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2024 DIGILAW 55 (ORI)

Girija Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Odisha

2024-05-17

SASHIKANTA MISHRA

body2024
JUDGMENT Sashikanta Mishra, J. Both these writ applications involve same facts for which they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020 has filed the writ application seeking the following relief: 'Under the above circumstances, it is therefore humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Court be graciously pleased to quash the order dtd: 22.10.2020 and dtd: 06.11.2020 of the Opposite Party No.2 under Annexure- 10 and 11 respectively and direct the opposite parties not to interfere in the functioning of the present petitioner as Principal-in-charge of the College; And further the Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash the draft charge dtd: 25.08.2020 under Annexure-11-A as it is illegal without jurisdiction and authority; And/ or pass any other writ/ writs, order/ orders/ direction/ directions in the fitness of the case. And for this act of kindness as in duty bound the petitioner shall ever pray. ' 3. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 633 of 2022 has filed the writ application seeking the following relief: 'Under the above circumstances, it is humbly prayed that the writ petition may be allowed; And (A) a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ may be issued commanding the opposite parties more particularly the Sub-Collector-cum-Special Officerin-Charge of the Governing Body of Anchalik Vigyan Higher Secondary School, Sirigida opposite party No.3 to appoint the petitioner as Principal-in-Charge of the Higher Secondary School in question as he is the senior most Lecturer of the said Higher Secondary School and he is also senior to opposite party No.4 in all respect i.e. in length of service as well as in age and the appointment of the petitioner as Principal-in-Charge of the Higher Secondary School in question may be approved by the Director, Higher Secondary Education, Odisha, Bhubaneswar basing upon the order dated 06.11.2020 of the Director, Higher Secondary Education, Bhubaneswar Odisha, under Annexure: 17 and the appointment and approval of opposite party No.4 and his further continuance against the post of Principal-in- Charge of the Higher Secondary School in question may be declared illegal and bad in law, within a time to be stipulated by this Hon'ble Court; (B) And any other order / orders or direction/directions may be issued so as to give complete relief to the petitioner; And for this act of kindness, the petitioner shall as in duty bound remain ever pray. 4. 4. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.30343 of 2020 is opposite party No.4 in W.P.(C) No. 633 of 2022 and the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 633 of 2022 is opposite party No.4 in W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020. For convenience, parties are referred to by their names. FACTS 5. The facts, which are common to both the writ applications, are as follows: 5.1. Sirigida Anchalika Bigyan Mahavidyalaya was established in the year 1992 with +2 Science class and received recognition from the academic session 1992-93. It received Block Grant under the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2008 w.e.f. 20.01.2009. The name of the institution was changed by the Government to Sirigida Anchalika Bigyan Higher Secondary School, Sirigida, vide notification dated 27.06.2011. 5.2. Girija Shankar Mohapatra was appointed as Lecturer in Chemistry of the College on 29.05.1994 and joined as such on 30.05.1994. Harihar Pati was appointed as Lecturer in Botany on 25.11.1993. Appointment of both Lecturers and other staff of the College were approved as per order dated 08.07.2011 of the Director, Higher Secondary Education, Odisha. By order dated 08.07.2011, the Sub-Collector was directed to nominate the name of the senior most approved teacher to function as Principal in charge. Harihar Pati being the senior most submitted his written unwillingness citing personal difficulty. The next senior being one Sabita Sahoo, Lecturer in English, also submitted her written unwillingness. Both of them recommended the name of Girija Shankar Mohapatra in their written unwillingness. Accordingly, the Sub-Collector recommended the name of Girija Shankar Mohapatra to act as Principal in-charge, which was approved by the Director in his letter dated 11.08.2011. 5.3. While Girija Shankar Mohapatra was continuing as such, the Director, Higher Secondary Education (opposite party No.2) directed the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar in his letter dated 18.02.2020 to initiate disciplinary action against him for negligence in duty, non-maintenance of cash book and use of card for biometric attendance. By letter dated 25.06.2020, Girija Shankar Mohapatra was directed to produce the records of the institution for enquiry, which he produced in his letter dated 05.07.2020. 5.4 By notification dated 08.09.2020, the State Government dissolved all the governing bodies of the aided Junior Colleges/ Higher Secondary Schools and nominated the Sub-Collector of the concerned sub-division to act as President of the governing body of the institution. 