JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 07.02.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.3362 of 2013, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 30.03.2013 issued by the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, by which, the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal dated 24.04.2004 passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand has been rejected/dismissed. Further, prayer has been made for quashing the order passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, whereby and whereunder, the petitioner has been dismissed from service. Further, prayer has been made for a direction upon the respondents for reducing the penalty of dismissal, imposed upon the petitioner to the penalty of forfeiture of increments as has been done in case of similarly situated persons. Further, prayer has been made for a direction upon the respondents to pay the monetary benefits to the writ petitioner under the head of retiral benefits and fix pension, for which, the petitioner would have been legally entitled to get after his superannuation for treating the intervening period as period spent on service, have been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. Facts 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the memo of appeal, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:- 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police in the year, 1976 and posted at Fulparash in Madhubani District in the State of Bihar. 4. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Inspector and he was posted as Group Officer, Special Branch, Bihar Sharif (Nalanda), Bihar and later on, he was transferred as Inspector, In-charge at Kotwali, Police Station, Bhagalpur and during this period, he was elected as President of Police Association. 5. 4. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Inspector and he was posted as Group Officer, Special Branch, Bihar Sharif (Nalanda), Bihar and later on, he was transferred as Inspector, In-charge at Kotwali, Police Station, Bhagalpur and during this period, he was elected as President of Police Association. 5. While the petitioner was posted as Inspector-In-Charge, Kotwali Police Station, and was also President of Police Association, an incident with regard to one Jokhu Singh Sub-Inspector of Police, who was posted at Saharsha was summoned in the Court of learned ADJ First, Bhagalpur to give his evidence, but in spite of summon, he did not appear, then warrant of arrest was issued against him and thereafter, he was taken into custody by the learned 1stAdditional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur and due to this reason the Police Personnel became annoyed and they had made slogan before the Court of learned 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur for release of Jokhu Singh and they had done the same incidence in the Court premises also. 6. The aforesaid incident was taken very seriously by the Court and a contempt proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and eight other police personnel and in that Contempt Proceeding, the petitioner along with others were convicted and petitioner was sentenced to undergo S.I. for three months, whereas the other police personnel were sentenced to undergo SI for two months vide judgment dated 10.02.1998 passed in CWJC No.10625 of 1997, which was heard along with contempt petition. 7. Against the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court, the petitioner and all the police personnel, filed appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court, but the Hon’ble Apex Court affirmed the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court and petitioner along with other Police Officers were directed to surrender before the court below. The petitioner surrendered before the Court of learned District Judge, Bhagalpur on 07.06.2004 and was taken behind the bar. 8. It is further the case of the petitioner that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the Inspector General of Police, Special Branch, Jharkhand, Ranchi on 08.06.2004 as to why a disciplinary action be not taken against him. In view thereof, the petitioner filed his reply on 17.06.2004 denied the allegation as he was not present on the alleged date of occurrence. 9. In view thereof, the petitioner filed his reply on 17.06.2004 denied the allegation as he was not present on the alleged date of occurrence. 9. Accordingly, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 21.08.2004 passed by the Director General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner had preferred an appeal on 26.11.2004 before the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi under Rule 851 (B) of Bihar Police Manual. 10. Thereafter, the Special Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Jharkhand had written letter to Director General of Police, Jharkhand for examining the facts and grounds taken in the appeal and to submit its report. In compliance of the same, the Inspector General of Police (Administration), Jharkhand, Ranchi had submitted its report to the Home Secretary, on 04.10.2008 and had recommended to reinstate the petitioner in the service after taking a lenient view, imposing punishment of withholding of three increments of the petitioner. 11. However, when no decision was taken in the appeal of the petitioner, he filed a writ petition being WP(S) No.2721 of 2012, which was disposed of vide order dated 21.03.2013 with a direction upon the respondents to pass an order in the appeal preferred by the petitioner, in accordance with law. 12. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner vide order dated 30.03.2013 without considering the grounds raised by the petitioner in the appeal as well as recommendation of Director General of Police as well as order passed by Appellate Authority in case of similarly situated Police Officers in the State of Bihar, wherein they were reinstated in services after reducing the punishment of dismissal to stoppage of 5 increments. 13. Hence, the writ petitioner has approached this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.3362 of 2013. 14. 13. Hence, the writ petitioner has approached this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.3362 of 2013. 14. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner happens to be the President of Police Association and while, posted as Inspector-In-Charge, Kotwali Police Station, an incident with regard to one Jokhu Singh Sub-Inspector of Police, who was posted at Saharsha was summoned in the Court of learned ADJ First, Bhagalpur to give his evidence, but, he did not appear, then warrant of arrest was issued against him and thereafter, he was taken into custody by the learned 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur which led the Police Personnel became annoyed and they had made slogan before the Court of learned 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur for release of Jokhu Singh and they had done the same incidence in the Court premises also. The aforesaid incident was taken very seriously by the Court and a contempt proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and eight other police personnel have been convicted in the said Contempt Proceeding along with the petitioner and the petitioner was sentenced to undergo S.I. for three months, whereas the other police personnel were sentenced to undergo S.I. for two months vide judgment dated 10.02.1998 passed in CWJC No.10625 of 1997. 15. Against the judgment passed by the Patna High Court, the petitioner and all the police personnel, filed appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court, but the Hon’ble Apex Court affirmed the order passed by the Patna High Court and the writ petitioner along with other Police Officers were directed to surrender before the court below. The petitioner surrendered before the Court of learned District Judge, Bhagalpur on 07.06.2004. However, a decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding against the petitioner as also the other Police Personnel. Thereafter, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service. 16. The appellant has preferred an appeal as also filed an application before the appellate authority but the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal. However, the appeals preferred by the other Police Personnel has been allowed, by which, the order of dismissal has been reversed to that of the order of withholding five increments. 17. The appellant has raised the aforesaid issue by filing an application. However, the appeals preferred by the other Police Personnel has been allowed, by which, the order of dismissal has been reversed to that of the order of withholding five increments. 17. The appellant has raised the aforesaid issue by filing an application. However, when no decision was taken, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2721 of 2012, which was disposed of vide order dated 21.03.2013 with a direction upon the respondents to pass an order in the appeal preferred by the petitioner, in accordance with law. 18. Accordingly, the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner vide order dated 30.03.2013 without considering the grounds raised by the petitioner in the appeal as well as recommendation of Director General of Police as well as order passed by Appellate Authority in case of similarly situated Police Officers in the State of Bihar, wherein, they were reinstated in services after reducing the punishment of dismissal to stoppage of 5 increments. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.3362 of 2013. 19. The learned Single Judge after considering the factual aspect and taking into consideration the nature of allegation as also the conviction in the criminal contempt case, has declined to interfere with the order impugned, against which, the present appeal. Argument of the appellant 20. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order that:- (i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact about the discrimination amongst the identically placed charge-sheeted persons, who have been inflicted with the punishment of five annual increments after reversal of the order of dismissal but in the case of the appellant, the order of dismissal has remained intact after dismissal of the appeal by the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi, therefore, the order of dismissal being in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) The respondents authorities while punishing the petitioner, particularly the appellate authority, has not acted upon on the basis of the recommendation of the Special Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi, therefore, the order of dismissal being in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) The respondents authorities while punishing the petitioner, particularly the appellate authority, has not acted upon on the basis of the recommendation of the Special Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Jharkhand addressed to the Director General of Police for taking a lenient view but when the decision was not taken and in that circumstances, a writ petition was filed in which the direction was passed to pass an order in the appeal preferred by the petitioner and in counterblast to filing of the writ petition, the appeal has been dismissed by the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand without taking into consideration the order of reversal of dismissal to that effect of the order of punishment of withholding 5 annual increments of other similarly placed Police Personnel. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order suffers from an error, hence, the impugned order requires interference. Argument of the Respondent-State 22. Learned counsel appearing for the State-respondent has taken the following grounds in defending the impugned order that:- (i) The case of the appellant is not of discrimination, rather, the fact of the case of the appellant is different to that of the other eight Police Personnel, which is evident from the fact that the other Police Personnel whose appeals have been allowed by reversing the order of dismissal to that of withholding of 5 annual increments but subsequent thereto, when the same has been cancelled by the Director General of Police, Bihar then the same was challenged before the Patna High Court and in pursuance to the order passed by the Patna High Court, wherein, the provision of Police Manual as under Rule 851-B thereof, the appellate authority since has exercised the power of revision after the delay of period of limitation as prescribed therein and on consideration of the aforesaid period of limitation, decision so taken by the Director General of Police, Bihar, was reversed by restoring the order passed by the appellate authority. But herein, there is no such factual aspect available with respect to the case of the appellant, rather, herein the factual aspect as would be evident from the pleading made in the writ petition as also the memo of appeal that the appellant has been dismissed and his dismissal order has also been affirmed by the Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take parity with the case of the other Police Personnel in view of the fact that the appellate authority has passed reversing the order of dismissal to that of the order of inflicting the punishment of withholding five annual increments. (ii) The appellant was admittedly the President of the Association and whose behest as per the charge, a situation in the Court premised has been disturbed as also the slogans have been made against the Judicial Officer who was presiding the Court at that time. Being the President, it was incumbent upon him to tackle the situation but instead of doing that, he has aggravated the situation, for which, the proceeding for contempt has also been initiated, in which, he was convicted for three months. 23. The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid fact and considering the conviction in the criminal contempt has found that there is no justification in taking back the appellant in service and that is the reason, by taking aid of the exception to Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the order of dismissal has been passed. 24. Learned State Counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order suffers from no error. Analysis 25. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also considered the factual aspect as available in the memo of appeal and the writ petition. 26. The appellant has taken the main ground of discrimination, since, the other identically charge-sheeted Police Personnel are in service by reversal of the order of dismissal to that of withholding of five annual increments, while, in the case of the appellant, the order of dismissal has not been quashed. 27. 26. The appellant has taken the main ground of discrimination, since, the other identically charge-sheeted Police Personnel are in service by reversal of the order of dismissal to that of withholding of five annual increments, while, in the case of the appellant, the order of dismissal has not been quashed. 27. The law is well settled that there cannot be any discrimination even in imposing the punishment on the principle of parity in awarding punishment, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers' Union Ltd. vs. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah, (2006) 6 SCC 548 , wherein, at paragraphs-27 and 28, it has been held as under: “27. There is, however, another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Identical allegations were made against seven persons. The management did not take serious note of misconduct committed by six others although they were similarly situated. They were allowed to take the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme. 28. The first respondent might not have opted therefor. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, he should be, in our opinion, treated on a similar footing. In view of the fact that the first respondent has succeeded in the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench; we are of the opinion that having regard to the overall situation, the interest of justice would be subserved if the award of the Labour Court dated 31-1-2003 as affirmed by the High Court is substituted by a direction that the first respondent shall also be given the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme from the month in which the other workmen were given the benefit thereof.” 28. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Rajendra Yadav vs. State of M.P., reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 , wherein, at paragraphs-9 and 10, it has been held as under: “9. The doctrine of equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate i.e. lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. 10. The principle stated above is seen applied in a few judgments of this Court. The earliest one is DG of Police v. G. Dasayan wherein one Dasayan, a police constable, along with two other constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same acts of misconduct. The disciplinary authority exonerated two other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on the Head Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice, substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents. This Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” 29. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj vs. Bank of India, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 786 , wherein, at paragraph 5, it has been held as under: “5. It is trite to say that the domain of the courts on the issue of quantum of punishment is very limited. It is the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, which decides the nature of punishment keeping in mind the seriousness of the misconduct committed. This would not imply that if the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the court the courts are denuded of the authority to interfere with the same. Normally even in such cases it may be appropriate to remit the matter back for consideration by the disciplinary/appellate authority. However, one other cause for interference can be where the plea raised is of parity in punishment but then the prerequisite would be that the parity has to be in the nature of charges made and held against the delinquent employee and the conduct of the employee post the incident. However, one other cause for interference can be where the plea raised is of parity in punishment but then the prerequisite would be that the parity has to be in the nature of charges made and held against the delinquent employee and the conduct of the employee post the incident. It is the latter aspect which is sought to be advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant by relying upon the judgment in Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P. On this very aspect the learned counsel for the respondents drew out attention to a subsequent judgment in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh which had taken note of the earlier judgment referred to aforesaid.” 