JUDGMENT Dharmadhikari, J:-- 1. Heard finally with the consent of the parties. This writ appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchha Nayayalaya (Khand Nyaypith Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam 2005 has been filed by the appellants assailing the order dated 18.3.2024 passed in W.P.No.9436/2012 whereby the petition filed by the present appellant was dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the appellants herein had purchased the below mentioned property by way of registered sale deed from Kumari Sharda Raje D/o Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar, erstwhile ruler of Indore. The description plot, area, survey numbers, date of sale deeds are as under :-- Appellant No.1: Plot No.48, South Avenue, admeasuring 3885 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.56 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 28.3.1997. Appellant No.2: Plot No.49, South Avenue, admeasuring 3150 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.56 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 4.4.1997. Appellant No.3: Plot No.73, South Avenue, admeasuring 3500 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.99/1 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 4.12.1996. Appellant No.4: Plot No.28, South Avenue, admeasuring 3200 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.58, 59 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 24.2.1997. Appellant No.5: Plot No.47, South Avenue, admeasuring 3395 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.56 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 4.4.1997. Appellant No. 6: Plot No.29, South Avenue, admeasuring 3600 sq. feet, comprised in Survey No.58 of Village – Tejpur Gadbadi, purchased vide registered sale deed dated 21.1.1997. 3. Subsequent to the execution of the sale deed, the Collector District Indore vide notices issued in the month of September, 2001 informed the appellants that as per the proceedings commenced in 130/ v -90/C-1/76-77 the possession of the aforementioned plots had been taken by the State Government by considering it as an excess land under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulations) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1976') and further if the appellants wish to get their plots regularised as per the policy decision of the State Government dated 3.2.2000, they were required to pay the amounts as prescribed and required in the notice. As soon as the appellants were made aware of the fact that their plots were under the scan of the Act of 1976 due which the possession of the said land had already been obtained by the State Government by way of paper Panchanama, the present appellants sought enquiry into the matter because the physical possession of the plots were never obtained by the State Government. Moreover, neither the present appellants nor their predecessors in title were served any notice under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 and till date they are holding the physical possession of the aforementioned plots. Subsequently, on initiation of proceedings by the District Collector, Indore for getting their plots regularized, the appellant No. 1 deposited a sum of Rs. 5,05,477/-, appellant No. 2 deposited a sum of Rs. 4,09,847/-, appellant No. 3 deposited a sum of Rs. 4,55,385/- and similarly appellants No. 4, 5 and 6 deposited Rs. 4,16,352/-, Rs. 4,41,723/- and 4,63,396/- respectively. 4. Thereafter, appellants were under assumption that their plots will be regularized in terms of the policy dated 3.2.2000 of the State Government. But no such action was taken due to which the appellants submitted representations in the Samadhan Shivir in 2004, 6.6.2006, 22.2.2008, 27.2.2008, 12.3.2009 and 14.7.2010 which evoked no response. 5. Despite the representations submitted by the appellants, the State Government did not regularize their plots, therefore, being aggrieved the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 9264/2011 before this Court which was disposed of vide order dated 9.4.2012 directing the appellants to file application before the State Government for expeditious disposal of the representation and also directed the Committee to take decision expeditiously preferably within a period of 90 days. Copy of the same was served by the appellants to the State Government on 14.4.2012. 