5.4 By notification dated 08.09.2020, the State Government dissolved all the governing bodies of the aided Junior Colleges/ Higher Secondary Schools and nominated the Sub-Collector of the concerned sub-division to act as President of the governing body of the institution. Accordingly, the Director, Higher Secondary Education in his letter dated 09.10.2020 requested all the Principals of the Aided Educational Institutions to abide by the decision of the Government. While the matter stood thus, by letter dated 25.08.2020, the Sub-Collector prepared draft charges against Girija Shankar Mohapatra and forwarded the same to the Director for approval and further course of action. Copy of the said letter has been enclosed as Annexure-11-A to the writ application, i.e., W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020. By letter dated 22.10.2020, the Additional Director intimated the Sub-Collector that the Director had approved the draft charges. Copy of such letter has been enclosed as Annexure-10 to the writ application. Again by letter dated 06.11.2020 the Director directed the Sub-Collector to intimate the name of the senior most teaching staff to be appointed as Principal in-charge of the institution. Case of Girija Shankar Mohapatra 6. Girija Shankar Mohapatra questions the competence of the Sub-Collector to initiate disciplinary action against him on the ground that it is only the governing body which is competent to do so. There being no governing body and the Sub-Collector being only the Special Officer cannot take any disciplinary action against any employee. Further, no show cause notice was issued with any definite charge before preparing the so called draft charges. In any case, the Government having dissolved the governing bodies of all the educational institutions nominating the Sub-Collector as the President, he could not have acted as Special Officer. Moreover, as per law laid down by this Court in the case of Sri Satya Sai Seva Organization and another Vs. State of Orissa and others 2008 (II) OLR-432, the Sub-Collector as President of the governing body is not competent to take any disciplinary action against any employee. Even otherwise, there is no provision under Rule-22 of the Orissa Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions) Rules, 1974 (in short 1974 Rules') for framing of draft charge or for the Director to approve such draft charge. Even otherwise, there is no provision under Rule-22 of the Orissa Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions) Rules, 1974 (in short 1974 Rules') for framing of draft charge or for the Director to approve such draft charge. That apart, merely on the basis of some bald allegations, without the same having been proved, Girija Shankar Mohapatra could not have been removed from the post of Principal in-charge. Further, Harihar Pati having expressed his unwillingness in writing to act as Principal in-charge, he may be deemed to have forfeited his right forever and therefore, cannot be nominated as such. Case of Harihar Pati 7. Though Harihar Pati has submitted his unwillingness in writing to act as Principal in-charge in the past, yet the same cannot stand in the way of his being so nominated again for the reason that the Government Resolution dated 23.03.2015 forfeiting the right of a person giving such written unwillingness to be considered for the post in future was not in existence when he had expressed his unwillingness on 18.07.2011. The Resolution dated 23.03.2015 cannot have any retrospective operation. That apart, said Resolution has since been withdrawn as per Government Order dated 20.04.2022. Further, the Sub-Collector having been appointed as Special Officer in exercise of the powers conferred on the prescribed authority by Section 7-A(3) of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (in short the Act') is fully competent to initiate disciplinary action against an employee. In any case, the Director has accorded approval to the action of the Sub-Collector in the absence of governing body. The Resolution dated 21.01.2020 was issued under Sub-Section 7(6) of the Act on entirely different premise and object. Said notification does not supersede the earlier notification issued under Section 7-A(3) of the Act. It is also the case of Harihar Pati that this Court may not interfere with the disciplinary proceeding as it has been initiated by the proper authority. Further, Girija Shankar Mohapatra cannot question the competence of the Sub-Collector or the Director since he had himself submitted to their jurisdiction without raising any objection in the past on several occasions including requesting the Director to conduct enquiry. Case of the State 8. The writ applications have been filed without proper cause of action since only a proceeding has been initiated and no action has been taken. Case of the State 8. The writ applications have been filed without proper cause of action since only a proceeding has been initiated and no action has been taken. In the instant case, the Sub-Collector has prepared and forwarded the draft charges to the Director, who being the final authority has approved it. Therefore, the Sub-Collector cannot be said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction. In fact, Girija Shankar Mohapatra was himself approved as Principal in-charge -cum- Secretary of the College by the Director on the recommendation of the Sub-Collector. Further, no cause of action also exists for Harihar Pati in view of the fact that because of operation of interim order of stay passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020 no action has been taken in relation to letter dated 06.11.2020 of the Director directing the Sub-Collector to intimate the name of the senior most teaching staff to be appointed as Principal in-charge. Since the Sub-Collector observed gross negligence in duty by Girija Shankar Mohapatra, such as, not taking classes regularly, tampering of biometric attendance of staff and irregularities in maintenance of financial transactions of the institution, he suggested for initiation of disciplinary action against him, which was approved by the Director. Girija Shankar Mohapatra is not the senior most approved teaching staff, rather Harihar Pati is the senior most. In any case, the post of Principal in-charge is not a substantive post. 9. Heard Mr. Sameer Kumar Das, learned counsel for Girija Shankar Mohapatra; Mr. Budhadev