30. Further, the law is settled that Article 14 will not attract if there is reasonable classification, but certainly in case of unreasonable classification, the Article 14 of the Constitution of India will attract. 31. The reasonable classification is permitted by law on valid grounds as it discriminates one group from another on the basis of circumstances or characteristics. Therefore, distinction on the basis of reasonable classification is rational and logical, whereas distinction on the basis of reasonable classification or class legislation is improper and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra, reported in (1952) 1 SCC 215 has observed that a distinction should be drawn between ‘discrimination without reason’ and ‘discrimination with reason’. The whole doctrine of classification is based on this distinction and on the well-known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects, so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as between persons governed by different conditions and different sets of circumstances. 33. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (1969) 1 SCC 817 while observing that article 14 does not operate against rational classification, has held as under: “Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals : its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (1969) 1 SCC 817 while observing that article 14 does not operate against rational classification, has held as under: “Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals : its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law.” 34. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Air India vs. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 has observed that Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification and Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. 35. This Court is now proceeding on the basis of the aforesaid premise by adverting to the factual aspects. 36. Herein, the admitted fact is that the appellant was the President of the Police Association. The day when the incident took place. The incident was that when the Police Personnel has not obeyed the summon, based upon the same, the concerned Court has issued warrant as also the concerned Police Officials have taken into custody then the President along with the other eight Police Personnel have entered into the Court premises and created disturbances in dispensation of the Justice Delivery system as also used absurd language against the judicial officer. The said consequence has been treated seriously, based upon the same, the proceeding for contempt was initiated, in which, the appellant along with eight Police Personnel have been held guilty for commission of contempt. Accordingly, they have been convicted. 37. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo S.I. for three months, while, the other Police Personnel were sentenced to undergo S.I. for two months vide judgment dated 10.02.1998. 38. The disciplinary authority has initiated disciplinary proceeding but based upon the conviction in the criminal case, the service of the appellant has been dismissed by taking aid of exception to Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 39. 38. The disciplinary authority has initiated disciplinary proceeding but based upon the conviction in the criminal case, the service of the appellant has been dismissed by taking aid of exception to Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 39. The Article 311 provides that a public servant holding the civil post cannot be dismissed without providing adequate and sufficient opportunity but subject to some exception, as under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, one of the exception is that if the conviction is inflicted in the criminal charge, there is no requirement to have regular departmental proceeding, for ready reference, Article 311 of the Constitution of India is being referred as under:- “(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him: Provided that this clause shall not apply— (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause; or (c) where the President or Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give to that person such an opportunity. (3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final.” 40. (3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final.” 40. Herein, the admitted case is that the appellant has been convicted in the criminal charge under the Contempt of Court Act which led the disciplinary authority to dismiss the appellant from service. 41. The appellant has preferred an appeal and when the appeal has not been decided, then, he has approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2721 of 2012 which was disposed of vide order dated 21.03.2013 with a direction upon the respondents to pass an order in the appeal preferred by the petitioner. 42. The Home Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand by taking into consideration the nature of allegation, has dismissed the appeal. 43. The appellant has challenged the aforesaid order on the ground of discrimination said to be committed with respect to the order of punishment of other eight Police Personnel, against whom, the order of sentence of two months of S.I. was passed by proving the guilt of commission of contempt. 44. The factual aspect with respect to the other Police Personnel is that the appellate authority has reversed the order of punishment to that of inflicting 5 annual increments. However, the same was enhanced by the Director General of Police. The order of the Director General of Police was challenged before the Patna High Court and based upon the provision of Police Manual as provided under Rule 853-A has set aside the order of enhancement of punishment. 