6. In compliance of the order dated 9.4.2012, the respondents/State after expiry of the period of 90 days proceeded with the representations filed by the appellants and fixed a date for hearing on 25.7.2012. After the hearing, the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4/State passed an order dated 28.8.2012 by which the representation of the appellants were rejected on the sole ground that the policy decision dated 3.2.2000 applies only to constructed houses and is not applicable for the plots. 7. After the hearing, the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4/State passed an order dated 28.8.2012 by which the representation of the appellants were rejected on the sole ground that the policy decision dated 3.2.2000 applies only to constructed houses and is not applicable for the plots. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, appellants again approached this Court by way of filing Writ Petition No. 9436/2012 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 18.3.2024 by passing the following order: ''8. .... According to the respondents, the petitioners did not deposit the lease rent within 30 days' from the date of notice, therefore, they have not right to claim the benefit of the aforesaid circular. 9. Even otherwise, the petitioners have not impleaded Kumari Shari Raje and Amit Priya Grih Nirman Society to establish that the sale deeds are valid, therefore, their title cannot be recognized. Subject land had already been vested with the State Government. Since it was a open land, therefore, the petitioners have unauthorizedly purchased the land saying that they are in possession. They have not filed any proof to establish that they have constructed their house and payment property tax to the Government. Hence, vacant land / plots cannot be treated to be in possession of the petitioners. Hence, no case for interference with the impugned order is made out. 10. In view of the above, Writ Petition stands dismissed.'' 8. The aforesaid order dated 18.3.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge has been challenged by the appellants by filing the present writ appeal. 9. However, it is pertinent to mention here that pursuant to the order dated 18.3.2024, the Sub Divisional Officer, Rau Division, District Indore in Case Nos. 114/ v -90/2000-01, 115/ v 90/2000-01, 139/ v 90/2000-01, 95/ v 90/2000-01, 113/A-90/2000-01, 96/ v 90/2000-01 has passed the orders dated 26.3.2024 against the appellants. 9. However, it is pertinent to mention here that pursuant to the order dated 18.3.2024, the Sub Divisional Officer, Rau Division, District Indore in Case Nos. 114/ v -90/2000-01, 115/ v 90/2000-01, 139/ v 90/2000-01, 95/ v 90/2000-01, 113/A-90/2000-01, 96/ v 90/2000-01 has passed the orders dated 26.3.2024 against the appellants. Operative portion of the order reads as under: ^^çdj.k esa layXu nLrkost¨a] rglhynkj] jktLo fujh{kd d¢ çfrosnu dk voy¨du fd;k x;kA esjs }kjk Lo;a e©d¢ dk fujh{k.k fd;k x;k ftlesa ik;k fd e©d¢ ij fdlh çdkj dh voSèk dky¨uh fodflr ugha gS v©j uk gh voSèk dky¨uh d¢ lk{; fo|eku gSaA e©d¢ ij vukosnd@d¨Ã Òh O;fä fuokljr~ ugha gSA okn¨ä Òwfe losZ uacj 56] 57] 58 59] 99@1 dqy jdok 4-967 gSDVs;j ftldk orZeku xkÃM ykÃu osY;w 118-21 dj¨M+ gS t¨ fd 'kgj d¢ eè; fLFkr g¨dj cgqewY; Òwfe g¨dj cktkj ewY; yxÒx 400 ls 450 dj¨M+ #i;s gSA mä cgqewY; Òwfe dk mi;¨x 'kklu dh fdlh Òh ;¨tuk@foÒkx d¢ dk;kZy;hu mi;¨x esa fd;k tk ldrk gSA vukosnd }kjk vU; vukosnd¨a ,oa Òw&ekfQkv¨a d¢ lkFk laxuer g¨dj bl egRoiw.kZ 'kkldh; Òwfe d¨ voSèk dky¨uh dk fgLlk fn[kkdj 'kklu d¢ ifji= Øekad ,Q@1&34@99@lkr&9@Ò¨iky fnukad 3-2-2000 d¢ rgr xyr rjhd¢ ls fofu;ferdj.k pkgrs gSa ftlls egRoiw.kZ 'kkldh; Òwfe ij voSèk dCtk dj vkfFkZd ykÒ çkIr dj ldsA vr% eè; çns'k i= Øekad ,Q@1&34@99@lkr&9@Ò¨iky fnukad 3-2-2000 d¢ rgr vukosnd d¨ fofu;ferhdj.k dh ik=rk ugha vkus ls çdj.k blh Lrj ij fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA çdj.k esa vU; dk;Zokgh visf{kr ugha g¨us ls çdj.k uLrhc) g¨dj nkf[ky fjdkMZ gSA^^ 10. Shri V.K.Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that while passing the impugned order, learned Single Judge failed to consider the fact that the land was never vested in the State Government as actual physical possession of the said plots was never taken from the appellants. The demand notices were issued by the respondents for regularization of their title and appellants have deposited the amount as demanded by the respondents way back in the year 2005, but no order for regularization of their sale deed was issued. He further contended that it has wrongly been held that the policy dated 3.2.2000 has no application in case of plots since there was no construction. He further contended that it has wrongly been held that the policy dated 3.2.2000 has no application in case of plots since there was no construction. It is contended that the said circular applies to the plots as well since as they are located in a colony namely 'South Avenue' and in any case the appellants had purchased the said plots. It is further contended that no notice u/S 10(5) of the Act of 1976 was ever issued to the appellants which is mandatory. 11. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the learned Single Judge has illegally and irrelevantly gone into the question that whether the power of attorney had the right to sell and the Society was registered or not. Kumari Sharda Raje Holkar executed a power of attorney in favour of Amrit Priya Grih Nirman Society who sold the subject plots to the appellants. The sale deeds of the said plots have not been disputed by the respondents, therefore, the question with regard to legality of power of attorney of the seller need not be examined or adjudicated by the learned writ Court in case of regularization of plots developed in the colony. Hence, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed and the order impugned dated 18.3.2023 be quashed with a further direction to respondent No.3 to execute the lease deed of the plots in favour of the appellants. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/State has opposed the contentions of the appellants and contended that the appellants have utterly failed to establish the source in law available to Kumari Sharda Raje Holkar for transecting the subject property after issuance of notification under section 10(1) on 25.6.1993 under the Act of 1976. Thereafter, proceedings under the Act of 1976 had been drawn pursuant to which possession over the subject land has been taken over by drawing possession Panchnama dated 28.9.1999 specifically mentioning that the possession has been physically taken over by the Tehsildar over the site. Therefore, the appellants cannot raise the plea of non-taking of possession. Learned counsel for the State further contended that the appellants never raised any construction upon the surplus declared land to the exception of decision dated 3.2.2000. The said aspect has elaborately been dealt with by the respondents while passing order dated 26.3.2021. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. Learned counsel for the State further contended that the appellants never raised any construction upon the surplus declared land to the exception of decision dated 3.2.2000. The said aspect has elaborately been dealt with by the respondents while passing order dated 26.3.2021. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. It is not in dispute that the plots in question have been purchased by the appellants herein by way of registered sale deed from Kumari Sharda Raje D/O Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar and on initiation of proceedings by the Collector, Distt. Indore for getting of title of the plots regularized, adhering to the said notices, they have paid the requisite amount of lease rent as mentioned above. 15. The first and foremost question that crops up for consideration is whether constructed houses are considered for regularization of title or plots are also included. Clause 4 of the circular unveils the answer to the same. 15. The first and foremost question that crops up for consideration is whether constructed houses are considered for regularization of title or plots are also included. Clause 4 of the circular unveils the answer to the same. For ready reference and convenience, Clause 4 of the said circular is reproduced below: 4- mä cktkj d¢ vkèkkj ij fuEukafdr çfØ;k d¢ vuqlkj voSèkkfud :i ls fnukad 4-1-2000 dh fLFkfr esa fufeZr edku@Òw[k.M¨a dh fu;ferhdj.k O;oLFkkiu fd;k tk,xkA ¼1½ t¨ vfrØked Òw[k.M èkkjk vk;dj dk Òqxrku djrs gSa muls mä cktkj nj ij laxf.kr çO;kfèk dh jkf'k yh tk, ,oa Òwfe ç;¨tu d¢ vuqlkj vkoklh; mi;¨x d¢ fy, çO;kfèk dk 5 çfr'kr Òw&ÒkVd rFkk xSj vkoklh; ç;¨tu d¢ fy, 7-5 çfr'kr okf"kZd Òw&ÒkVd fuèkkZfjr fd;k tk,A ¼2-1½ t¨ vfrØked Òw&[k.Mèkkjh vk;djnkrk ugha gS ,oa ftld¢ ikl 2400 oxZQqV ls de {ks=Qy dk Òw[k.M gS mlls mä cktkj nj dh vkèkh ij ij çC;kft dh x.kuk dh tk, fdUrq okf"kZd Òw&ÒkVd dj fuèkkZj.k mij¨ä df.Mdk ¼1½ vuqlkj fd;k tk,A ¼2-2½ ftu