ORDER : 1. The present petition has been filed challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 43, 43-A and 47 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 2019, which is evident from S. No. 13, 14 & 15, respectively of the amendment dated 12/12/2019, by which the State Government has added the word “President” in Sections 43 & 43-A and omitted Section 47 of the original Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961. The erstwhile provision of now omitted Section 47 provides a detailed procedure for conducting enquiry before removal of a President from the office. 2. Sections 43 & 43-A which stood after amendment reads as under: 43. Election and term of [the President and] Vice-President: (1) The State Election Commission shall cause the election of President and Vice-President immediately after every election of Municipal Council and Nagar Parishad in such manner as may be prescribed. The elected members of the Council shall elect a President and a Vice-President in the prescribed manner, from elected members in its first meeting as specified in Section 55. (2) The meeting under sub-section (1) shall be presided over by such officer as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 55. (3) The term of the [the President and] Vice-President shall be conterminous with the term of the Council. 43-A. No-confidence motion against [the President and] Vice President: (1) A motion of no-confidence may be moved against [the President and] Vice-President by any elected Councillor at a meeting specially convened for the purpose under sub-section (2) and if the motion, is carried by a majority of two thirds of the elected Councillors present and voting in the meeting and if such majority is more than half of the total number of elected Councillors constituting the Council, the office of the [the President and] Vice President, shall be deemed to have become vacant forthwith. A copy of such motion shall be sent by the Chief Municipal Officer to the Collector forthwith for filling up the vacancy: Provided that no such resolution shall lie against the [the President and] Vice-President within a period of: (i) two years from the date on which the [the President and] Vice-President enters upon his office. (ii) one year from the date on which the previous motion of no-confidence was rejected. (ii) one year from the date on which the previous motion of no-confidence was rejected. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a meeting of the Council shall be convened and presided over by the Collector or a Class-I Officer in case of a Municipal Council and a Class II Officer in case of Nagar Panchayat as nominated by him, in the following manner, namely: (i) the meeting shall be convened forthwith on a requisition signed by not less than one-sixth of the total number of elected Councillors constituting the Council for the time being. (ii) the notice of such a meeting specifying the date, time and place shall be despatched to the [President, Vice-President] and every Councillor ten clear days before the meeting. (iii) the no-confidence motion moved under this Section shall be decided through secret ballot. 3. Submission of the petitioner is that the State Government by notification dated 12/12/2019 amended few sections of the Municipalities Act, 1961. The petitioner was an elected President of Nagar Panchayat, Gandai. The President-in-Council of Nagar Panchayat, Gandai vide resolution No. 5 permitted one Sanjay Agrawal to construct an extension of 01 meter over the alleged shop to him. The CMO, Nagar Panchayat, Gandai on 28/01/2022 tried to demolish the aforesaid structure, which, in turn, was resisted by the petitioner, which led to filing of FIR. 4. Subsequent to it, the no confidence motion was moved by the councilors on 07/03/2022 vide Annexure P/7 on different grounds that the petitioner did not take interest in the council work for last four months. Pursuant thereto, the Collector issued notice of meeting under Section 43-A of the C.G. Municipalities Act, 1961 vide Annexure P/1. It is the allegation of the petitioner that without due verification of proposal of authenticity of the matter, the same was executed by the Collector and in an illegal meeting held by the Councilor, the petitioner, who is the President was removed from the said post and in consequence of such vacation of the office, new President was elected, who is arrayed as Respondent No. 5. 5. 5. The further submission is made that the insertion of the word ‘President’ in Section 43-A of the parent Act and omission of Section 47 in the parent Act whereby the Collector was denuded of his power to record his satisfaction on the proposal of removal, which was earlier incorporated under Section 47 of the deleted Act which is based on arbitrary action of majority which denies the right of fair opportunity to the President to elect and defend, which would lead to a fact that on a false allegation also the President could be removed without even giving an opportunity to state forth his case and the authority which was earlier existing as per Section 47 was wrongly deleted. Learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India, (2021) SCC Online SC 463 and would submit that the Court can strike down legislation either on the basis that it falls foul of federal distribution of powers or that it contravenes fundamental rights or other constitutional rights/provisions of the Constitution of India and if there is manifest arbitrariness the same can be struck down. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the arguments and would submit that the petitioner was elected as a President by the Council and if the Councilors have lost confidence then the opportunity of hearing do not arise at all and the legislation cannot be struck down only on the mere say of arbitrariness. 7. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 4 adopts the arguments submitted by the State. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 9. The Municipalities Act was amended on 12/12/2019 as per Annexure P/1. Section 19 of the principal Act was amended, which reads as under: 19. Composition of Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat: (1) A Municipal Council or a Nagar Panchayat, shall consist of: (a) a President, who should be an elected Councilor from some ward in the Municipal area, and is elected thereafter as President by the elected Councilors of the Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat, as the case may be. (b) Councillors elected by direct election from the wards. (b) Councillors elected by direct election from the wards. (c) Not more than [five] persons in the case of Municipal Councils and not more than [three] persons in the case of Nagar Panchayat having special knowledge or experience in Municipal Administration nominated by the State Government: Provided that only a person residing within the Municipal area and being otherwise not ineligible for election as a Councilor may be nominated: Provided further that if in the general