JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.10.2018, passed by learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.5050 of 2001, whereby the claim of appellant-petitioner of appointment as Assistant Teacher is turned down primarily on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Clause 2(3)(ii)&(iii) of Uttar Pradesh Secondary education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Second Order, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Second Order of 1981’) was not followed and consequently the appointment of appellant-petitioner was nullity. 2. There exists an educational institution known as Krishak Inter College, Kashauta, Allahabad (Prayagraj) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Institution’], which is duly recognized under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1921’) and provisions of U.P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 are applicable upon it. The provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Boards Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1982’) regulated the appointment of Teachers in the Institution. 3. Vide letter/order dated 13.11.1991, which was effective from 01.04.1991, one post of Principal; two post of L.T. Grade Teacher; and four post of C.T. Grade Teacher were sanctioned by the competent authority in the Institution. The senior most teacher in the Institution, namely Surendra Prasad Tripathi, was appointed as ad-hoc Principal. Resultantly, a short-term vacancy on the post of Assistant Teacher (L.T. Grade) came into existence against which the appellant-petitioner claims to have been appointed on 05.08.1992 under the Second Order of 1981. 4. Though the appellant-petitioner claimed to have been validly appointed but his salary was not paid. Consequently, he filed a Writ Petition No.31694 of 1994, which was dismissed on 31.10.1995, observing that the procedure laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Radha Raijada vs. State of U.P. and others, 1994 UPLBEC 1551 regarding publication of vacancy in two newspapers etc. has not been followed. This order of learned Single Judge has been reversed in Special Appeal No.948 of 1995 vide judgment dated 18.08.1998. The Division Bench held that the procedural requirement made applicable in case of short-term vacancy in Radha Raijada’s case (supra) was to apply prospectively and since the appointment of appellant-petitioner was made prior to such judgment, therefore, the rigours of procedure laid down in Radha Raijada’s case (supra) would not be attracted. The Division Bench held that the procedural requirement made applicable in case of short-term vacancy in Radha Raijada’s case (supra) was to apply prospectively and since the appointment of appellant-petitioner was made prior to such judgment, therefore, the rigours of procedure laid down in Radha Raijada’s case (supra) would not be attracted. It was thereafter that the matter was again considered and rejected by the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Inspector’) vide his order dated 17.11.1998. Appellant-petitioner then filed Writ Petition No.40140 of 1998 challenging the order dated 17.11.1998, which was allowed relying upon the previous adjudication made in the special appeal. The authorities, however, again reiterated their stand while rejecting the claim of appellant’s appointment, which came to be challenged by the appellant-petitioner in Writ-A No.5050 of 2001. 5. Writ Petition No.5050 of 2001 was entertained and an interim protection was granted. The appellant-petitioner continued to work under the interim order and also received salary. We are informed that he has attained the age of superannuation on 31.03.2020. The writ petition, however, came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment and order 31.10.2018, wherein the facts relating to appointment and creation of vacancy etc. have been elaborately noticed. In para 17 of the judgment learned Single Judge has crystallized following three issues that required examination in the writ petition:- “(1) Whether ban imposed by Government Order dated 29.06.1991 could be extended to short term vacancies? (2) Whether ad hoc appointment of petitioner was validly made by following relevant Removal of Difficulties Order i.e. 'Second Order'? (3) Whether vacancy in question could have been treated to be a substantive vacancy or short term vacancy? ” 6. So far as the issue no.1 is concerned, learned Single Judge has categorically held that the ban imposed vide Government Order dated 29.06.1991 could not have been extended to short-term vacancy. The first issue, therefore, stands adjudicated in favour of the appellant-petitioner. The other two issues have been dealt with in para 19 of the judgment. Clause 2 of the Second Order of 1981 is relied upon which is quoted hereinafter:- “2. The first issue, therefore, stands adjudicated in favour of the appellant-petitioner. The other two issues have been dealt with in para 19 of the judgment. Clause 2 of the Second Order of 1981 is relied upon which is quoted hereinafter:- “2. Procedure for filling up short-term vacancies.