vfrØked Òw&[k.Mèkkfj;¨a d¢ ikl 2400 oxZQqV ls vfèkd {ks=Qy d¢ Òw&[k.M gSa muls mi;qä df.Mdk ¼1½ vuqlkj çC;kft dh jkf'k yh tk, ,oa rnuqlkj okf"kZd Òw&ÒkVd dk fuèkkZj.k fd;k tk,A ¼3½ xjhch js[kk d¢ uhps thou ;kiu djus okys ,oa vuqlwfpr tutkfr d¢ vfrØked Òw&[k.Mèkkfj;¨a ls fj;k;rh nj ij çC;kft dh jkf'k yh tk, ,oa rnuqlkj okf"kZd Òw&ÒkVd fuèkkZfjr fd;k tk,A bl fj;k;rh nj dk fuèkkZj.k mä lfefr }kjk fd;k tk,xkA ¼4½ mä Jsf.k;¨a esa vkus okys vfrØked Òw&[k.Mèkkjh d¢ lQkà dkexkj g¨us dh fLFkfr esa muls mi;qZä nj¨a ls vkèkh nj ij çC;kft dh x.kuk dh tk,xh ,oa rnuqlkj okf"kZd Òw&ÒkVd dk fuèkkZj.k fd;k tk,xkA ¼5½ mi;qäkuqlkj fuèkkZfjr çC;kft dh x.kuk çR;sd vfrØked Òw&[k.Mèkkjh d¢ vkfèkiR; d¢ Òw&[k.M d¢ lacaèk esa dh tk,A rnqijkar vfrØked d¨ u¨fVl fn;k tk, ftlesa fuf'pr fnukad rd u¨fVlh d¢ fnukad ls 30 fnol dh vukfèkd vofèk nsrs gq, mä jkf'k ftyk dk;kZy; esa tek djus ,oa ,slk u djus ij vU; fufnZ"V fnukad rd ¼u¨fVl dh fnukad ls nh xà 30 fnol dh vofèk d¢ i'pkr~ 15 fnol d¢ Òhrj dh lqfoèkktud d¨Ã frfFk½ vfrØe.k dh LosPNkiwoZd gVkus d¢ funsZ'k fn, tk,aA fufnZ"V fnukad rd jkf'k tek u djus ,oa dCtk u gVus ij mudk vfrØe.k dh LosNkiwoZd gVkus d¢ funsZ'k fn, tk,A fufnZ"V fnukad rd jkf'k tek u djus ,oa dCtk u gVus ij mldk vfrØe.k gVk;k tk,A mld¢ lkFk gh dCtk gVus d¢ fy, fufnZ"V fnukad ls okLro esa dCtk gVkus d¢ fnukad rd lacafèkr vfrØked ls nkf[ky nj ij fdjk;k ¼laxf.kr vkfFkZd Òw&ÒkVd dk 10 xq.kk½ olwy fd;k tk,A 16. From the language of circular, it is clear that in clause 4 the words 'houses/plots' have been used and therefore, the objection as regards the regularization of title of only constructed houses is over ruled as the circular itself envisaged the word houses/plots and, therefore, respondents who are having plots falls under the purview of the said circular. 17. Secondly, proceedings u/S 10(5) of the Act of 1976 is mandatory requirement to be followed before taking possession. It is clear from the record that no notice u/S 10(6) was issued and even no notice u/S 10(5) was ever served upon the appellants. 18. In number of cases, writ Court in writ petitions as well as Divsion Bench in writ appeals has approved this position and also approved the fact that notice u/S 10(5) of the Act of 1976 is mandatory requirement as held by the apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hariram reported in (2013) 9 SCC 280 wherein the view taken by the apex Court is as under: “Voluntary Surrender 28. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and others (1977) 1 SCC 155 , while interpreting section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows: “We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To vest, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 29. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 29. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under section 10(3) of the Act. 30. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub- section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 31. S ub-section (5) of section 10, for the first time, speaks of “possession” which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 32. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under ubsection (3) to section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub- section (5) to section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under section 11 of the Act early. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 33. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under subsection (5) of section 10. Sub-section (6) to section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub- section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub- section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under subsection (6) and not under sub-section (5) to section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under section 10(5), than “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of section 10. 34. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 35. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 35. Above reasoning is in consistence with the Directions 1983 which has been issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred under section 35 of the Act. Directions clearly indicate that the procedure for taking possession of the vacant land in excess of the prescribed ceiling limit, which reads as under : The Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession payment of amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1983 (Directions issued by the State Government under section 35 of the Act, 1976): “In exercise of the powers under section 35 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of 1976), the governor is pleased to issue the following directions relating to the powers and duties of the Competent Authority in respect of amount referred to in section 11 of the aforesaid Act to the person or persons entitled thereto : 1. Short title, application and Commencement –These directions may be called the Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession Payment of Amount and Allied Matters Directions, 1983) 2. The provisions contained in this direction shall be subjected to the provisions of any directions or rules or orders issued by the Central Government with such directions or rules or orders. 3. They shall come into force with effect from the date of publication in the Gazette. 2. Definitions :-- 3. Procedure for taking possession of vacant Land in excess of Ceiling Limit -- (1) The Competent authority will maintain a register in From No.ULC -1 for each case regarding which notification under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Act is published in the Gazette. 4. (2) an order in Form No. ULC-II will be sent to each land holder as prescribed under sub-section (5) of section 109 of the Act and the date of issue and service of the order will be entered in Column 8 of Form No. ULC--1. (3) On possession of the excess vacant land being taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) or subsection (6) of section 10 of the Act, entries will be made in a register in Form ULC-III and also in Column 9 of the Form No.ULC-1. (3) On possession of the excess vacant land being taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) or subsection (6) of section 10 of the Act, entries will be made in a register in Form ULC-III and also in Column 9 of the Form No.ULC-1. The Competent Authority shall in token of verification of the entries, put his signatures in column 11 of Form No.ULC-1 and Column 10 of Form No.ULC-III. Form No. ULC-1 Register of Notice u/S 10-(3) and 10(5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) S. No. S. No. of register of receipt S. No. of register of taking possession Case Number Date of notification under Section 10(3) Land be acquired Village Mohali Date of taking over possession Remarks Signature of competent authority Form No. ULC-II Notice order u/s 10(5) (See clause (2) of Direction (3) In the Court of Competent Authority U.L.C. …………… No…………… Date ………… Sri/Smt……………….T/o …………………………………. In exercise of the powers vested un/s 10(5) of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of 1976, you are hereby informed that vide Notification No……. dated ….. under section 10(1) published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated …… following land has vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances as a consequence Notification u/s 10(3) published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated ……. Notification No……… dated …. With effect from ………. you are hereby ordered to surrender or deliver the possession of the land to the Collector of the District Authorised in this behalf under Notification No.324/II-27- U.C.77 dated February 9, 1977, published in the gazette, dated March 12, 1977, within thirty days from the date of receipt of this order otherwise action under sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act will follow. Description of Vacant Land Location Khasra Number Identification Area Remarks (1) (2) (3) (4) Competent Authority ....................... Dated……………………….. No. …………………………. Copy forwarded to the Collector ………… with the request that action for immediate taking over of the possession of the above detailed surplus land and its proper maintenance may, kindly be taken an intimation be given to the undersigned along with copy of certificate to verify. CompetentAuthority …………………………. ..………………………..” 36. Dated……………………….. No. …………………………. Copy forwarded to the Collector ………… with the request that action for immediate taking over of the possession of the above detailed surplus land and its proper maintenance may, kindly be taken an intimation be given to the undersigned along with copy of certificate to verify. CompetentAuthority …………………………. ..………………………..” 