. 17. In the circumstance, it emerges from the whole statement of Aman (PW2) that the suggestions accepted by him during his recross-examination on 6.1.2020 was a consequence of influence of his father/Appellant. From the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of this witness it reveals that the Appellant was present in his house even at the time when his bedroom was locked and unpleasant smell was coming out from the bedroom and at that time on being asked by this witness the Appellant had not given him a clear answer that where had his mother gone and why did she not return. In the circumstance, it is clear that what was there inside the bedroom was in the knowledge of the Appellant and, therefore, he had locked the bedroom so that nobody could know the fact. 18. Afsana Ansari (PW3), who was residing above the quarter of the Appellant, has stated in her Court statement that the Appellant had knocked her door a few days before finding of the dead body. 18. Afsana Ansari (PW3), who was residing above the quarter of the Appellant, has stated in her Court statement that the Appellant had knocked her door a few days before finding of the dead body. At that time, he was under a fear and he had taken name of the mother of Aman 3-4 times before her and, therefore, this witness had scolded and sent him away. 3-4 days thereafter, unpleasant smell was coming out from the house of the Appellant. The above statement of this witness has remained unrebutted and this supports the statement of Aman (PW2). Hence, it is proved that when the dead body of the deceased was lying in the bedroom the Appellant had locked the bedroom and even in the condition of unpleasant smell coming out from the bedroom he stayed in the house and his not informing anybody about the fact discloses his intention of hiding the incident. 19. Investigating Officer Sub-Inspector S.K. Singh (PW15) had seized a key of Lark make from the Appellant on the basis of his memorandum statement. This memorandum statement and seizure is supported by the statement of Ankit Kumar (PW10). According to S.K. Singh (PW15), the lock put on the door of the bedroom of the Appellant was opened from the key of Lark make seized from the Appellant. That lock was detached from the door along with the bolt and a panchnama (Ex.P6) thereof was prepared and the seizure thereof (Ex.P8) was made. The lock was opened from the said seized key. A panchnama (Ex.P14) was prepared in this regard. This finds support from the statement of Ankit Kumar (PW10). Thus, this is an important circumstantial evidence that key of the lock of the bedroom in which dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was found lying below the bed was in possession of the Appellant. This establishes that the Appellant was well within the knowledge of the facts that dead body of his wife Vinay Prabha Lakda was kept below the bed of his bedroom, how her dead body came there and how she died. Burden to prove these facts was upon the Appellant under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, but, nothing has been explained by him in this regard. 20. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under: “14. Burden to prove these facts was upon the Appellant under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, but, nothing has been explained by him in this regard. 20. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under: “14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1944 AC 315 – quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 .) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision ad it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 22. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision ad it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of H.P., (1972) 2 SCC 80 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with “khukhri” and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State of T.N. v. Rajendran, (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime.” 21. In Prem Ram v. State of C.G., Criminal Appeal No.383 of 1999 decided on 17.1.2007, this Court has held thus: “15. Further in the matter of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram AIR 2006 SCW 5768 while interpreting Section 106 of the Evidence Act the Apex Court held that: Whether an inference ought to be drawn under Section 106 is a question which must be determined by reference to facts proved. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on it s own facts. The Respondent, accused having been seen last with the deceased, the burden was upon him to prove what happened thereafter, since those facts were within his special knowledge. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on it s own facts. The Respondent, accused having been seen last with the deceased, the burden was upon him to prove what happened thereafter, since those facts were within his special knowledge. Since the Respondent failed to do so, it must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by S. 106 of the Evidence Act. This circumstance, therefore, provides the missing link in the chain of circumstances which prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court further held that: … The Principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohd.’s case MANU/TN/0359/1959 : AIR 1960 Mad 218 .” 22. In Navadhar Prasad Rathod v. State of C.G., Criminal Appeal No.267 of 2001, decided on 8.3.2010, this Court has held as under: “18. The principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohd.’s case MANU/TN/0359/1959 : AIR 1960 Mad 218 .” 22. In Navadhar Prasad Rathod v. State of C.G., Criminal Appeal No.267 of 2001, decided on 8.3.2010, this Court has held as under: “18. By adducing the aforesaid evidence, the prosecution has established the following circumstances, (i) The Appellant and the deceased were found present in one room at the time of incident when the deceased died as a result of fatal injuries. (ii) The Appellant has not offered any explanation that as to how the deceased received injuries and how she died. If the aforesaid circumstances are considered together, then only the aforesaid hypothesis of the guilt of the Appellant would be possible. Except hypothesis of the guilt of the Appellant, no other hypothesis of the Appellant would be possible.” 23. In State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh, (2014) 12 SCC 211 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under: “18. Reliance was placed by this Court on Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 in which case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.” 24. In Kalu alias Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 10 SCC 211 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held thus: “16. In view of our conclusion that the prosecution has clearly established a prima facie case, the precedents cited on behalf of the appellant are not considered relevant in the facts of the present case. Once the prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section 313 CrPC with regard to the circumstances under which the deceased met an unnatural death inside the house. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever therefore leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being the assailant of the deceased.” 25. Once the prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section 313 CrPC with regard to the circumstances under which the deceased met an unnatural death inside the house. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever therefore leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being the assailant of the deceased.” 25. Examination of the present case in the light of above judgments establishes that dead body of Vinay Prabha Lakda was found below the bed of bedroom of the Appellant and the bedroom was locked from outside and the lock put on the door of the bedroom was broken by police. From the statement of Aman (PW2) it is established that while coming out of unpleasant smell from the house, the Appellant was staying in the house and even on being asked by this witness the Appellant had not given him a clear answer that where had his mother gone. In the circumstance, under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act the Appellant was required to make it clear that when, how and in which circumstances, dead body of his wife Vinay Prabha Lakda was found below the bed of his bedroom. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also, nothing has been explained by him in this regard. 26. In the circumstance, this Court finds that the evidence led by the prosecution fulfills the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) regarding circumstantial evidence. The present case is fully established against the Appellant on the circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution. From the evidence on record, it is proved that it was none other than but the Appellant who caused death of his wife Vinay Prabha Lakda by strangulating her neck with the seized rope. Thus, the conviction imposed upon him by the Trial Court is upheld. 27. The judgment of Dhaneshwar Verma (supra) relied upon by Learned Counsel for the Appellant is distinguishable on facts. 28. Consequently, the criminal appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed. 29. The Appellant is reported to be in jail. 30. Records of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for necessary compliance.