ORDER : As the issue involved in these Writ Petitions is one and the same, they are being taken up for hearing as well as disposed of by way of this Common Order. 2. The main grievance in all these writ petitions are that they have offered some properties for sale by Sri Mahaboob Basha and others, being the legal heirs of Sri Syed Alli Peera S/o Sameera Hussain Shah, the original owner of the property. After verifying the title of the properties with revenue authorities and having been satisfied with their vendors, title over the said property, the petitioners have paid different amounts as sale consideration and got executed sale deeds transferring the right and title over the said land in favour of the petitioners. The documents were presented before the Sub Registrar duly paying necessary stamp duty and registration fee. Since the Sub Registrar was not releasing the documents, the vendors of the petitioners have filed WP No.8596 of 2015 before this Court challenging the said inaction. The same was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 20.01.2016. It is further stated that the impugned complaint was lodged by the 4th respondent on 21.02.2016 stating that the land mentioned herein above was handed over by the Magunta Layout Trust to the Municipal Corporation and since then the same is under their possession. In the light of the complaint given by 4th respondent, 3rd respondent started enquiry and has been pressurizing the petitioners to present themselves in the police station despite the fact that the 4th respondent has not named anybody in his complaint. The transaction referred to in the complaint dated 19.02.2016, while the sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners by their vendors are dated 10.03.2015 which is one year prior to the date of incident referred to in the complaint. The 3rd respondent has unnecessarily troubling the petitioners to be present before him and if the petitioners will be presented themselves they will be arrested. Questioning the action of the respondents’ police, the present writ petitions came to be filed. 3. This Court has granted interim direction in all the writ petitions vide separate orders. The 3rd respondent has unnecessarily troubling the petitioners to be present before him and if the petitioners will be presented themselves they will be arrested. Questioning the action of the respondents’ police, the present writ petitions came to be filed. 3. This Court has granted interim direction in all the writ petitions vide separate orders. In W.P.No.11597 of 2016, this Court vide order, dated 07.04.2016, while issuing Rule Nisi, has granted interim direction vide WPMP No.14595 of 2016, as under: “…The complaint made by the Nellore Municipal Corporation, which formed the basis for registration of Crime No.42 of 2016 on the file of Nellore IV Town Police Station, reflects, prima facie, that no ingredients are made out to attract Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC. There shall accordingly be interim stay as prayed for.” 4. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing M/s. Indus Law Firm, learned counsel and Sri V.R.N. Prasanth, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri T.M.K. Chaitanya, learned Government Pleader for Home appearing for the respondents. 5. On hearing, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, while reiterating the averments made in the petitions, submits that , the mere registration of sale deeds in respect of subject properties would not attract the provisions of Sections 420, 468, 471 r/w 34 IPC as the complaint was neither cheated nor has been deprived of property by the said transactions. If at all anyone has a grievance as regard the said transactions, it is the petitioners as they purchased the land bona fide believing the title of the vendors over the said properties. He further submits that even if the allegations in the complaint are taken on their face value still they do not constitute an offence under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 IPC, more so, in view of the fact that the allegations are civil in nature. He further submits that the 3rd respondent without even verifying the contents of the complaint has been insisting the petitioners presence and the petitioners are being threatened and intimidated of being arrested. This action of the 3rd respondent is nothing but abuse of process of law. He mainly contended that the ingredients to register a complaint under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 IPC have not been made out in the complaint. 6. This action of the 3rd respondent is nothing but abuse of process of law. He mainly contended that the ingredients to register a complaint under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 34 IPC have not been made out in the complaint. 6. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents denied all the allegations made by the petitioners and opposed for grant of relief as claimed in all these petitions. He has placed reliance on a catena of decisions reported in Vinod Raghuvanshi versus Ajay Arora and others, (2013) 10 SCC 581 , wherein the Apex Court held that : 30. It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not "kill a stillborn d child", and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the e allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court f is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial court at a later stage. (ii) in a case of V.Ravi Kumar versus State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamilnadu and others, (2019) 14 SCC 568 , wherein the Apex Court was held that : “Power under section 482 Cr.P.C., might be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law, but only when, the allegations, even if true, would not constitute an offence and/or were frivolous and vexatious on their face. Where the accused seeks quashing of the