State Rep. Inspector, ACB, Hyderabad Range v. K. Dattatreya
2024-08-09
K.SURENDER
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : K. SURENDER, J. 1. The State aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent/Accused for the offences under Sections 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 vide judgment in C.C. No. 11 of 2009, dated 16.08.2012 passed by the I Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases-cum-V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, filed the present appeal. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the accused officer (AO) worked as the Village Revenue Officer of Laxmapur village in Shameerpet Mandal of Ranga Reddy District. The defacto complainant namely Konduri Balraj (hereinafter referred as Balraj) was the owner and possessor of Acs.3.11 guntas of agricultural land in Sy.Nos.184, 186 and 194 of Laxmapur village and he gifted the aid land to his wife (PW-2) under a registered gift deed dated 06.02.006. On 08.10.2007, the said Balraj submitted an application to PW-3, the then Tahsildar, Shameerpet Mandal with a request to effect the mutation in the concerned records with regard to the change of title in favour of his wife and also for issuance of pattedar pass books to his wife. PW-3 endorsed the said application and directed PW-4, the then Revenue Inspector, to conduct an inquiry in the village and submit a report. On the basis of the report submitted by PW-4, PW-3 effected the mutation in favour of PW-2 on 3/12/2007 and directed the AO to prepare the pattedar passbooks for the said land and to issue the same in favour of the pattedar. On the same day, i.e., on 03/12/2007, Balraj met the AO at his office and requested him for issuance of pattedar passbooks as early as possible. The AO asked Balraj to come after one week and thereafter, he dodged the matter on some pretext or other, whenever Balraj met him and renewed his request. 3. In the first week of February, 2008, Balraju met the AO in his office and enquired about the process of issuing the pattedar pass books, for which the AO demanded for payment of bribe of Rs.6000/-. Balraju expressed his inability to pay the bribe amount and on that the AO refused to do the work without the payment of the bribe amount. 4.
Balraju expressed his inability to pay the bribe amount and on that the AO refused to do the work without the payment of the bribe amount. 4. On 21.02.2008, Balraju again met the AO in his office and requested to do his work and the AO reiterated his earlier demand for payment of bribe amount. After much persuasion by Balraj, the AO reduced the bribe amount to Rs.5,000/-. The AO made it clear to Balraj that he (AO) would not do any work as requested by Balraj, unless his demand for bribe amount was complied with. 5. On 25.02.2008, Balraj went to the office of the DSP, ACB, Hyderabad range, Hyderabad and submitted Ex.P12 report against the AO. PW-8, the then DSP, ACB, Hyderabad range, arranged trap on 26.02.2008. 6. The trap party having undergone the exercise of following the pre-trap proceeding formalities, proceeded to the house of the accused. There, the accused was trapped and the bribe amount of Rs.5,000/- was recovered at his instance. 7. The defacto complainant Balraj, who lodged the complaint, died during the pendency of trial, as such, he was not examined. PW-1 is the independent mediator, who formed part of the trap party. PW-2 is the wife of defacto complainant. PW-3 is the Tahsildar. PW-4 is the then Revenue Inspector in the office. PW-5 was Senior Assistant underneath the Tahsildar/PW-3, PW-7 was also working in the said office. PW-8 is the Investigating Officer. 8. The case of the accused officer is that he had no involvement in issuing the pattedar pass books. Once these pass books were handed over to PW3, it was PW3’s responsibility to take further steps. 9. Learned Special Judge reviewed the procedure for effecting mutation in favour of a pattedar of land and issuing the pattedar pass books after an enquiry and noted inconsistencies in the testimonies of PW3, PW4, PW5, and PW7 regarding the distribution of the pattedar pass books. 10. According to PW4, once the VRO prepares the pass books, the Tahsildar is responsible for obtaining the signature on the pass books from the RDO and delivering them to the concerned party. PW3, however, stated that the pass books were delivered to the parties through the concerned VRO, who had to maintain a separate register and obtain the signatures of the recipients upon delivery.