45. Based upon the aforesaid ground, the order of the appellate authority quashing the order of dismissal as also the consequential order, have been quashed and set aside, for ready reference, the order passed by the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No.15174 of 2009 is being referred as under:- “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner was dismissed from service by an order dated 16.9.2004. In appeal on 14.8.2005 this was reduced to stoppage of five increments and that the period between the date of dismissal and reinstatement shall be treated as period of suspension. The petitioner was dismissed from service by an order dated 16.9.2004. In appeal on 14.8.2005 this was reduced to stoppage of five increments and that the period between the date of dismissal and reinstatement shall be treated as period of suspension. Thereafter in exercise of powers under Rule 853A of the Bihar Police Manual, the order dated, 14.8.2005 has been set aside and the dismissal restored on 30.5.2008. It is not necessary for this Court to discuss the detailed facts of the case in view of the very short legal submission made on behalf of the petitioner supported by a Bench decision of this Court in 2001(4) PLJR 177 (Anjan Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suo motu powers provided for in Rule 853A of the Bihar Police Manual for enhancement of punishment shall have to be read as a power to be exercised within reasonable time quantified by this Court as three years. In this present case, this power has been exercised well beyond three years. A Bench of this Court in Anjan Kumar Singh (supra) in the relevant extract of Paragraph-9 of the judgment held as follows:- “……..Even assuming that the order passed by the appellate authority was reviewed in exercise of the power under Rule 853A (a) of the Manual, it could have been exercised in any manner beyond a period of more than three years. The provision as envisaged, under Rule 853A of the Manual, in that view of the matter, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case." The order dated 30.5.2008 and the consequential orders dated 15.10.2009 as contained in Annexure-24 stands set aside. The writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated above.” 46. Thus, it is evident that the order of dismissal which has been quashed and reversed to that of withholding five annual increments, is on the basis of the order passed by the Patna High Court. 47. The factual aspect of the present case is that herein the appellate authority has not taken such decision, rather, the appellate authority has taken decision by dismissing the appeal, based upon the conviction in the criminal charge, therefore, the order of dismissal so far as the appellant is concerned, has been passed under the exception to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 33. 33. The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the basic issue, as to whether, after conviction in the criminal charge in a contempt proceeding, is it available for an employee to be retained in service? 48. The law is well settled that if an employee has been convicted in any criminal charges as mandated in the Constitution as under Article 311(2)(a), no such right of the concerned public servant is to retain in service. 49. The aforesaid parameter has not been taken into consideration with respect to the case of the other Police Personnel. 50. The question herein is that whether in such pretext, the principle of parity can be taken into consideration. 51. The question further would be that if the constitutional mandate has not been followed by one or the other authority and on technicality, if any order has been passed in favour of other Police Personnel, can the present appellant, be allowed to take advantage of the same. 52. We, on consideration of the order passed by the Patna High Court, have found that there is no consideration of the effect of dismissal on the ground of conviction based upon the criminal charge in consequence of the contempt proceeding which has attained finality upto the level of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 53. This Court, considering the fact that once the public servant has been convicted and the said conviction order has sustained upto the final adjudicatory forum, i.e., the Hon’ble Apex Court, therefore, is of the view that such public servant cannot be allowed to retain on the post, otherwise, the same will hit the constitutional mandate as under Article 311 (2)(a) of the Constitution of India. 54. Herein also, exactly the similar situation is with respect to the case of the appellant. 55. However, the ground of discrimination has been taken that other identically placed Police Personnel have been convicted but they have been retained in service. 56. This Court, is of the view that if any illegal decision has been taken by the authority concerned in reversing the order of dismissal and the Patna High Court has gone into the technical issue having not considered the impact of the conviction for the criminal charge, then there is no question of applying the principle of parity. 57. 56. This Court, is of the view that if any illegal decision has been taken by the authority concerned in reversing the order of dismissal and the Patna High Court has gone into the technical issue having not considered the impact of the conviction for the criminal charge, then there is no question of applying the principle of parity. 57. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and the legal position as referred hereinabove and adverting to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid fact of conviction of the appellant for the criminal charge which having not been taken into consideration by the Patna High Court as also the appellate authority of the State of Bihar. But the same has been taken into consideration by the appellate authority of the State of Jharkhand. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition, which according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 58. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed. 59. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. I agree, Arun Kumar Rai, J.