ORDER : 1. The present petition has been filed by the mother of the deceased namely Sunil Kumar, who died in harness 21/09/2014 while working as a General Mazdoor Category-1 with the SECL. By way of the instant petition, the petitioner is the rejection of her claim for grant of compassionate appointment. 2. According to the petitioner she being the mother of the deceased employee and her only son died in harness and there is no other member in the family after the death of her son, she received a communication on 28/11/2014 wherein in lieu of service, the monetary compensation was contemplated and she was asked to move an application. Subsequently, the petitioner moved the application but the monetary compensation was denied to her. This led to filing of a writ petition bearing WPS No. 2706 of 2015, wherein this Court by order dated 05/10/2015 disposed of the said writ petition directing the respondents to decide the petitioner’s claim concerning monetary compensation and/or compassionate appointment within a specified time period. Subsequently, when the representation was filed, the claim of the petitioner/mother was denied on the ground that she being the mother do not come within the definition of dependent and National Coal Wage Agreement do not include the mother and reference to clause 9.3.3 of the National Coal Wage Agreement was made to reject her claim. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that it has not been disputed that the mother being the only dependent survived after the death of her son and she being the female dependent was entitled to claim the monetary compensation as the definition of dependent of family cannot be narrowed down. He placed his reliance on the judgment passed by the High Court of Jharkhand in the matter of Madhubala Sinha vs. M/s Central Coalfields Limited and Others in LPA No. 617 of 2017 decided on 16.09.2019. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the petitioner being the mother of the deceased employee will not be covered under the definition of ‘dependent’ as provided in the National Coal Wage Agreement. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the petitioner being the mother of the deceased employee will not be covered under the definition of ‘dependent’ as provided in the National Coal Wage Agreement. The provisions of agreement provides employment to the dependent but the same is only confined to unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son and in case they are not available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependents of the deceased. He placed his reliance in the matter of V. Sivamurthy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2008) 13 SCC 730 to submit that compassionate appointments are permissible only in the case of a dependent member of family of the employee concerned, that is spouse, son or daughter and not other relatives. Therefore, the rejection of the claim of the petitioner is well merited. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 6. There is no dispute of the fact that the petitioner and her son, who died in harness, were alone in the family and no other member exists. The son of the petitioner namely Sunil Kumar died in harness, while serving as a General Mazdoor. The relevant clause 9.3.3 and 9.5.0 of the National Coal Wage Agreement, on which the respondents are seeking his redressal to justify his claim to be valid, are reproduced herein-below: “9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependent is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter /widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased.” “9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependent. Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependents of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under: (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependent would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 4000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. 4000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clauses 9.4.0, if the female dependent is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 3000/- per month or employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependent of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependent is on live roster, the female dependent will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at Paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000.” (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) the existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Standardisation Committee and finalised. 7. Similar issue came up before the Division Bench of Jharkhnad High Court in LPA No. 617 of 2017, decided on 16/09/2019, wherein the Court held that sister and the mother of the deceased workman of CCL, who though were admittedly not included as dependents under Clause 9.3.3 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘NCWA’) could be appointed on compassionate ground. The Court while interpreting the dependency has observed thus at Paras 23, 24 & 25 which are reproduced herein-below: 23. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we find that in both these appeals, Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA, which makes provision for employment of dependent of the workman who dies while in service, needs to be interpreted, which reads as follows: “9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependent is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter /widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased.” A bare reading of the aforesaid clause clearly shows that the brother of the deceased workman comes within the zone of consideration for appointment on compassionate ground in absence of wife, husband and unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. The father, mother and sister of the deceased workman have been totally excluded from the list of dependants, though, it cannot be denied that an employee dying at a very young age, may be leaving behind father and mother, who were dependants upon him/her, still within the age of consideration of compassionate appointment. Thus a plain reading of this provision clearly shows that if the workman dies unmarried, except for his/her brother, no other blood relative is within the consideration zone for employment on compassionate ground, though they may be fully dependent upon the earnings of the deceased workman at the time of his/her death in harness. We are of the considered view that so far as the parents of the deceased workman are concerned, the deceased was in a moral and legal obligation to maintain them and if he/she failed to maintain them, the action would lie under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. as well. In that view of the matter, there appears to be no reason as to why, such parents of the workman dying unmarried at an young age, be not included in the list of the dependants for being considered for compassionate appointment, if they are capable and otherwise eligible for the same. Excluding such parents of the deceased workman, cannot be said to be based on any plausible justification. 24. So far as the sister is concerned, we find from a plain reading of Clause 9.3.3 of NCWA quoted above that the brother of the deceased workman dying unmarried, if fully dependent upon him, is also entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground. In that view of the matter, there is no reason as to why, sister, whether married or unmarried, should be deprived of such benefit. In that view of the matter, there is no reason as to why, sister, whether married or unmarried, should be deprived of such benefit. If a sister is denied the benefit of compassionate appointment only on the ground that she is not included as dependent under Clause 9.3.3 of NCWA, this is a clear case of gender bias and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, also on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture, we are tempted to quote Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, even though the General Clauses Act relates to Central Acts and Regulations. We are referring to this Section as admittedly the respondent Coal India Ltd is also ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and Section 13 of the General Clauses Act aims at non-discrimination only on the basis of gender. In other words, it prohibits gender discrimination. Section 