Routray, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Prabhat Kumar Dash; and Mr. Kunal Kumar Swain, learned counsel appearing for Harihar Pati; and Mr. S.N. Pattnaik, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the State. Submissions 10. Mr. Sameer Kumar Das would argue that the Sub-Collector is not competent to initiate disciplinary action against any employee for the reason that he being nominated as the President of the governing body cannot act as the governing body. It is the governing body alone which is competent to take disciplinary action against an employee. Mr. Das further argues that Rule-22 of 1974 Rules provides the procedure for imposing penalties. There is no provision for preparation of any draft charges, rather sub-Rule (2) provides that definite charges shall be framed and communicated in writing to the employees. It is the governing body alone which is competent to take disciplinary action against an employee. Mr. Das further argues that Rule-22 of 1974 Rules provides the procedure for imposing penalties. There is no provision for preparation of any draft charges, rather sub-Rule (2) provides that definite charges shall be framed and communicated in writing to the employees. As per sub-Rule (12), the disciplinary authority can only forward the record of the enquiry to the Director for his advice. Thus, the Director also cannot take any disciplinary action against any employee. Mr. Das further submits that no show cause notice was issued to Girija Shankar Mohapatra before initiating the proceeding. Mr. Das has drawn attention to the relevant documents available on record to argue that the Sub-Collector was appointed as Special Officer on 18.03.2020 and on the same day the Director directed him to initiate disciplinary action, conduct special audit and direct the Principal regarding work distribution. All this reflects a pre-determined mind. Further, the Sub-Collector assumed charge on 25.08.2020 so, how could he take stock of the situation so as to initiate disciplinary action by issuing the draft charges on the very same day. Mr. Das concludes his arguments by submitting that the Girija Shankar Mohapatra cannot be removed from the post of Principal in-charge without any finding of guilt recorded against him. 11. Mr. B. Routray, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. K.K. Swain have both contended that the arguments advanced on behalf of Girija Shankar Mohapatra are misconceived. The order of the Director, being the prescribed authority, appointing the Sub-Collector as Special Officer is upon exercise of power conferred on him by Section 7-A(3) of the Act. On the other hand, the notification of the Government dissolving all governing bodies was issued by exercising power under Section 7(6) of the Act. The scope of both are different. The subsequent notification cannot therefore, be said to have superseded the earlier notification which implies that the Sub-Collector continued to be the Special Officer with power to take all administrative action in respect of the institution. It is further contended that even otherwise, only charges have been framed and no action had been taken against Girija Shankar Mohapatra. Dislodging him from the post of Principal in-charge is not a punishment within the meaning of Rule-20 of the 1974 Rules as it is not a substantive post. Additionally, Mr. It is further contended that even otherwise, only charges have been framed and no action had been taken against Girija Shankar Mohapatra. Dislodging him from the post of Principal in-charge is not a punishment within the meaning of Rule-20 of the 1974 Rules as it is not a substantive post. Additionally, Mr. Swain would contend that reliance placed on the Resolution of the Government dated 23.03.2015, as per which an employee having once expressed his unwillingness to act as Principal is not to be considered in future, cannot have a retrospective operation. Harihar Pati had submitted his unwillingness much before i.e. on 15.07.2011. In any case, Resolution dated 23.03.2015 has since been withdrawn. 12. Mr. S.N. Pattnaik, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State would contend that the letter under Annexure- 11-A of W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020 contains the details of the draft charges, which were approved by the Director in his letter vide Annexure-10. But, no disciplinary action has been taken against Girija Shankar Mohapatra as yet. Therefore, there is no definite cause of action to prefer the writ application and in any case, it is premature. Mr. Pattnaik further contends that the letter under Annexure-11 reflects an entirely different matter having no connection with the other impugned letters. The Sub-Collector has only forwarded the draft charges to the Director, who is the final authority to take disciplinary action in the absence of a governing body. Analysis of rival submissions and findings 13. From the rival submissions noted before, it is evident that the following points need to be determined in these writ applications: (i) Whether the writ applications have been prematurely filed. (ii) Whether the Sub-Collector as Special Officer appointed under Section 7-A(3) of the Act is competent to frame draft charges against an employee of an aided educational institution. (iii) Whether the Director, Secondary Education is competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding against an employee of an Aided Educational Institution. (iv) Whether it is otherwise open to Girija Shankar Mohapatra to question the competence of the Sub-Collector to initiate disciplinary proceeding against him. 14. As already stated, Girija Shankar Mohapatra has filed the writ application seeking quashment of the orders under Annexure-10, 11 and 11-A. By the letter under Annexure-11-A, draft charges were framed by the Sub-Collector and forwarded to the Director for his approval. By the order under Annexure-10, said draft charges were approved. 