election to the Municipalities and/or Nagar Panchayat, no person with disability has been elected, then the State Government shall nominate to such Municipalities and/or Nagar Panchayat, as the case may warrant, a person with disability, and the members with disability so nominated shall be in addition to the general members nominated under this clause. Explanation - Person with disability for the purpose of this proviso shall mean a person, as duly certified by a Government doctor, to have one or more of the disabilities included in the Schedule to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (No. 49 of 2016) except for disabilities mentioned therein against serial numbers 2 (Intellectual disability) and 3 (Mental Behaviour). (d) Members of the House of the people and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the municipal area. (e) Members of the Council of State registered as electors within the municipal area: Provided that a member of the House of the People and a member of the State Legislative Assembly as mentioned in clause (d) or a member of Council of States, as mentioned in clause (e) may nominate his representative, who possesses such qualifications as may be prescribed in this behalf to attend the meeting of the Council. (2) The persons nominated under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. (3) Persons referred to in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be Councilors, but shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Council. (2) The persons nominated under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. (3) Persons referred to in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be Councilors, but shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Council. (4) If any ward of any municipal area fails to elect a Councilor, fresh election proceedings shall be commenced for such ward within six months to fill the seat and until the seat is filled, it shall be treated as casual vacancy: Provided that proceedings of election of President or Vice-President, or any of the Committees under the Act shall not be stayed, pending the election of such seat. 10. In order to qualify to be elected as a President, the condition imposed that he should be an elected Councilor from some ward in the Municipal area, and is elected thereafter as President by the elected Councilors of the Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat, as the case may be. Accordingly, the petitioner being a Councilor was elected by the other Councilors to be a President on 08/01/2020. 11. The amended Act further purports that Section 43 & 43-A which was amended, the word President was added along with Vice President. Both the sections, which have been reproduced supra, would show that the motion of no confidence may be moved against the President and Vice President by the elected Councilors on a meeting specially convened for the purpose under sub-section (2), however, the proviso clause puts a rider that within a period of two years from the date on which such President is elected and enters his office, no confidence motion cannot be arrived at. So necessary safeguard is also provided for specified tenure of term. 12. Therefore, the entire object of the amendment would show that when the President was elected by the Councilors, it would be within the domain of Councilors to continue whether the President still holds the confidence, it would rather lead to more democratic approach as in the present case the petitioner was not elected by the Ward Members of the Nagar Panchayat. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 wherein Nariman, J. traced the evolution of non-arbitrariness jurisprudence in India and observed that State of A.P. and Others vs. McDowell & Co. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 wherein Nariman, J. traced the evolution of non-arbitrariness jurisprudence in India and observed that State of A.P. and Others vs. McDowell & Co. and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 has not considered at least two binding precedents, namely, Ajay Hasia and K.R. Lakshmanan. This Court further observed that McDowell did not notice Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , where this Court held that substantive due process is a part of Article 21 which has to be read along with Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Therefore, held that arbitrariness of a legislation is a facet of unreasonableness in Articles 19(2) to (6) and arbitrariness can also be used as a standard to strike down legislation under Article 14. This Judgment in Shayara Bano (Supra) has marked the Revival of Non-Arbitrariness Principle the said judgment has also highlighted the test to determine whether such legislation is Manifestly Arbitrary. The Judgment of Shayara Bano was later followed by the other constitutional benc Judgment the latest is Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond Scheme) vs. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1 wherein the suprme court has observed as under 195. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277 clarified [In Re: Natural Resources Allocation, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 ] by holding that a finding of manifest arbitrariness is in itself a constitutional infirmity and, therefore, a ground for invalidating legislation for the violation of Article 14. Moreover, it was held that there is no rational distinction between subordinate legislation and plenary legislation for the purposes of Article 14. Accordingly, the test of manifest arbitrariness laid down by this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 in the context of subordinate legislation was also held to be applicable to plenary legislation. In conclusion, this Court [Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277] held that manifest arbitrariness “must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle.” It was further held that a legislation which is excessive and disproportionate would also be manifestly arbitrary. In conclusion, this Court [Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277] held that manifest arbitrariness “must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle.” It was further held that a legislation which is excessive and disproportionate would also be manifestly arbitrary. The doctrine of manifest arbitrariness has been subsequently reiterated by this Court in numerous other judgments. Reading of aforesaid has held that the legislation which has been enacted by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle” OR a legislation which is excessive and disproportionate would also be manifestly arbitrary. Therefore in this context we will examine whether the legislation which is subject matter of the dispute can be held to be Manifestly Arbitrary. Initially when the act has entrusted the collector to record satisfaction but with effect from this amendment such condition of recording satisfaction by the collector has been waived and now the president may be removed