-(1) If short-term vacancy in the post of a teacher caused by grant of leave to him or on account of his suspension duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools or otherwise, shall be filled by the Management of the Institution by promotion of the permanent senior-most teacher of the institution, in the next lower grade. The Management shall immediately inform the District Inspector of Schools of such promotion along with the particulars of the teacher so promoted. (2) Where any vacancy referred to in Clause (1) cannot be filled by promotion, due to non-availability of a teacher in the next lower grade in the institution, possessing the prescribed minimum qualifications, it shall be filled by direct recruitment in the manner laid down in Clause (3). (3) (i) The management shall intimate the vacancies to the District Inspector of Schools and shall also immediately notify the same on the notice board of the institution, requiring the candidates to apply to the Manager of the Institution along with the particulars given in Appendix "B" to this Order. The selection shall be made on the basis of quality point marks specified in the Appendix to the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981, issued with Notification No. Ma-1993/XV-7(79)-1981, dated July 31, 1981, hereinafter to be referred to as the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. The compilation of quality point marks shall be done under the personal supervision of the Head of Institution. (ii) The names and particulars of the candidate selected and also of other candidates and the quality point marks allotted to them shall be forwarded by the Manager to the District Inspector of Schools for his prior approval. (iii) The District Inspector of Schools shall communicate his decision within seven days of the date of receipt of particulars by him failing which the Inspector will be deemed to have given his approval. (iii) The District Inspector of Schools shall communicate his decision within seven days of the date of receipt of particulars by him failing which the Inspector will be deemed to have given his approval. (iv) On receipt of the approval of the District Inspector of Schools or, as the case may be, on his failure, to communicate his decision within seven days of the receipt of papers by him from the Manager, the Management shall appoint the selected candidate and an order of appointment shall be issued under the signature of the Manager. Explanation-For the purpose of this Paragraph- (i) the expression "senior-most teacher" means the teacher having longest continuous service in the institution in the Lecturer's grade or the Trained prabhatgraduate (L.T.) grade or Trained under-graduate (C.T.) grade or J.T.C. or B.T.C. grade as the case may be; (ii) in relation to institution imparting instructions to women, the expression ''District Inspector of Schools' shall mean the Regional Inspectress of Girls' Schools; (iii) short-term vacancy which is not substantive and is of a limited duration." (emphasis added) ” 7. Learned Single Judge after referring to the series of judgments delivered by this Court has ultimately opined in para 33 that since appointment letter to the appellant-petitioner was issued on the date of selection itself i.e. 05.08.1992 and he was actually joined on the next day i.e. 06.08.1992, therefore, there was no compliance of the procedure laid down in Clause 2(3)(ii) of the Second Order of 1981. Learned Single Judge has noticed that the appointment was not approved by the educational authority and occasion had not arisen even for deemed approval of short-term appointment of the appellant-petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner has invited our attention to the previous judgment delivered in the case of appellant-petitioner reported in 1998 (3) UPLBEC 1722 , wherein import of non-approval to appointment against short-term vacancy was examined. In para 15 and 16 of the judgment the Division Bench observed as under:- “15. The next question that falls for consideration is whether the appointment of the petitioner-appellant could still stand invalidated on the ground that it was made without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. In para 15 and 16 of the judgment the Division Bench observed as under:- “15. The next question that falls for consideration is whether the appointment of the petitioner-appellant could still stand invalidated on the ground that it was made without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Sri Yatindra Singh placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in A. K. Pathshala v. Smt. M. D. Agnihotri, 1971 All LJ 983, wherein it was held, on construction of Section 16F (1) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, that appointment without prior approval by the Competent Authority would, in the eye of law, be no appointment. The ratio of the said decision as held by a subsequent Division Bench in Lalit Mohan Misra v. District Inspector of Schools. 1979 All LJ 1025, is that a "person gets the status of a teacher when requisite formality is completed." The relevant observations are as under : "Without approval the person does not get the status of a teacher even though the approval is to be followed by formal letter but in the absence of formal letter the person gets the status of a teacher after approval to the appointment is given by the District Inspector of Schools. The appointment of a person as a teacher becomes effective only from the date approval is given and even if a person is allowed to work before that the same has no recognition under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act." 16. Paragraph 2 (3) (iv) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order is not phrased in a prohibitory language as was the language used in Section 16F (1) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The words 'prior approval' have been used in sub-clause (ii) of paragraph 2 (3) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order and a conjoint reading of sub-clauses (it), (Hi) and (iv) of clause (3) of paragraph 2. no doubt, leads to an inescapable conclusion that the appointment would be issued under the signature of the Manager only on the approval having been communicated by the District Inspector of Schools within seven days of the receipt of the papers or where the approval is deemed to have been accorded as visualised by sub-clause (Hi) of clause (3) of paragraph 2 of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order. However, appointment, if made prior to approval or deemed approval, would become effective from the date of approval or deemed approval as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Lalit Mohan Misra (supra). There is nothing on the record to connote that prerequisite conditions attracting deemed approval were not satisfied in the instant case. The learned single Judge has also not addressed himself to this facet of the matter and the Judgment under appeal on this score too cannot be sustained.” 