PW3, however, stated that the pass books were delivered to the parties through the concerned VRO, who had to maintain a separate register and obtain the signatures of the recipients upon delivery. Learned Special Judge observed that this procedure mentioned by PW3 was not disclosed to the ACB authorities during his examination. However,, no proof of this practice was collected from PW3 and the AO’s office during the investigation. 11. During cross-examination, PW3 admitted that the title deed pass book and the pattedar pass book of PW2 were in his possession when seized by the ACB authorities on 26.02.2008. PW3 further stated that once the pattedar pass books were sent to his office by AO, AO’s role was complete, and it was PW3’s responsibility to obtain the RDO's signature and deliver the pass books. 12. PW3 also admitted in his cross-examination that he did not inform the ACB authorities that AO did not submit the pattedar pass books to him. 13. PW4 deposed that the pattedar pass book was already submitted by the VRO to him. After his scrutiny, it was submitted to PW3 by the date of the trap. He stated unequivocally that the AO, being the VRO, had no role in the issuance of the pattedar pass books, as it was PW3’s responsibility to obtain the RDO’s signature and deliver the same. PW5 deposed that upon receiving an application from the complainant, he made a note before PW-3. He confirmed that the AO had already submitted the pattedar pass books to the office of the MRO by the date of the trap. 14. Learned Special Judge concluded that the pattedar pass books were submitted to PW3 by the date of the trap by the AO, and these were seized by the ACB authorities from the almirah in PW3’s office on 26.2.2008 and that no official records were seized from the AO’s house during the trap. Instead, documents ExP5, P6, and P11 were seized under ExP8 at PW3’s office. 15. PW7 deposed that he produced documents ExP 5, 6, and 11 before the ACB authorities when they requested official records related to the complainant.PW1 and PW3 deposed that the almirah in PW3’s office was locked and had to be forcibly opened in PW3’s absence. The ACB authorities then seized Exs.P5, 6, and 11 from the almirah under ExP8. 16.
15. PW7 deposed that he produced documents ExP 5, 6, and 11 before the ACB authorities when they requested official records related to the complainant.PW1 and PW3 deposed that the almirah in PW3’s office was locked and had to be forcibly opened in PW3’s absence. The ACB authorities then seized Exs.P5, 6, and 11 from the almirah under ExP8. 16. PW8 deposed that he instructed the ACB inspector to go to the AO’s office and seize the records. The inspector then proceeded to the Tahsildar’s office, where he seized ExsP5, 6 and 11 under Ex.P8 and brought them to PW8 while PW8 was still at the AO’s house. PW1 as a key mediator witness, testified that PW8 personally went to the Tahsildar’s office and seized ExsP.5, 6 and 11. 17. Learned Special Judge noted that PW1, an important mediator witness, did not corroborate PW8’s account of deputing the inspector. Instead, PW1 stated that PW8 himself seized the documents at the Tahsildar’s office. Learned Special Judge also took into consideration the defence counsel’s argument that the charge sheet filed by PW8 did not mention that he had delegated the task of seizing records at the AO’s office to the ACB inspector. 18. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB relied heavily on the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He argued that the seizure of MO5 from the AO’s possession creates a strong presumption that the AO demanded and accepted the bribe. He further argued that the presumption under Section 114(a) of the Indian Evidence Act could also support the prosecution. The Special Public Prosecutor further argued that minor discrepancies in witness testimonies should not be given much importance, and any omissions should not be unduly magnified. 19. Learned Special Judge considered various precedents and observed that even if the prosecution proved the seizure of MO5 under ExP4, it does not automatically implicate the AO in the alleged offence and emphasized the necessity of proving crucial aspects of the prosecution case, including: (i) The alleged demand of the bribe by the AO. (ii) The payment of the bribe. (iii) The acceptance of MO5 by the AO from the complainant at the time of the trap, specifically as a motive to perform an official favor for the complainant.
(ii) The payment of the bribe. (iii) The acceptance of MO5 by the AO from the complainant at the time of the trap, specifically as a motive to perform an official favor for the complainant. Consequently, learned Special Judge found that the prosecution could not rely on the presumption under Section 20(1) of the Act without establishing these vital elements. 20. Learned Special Judge held that the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence were significant and irreconcilable. 21. The prosecution failed to prove the factum of demand and also that any work was pending with the AO. The initial burden of proving demand and pending official favour was not discharged by the prosecution. 22. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mallappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 , wherein it is held as follows: “42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive – inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary. (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge. (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed. (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts. (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 23. Learned Special Judge has given adequate reasons as discussed above finding the accused not guilty of the offence.
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 23. Learned Special Judge has given adequate reasons as discussed above finding the accused not guilty of the offence. Nothing is argued by the learned Special Public Prosecutor so as to infer that the learned Special Judge has committed any error while giving reasons for the acquittal. In fact, the law is that even if two views are reasonable and possible on the very same set of circumstances, the view favouring the accused has to be adopted by the Courts. Further, the appeal is against acquittal. The acquittal recorded by the trial Court on reasonable grounds, cannot be interfered with only for the reason of there being another view which could be possible on the very same set of circumstances. Accordingly, there are no merits in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 24. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal is dismissed.