14. As already stated, Girija Shankar Mohapatra has filed the writ application seeking quashment of the orders under Annexure-10, 11 and 11-A. By the letter under Annexure-11-A, draft charges were framed by the Sub-Collector and forwarded to the Director for his approval. By the order under Annexure-10, said draft charges were approved. Ordinarily, a mere challenge to framing and approval of draft charges could not have been challenged as it would be premature, but in the instant case, Girija Shankar Mohapatra has questioned the very competence of the concerned authorities in taking such action. It is trite law that a disciplinary action can only be taken by the competent authority. Since the competence of the authority has been questioned, this Court holds the writ application maintainable even at this stage. As regards the communication under Annexure-11, though the same ostensibly does not have any relation to either Annexure-10 or Annexure-11-A, yet since Girija Shankar Mohapatra is presently functioning as Principal in-charge, he would be affected by giving effect to the order under Annexure-10. Therefore, it is open to him to challenge the said order. 15. In so far as the prayer made by Harihar Pati is concerned, he has prayed for appointing him as Principal in-charge and for removal of Girija Shankar Mohapatra as such. Said order has not yet been acted upon because of operation of the order of stay granted by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 30343 of 2020. Even otherwise, only a direction has been issued to the Sub-Collector by the Director. Harihar Pati's approach to this Court at this stage appears to be a pre-emptive action, which cannot be countenanced in law. It seems he apprehends that despite being the senior most, he may not be nominated to act as the Principal in-charge which reflects an apprehended cause of action. This Court therefore, holds W.P.(C) No.633 of 2022 as not maintainable. 16. As regards the competence of the Sub-Collector to issue the notifications, much has been argued with reference to the provisions under Section-7-A(3) and 7(6) of the Act. Both sides have also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Sri Satya Sai Seva Organization (supra) in support of their respective stands. Additionally, reference has been made to the provisions under Rules-20, 21 and 22 of the 1974 Rules. Both sides have also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Sri Satya Sai Seva Organization (supra) in support of their respective stands. Additionally, reference has been made to the provisions under Rules-20, 21 and 22 of the 1974 Rules. There is no dispute that the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar was appointed as Special Officer in respect of the institution in question by order dated 18.03.2020 of the Director in exercise of powers conferred under Section 7-A(3) of the Act. It would be profitable to refer to Section 7-A as a whole, which is quoted hereunder: '7-A.(l) Where the prescribed authority is satisfied that the managing committee or, as the case may be, the governing body of any private educational institution has neglected or failed to perform any of the duties imposed by or under this Act or the rules or to give effect to the order or direction issued by the Tribunal under Section 24-A or has acted in excess of the authority vested in it or in any manner which is prejudicial to the interest of the educational institution, he may, after giving the managing committee or the governing body, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, supersede the managing committee or the governing body, as the case may be. (2) As soon as possible, after supersession of a managing committee or governing body, as the case may be, the prescribed authority shall reconstitute the managing committee or the governing body, as the case may be, and the managing committee or the governing body, so reconstituted shall, subject to the provision in sub-section (1), continue for a term of three years from the date of such reconstitution. (3) During the period intervening the supersession or expiry of the term of a managing committee or governing body, as the case may be, and its reconstitution, the powers and Junctions of the managing committee or the governing body, as the case may be, shall be exercised by such person or persons as the prescribed authority may appoint. xx xx xx' On the other hand, by notification dated 08.09.2020, the Government in exercise of power conferred under Sub-Section(6) of Section-7 of the Act inter alia dissolved the governing bodies of the aided educational institutions and directed that the Sub-Collector of the concerned subdivision to act as the President of the governing body. xx xx xx' On the other hand, by notification dated 08.09.2020, the Government in exercise of power conferred under Sub-Section(6) of Section-7 of the Act inter alia dissolved the governing bodies of the aided educational institutions and directed that the Sub-Collector of the concerned subdivision to act as the President of the governing body. Pursuant to such notification, further letter was issued by the Director on 09.10.2020 inter alia to the Principals of all concerned educational institutions to abide by the decision of the Government. It would be useful to refer to the relevant provision, which is quoted hereinbelow. '7(6) The prescribed authority may allow the Governing Body or the Managing Committee, as the case may be, whose term has expired under sub-section (4) or sub-section (2) of section 7-A to continue in office till the Governing Body or the Managing Committee is reconstituted, or appoint any person or persons to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Governing