JUDGMENT : RAMESH SINHA, C.J. 1. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the Special Judge (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012) (for short ‘the POCSO Act’) Mahasamund (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. H-12/2023, whereby the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner: Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of the IPC 05 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default of fine amount, additional R.I. for 01 month. U/s 6 of POCSO Act Imprisonment for life (i.e. till his remaining natural life) and fine amount of Rs. 10,000/- in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 06 months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, the complainant/mother of the victim (PW-2) filed a written complaint (Ex.P-1) in the Mahasamund Police Station that on 08.01.2023 at about 3:00 pm, her daughter/prosecutrix aged 08 years went to play in the vegetable market near her grandmother Rukmani Lanjewar’s shop. When she did not return till 5:00 pm, she searched around, when she could not find her, she informed her husband about this at 7:00 pm, who brought the prosecutrix home at 7:30 pm, then on questioning the prosecutrix, she told that Nehru Sahu, who used to live in the locality earlier, took her along with him by luring her to take a walk in the garden and took her to the field behind Gudrupara and took out his urine spot from his jeans and after removing the clothes of the prosecutrix, he was shaking it by putting it in the urine spot of the prosecutrix, due to which she is having pain in her waist. Based on the aforesaid written complaint, First Information Report (Ex.P-2) was registered against the accused/appellant at the Mahasamund Police Station under Crime No. 17/2023 for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(a) (ii) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. 3. During the investigation, the medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted by Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-7) after obtaining consent from the mother of the prosecutrix vide Ex.P-3, the private parts of the prosecutrix were examined by the said doctor. 3. During the investigation, the medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted by Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-7) after obtaining consent from the mother of the prosecutrix vide Ex.P-3, the private parts of the prosecutrix were examined by the said doctor. After the examination of the private parts of the prosecutrix, the vaginal slide and underwear recovered were seized vide Ex.P-6. The accused was arrested vide Ex.P-7 and information of his arrest was sent to his family vide Ex.P-8. The Accused was also medically examined by Dr. Shailendra Pradhan (PW-4) vide Ex.P-4. Underwear of the accused was seized vide Ex.P-5. A site map of the incident was prepared by the police vide Ex.P-12 and by the patwari vide Ex.P-14. A memo (Ex.P-9) was sent to the Headmaster of Government New Girls School, Mahasamund for providing certified copy of the dakhil kharij register and the certified copy of dakhil kharij register (Ex.P-15C) was seized vide Ex.P-10. The slides and underwear seized in the case were sent to the forensic science laboratory for examination and therefrom, FSL report was obtained vide Ex.P-16. Thereafter, after recording the statements of the witnesses and completing the investigation proceedings, the final charge sheet was presented in the Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act’), Mahasamund (C.G.) for trial. 4. Charges were framed against the accused under the relevant Sections. When these were read out and explained to the accused, he denied committing the crime and demanded a trial. The accused declared himself innocent under section-313 of the Cr.P.C. and expressed that he would not give any evidence in his defence. 5. In support of its case, the prosecution has produced the statements of the prosecutrix (PW-01), mother of the prosecutrix (PW-02), father of the prosecutrix (PW-03), Dr. Shailendra Pradhan (PW-04), Lady Head Constable Bhagyawati Khan (PW-05), Assistant Sub-Inspector Suresh Singh Parihar (PW-06), Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-07), Deputy Superintendent of Police Garima Dadar (PW-08), Head Mistress Dimeshwari Gajendra (PW-09). 6. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2023 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by them calling in question the impugned judgment. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant because he has been falsely implicated in the instant case, there is no material evidence available on records against the appellant and the learned trial Court has passed the order of conviction only on the basis of statement of the prosecutrix. He further argued that the fact that the prosecutrix (PW-01) has been raped is not being confirmed by medical and chemical evidence because Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-07) has given her opinion in her medical examination report (Ex.P-11) that there was incomplete intercourse, there was no intercourse of any kind with the prosecutrix (PW-01). In the FSL report (Ex.P-16) also, no semen stains and human sperms have been found in the slide, underwear of the prosecutrix and the underwear of the accused, which shows that the accused did not rape the prosecutrix, but he has been falsely implicated. There are contradictions and omissions in the Court statement of the prosecutrix and the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He submitted that the testimonies of the witnesses who are not hostile are full of contradictions, interpolations, additions and omissions, such inconsistencies are a direct consequence of the fact that the testimonies are vitiated by afterthoughts and confirmation bias. He further submitted that according to Section 29 of the POCSO Act presumption cannot be drawn against the appellant/accused, because he has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, whereas Section 29 provides that the alleged offence should be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the learned trial Court has also failed to consider that the prosecution witnesses have made contradictory statements, which clearly shows that they are not supporting the prosecution story, in spite of that he has been inflicted for life imprisonment which is on higher side and his future will be ruined. Hence, the conviction is liable to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, learned State counsel for the State/respondent submitted that the appellant has committed a heinous crime of rape against minor girl, aged about 8 years and the same has been duly proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 9. As such, the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim was minor? 11. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 12. In Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under: “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age: (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining: (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof. (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended and in the absence whereof. (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. While passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 13. In the present case, the prosecution has presented birth certificate of the victim (Ex.P-15C), in which the date of birth of victim is mentioned as 13.12.2015 and date of admission and class is mentioned as 11.07.2021 and Class 1 respectively. The above document is a document maintained by the Government New Girls School, Mahasamund and the said document has been maintained by the public servants in the normal sequence, due to which the said document comes in the category of public document. Therefore, it will be considered that the said document is the correct document. The above document is a document maintained by the Government New Girls School, Mahasamund and the said document has been maintained by the public servants in the normal sequence, due to which the said document comes in the category of public document. Therefore, it will be considered that the said document is the correct document. The defence has not presented any oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victims, as 13.12.2015 and as per the FIR (Ex.P-2), the incident took place on 08.01.2023, thus according to the above provisions, the age of victim on the date of incident i.e. on 08.01.2023 was 08 years as per her date of birth 13.12.2025 hence, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident i.e. on 08.01.2023, the victim comes under the category of “child” as defined under the POCSO Act. 14. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC? 15. The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363 of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under: “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship - Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 16. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients: (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. Section 361 has four ingredients: (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are: (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 17. The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S. Varadarajan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942 took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under: “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to taking.” 18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of ingredients of offence under Section 361 of the IPC which is punishable under Section 363 of the IPC & as well as principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of S. Varadarajan (supra), it is evident that as per the written report (Ex.P-1) and FIR (Ex.P-2) on 08.01.2023 at about 3:00 pm, the victim aged 08 years went to play in the vegetable market near her grandmother Rukmani Lanjewar’s shop. When she did not return till 5:00 pm, her mother searched around, when she could not find her, she informed her husband about this at 7:00 pm, who brought the victim home at 7:30 pm, then on questioning the victim, she told that accused Nehru Sahu, who used to live in the locality earlier, took her along with him by luring her to take a walk in the garden and took her to the field behind Gudrupara and took out his urine spot from his jeans and after removing the clothes of the prosecutrix, he was shaking it by putting it in the urine spot of the prosecutrix, due to which she is having pain in her waist and the said fact has been duly corroborated by the evidence of the victim (PW-1), her mother (PW-2) and her father (PW-3). It is well-established principle of law that in cases of sexual offence, the accused can be convicted on the basis of the evidence of a sole victim, if proven reliable even in the absence of corroboration from other witnesses. As such, we are of the considered view that the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC. 19. The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed rape on minor victim? 20. Since conviction of the appellant is under Section 6 of POCSO Act, it would be relevant to go through the relevant provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. 19. The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed rape on minor victim? 20. Since conviction of the appellant is under Section 6 of POCSO Act, it would be relevant to go through the relevant provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. Presumption as to certain offences under the POCSO Act is given under Section 29 of the said Act, which reads as under: “29. Presumption as to certain offences - Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under sections 3, 5, 7 and section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be unless the contrary is proved.” According to the above provision, it will be presumed that the accused has committed the said crime. 21. Presumption of culpable mental state is given Section 30 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under: “30. Presumption of culpable mental state: (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. (2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. Explanation - In this section “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.” According to the above provision, it will be presumed that the accused has committed the crime of gross penetrative sexual assault on the prosecutrix due to his criminal mental state. 22. The prosecutrix (PW-01) is an 08 year old innocent girl. Since the witness was a child witness, general questions were asked to the witness by the trial Court and after the witness gave satisfactory answers to those general questions, the witness was examined, in which she stated that she knows the accused. 