ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants before us are the father and sons. Out of the three appellants, the father, namely, the appellant no. 1, died. Thus, the appeal stands abated in so far as appellant no. 1 is concerned. 3. Appellant No. 1 has been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 294(b), 323 of Indian Penal Code, (for short the ‘IPC’) and Section 3(1)(x) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, the SC/ST Act). The appellant No. 2 is convicted under Section 323 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. While appellant No. 3 was convicted under Section 323 of the IPC. All the Courts concurrently confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellants. 4. Mr. T. Harish Kumar, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that insofar as the appellant No. 2 is concerned, the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is not made out. The occurrence took place in a liquor shop run by the appellants, in which the victim came to buy a liquor. PW-3 and PW-4 came to the scene of the occurrence only after the utterance alleged to have been made by the victim. 5. In such view of the matter, even assuming any derogatory statement is made by the appellant No. 2, touching upon the caste of the PW-1, no offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is made out as held by this Court in Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 435 . 6. Insofar as the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC is concerned, it is submitted that the evidence available is found lacking and, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 7. Mr. Joseph Aristotle, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that it is not as if independent witnesses may not available as PW-3 and PW-4 have deposed, which has been duly taken note of by all the courts. 8. Upon perusing the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4, we are in respectful agreement with the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that their presence, at the time of uttering the remarks, attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, is extremely doubtful. In any case, the appellant No. 3 has not even charged for the said offence. 8. Upon perusing the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4, we are in respectful agreement with the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that their presence, at the time of uttering the remarks, attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, is extremely doubtful. In any case, the appellant No. 3 has not even charged for the said offence. Thus, we acquit the appellant No. 2 for the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, particularly, in the light of the decision referred above supra. We would like to quote paragraph 27 and 28 of the said decision referred above supra and the same is as follows: “27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions. 28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 9. Coming to the offence committed under Section 323 of the IPC, taking note on the injuries suffered and the statement of PW-1, we are not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below. However, taking note of the fact that the occurrence was committed on 30.06.2012 and there was a verbal quarrel, as the appellants were running the liquor shop in which PW-1 came, pursuant to which the offence was said to have been committed, we are inclined to modify the said sentence to the period already undergone. 10. The appeal stands allowed accordingly. 11. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.