9. The Division Bench has noticed the language employed in Clause 2(3)(ii)&(iii) of the Second Order of 1981 as per which selection on a short-term vacancy could be made on the basis of quality point marks specified in the appendix to the Second Order of 1981. As per Clause 2(3)(ii), the names and particulars of selected candidates and other candidates along with quality point marks allotted to them shall be forwarded by the Manager to the Inspector, who shall communicate his decision within seven days as per Clause 2(3)(iii) and in the event no decision is intimated by the Inspector, within seven days of the receipt of particulars by him, the approval shall be deemed to have been granted. 10. In the facts of the present case, the papers relating to selection proceedings alongwith quality point marks and other details were sent by the Manager to the Inspector on 12.08.1992 in terms of Clause 2(3)(ii) of the Second Order of 1981. It is also admitted that within a period of seven days or even after expiry of seven days no decision was intimated to the management regarding appointment of appellant-petitioner. It is therefore to be seen as to whether the appointment made even before expiry of seven days period could be treated as legal or not. 11. In the previous round of litigation inter se between the parties the Division Bench of this Court had relied upon the judgment of this Court in A. K. Pathshala vs. Smt. M.D. Agnihotri, 1971 Alld.LJ 983, which recognized the principle that appointment of a teacher would become effective only from the date approval is given to it. In law any working prior to the date of approval or deemed approval cannot be counted or relied upon. In law any working prior to the date of approval or deemed approval cannot be counted or relied upon. In the facts of the present case, papers relating to selection had been sent to the Inspector for his approval on 12.08.1992 and since for a period of one week no decision was intimated as such the approval would be deemed to have been given in law to the selection for appointment on the expiry of one week. It is only with the deemed approval granted to the appellant’s appointment that legality would be attached to the appointment offered to him. 12. The mere fact that appointment letter was issued even before deemed approval was accorded to the appellant-petitioner would not mean that appointment offered to the appellant-petitioner would become invalid. In the previous round of litigation, inter-se between the parties, this Court had relied upon the judgment of this Court in Lalit Mohan Misra vs. D.I.O.S., 1979 All. 1075, which held the approval to be the date when recognition is granted to the teacher. This Court also held that appointment made prior to approval or deemed approval would become effective only from the date of approval. A finding was also returned that deemed approval had occurred. Similar view has also been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Pramod Kumar Pandey vs. D.I.O.S., 2019 (11) ADJ 127 . In paragraph 17, this Court held as under:- “17. In the present case, it is admitted fact that the papers relating to selection and appointments of the appellant-petitioners were sent to DIOS by the Management on 17.10.1997 for his grant of approval after having issued letters of appointment to the appellant-petitioners. It is also not in dispute that the DIOS did not bestow his consideration on these papers within statutory specified period of seven days. As such the appointment of appellant-petitioners stood approved by deemed fiction of law and in view of the law settled by this court in above authoritative pronouncements (Lalit Mohan Misra and Another (supra), and Abhay Pal Singh (supra)].” 13. In that view that matter, we find that the learned Single Judge is not justified in dismissing the writ petition only on the ground that appointment was offered to the appellant-petitioner even before deemed approval could be granted to such appointment. In that view that matter, we find that the learned Single Judge is not justified in dismissing the writ petition only on the ground that appointment was offered to the appellant-petitioner even before deemed approval could be granted to such appointment. The appointment of appellant-petitioner made on 05.081992 become effective only from the date of deemed approval i.e. upon expiry of one week from 12.08.1992. The authorities, therefore, were not justified in non-suiting the appointment of appellant-petitioner for such reason. 14. Consequently, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. Judgment and order dated 31.10.2018, passed by learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.5050 of 2001, is hereby set aside. Respondents shall treat the appointment of appellant-petitioner to be validly made in terms of Clause 2(3)(ii)&(iii) of the Second Order of 1981 upon expiry of seven days period from the date when particulars of selected candidates alongwith quality point marks were sent to the Inspector i.e. 12.08.1992, treating it to be a case of deemed approval. The respondents shall also accord consideration to the appellant’s case for regularization in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Act of 1982, within a period of two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. Since the appellant-petitioner has superannuated on 31.03.2020, his claim for superannuation benefits as per his entitlement shall be dealt with, in accordance with law, within a further period of six weeks, thereafter.