Body or the managing Committee during the intervening period: Provided that the State Government may reconstitute the Governing Body or the Managing Committee as the case may be, notwithstanding that the term of such Governing Body or Managing Committee has not expired and on such reconstitution, the existing Managing Committee or Governing Body, as the case may be, shall stand dissolved' 17. As regards the educational institution in question, admittedly there was no governing body for which the Director appointed the Sub-Collector as Special Officer to exercise all the administrative and financial powers of the governing body under the provisions of Orissa Education Act and Rules till reconstitution of the governing body. It is contended that the subsequent notification dated 08.09.2020 issued by the Government automatically superseded the order appointing the Sub-Collector as Special Officer. 18. On a plain reading of the notification dated 08.09.2020 it is seen that the same was made applicable to the governing bodies of all non-Government Aided Higher Secondary Schools except 'the Higher Secondary Schools, where Sub-Collectors/Additional District Magistrates have already been nominated as President of the governing bodies' (emphasis added). As already stated, in the case at hand, the Sub-Collector was not nominated to act as President of the governing body but as Special Officer. Thus, the power has been exercised by different authorities under two different provisions. As already stated, in the case at hand, the Sub-Collector was not nominated to act as President of the governing body but as Special Officer. Thus, the power has been exercised by different authorities under two different provisions. Section 7-A(3) of the Act comes into operation when there is a time-gap between supersession or expiry of the term of the governing body and reconstitution of a new body, for whatever reason. It is to prevent a hiatus being created that the Prescribed Authority (Director) has been empowered to appoint a person (usually called Special Officer) to exercise the powers and function of the governing body. Section 7-A, it must be noted, is a special provision relating to supersession and reconstitution of Managing Committee or Governing Body. 19. Section-7, on the other hand is a general provision relating to Managing Committee or Governing Body of an institution. Sub-Section (6) inter alia confers power on the State Government to dissolve the Managing Committee or Governing Body of an institution or reconstitute a new body even before expiry of its term. Obviously, the provisions under Section 7(6) and 7-A(3) operate in different situations. Section 7-A comes into play when there is any default on the part of the body as mentioned in Sub-Section(l) whereas Section-7, as already stated, can come into play at any time without any preconditions being in existence. Significantly, the State has clarified that the appointment of the Sub-Collector as Special Officer was in terms of Section 7-A(3) of the Act, as evident from the following averments made in its counter affidavit. '6. That in reply to the averments made in paragraph-7 of the writ petition, it is humbly submitted that, the averments made by the writ petitioner are not sustainable in the eye of law. In this writ petition, the petitioner questioned about the authority of Governing Body as there is no Governing Body which has already been admitted by the writ petitioner in this paragraph and also alleged on what authority, direction was issued to the Sub-Collector to proceed against the petitioner. In this writ petition, the petitioner questioned about the authority of Governing Body as there is no Governing Body which has already been admitted by the writ petitioner in this paragraph and also alleged on what authority, direction was issued to the Sub-Collector to proceed against the petitioner. In this scenario it is to state that, the Special Secretary-cum-Director, Higher Secondary Education, Odisha, Bhubaneswar in exercise of powers conferred under section 7-A(3) of O.E. Act, 1969 appointed the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar Sadar as Special Officer in respect of the Anchalika Higher Secondary School, Sirigida, Telkoi in the district of Keonjhar in order to exercise all the Administrative & Financial powers of the Governing Body of the said Higher Secondary School/ Jr. College till reconstitution of G.B. vide Order No.4920, dated 18.03.2020 which has been communicated to the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar Sadar aide Memo No.4921, dtd. 18.03.2020 of the Additional Director, DHSE, Odisha..' 20. In view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the view that the Notification dated 08.09.2020 has no relevance in the present context. Significantly, the SubCollector being appointed as Special Officer by order dated 08.03.2020 of the Director assumed charge as such as late as on 25.08.2020. In the meantime however, he seems to have functioned purportedly in such capacity by issuing several instructions to Girija Shankar Mohapatra including production of records/documents etc. Nevertheless, fact remains that he prepared the draft charges after formally assuming charge as Special Officer. 