22. The prosecutrix (PW-01) is an 08 year old innocent girl. Since the witness was a child witness, general questions were asked to the witness by the trial Court and after the witness gave satisfactory answers to those general questions, the witness was examined, in which she stated that she knows the accused. On the date of the incident, she was going from her house towards her grandmother's shop, when she met the accused Nehru Sahu on the way, he asked her to go for a walk in the garden. The accused had given him chips and chocolates etc. The accused had taken her to the fields. In the field, the accused inserted his penis into her vagina, the accused was fingering her vagina and the accused had taken a photo of her vagina with his mobile. Because of the said acts committed by the accused, there was a lot of pain in her urinating area. The accused had taken her from the field to a room. Meanwhile, the accused had received a call from her father, then the accused took her along with him and left her near Mahamaya Temple Mahasamund. Then her father came and took her home. She went home and informed her parents about what the accused had done to her. After getting the information, he, his parents, aunt etc. went to Mahasamund Police Station and filed a report. From the police station, he was taken to the District Hospital Mahasamund where the doctor examined her urinating area. 23. The victim (PW-01) admitted in her cross-examination that she came to know about the name of accused Nehru Sahu only after the accused told her about it. The accused had not come to her house before the incident. The accused earlier lived in Neechepara, now he has left it, this was told to her by his father. The witness has denied the suggestion that the farm where the accused had taken her, there was movement of people and movement of vehicles. The witness has also denied the suggestion that no incident has happened to her and she is making a false statement against the accused at the behest of her parents. 24. The mother of the victim (PW-02) has stated that she knows the accused. The victim is her daughter. The witness has also denied the suggestion that no incident has happened to her and she is making a false statement against the accused at the behest of her parents. 24. The mother of the victim (PW-02) has stated that she knows the accused. The victim is her daughter. About 2-3 months ago, there is a vegetable market of Mahasamund adjacent to Mahamaya Para where his mother works to sell potatoes and onions. On the date of the incident, the victim had gone to her grandmother's shop after telling her. When the victim did not return home for a long time, she searched for her in the neighbourhood. When the victim was not found, she informed her husband that the victim had not come home. At the time of finding the victim, during interrogation, the people of the neighborhood had told that the accused Nehru Sahu was talking with the victim and her husband had called the accuse Nehru Sahu on phone. The accused had brought the victim and handed her over to her husband near Mahamaya temple. At home, the victim had told that the accused had given her chocolate chips and taken her to the fields, saying that he would take her for a walk in the garden. The victim had also stated that in the field, the accused was inserting his penis into the urinating area of the victim and was also inserting his finger into her urinating area, due to which there was injury in the urinary area and waist of the victim. It was hurting. On being informed by the victim, she went to the police station with her husband and the victim and filed a written complaint (Ex.P-1) and on the basis of which First Information Report (Ex.P-2) was registered. From the police station, the victim was taken to the District Hospital Mahasamund for physical examination where she was examined with her consent. The consent letter is Ex.P-3. 25. The mother of the victim (PW-02) has stated in her cross-examination that when the victim did not come home for a long time, she had inquired from her mother and then her mother had told that the victim had come to her. Her mother had also told that when the victim had reached her, the accused Nehru Sahu had also come there and was talking about taking the victim with him. Her mother had also told that when the victim had reached her, the accused Nehru Sahu had also come there and was talking about taking the victim with him. This witness has admitted that she herself did not see the accused bringing back her daughter. The witness has admitted that while writing the report to the police, she had not told while the accused Nehru Sahu was talking to the prosecutrix, they were seen by other people. 26. The father of the victim (PW-03) has stated that he knows the accused. The victim is his daughter. On the date of the incident, he had left home in the morning for work. On the date of the incident, in the evening, her son Ishwar Pal came to the bus stand and informed him that the victim had not come home for a long time and could not be found even after a lot of searching. After receiving said information, he came back to his home and searched the victim in the neighborhood. His wife told him that the victim had left on the day of the incident saying that she was going to her grandmother's shop and had not returned. When he interrogated the grandmother of the victim, the grandmother told that she had seen the victim with accused Nehru Sahu. Then he went to the place where the accused Nehru worked and found out that the son of the accused there, then he called the accused from the mobile phone of the son of the accused and inquired about the victim, then after about half an hour the accused brought the victim near Mahamaya temple. He took the victim to his house, where the victim told him that when she was coming back from her grandmother's shop, the accused had taken her to the field with him saying that he would take her for a garden tour and had placed his place of urination in her urinating area. The victim had also told that the accused was also inserting his finger in her place of urination and had taken photographs of the place of urination of the victim. The victim had reported severe pain at her place of urination. On getting information about the incident from the victim, he along with his wife, the victim and the neighbor's sister went to Mahasamund Police Station and reported the incident. 27. The victim had reported severe pain at her place of urination. On getting information about the incident from the victim, he along with his wife, the victim and the neighbor's sister went to Mahasamund Police Station and reported the incident. 