13 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows:- “13. Gender and number - In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: (1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females. (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.” A plain reading of this Section clearly shows that all the words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females and in that view of the matter also, if brother is included in the list of dependents under Clause 9.3.3 of NCWA, there is no reason as to why the word ‘brother’ shall not include sister also. 25. We are of the considered view that the case of the appellants is fully covered by the decisions relied upon by learned counsels for the appellants herein before. The non-inclusion of the parents and sister of the deceased workman dying in harness, in the list of dependants to be appointed on compassionate ground, cannot be said to be based on any rational basis, rather this is wholly unfair and absolutely unjust. It is also not based on any intelligible differentia, and frustrates the very object the scheme for compassionate appointment. It is also not based on any intelligible differentia, and frustrates the very object the scheme for compassionate appointment. These immediate blood relations cannot be denied the benefit of compassionate appointment, if they are otherwise entitled for the same, simply because of the fact that they may be entitled to the compensation under the workman compensation benefits admissible under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as they fall within the definition of ‘dependent’, given in Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act. 8. When we come back to the National Coal Wage Agreement, the provision for Workmen’s compensation Benefits is under Chapter IX under the caption of Social Security, wherein Clause 9.3.0 which is reproduced herein above is in different part and Clause 9.3.2 is under the heading of employment to one dependent of the worker who dies while in service and it further speaks that if so far female dependents are concerned, the employment/payment of monthly monetary compensation would be covered by Clause 9.5.0. and the clause 9.5 and 9.5.0 both cover the employment and monetary compensation in case of female dependent of workmen. 9.5.0 (ii) which covers the case of the petitioner purports that in case of death of an employee if the female dependent is below the age of 45 she would have an option either to accept the monetary compensation or employment and in case the female dependent is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to the employment. The petitioner is shown to be 44 years when the petition was filed in the year 2016. The Coal Wage Agreement is saved by Section 18 of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, which laid down that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Therefore, it has a statutory protection under Section 18 of the I.D. Act, 1947 and the agreement is under the social security it is a benevolent legislation. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of X vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Another, (2023) 9 SCC 433 interpreted that while construing beneficial legislation the Court have to be construed with a purpose-oriented approach. Para 39 of the judgment is reproduced herein-below: 39. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of X vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Another, (2023) 9 SCC 433 interpreted that while construing beneficial legislation the Court have to be construed with a purpose-oriented approach. Para 39 of the judgment is reproduced herein-below: 39. This principle has consistently been applied by this Court while construing beneficial legislation. Most recently in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, Nageshwar Rao, J. writing for a two-judge Bench observed: “11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented approach. The Act should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. Also, literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation.” 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of M.P. v. M.P. Ojha, (1998) 2 SCC 554 has deliberated on interpretation of expression “wholly dependent” wherein the Supreme Court has held that the expression must be given due meaning with reference to the rules in which it appears and it must be understood in the context in which it has been used. The Supreme Court has also observed that wholly dependent would therefore include financial and physical dependence: 13. The expression “wholly dependent” is not a term of art. It has to be given its due meaning with reference to the Rules in which it appears. We need not make any attempt to define the expression “wholly dependent” to be applicable to all cases in all circumstances. We also need not look into other provisions of law where such expression is defined. That would be likely to lead to results which the relevant rules would not have contemplated. The expression “wholly dependent” has to be understood in the context in which it is used keeping in view the object of the particular rules where it is contained. We cannot curtail the meaning of “wholly dependent” by reading into this the definition as given in SR 8 [sic SR 2(8)] which has been reproduced above. Further, the expression “wholly dependent” as appearing in the definition of family as given in Medical Rules cannot be confined to mere financial dependence. We cannot curtail the meaning of “wholly dependent” by reading into this the definition as given in SR 8 [sic SR 2(8)] which has been reproduced above. Further, the expression “wholly dependent” as appearing in the definition of family as given in Medical Rules cannot be confined to mere financial dependence. Ordinarily dependence means financial dependence but for a member of a family it would mean other support, maybe physical, as well. To be “wholly dependent” would therefore include both financial and physical dependence. If support required is physical and a member of the family is otherwise financially sound he may not necessarily be wholly dependent. Here the father was 70 years of age and was sick and it could not be said that he was not wholly dependent on his son. The son has to look after him in his old age. Even otherwise by getting a pension of Rs. 414 per month which by any standard is a paltry amount it could not be said that the father was not “wholly dependent” on his son. That the father had a separate capacity of being a retired government servant is immaterial if his case falls within the Medical Rules being a member of the family of his son and wholly dependent on him. A flexible approach has to be adopted in interpreting and applying the Rules in a case like the present one. There is no dispute that the son took his father to Bombay for treatment for his serious ailment after getting due permission from the competent authority. It was submitted before us that the father being a retired government servant could himself get sanction for treatment outside the State as a special case from the competent authority. It is not necessary for us to look into this aspect of the matter as we are satisfied that under the relevant Medical Rules, the father was a member of the family of his son and was wholly dependent on him and the 2nd respondent was thus fully entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred on the treatment of his father and other travelling expenses. 11. 11. In the instant case at hand, the petitioner is the only person who survived in her family after the death of his son and the social security arrived at by way of a coal wage agreement, which has a trapping of Section 18 of the I.D. Act it is to be liberally construed to promote its objects and the literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided and it is the court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the law. If the mother who only survives it is obvious that she is alone the female dependent. Consequently, the mother if alone survives, she cannot be eliminated by interpreting the provisions which does not favour to the petitioner. 12. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the petition stands allowed and the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner as an exceptional one to hold the sole female dependent to grant benefit as per the agreement.