JUDGMENT : Pankaj Purohit, J. 1. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. State has filed this government appeal No. 229/2007 against the judgment and order dated 28.10.2003 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge/FTC-IV, District Haridwar in Case Crime No.264 of 2001 [S.T. No. 21/2002] (State vs. Upendra @ Nitu) whereby the respondent-Upendra @ Nitu has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act. 3. State has also preferred G.A. No. 32/2009 challenging the acquittal of respondents under Sections 307/34 and 411 of Indian Penal Code in S.T. No. 19 of 2002 (Case Crime No. 262 of 2001). During pendency of appeal, respondent no.1-Harendra @ Raj died, hence appeal qua respondent no.1 was abated vide this Court’s order dated 01/12/2023. 4. The facts of the case in brief are that on 30/05/2001 at around 05:00 PM, one of the informers informed the police that dreaded criminal Jitendra, who himself was in jail, has sent four of his men to kill a contractor. He also informed that they are coming in a yellow Santro car bearing registration number DL 6 CG 2578 and are also carrying weapons. He informed that they are presently in Haridwar. On receiving this information the police party reached the place the informer had told them and waited there hiding in the bushes. As soon as they saw a yellow Santro car coming from Bilkeshwar colony, they stopped the car. Four persons were seated in the car and as soon as the police personnel tried to come closer to the car they started firing upon them. Somehow the police personnel managed to save themselves and arrested all the persons who were in the car. The accused persons told their names as Harendra @ Raj, Upendra @ Nitu, Dharmendra @ Kanchu and Deepak @ Bharat. The accused persons further informed that the car in which they were travelling was stolen by a person named Dhoom Singh. On the basis of above information, the case was registered on 30/05/2001 at police station Kotwali Nagar, District Haridwar under Sections 307/34 and 411 of Indian Penal Code against all the accused and under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act against Upendra@ Nitu and Harendra@ Raj. 5. On the basis of above information, the case was registered on 30/05/2001 at police station Kotwali Nagar, District Haridwar under Sections 307/34 and 411 of Indian Penal Code against all the accused and under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act against Upendra@ Nitu and Harendra@ Raj. 5. The investigation officer conducted investigation of the case, recorded the statement of the witnesses and after inspecting the place of occurrence, prepared the site plan, inquest and on completion of investigation submitted a charge sheet under Sections 307/34 and 411 of Indian Penal Code against all the accused and under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act against Upendra @ Nitu and Harendra @ Raj. The cognizance was taken against the accused/respondents and the case was committed to Learned Additional Sessions Judge for trial. 6. The charges were framed against the accused/respondents under Sections 307/34 and 411 of Indian Penal Code against all the accused and under Sections 25 and 27 Arms Act against Upendra and Harendra which they denied and claimed to be tried. 7. As many as four witnesses were produced by the prosecution to prove its case against the accused. They are PW-1 Inspector Ajay Kumar, PW-2 S.I. Sanjay Chauhan, PW-3 Kashivishwanath Tyagi, PW-4 Head Constable Rishi Kumar and documentary evidence was also proved and exhibited by the prosecution witnesses. 8. Thereafter, the statements of accused/ respondents were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which, the accused persons stated the prosecution case to be false and stated that they were innocent but did not give any evidence in defence. 9. The trial court on conclusion of trial found that the prosecution could not prove the case against the accused/respondents beyond all reasonable doubt and it accordingly proceeded to acquit the accused/respondents as mentioned in Para 2 and Para 3 of this judgment. Hence, these two government appeals. 10. PW-1 Inspector Ajay Kumar reiterated the version of the FIR and stated that on that evening he along with S.I. R.B. Chamola, S.I. Sanjay Chauhan, Head Constable Yogendra Singh and Constable Rampal were waiting for the yellow Santro car on the basis of information received at around 5:00 PM from one of the informers. Upon arriving at the place of incident, they stopped a yellow Santro car coming from Bilkeshwar colony. Upon arriving at the place of incident, they stopped a yellow Santro car coming from Bilkeshwar colony. Four persons were seated in the car and as soon as they tried to go close to the car the accused persons started firing towards them. They somehow managed to arrest all the accused persons and recovered weapons from two of them. He further stated that despite trying no person from public was ready to become a witness because of fear of criminals. He also informed that the place of incident was an isolated road. 11. PW-2 S.I. Sanjay Chauhan on oath stated that at 5:00 PM he along with fellow police personnel was waiting for the yellow Santro car as per the information received. As soon as they saw the car coming they tried to go near the car. On seeing this, the accused persons started screaming that these are police personnel, kill them or we will get caught. He supported the case of prosecution in entirety 12. PW-3 Kashivishwanath Tyagi was the investigating officer of the case. He on oath stated that the complainant was the S.H.O of their police station. He stated that he was the one who prepared the site map. He further stated that he was not informed about the direction from which the police party reached the place and also regarding the fact that where was the government gypsy parked. Therefore, he has not mentioned it in the site map. 13. PW-4 Head Constable Rishi Kumar who wrote the FIR deposed on oath that there has been some overwriting in the chick FIR but he has not signed the places in which there was overwriting. 14. Accordingly, the trial court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the accused/respondents beyond all reasonable doubt as the statements of all the prosecution witnesses are highly contradictory for example PW-1 Ajay Kumar states that the information was received at 5:00 PM and they reached the place of incident from north direction. He also stated that during the documentation work the accused were sitting on the road. On the contrary, PW-2 Sanjay Chauhan states that they were already present at the place of incident at 5:00 PM and came from west direction while the Santro car came from north direction. He also stated that during the documentation work the accused were sitting on the road. On the contrary, PW-2 Sanjay Chauhan states that they were already present at the place of incident at 5:00 PM and came from west direction while the Santro car came from north direction. He also told that during the documentation work the accuse persons were sitting in the car. These contradictions make it highly impossible that both the witnesses were present at the same time at the place of incident There are also anomalies to the fact that Mahendra Singh’s house is near the place of incident or not. These were the reasons the trial court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the accused persons. 15. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 laid down general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, which are as follows: i. An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. ii. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. iii. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. iv. An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. iv. An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. v. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, this Court is of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its onus to the hilt. I am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court. Nothing substantial could be argued by learned State Counsel so as to warrant any interference in the judgment passed by trial court. By acquittal the presumption of innocence of the respondents got further reinforced. No substantial and compelling reasons could be asserted by the learned State Counsel, which could warrant interference in the well-reason judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court. 17. Accordingly, both the Government Appeals are dismissed. 18. Let the LCR be sent back to the trial court for consignment.