if No Confidence Motion has been passed against him. 14. The reading of the scheme of act provides that appointment of the president has to be done through elections by the Councillors it cannot be doubted that this amendment will reduce the executive interference upon the process which is purely democratic. Therefore the collective reading of the act shows a clear intention of the legislature wherein the democratic functions have been seprated from the executive interference. The Preamble to the constitution clearly provides to uphold the democratic process the Supreme Court in the series of Judgment held that that democracy is the basic structure of the Constitution. [In Re: Gujarat Assembly Election Matter, Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1 and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1] More recently Supreme Court in Kuldeep Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2024) 3 SCC 526 highlighted that Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country the supreme court in Para 36 held as under: 36. This Court has consistently held that free and fair elections are a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This Court has consistently held that free and fair elections are a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : AIR 1993 SC 412 ; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1] Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives - both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. 15. The another important facet of the Constitution is sepration of powers which is also recognised as the basic structure of the constitution. That separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary is the basic structure of the Constitution is expressly stated by Sikri, C.J. in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 . The same view is expressed in subsequent decisions of this Court in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1, State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 489 and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1 . The Supreme Court in State of T.N. v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696 observed as under: 98. Indian Constitution, unlike the Constitution of United States of America and Australia, does not have express provision of separation of powers. However, the structure provided in our Constitution leaves no manner of doubt that the doctrine of separation of powers runs through the Indian Constitution. It is for this reason that this Court has recognised separation of power as a basic feature of the Constitution and an essential constituent of the rule of law. The doctrine of separation of powers is, though, not expressly engrafted in the Constitution, its sweep, operation and visibility are apparent from the Constitution. Indian Constitution has made demarcation without drawing formal lines between the three organs - legislature, executive and judiciary. 16. The doctrine of separation of powers is, though, not expressly engrafted in the Constitution, its sweep, operation and visibility are apparent from the Constitution. Indian Constitution has made demarcation without drawing formal lines between the three organs - legislature, executive and judiciary. 16. The submission of the petitioner that it is the amendment so incorporated is arbitrary and the reliance which is placed on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Madras Bar Association (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has held that the Court can strike down legislation if it falls foul of federal distribution of powers or that it contravenes fundamental rights or other constitutional rights/provisions of the Constitution of India. 17. So, separation of three organs of the state is requirement of the Indian constitution and the amendment in question tries to make strengthen the separation wherein the executive interference in legislative process has been limited. If the petitioner is trying to challenge the validity on the ground of Manifest Arbitrariness the burden is on him to prove the fact that the why legislation is capricious, irrational and/or without adequate determining principle” OR a legislation which is excessive and disproportionate. The Supreme Court in Nagaland Senior Govt. Employees Welfare Assn. v. State of Nagaland, (2010) 7 SCC 643 has observed as under: 43. In State of U.P. v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1135 : (1964) 2 Cri. L.J. 229 : (1964) 6 SCR 679 the Constitution Bench of this Court held that where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule on the ground of such rule offending Article 14, the burden is on him to plead and prove infirmity. This Court said: (AIR p. 1138, Para 15) “15.........if the rule has to be struck down as imposing unreasonable or discriminatory standards, it could not be done merely on any a priori reasoning but only as a result of materials placed before the Court by way of scientific analysis. It is obvious that this can be done only when the party invoking the protection of Article 14 makes averments with details to sustain such a plea and leads evidence to establish his allegations. It is obvious that this can be done only when the party invoking the protection of Article 14 makes averments with details to sustain such a plea and leads evidence to establish his allegations. That where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground that the rules offend Article 14 the burden is on him to plead and prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration. If, therefore, the respondent desired to challenge the validity of the rule on the ground either of its unreasonableness or its discriminatory nature, he had to lay a foundation for it by setting out the facts necessary to sustain such a plea and adduce cogent and convincing evidence to make out his case, for there is a presumption that every factor which is relevant or material has been taken into account in formulating the classification of the zones and the prescription of the minimum standards to each zone, and where we have a rule framed with the assistance of a committee containing experts such as the one constituted under Section 3 of the Act, that presumption is strong, if not overwhelming.” Therefore, it was for the petitioner to show why such legislation can be termed as Manifestly Arbitrary specially when such amendment is brought for implemention of well founded constitutional goal i.e. strengthing of democrary, sepration of powers and strengthing local governance. 18. The nature of amendment incorporated in this case shows that when the petitioner was elected by the Councilor, the power was delegated to the councilors themselves to continue with the confidence or not and inconsequence thereof they were bestowed with the power to push their narrative, if so they hold. Consequently, we are not in agreement with the submission made by the petitioner. 19. Accordingly, the petition sans merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.