21. Now, coming to the question of competence of the Sub-Collector in preparing the draft charges against Girija Shankar Mohapatra in the capacity of Special Officer and of the Director in approving such charges, it has been argued that no authority other than the governing body has the power to initiate and take disciplinary action against a staff and that the Director has only an adversary jurisdiction in terms of Rule-22(12) of the 1974 Rules. This Court is unable to accept the above arguments - firstly, for the reason that if such is the interpretation then a vacuum would be created inasmuch as there would be no one competent to take disciplinary action against an errant employee till reconstitution of the governing body. Such a proposition would be absurd as there can be no vacuum in law. Such a proposition would be absurd as there can be no vacuum in law. Reference to Rule-21 of 1974 Rules would indicate that the Director is competent to impose the penalty specified in Rule-20 with the proviso that the Director shall not initiate any disciplinary proceeding unless the governing body refuses or neglects to take disciplinary action against any employee. For immediate reference, Rule 21(1) of 1974 Rules is quoted hereinbelow: '21(1) The Director may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 20 on any employee: Provided that the Director shall not initiate any disciplinary proceeding unless the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, refuses or neglect to take disciplinary action against any employee. ' 22. Read as a whole, the interpretation according to this Court of the above provision would be that ordinarily it is the governing body which is competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding against an employee. But if it neglects or refuses to do so, the Director can himself initiate a disciplinary proceeding. The power to impose penalties is however, vested on the Director subject to the proviso. On the same analogy, in the absence of a governing body the Director can initiate the proceeding and impose penalties on an employee. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Upendra Sahoo vs. State of Orissa and others, 2015 (Supp.1) OLR 1104, wherein the following observations are noteworthy:- '12. From the above order of the High Court, it is crystal clear that this Court gave a clear direction to the opposite party no.2 therein, i.e., the Director, Higher Education, Bhubaneswar to conclude the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner within a period of four months with further direction to pay the arrear subsistence allowance entitled to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of communication of the order. It is needless to submit here that Rule-21 of 74 Rules also makes it clear that if Governing Body is unable to conclude a proceeding the Director can exercise the power of Disciplinary authority hence and conclude the proceeding. In the present case in absence of a Governing Body the Director was directed to conclude the disciplinary proceeding. It is needless to submit here that Rule-21 of 74 Rules also makes it clear that if Governing Body is unable to conclude a proceeding the Director can exercise the power of Disciplinary authority hence and conclude the proceeding. In the present case in absence of a Governing Body the Director was directed to conclude the disciplinary proceeding. On conclusion of the Disciplinary proceeding at his end following Sub-rule-2(b) of Rule 21 on his recommendations the Government Body ought to have imposed any of the penalties specified in Rule 20 on the petitioner. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)' 23. Obviously, if any other interpretation would be made, it would render the very object of the provision otiose inasmuch as it would entail a situation where, as already stated, there would be no authority competent to take action against an errant employee. In other words, a vacuum The above could not have been the object of the statute. It is well settled that the Court must construe the statute to promote its object and to serve the purpose for which it had been enacted and not deface its very purpose. Reference in this regard may be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 , where the following observations are noteworthy: '33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasonsfor it that the Court construed the expression 'Prize Chit' in Srinivasa [ (1980) 4 SCC 507 : (1981) 1 SCR 801 : 51 Com Cas 464] and we find no reason to depart from the Court's construction. ' 24. Further, a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object. Further, the Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative. Reference in this regard may be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123 , where the following observations are noteworthy: '118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat'. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat'. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a court of construction, dealing with the language of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. [(1904) 2 Ch 352 : 16 TLR 429 : 83 LT 274] Farwell J. said: (pp. 360-61) 'Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty. ' 25. Secondly, in the instant case the Sub-Collector has merely prepared the draft charges and forwarded the same to the Director for his approval. Obviously, this much alone would not be akin to initiation of disciplinary proceeding. Plainly understood, this would mean that a draft of the charges proposed to be framed was sent to the Director for his approval and the charges so approved were ultimately communicated to Girija Shankar Mohapatra. It is immaterial as to who drafted the charges as it would be in the realm of an administrative act. True, the authority is also required to frame charges after due application of mind but then the draft charges having been prepared by the Sub-Collector and approved by the Director, there is no reason to suppose that the latter had not applied his mind. The contention that the rules do not permit preparation of draft charges does not hold much water for the reason that the preparation of draft charges can be construed as an administrative act and it is only upon their approval that they become definite. To put it differently, without the seal of approval of the Director, the draft charges would have had no value or