36. Above-mentioned directives make it clear that sub-section (3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto possession, therefore, if the land owner is not surrendering possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or surrendering or delivering possession after notice, under section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it cannot be said that the State Government has taken possession of the vacant land. 37. The scope of Act 33 of 1976 came up for consideration before this Court on few occasions, reference may be made to certain judgments, even though there has been no elaborate discussion of the provision of the Act and its impact on the Repeal Act. Reference may be made to Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P. and Others (2000) 6 SCC 325 , Ghasitey Lal Sahu and Another v. Competent Authority, Under the Urban (Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976), U.P. and Another (2004) 13 SCC 452 , Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2007) 11 SCC 90 and Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority and Others (2012) 4 SCC 718 . Effect of the Repeal Act 38. Let us now examine the effect of section 3 of the Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. The Object and Reasons of the Repeal Act has already been referred to in the earlier part of this Judgment. Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case. 39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. 39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of section 3 of the Repeal Act. 40. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also the other appeals. No documents have been produced by the State to show that the respondents had been dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the respondents are entitled to get the benefit of section 3 of the Repeal Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.” 19. In view of the above, it is settled position that notices u/S 10(5) of the Act of 1976 are mandatory and which have not ever been served upon the appellants. 20. So far as the objection raised by the State as regards posession by drawing paper panchnama is concernerd, the same is an empty formality as the apex Court in the case of Hari Ram (supra), in the context of Act, has clearly held that de facto possession is required to be taken by the State and not de jure. However, in the present case, State has never taken physical possession of the plots in question and appellants are in possession of the said plots since they purchased the aforesaid plots and therefore with effect from 7.2.2000 when the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeat Act,1999 was adopted by the State of M.P. They retained ownership and possession of the said plots and therefore, respondents were not justified in issuing notices for regularization of title of plots in the name of appellants. Despite that when the appellants deposited the amount as demanded, respondents on the one hand kept mum for years together and did not act upon the several representations submitted by the appellants in various Samadhan Shivirs on in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010 leading to filing of petition before this Court through which directions were issued for expeditious disposal of representations submitted by the appellants within stipulated time. Though representations were adverted too by the respondents, but against the interest of appellants in the year 2012. The appellants kept waiting for years together and in the end they have got an order against them. 21. It is the high-handedness of the State authority that on the one hand, they are accepting the amount deposited by the appellants in the year 2004 and on the other hand, after keeping silent for years together woke up from slumber in the year 2012 when the order dated 28.8.2012 was passed, that too after directions passed by this Court and directed the appellants to take the lease rent back. 22. On perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it has surfaced that the petition was dismissed on twin grounds: (a) The respondents have though deposited the lease rent, but not within the precribed time limit of 30 days from the date of notice. (b) Respondents have not impleaded Kumari Sharda Raje D/O Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar and Amrit Priya Grih Nirman Society as a party to establish that the sale deed are valid. 23. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants, learned Single Judge has held that lease rent has been deposited, but belatedly. It is an admitted position that lease rent in terms of the notice has been deposited off late in 2004 but certain new guidlines have been laid down vide circular dated 12.5.2020 by the Revenue Department, State of M.P. for arrangements of illegal colonies coming under the purview of the Act of 1976. It is an admitted position that lease rent in terms of the notice has been deposited off late in 2004 but certain new guidlines have been laid down vide circular dated 12.5.2020 by the Revenue Department, State of M.P. for arrangements of illegal colonies coming under the purview of the Act of 1976. Clause 2 of the said circular is as follows: ^^2- foÒkxh; lela[;d ifji= fnukad 3-2-2000 d¢ vkèkkj ij dk;Zokgh djrs gq, ftu çdkj.k¨a esa ekax tkjh dh xà gS ,oa ekax d¢ fo#) fuèkkZfjr le;kofèk d¢ i'pkr ekax vuqlkj iw.kZ jkf'k tek djk nh xà gS] mu çdj.k¨a esa iwoZ d¢ ns; ÒqÒkVd ij çFke o"kZ d¢ fy, 12 çfr'kr ls v©j mld¢ i'pkr 'ks"k vofèk d¢ fy, 15 çfr'kr fu;ekuqlkj lkèkkj.k C;kt lfgr laxf.kr laiw.kZ jkf'k tek djkus d¢ ckn foÒkxh; ifji= fnukad 4 eà 2002 fuèkkZfjr çk:i esa iV~Vk çnku djus dh dk;Zokgh dh tk,A^^ 24. A careful reading of the said clause 2 indicates that in continuance of the circular dated 3.2.2000, those old cases which are falling under the purview of the Act of 1976 and a demand has been made by way of issuance of notices for regularization of title of the plots/houses and a partial amount has been deposited after lapse of time, the outstanding lease rent in such cases shall be deposited as per the following arrangement: (a) Lease rent as demanded by way of issuance of notice shall carry interest @ 12% from the date of issuance of notice i.e. in the year 2001 till one year. (b) Lease rent for the remaining years i.e. from the year 2002 till today shall carry interest @ 15%. 25. In the light of the said circular dated 12.5.2020, in continuance of circular dated 3.2.2000 for regularization of plots/houses falling within the purview of the Act of 1976, appellants are entitled for regularization of title of plots on payment of outstanding amount of lease rent(if any) alongwith interest rates as mentioned above. 26. So far as impleadment of Kumari Sharda Raje D/O Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar and Amrit Priya Grih Nirman Society for establishing that sale deeds are valid, the same are registered documents and even have not been disputed by the respondents themselves. 26. So far as impleadment of Kumari Sharda Raje D/O Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar and Amrit Priya Grih Nirman Society for establishing that sale deeds are valid, the same are registered documents and even have not been disputed by the respondents themselves. If at any point of time, respondents raised any dispute regarding the same being null and void, they must have approahced challenging the said sale deeds before the civil Court which has not been done. Therefore, since there is no need to go into the veracity of these registered documents, no question of impleading Kumari Sharda Raje D/O Maharaja Tukoji Rao Pawar and Amrit Priya Grih Nirman Society arises. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court in the case of Hari ram (supra), as well as in the light of circular dated 12.5.2020, case is made out to allow the appeal and appellants are entitle for regularization of title on the plots. Accordingly, writ appeal is allowed with the following directions : (i) The order passed by learned Single Judge dated 18.3.2024 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the order passed by the SDO, Rau Distt. Indore dated 26.3.2024 does not stand and is also set aside. (ii) Appellants are directed to deposit the outstanding amount of lease rent alongwith interest in terms of the circular dated 12.5.2020 which is as follows: (a) Lease rent as demanded by way of issuance of notice shall carry interest @ 12% from the date of issuance of notice i.e. in the year 2001 till one year. (b) Lease rent for the remaining years i.e.from the year 2002 till today shall carry interest @ 15%. (iii) After payment of lease rent alongwith interest as mentioned above, the title of plots be regularized and lease deeds be executed in favour of the appellants as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six weeks from the date of deposit of outstanding lease rent(if any) alongwith interst as directed hereinabove. (iv) With the aforesaid directions, appeal stands disposed off.