JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 4.6.2002 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jashpurnagar in Sessions Trial No.123 of 2001, whereby the Appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Appellant No.1 Under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.500, in default of payment thereof, additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 months Under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years Appellants No.2 and 3 Under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.500, in default of payment thereof, additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 months 2. According to the prosecution, the alleged incident took place in Primary School Basen, Police Station Kansabel, District Jashpur in the intervening night of 13th and 14th March, 2001. Information of the incident was given by Thadiyus Lakda (PW1) in Police Station Kansabel on 14.3.2001 at 11:30 O’clock. On the basis of the said information, morgue (Ex.P1) was registered. After morgue inquiry, First Information Report (Ex.P12) was registered against the Appellants on 24.3.2001. According to the prosecution, at the time of incident, Sadhna Gupta (deceased) was working as a Shiksha Karmi Grade-3 in Primary School Basen. Her marriage was solemnised with Appellant Satyaprakash in April, 2000. She had been living at her matrimonial house from before 15 days of the incident and she used to go to her school from there. On 13.3.2001 she had gone to the school for teaching. Incharge Master of the school, namely, Lochan Prasad Sahu was absent on that date. According to the students of the school, Sadhna Gupta had returned from the school after teaching in the evening. Later, in the night at about 9 O’clock, her husband inquired from the cook of the school, namely, Kusum in Basen that where was his wife Sadhna Gupta. On coming to know from the cook that Sadhna Gupta had returned, he returned. On 14.3.2001 at about 9:30 a.m. when cook Kusum reached school he found that the staff room which always remained locked was open and when he entered the staff room he found that Sadhna Gupta was lying dead on a wooden chair. 3. On coming to know from the cook that Sadhna Gupta had returned, he returned. On 14.3.2001 at about 9:30 a.m. when cook Kusum reached school he found that the staff room which always remained locked was open and when he entered the staff room he found that Sadhna Gupta was lying dead on a wooden chair. 3. During investigation of the crime in question, it was found that in the marriage of Sadhna Gupta, her husband/Appellant No.1 was given cash of Rs.41,000 for a motorcycle and he was also given other domestic articles. After the marriage, the Appellants started treating Sadhna Gupta with cruelty. They, after consuming liquor, ill-treating her at the matrimonial house. They had been demanding account of her salary and asking her for bringing amount of Rs.50,000. Due to the ill-treatment at her matrimonial house, she came back to her maternal house. The Appellants created a pressure at her maternal house and took her back to her matrimonial house on 4.3.2001, but, their cruel behaviour with her did not change. On 12.3.2001, the Appellants again quarreled with her and, therefore, on 13.3.2001, she, after performing her duties in the school, consumed poisonous substance and committed suicide. Spot maps (Ex.P6, P13 and P14) were prepared. Dead body of Sadhna Gupta was sent to Primary Health Centre, Kansabel vide Ex.P5 for post mortem examination. Post mortem Report is Ex.P9. Seizures were made. Statements of witnesses were recorded. Seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory. FSL Report is Ex.P15. 4. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the Appellants. Charges were framed against them under Sections 498A, 304B and 306 IPC. 5. To bring home the offence against the Appellants, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. Statements of the Appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which they pleaded innocence. No witness was examined in their defence. 6. On completion of trial, the Trial Court acquitted the Appellants of the charge under Section 306 IPC, but, convicted and sentenced them as mentioned in first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the instant appeal. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for Appellants No.1 and 2 submitted that without there being any evidence on record against Appellants No.1 and 2 they have been convicted by the Trial Court. The finding of conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. Hence, the instant appeal. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for Appellants No.1 and 2 submitted that without there being any evidence on record against Appellants No.1 and 2 they have been convicted by the Trial Court. The finding of conviction is based on surmises and conjectures. The Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in right perspective. The Trial Court has failed to see that from the statement of Motilal (PW2), who is father of the deceased, it is apparent that the deceased was not satisfied with the marriage because of the difference in status of the deceased and her husband and, therefore, she terminated her life in frustration. The Trial Court has also failed to see the explanation given by Motilal (PW2) regarding living of the deceased at her maternal house after her marriage as this witness has stated that the only problem of his daughter (the deceased) was that her work place was Basen which was far away from her matrimonial house situated at Bandarchuan and, therefore, she wanted to reside at Mahadevdhad where her maternal house was situated. The Trial Court has also overlooked the delay in lodging the FIR. The Trial Court has failed to appreciate the material contradictions and omissions occurred in the statement of Ashok Kumar (PW10), who is younger brother of the deceased. In the statements of the witnesses, no fact has been stated on the basis of which it could be established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry soon before her death. Hence, it is prayed that Appellants No.1 and 2 may be acquitted. 8. On the contrary, Learned Counsel appearing for the State supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. 9. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available with due care. 10. It is not in dispute that Sadhna Gupta was found dead in an unnatural condition at the place of her duty within 7 years of her marriage. 11. Motilal (PW2), father of the deceased, has made statement in his examination-in-chief in paragraphs 1 and 2 against the Appellants, but, in his cross-examination in paragraph 3 he has admitted that on re-opening of her school after 1–1½ months of her marriage when the deceased visited Mahadevdhad, where her maternal house was situated, their meeting could not take place with her. He has further admitted that before her this visit to Mahadevdhad she had not told them anything against the Appellants. In paragraph 5, this witness has admitted that the deceased was of an independent thinking. He has further admitted that the deceased was of the view that since she was educated she will do a job wherever she will live. He has further admitted that the deceased was also of the view that it will be good for her if her marriage is performed with an employed boy. This witness has further stated that he tried to perform marriage of the deceased with an employed boy but his age was lower than the deceased and, therefore, their marriage could not take place. 12. In paragraph 6, Motilal (PW2) has admitted that on re-opening of her school after 1-1½ months of her marriage, the deceased had returned to his house situated at Mahadevdhad and she used to visit Basen from his house. He has further admitted that whenever the Appellants visited his house for bringing the deceased back with them, on those occasions the deceased had been telling that her school situated at Basen was far away from Bandarchuan and attending her school at Basen from Bandarchuan was not possible for her and, therefore, she had been expressing her wish that she wanted to attend her school at Basen living at Mahadevdhad itself. This witness has further stated that this was the only problem with the deceased. In paragraph 7, this witness has further stated that every father wishes that after marriage his daughter may live at her matrimonial house for a longer period, but, the deceased did not want to live at her matrimonial house. He has further admitted that education of the husband of the deceased was lesser than the deceased and, therefore, there was lack of coordination between them and hence she did not want to live with him. 13. In paragraph 13, Motilal (PW2) has admitted that before marriage of the deceased with Appellant No.1, Appellants No.2 and 3 were living separately from Appellant No.1. He has further admitted that after the marriage, all the Appellants began to live together and this fact was told to him by the deceased. 14. 13. In paragraph 13, Motilal (PW2) has admitted that before marriage of the deceased with Appellant No.1, Appellants No.2 and 3 were living separately from Appellant No.1. He has further admitted that after the marriage, all the Appellants began to live together and this fact was told to him by the deceased. 14. Girijadevi (PW3), mother of the deceased, has admitted in paragraph 5 that they performed marriage of the deceased with Appellant No.1 after observing his family and being satisfied with his living standards. She has further admitted that this marriage was solemnised in a temple of Lord Shiv situated at Kansabel. She has further admitted that after 2-3 days of the marriage Appellant No.1 himself had brought the deceased to her maternal house at Mahadevdhad. 8-10 days thereafter, Appellant No.1 had taken the deceased back with him from Mahadevdhad. On re-opening of the school of the deceased, Appellant No.1 had again brought her to Mahadevdhad. She has further admitted that Appellant No.1 had brought the deceased to Mahadevdhad on re-opening of her school so that it could be convenient for her to attend her school at Basen from Mahadevdhad. 15. In paragraph 11, Girijadevi (PW3) has admitted that the Appellants and their family members had been frequently asking for taking the deceased with them from her maternal house, but, the deceased herself did not want to go. She has further admitted that on refusal of the deceased to go to her matrimonial house, a letter was written to them from the matrimonial side of the deceased asking for sending the deceased to her matrimonial house or in case of non-sending to express and inform their stand in this regard. On the basis of the said letter, husband of this witness had gone to Village Bandarchuan and asked the father of Appellant No.1 to wait for sending of the deceased to her matrimonial house. This witness has further admitted that even after this visit, when the deceased did not want to go to her matrimonial house, family members of her matrimonial house had come to Mahadevdhad for bringing her with them. This witness has further admitted that even after this the deceased had refused to go to her matrimonial house. On this, due to refusal of the deceased to go to her matrimonial house, the family members of her matrimonial house had asked her to write a divorce document. This witness has further admitted that even after this the deceased had refused to go to her matrimonial house. On this, due to refusal of the deceased to go to her matrimonial house, the family members of her matrimonial house had asked her to write a divorce document. 16. Ajay Kumar Gupta (PW9), Ashok Kumar (PW10) and Subhash Gupta (PW14), who are brothers of the deceased, have stated in support of the evidence of Motilal (PW2) and Girijadevi (PW3). 17. Thadiyus Lakda (PW1), on whose information morgue (Ex.P1) was registered, in his cross-examination in paragraph 4, has stated that whenever he visited Basen his meeting took place with the deceased, but, she never told him anything about the incidents happened to her. He has admitted that the deceased always used to remain happy and execute her work properly. 18. Neelkusum Khess (PW8) has stated in his examination-in-chief about the incident of death of Sadhna Gupta. In his cross-examination in paragraph 5 he has admitted that the deceased had been coming to the school at Basen from Mahadevdhad. He has further admitted that on the date of her death also the deceased had come to Basen for teaching from Mahadevdhad. 