could be acted upon. It has been argued that use of the word 'definite' in Rule 22(1) forecloses any draft charges being framed. To put it differently, without the seal of approval of the Director, the draft charges would have had no value or could be acted upon. It has been argued that use of the word 'definite' in Rule 22(1) forecloses any draft charges being framed. This Court cannot accept such contention for the reason that 'definite' obviously means something specific and not vague. Draft charges on the other hand are the precursor of the definite charges, which have received the seal of approval of the competent authority. It is stated at the cost of repetition that what the Sub-Collector did is, he being at the helm of affairs prepared draft charges and forwarded the same to the Director for his approval. Had the Sub-Collector communicated the draft charges to Girija Shankar Mohapatra without approval of the Director, it would have been open to the employee to raise the above contention, but once the draft charges attained finality and definiteness by the approval of the Director, such a contention can no longer be raised. 26. Thirdly, it has also been argued that under the scheme of things as per the 1974 Rules, the Director has only an advisory jurisdiction. This Court has already held that in the absence of the governing body, the Director is competent to take necessary disciplinary action against an errant employee as otherwise it would be contrary to the very object of the statute. That apart, it is seen that Girija Shankar Mohapatra as Principal-in-Charge of the Institution had himself written on multiple occasions to the Director requesting him to take action with regard to certain activities of some of the staff. Some of such letters i.e., letters dated 15.12.2016, 18.01.2018 and 28.05.2018 have been enclosed to the counter filed by the State. In fact, on such correspondence, a preliminary fact finding enquiry was also conducted being directed by the Director. It is trite law that when a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of a particular authority, he cannot subsequently challenge the competence of the said authority. Reference may be had in this regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., AIR 2023 SC 2769 , in which the following was observed: 43. Reference may be had in this regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., AIR 2023 SC 2769 , in which the following was observed: 43. The Principle of Acquiescence has been explained in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, as a person's tacit or passive acceptance or implied consent to an act. It has been described as a principle of equity which must be made applicable in a case where the order has been passed and complied with without raising any objection. Acquiescence is followed by estoppel. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, six decades ago, had an occasion to explain the scope of estoppel. It says that once an order is passed against a person and he submits to the jurisdiction of the said order without raising any objection or complies with it, he cannot be permitted to challenge the said order, subsequently, when he could not succeed. The conduct of the person in complying with the order or submitting to the jurisdiction of the order of the Court by participation, disentitles him to any relief before the Court. ' In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that (i) Sub-Collector as Special Officer was competent to prepare draft charges and (ii) the Director was also competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding against Girija Shankar Mohapatra. 27. Having held so, this Court would now like to deal with the case laws relied upon by learned counsel for Girija Shankar Mohapatra. The judgment of this Court in the case of Janardan Rout v. Election Officer, Cuttack Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others, 1990 (II) OLR 511 has been relied upon to put forth the contention that discharging the powers of an elected body temporarily does not make the person so discharging the duties the elected body itself. On such basis it is argued that the Sub-Collector being appointed as Special Officer to discharge the functions of the governing body does not become the governing body itself. In view of what has been discussed hereinbefore in detail and in particular the finding of this Court that the Sub-Collector in the present case cannot be held to have initiated disciplinary proceeding against Girija Shankar Mohapatra, the ratio of the cited case does not apply. 28. In view of what has been discussed hereinbefore in detail and in particular the finding of this Court that the Sub-Collector in the present case cannot be held to have initiated disciplinary proceeding against Girija Shankar Mohapatra, the ratio of the cited case does not apply. 28. As regards the opt-quoted judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Sathya Sai Seva Organization (supra), the said case is one in which this Court held that nomination of a person as the President of the governing body after dissolution thereof is bad in law. Such is not the fact situation obtaining in the present case as would be evident from the discussion made hereinbefore. 