27. The father of the victim (PW-03) has admitted in his cross-examination that the accused Nehru Sahu had left their locality about 8-9 years ago. Presently he is residing in village Saradih. The victim did not know Nehru Sahu. He has not had any dealings or conversation with the accused for the last 8-10 years even before the birth of the victim. The witness has denied the suggestion that no incident has happened to his daughter and he is making a false statement against the accused out of hatred against him. The witness has admitted that he had not told the police about the fact that he had come to know about seeing of the victim with accused Nehru Sahu from the grandmother of the victim. The witness has denied the suggestion that the accused had not brought the victim and left her near the Mahamaya temple; the victim herself had come. 28. According to investigator Garima Dadar (PW-08), written complaint (Ex.P-1) was presented by the complainant in Police Station Mahasamud on 08.01.2023. On the basis of which she had registered the First Information Report (Ex.P-2) in Crime No. 17/2023 under Section 376(2)(A)(ii), 363 IPC and Section 04 POCSO Act. The above statement of the witness remained consistent in cross-examination. 29. The statement of the victim in the case has been recorded by lady head constable Bhagyawati Khan (PW-05) as per her statement dated 09/01/2023. The cross-examination of the witness in this regard has remained unbroken. 30. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the fact that the prosecutrix (PW-01) has been raped is not being confirmed by medical and chemical evidence because Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-07) has given her opinion in her medical examination report (Ex.P-11) that there was incomplete intercourse, there was no intercourse of any kind with the prosecutrix (PW-01). In the FSL report (Ex.P-16) also, no semen stains and human sperms have been found in the slide, underwear of the prosecutrix and the underwear of the accused, which shows that the accused did not rape the prosecutrix, but he has been falsely implicated. 31. In the FSL report (Ex.P-16) also, no semen stains and human sperms have been found in the slide, underwear of the prosecutrix and the underwear of the accused, which shows that the accused did not rape the prosecutrix, but he has been falsely implicated. 31. In view of the above argument made on behalf of the accused, though as per the FSL report Ex.P-16, no stains of semen or human sperm were found in the slide of the victim marked as ‘A’ the underwear of the victim marked as ‘B’ the swab of the victim marked as ‘C’ and the underwear of the accused marked as ‘D’ but it is clear from the statement of the medical examiner Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-07) and the report given by her (Ex.P-11) that during the internal examination of the victim (PW-01), the hymen membrane was half torn and there was redness in its surrounding area and according to her, sexual intercourse had taken place with the victim. In the context of the argument presented by the accused, it is necessary to clarify what rape and sexual assault are and who can do it. Rape has been defined in Section 375 of the IPC, which reads as follows: “375. Rape - A man is said to commit “rape” if he: (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person. (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person. (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person. (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: First - Against her will. Secondly - Without her consent. Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Secondly - Without her consent. Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly - With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly - With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly - With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly - When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1 - For the purposes of this section “vagina” shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2 - Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1 - A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2 - Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” 32. Dr. Manisha Minj (PW-07) has stated that during the internal examination, the hymen membrane of the victim (PW-01) was half torn and there was redness around it. It is a well-established principle of law that in a case of rape, if the statement of the victim is otherwise proven to be reliable, then her statement will not be called unreliable merely on the basis that her statement is not fully supported by medical evidence. The report given by the doctor is her own opinion which comes in the category of corroborative evidence and not in the category of definitive evidence. 33. So far as the alleged variance between medical evidence and ocular evidence is concerned, it is trite law that oral evidence has to get primary and medical evidence is basically opinionative. The report given by the doctor is her own opinion which comes in the category of corroborative evidence and not in the category of definitive evidence. 33. So far as the alleged variance between medical evidence and ocular evidence is concerned, it is trite law that oral evidence has to get primary and medical evidence is basically opinionative. It is only medical evidence specifically rules out the injury as is claimed to have been inflicted as per the oral testimony, than only in a given case the Court has to draw adverse inference. 34. On the plea of there being no injury found on the private part or any part of the body of the victim, the same would not be render prosecution case liable to be rejected firstly, because it is settled legal position that where the evidence of the victim inspires confidence and does not appear to be doubtful, there is no necessity to look for corroboration from any other evidence including medical evidence. 35. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 , the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. 36. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 , it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. 37. In the case of Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 38. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 38. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases (supra) to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victims. They are found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victims can be sustained. 39. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available on record and we are of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the learned trial Court. 40. From the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 41. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 42. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment and order dated 30.06.2023. 43. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any.