19. Dr. Ashok Kumar Sanyal (PW13), who conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of Sadhna Gupta, has deposed that nature of the death was suicidal. His report is Ex.P9. 20. FSL Report (Ex.P15) states that Organophosphorus insecticide ‘Phosphamidon’ was found in Article A, i.e., vomit of the deceased seized from the place of occurrence, Article B, i.e., saree of the deceased, Articles C and D, i.e., pieces of viscera of the deceased. 21. Vide Ex.P2, an unsigned note, said to be written by the deceased against cruelty done by the Appellants to her, was seized from the place of occurrence. But, this note has not been exhibited by the prosecution nor has any report of a handwriting expert been placed on record claiming that the deceased was the writer of the said note. 22. At this stage, it would be appropriate to go through the observations of the Supreme Court on the subject issue. 23. In AIR 2014 SC 2555 (Manohar Lal v. State of Haryana), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under: “19. 22. At this stage, it would be appropriate to go through the observations of the Supreme Court on the subject issue. 23. In AIR 2014 SC 2555 (Manohar Lal v. State of Haryana), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under: “19. The expression “soon before her death” used in the Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by this Court in Hira Lal & others v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2865 ), which reads as under: “8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows: “304-B. Dowry death.–(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub -section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B, IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows: “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.–When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10.8.1988 on “Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature through it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113 -B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been “soon before her death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or in connection with the demand of dowry”. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC). (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” Similar observation was made by this Court in Balwant Singh and another v. State of Punjab (2004) 7 SCC 724 : ( AIR 2005 SC 1504 ). In the said case this Court held: “10. These decisions and other decisions of this Court do lay down the proximity test. It has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court that “soon before” is an expression which permits of elasticity, and therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts must show the existence of a proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death of the victim.” 20. In the present case, from the statement of PW.1 it appears that the death took place within seven years of marriage. Admittedly, death of the deceased was due to burning i.e. not in normal circumstances. We have to see now whether the remaining two ingredients are satisfied looking into the evidence on record.” 24. In (2008) 1 SCC 202 (Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B.), it was further observed by the Supreme Court as under: “13. Admittedly, death of the deceased was due to burning i.e. not in normal circumstances. We have to see now whether the remaining two ingredients are satisfied looking into the evidence on record.” 24. In (2008) 1 SCC 202 (Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B.), it was further observed by the Supreme Court as under: “13. If Section 304-B IPC is read together with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, a comprehensive picture emerges that if a married woman dies in unnatural circumstances at her matrimonial home within 7 years form her marriage and there are allegations of cruelty or harassment upon such married woman for or in connection with demand of dowry by the husband or relatives of the husband, the case would squarely come under “dowry death” and there shall be a presumption against the husband and the relatives. 14. In this case we find that there is practically no evidence to show that there was any cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry. There is also no finding in that regard. This deficiency in evidence proves fatal for the prosecution case. Even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment is not sufficient to bring in application of Section 304-B IPC. It has to be shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry. (See Kanchy Komuramma v. State of A.P., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 118) Since the prosecution failed to prove that aspect, the conviction as recorded cannot be maintained.” 25. In AIR 2016 SC 5313 (Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh), the Supreme Court has observed thus: “35. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304B as in Shindo alias Sawinder Kaur and another v. State of Punjab – (2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011 AIR SCW 6556) and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana – (2013) 16 SCC 640 : ( AIR 2014 SC 227 ). In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prerna S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao – (2003) 1 SCC 217 : ( AIR 2003 SC 11 ) to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connect with the demand for dowry”.” 26. Keeping in view the above observations of the Supreme Court a minute examination of the evidence available on record of the instant case clearly goes to show that the death of the deceased occurred in an unnatural condition within 7 years of her marriage, but, the death was a result of any demand for dowry or due to any cruelty done to her by the Appellants is not established. The present is not a case where ‘soon before her death’ she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by any of the Appellants in connection with any demand for dowry. 27. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. Appellants No.1 and 2 are acquitted. 28. Appellants No.1 and 2 are reported to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 6 months under Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the said bonds shall stand discharged. 29. Record of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for necessary compliance.