JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed for the following reliefs: “(a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to admit and allow this petition; (b) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue appropriate writ or direction to the respondents authority to quash and set aside the detention order passed by the respondent no.2 herein vide Number/PCB/DTN/PASA/529/2023 dated 27.09.2023 (Annexure-A) in the interest of justice; (c) Pending admission and/or final disposal of this petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the proposed detention order passed by the respondent no.2 herein Number/PCB/DTN/PASA/529/2023 dated 27.09.2023 (Annexure-A) in the interest of justice; (d) xxx.. xxx… xxx; (e) xxx.. xxx… xxx.” 2. The challenge is to the order of detention dated 27.09.2023 passed by the respondent– detaining authority viz. the Commissioner of Police, City Ahmedabad, in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) by detaining the petitioner – detenue as defined under section 2(c) of the Act. 3. Learned advocate for the petitioner has challenged the order of detention on the ground that the offences on which the detaining authority has relied upon are of private nature and cannot be said that even tempo of life in general public was disturbed on account of role attributed to the applicant in such offences. 4. Learned advocate has further challenged the order of detention on the ground of delay in passing the order of detention as the applicant was enlarged on 12.08.2023 on regular bail in connection with the last offence registered. Thereafter delay of 1.5 months, the detention order was passed on 27.09.2023. 5. Learned advocate has also challenged the order on the ground that the detaining authority has relied upon the stale offences as amongst four offences relied upon by the detaining authority, two offences are registered in the year 2020 to 2022. 6. As against that, learned AGP is objecting to grant of the petition submitted that the petitioner has arraigned as accused in four FIRs in under Chapters 16 and 17 of the IPC and therefore, is continuing indulgence in such offences as made him an habitual offender. Thereby justifying the detaining authority to treat the petitioner as a ‘dangerous person’ as contemplated under section 2(C) of the PASA. 7. Thereby justifying the detaining authority to treat the petitioner as a ‘dangerous person’ as contemplated under section 2(C) of the PASA. 7. Learned AGP has also submitted that on earlier occasion also twice the petitioner has been detained in the year 2021 and 2022. Despite this, the petitioner has continued to indulge into similar kind of activities. 8. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that thought the petitioner was detained under the previous orders of detention in the year 2021-2022 yet, the said orders were the subject matter of challenge before this Court and this Court has set aside the orders of detention which the detaining authority ought to have referred to. 9. Having heard rival submissions of the parties and having perused the documents on record, the petitioner is detained as a ‘dangerous person’ by the impugned order of detention under PASA dated 27.09.2023 by the Commissioner of Police, City Ahmedabad. 10. The grounds of detention would indicate that the detaining authority has relied upon four FIRs registered under IPC with Amraivadi and Bapunagar Police Stations. The details of which are in tabular form given as under: FIR No. Name of Police Station Offence Date of Arrest Date of order of Bail 1119100422 0281/ 2022 Amraivadi 326, 323, 506(2), 294B, 114 18.06.2022 08.07.2022 1119100722 0761/ 2022 Bapunagar 379, 114 28.09.2022 01.10.2022 1119100423 0020/ 2022 Amraivadi 324, 233, 294(B), 114 23.01.2023 23.01.2023 1119100423 0375/ 2022 Amraivadi 324, 323, 294B, 114 11.08.2023 12.08.2023 11. The Court has observed that the last offence registered against the petitioner at Amaraivadi Police Station is on 12.06.2021, for which the petitioner was arrested on on 11.08.2023 and was immediately enlarged on bail on the next day i.e. 12.08.2023. Thereafter, the order of detention is passed on 27.09.2023, which is after delay of 1.5 months. 12. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik Vs. State of Tripura, reported in AIR 2022 S.C. 4715 , where the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the "live and proximate link" between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention & failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the "live and proximate link" between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention & failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: "Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the "live & proximate link" between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxxxx 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner & though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” The Court finds that the delay of 1.5 months is fatal to the present detention order as well. 13. The Court has taken into consideration the fact that the first offence against the petitioner was registered at Amraivadi police station on 18.06.2022, whereas the triggering offence which were registered in the month of January, 2023 and June, 2023. There is a time gap of almost one year between the two offences and therefore, the detaining authority appears to have relied upon the stale offence. 14. The Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the petitioner was enlarged by the Court of competent jurisdiction on regular bail, despite this, there is no effort made on behalf of the concerned police station/ sponsoring authority to resort to cancellation of bail granted to the petitioner. Moreover, the detaining authority has also not referred to the application of mind to resort to the lesser drastic remedy of cancellation of bail before passing the order of detention. 15. Lastly, the Court has also taken into consideration the fact that though the detaining authority has referred to and relied upon the previous orders of detention, the detaining authority was unmindful of the subsequent development, by which this Court in Special Civil Application No.4808 of 2021 and Special Civil Application No.1200 of 2022 had passed the order quashing and setting aside those detention orders and therefore, the detaining authority has failed to refer to the subsequent development in this regards hence subjective satisfaction on this count will stand vitiated. 16. 16. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 17. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 27.09.2023 passed by the respondent – detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 18. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.