29. In the case of Baijayanti Nayak vs. State of Orissa & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 34453 of 2021, decided on 03.01.2024, a coordinate Bench of this Court held that the Additional District Magistrate of the institution in question being notified to act as the President of the governing body is not competent in such capacity to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against an employee. There is no quarrel with above proposition. But then the case in hand is one in which the Director has initiated disciplinary proceeding against Girija Shankar Mohapatra and not the Sub-Collector. Furthermore, the Director, in view of what has been stated earlier, is fully competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding during the intervening period when there is no governing body and only a Special Officer is appointed to discharge its functions. The question of competence of the Director in this regard does not appear to have been raised before the coordinate Bench nor any finding rendered thereon. On the contrary, this Court has referred to the judgment of another coordinate Bench in the case of Dr. Upendra Sahoo (supra), where this very aspect was decided in the manner quoted earlier. 30. As regards the permissibility of Harihar Pati being again nominated to act as Principal in-charge at the expense of the Girija Shankar Mohapatra, this Court, firstly takes note of the fact that the Principal in-charge is not a substantive post. Dislodging of an incumbent from the position of Principal in-charge cannot therefore, amount to a penalty, much less one within the meaning of Rule-20 of the 1974 Rules. Dislodging of an incumbent from the position of Principal in-charge cannot therefore, amount to a penalty, much less one within the meaning of Rule-20 of the 1974 Rules. It is for the prescribed authority to nominate any of the teaching staff, preferably the senior-most to act as the Principal in-charge looking at the welfare of the institution. Admittedly, Harihar Pati had submitted a written unwillingness on 18.07.2011 to act as the Principal in-charge citing personal difficulty. Subsequently, by a resolution dated 23.03.2015 of the Government, it was laid down that if a person appointed as Principal is not willing to join the said post, he shall give the same in writing so that his claim for holding the post in future shall not be taken into consideration. There is nothing in the said resolution to suggest that it had any retrospective application. Therefore, per se, said resolution would not be applicable as on 18.07.2011, when Harihar Pati submitted his unwillingness. In other words, the clause debarring him from being considered for the post of Principal in-charge in future as per resolution dated 23.03.2015 cannot be invoked to operate retrospectively. It is to be further noted that at the relevant time there was no such restriction for a teacher to be reconsidered for nomination as Principal in-charge even after submitting his unwillingness earlier. In fact by resolution dated 20.04.2022, the Government has withdrawn the resolution dated 23.03.2015. The factual position that emerges thus is, there is no legal bar for a teacher from being reconsidered to act as Principal in-charge, if prior to issuance of the resolution dated 23.03.2015 he had submitted his written unwillingness. 31. Mr. Das has heavily relied upon a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Satyajeet Roy Choudhury vs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No. 18092 of 2018, decided on 24.02.2023 to buttress his point that Girija Shankar Mohapatra could not have been dislodged from the post of Principal in-charge without being found guilty in a valid disciplinary proceeding. This Court finds that the case of Satyajeet Roy Choudhury (supra) stands on a different footing inasmuch as no disciplinary proceeding as per law had been initiated against him and secondly, he had been dislodged on vague allegations without giving him an opportunity to explain. This Court finds that the case of Satyajeet Roy Choudhury (supra) stands on a different footing inasmuch as no disciplinary proceeding as per law had been initiated against him and secondly, he had been dislodged on vague allegations without giving him an opportunity to explain. Moreover, Satyajeet Roy Choudhury was the senior-most teacher for which this Court held that it would be a definite downgrading of status, if he is forced to work under his immediate junior. In the instant case however, Girija Shankar Mohapatra is admittedly junior being third in order of seniority. Secondly, consequent upon his own correspondence made with the Director, a fact finding enquiry was held, in course of which he was asked to produce documents/records. Thus, it is not as if by framing of charges he was taken by surprise. This Court therefore, holds that the judgment rendered in Satyajeet Roy Choudhury (supra) is not applicable. Summary of findings 32. On a conspectus of analysis of facts, law and the discussion made thereon, this Court arrives at the following findings. (i) There was no legal impediment for the Sub-Collector to prepare draft charges against Girija Shankar Mohapatra and forward the same for approval to the Director. (ii) The Director having approved the draft charges, the same amounts to definite charges being framed against Girija Shankar Mohapatra within the meaning of Rule-22(1) of the 1974 Rules. (iii) In the absence of the governing body, the Director is fully competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding and take action against an errant employee as per the procedure prescribed under 1974 Rules. (iv) Girija Shankar Mohapatra cannot legally question the competence of the Director to approve the draft charges having himself submitted to his jurisdiction in the past. (v) Dislodging Girija Shankar Mohapatra as Principal in-charge does not amount to penalty within the meaning of Rule-20 of 1974 Rules nor it can attach a stigma. (vi) There is no legal bar for consideration of the case of a teacher for his nomination as Principal in-Charge only because he had submitted written unwillingness prior to coming into force of resolution dated 23.03.2015. Conclusion 25. For the foregoing reasons therefore, this Court finds no merit in either of the writ applications. Resultantly, both the writ applications are dismissed but in the circumstances, without any costs.