FIR invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint.” (iii) In another case reported in Tika Ram versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760 , wherein the Apex Court held that : “….The argument that the name of this witness (sic accused) is not mentioned in the FIR would not by itself be sufficient to reject the prosecution case as against this accused. It is the case of the prosecution that Gulab Singh, the brother of the deceased having come to know of the incident came to the place of occurrence and having seen only a part of the incident informed the police, therefore, in that process if he failed to mention the name of this appellant, we do not think that circumstance alone would not (sic) be sufficient to discard the evidence of PW 48 who has specifically identified this witness (sic accused) and has narrated the role played by this witness (sic accused). Therefore, the complaint made by the learned counsel as to the non-mentioning of the appellant's name in the FIR should be rejected. We also find no force in the argument addressed on behalf of the appellant…” (iv) In State of Uttar Pradesh versus Krishna Master and others, (2010) 12 SCC 324 , wherein it was held that : “…… Nature and Purpose – Principles reiterated – should contain basic prosecution case – mention of minute details of prosecution case or evidence on which prosecution proposes to rely at trial not necessary – non-mentioning of motive in FIR not significant, more so where FIR filed by a rustic man and filed promptly, ruling out chances of false implication of accused…” (v) In a case of Jitender Kumar versus State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 204 , wherein the Apex Court held that : “….As already noticed, the FIR (Ext.P-2) had been registered by ASI Hans Raj, PW 13 on the statement of Ishwar Singh, PW.11. It is correct that the name of accused Jitender, son of Sajjan singh, was not mentioned by PW 11 in the FIR. However, the law is well settled that merely because an accused has not been named in the FIR would not necessarily result in his acquittal. It is correct that the name of accused Jitender, son of Sajjan singh, was not mentioned by PW 11 in the FIR. However, the law is well settled that merely because an accused has not been named in the FIR would not necessarily result in his acquittal. An accused who has not been named in the FIR, but to whom a prosecution is also able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, such an accused can be punished in accordance with law, if found guilty. (vi) In another case reported in M.Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and another, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 3014, wherein the Apex Court held that : “Right from the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866, this Court has held that revisional or inherent powers for quashing the proceedings at the initial stage can be exercised only where the allegations made in the complaint or the first information report, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence or where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence relied in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence against the accused, or the allegations are so absurd and inherently improper that on the basis of which no prudent person could have reached a just conclusion that there were sufficient grounds in proceeding against the accused or where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any provisions of the Code or any other statute to the institution and continuance of the criminal proceedings or where a criminal proceeding is manifestly actuated with malafide and has been initiated maliciously with the ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Applying the aforesaid test, it cannot be said that the complaint filed by the appellant did not disclose the commission of an offence or there existed any other circumstance which can be made the basis for quashing the proceedings. In fact allegations made in the complaint required adjudication and the complaint could not have been aborted in the manner it has been done by the High Court vide the impugned order." (vii) In a case of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and others vs Tapan Kr. In fact allegations made in the complaint required adjudication and the complaint could not have been aborted in the manner it has been done by the High Court vide the impugned order." (vii) In a case of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and others vs Tapan Kr. Singh, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 4140, wherein it was held that It is well settled that a First Information Report is not an encyclopedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye witness so as to be able to disclose in great details all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details, he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. 7. On a reading of the above decisions, it is observed that, if the section of law attracts in this case the law will be applicable, but here, those judgments are not applicable. 8. As seen from the material available on record, it is the contention of the petitioners that they were offered subject plots of Nellore village for sale by Sri Mahaboob Basha and others. Thereafter, since the Sub Registrar was not releasing the documents, the vendors of the petitioners approached this Court by way of filing WP No.8596 of 2015 and the same was disposed of. It the main contention of the petitioners that the 4th respondent has given complaint stating that the subject land mentioned was handed over by Magunta Layout Trust to the Municipal Corporation and since then the same is under their possession. 9. On a perusal of the complaint, wherein, it was stated that the subject land was handed over by Magunta Layout Trust to the Municipal Corporation and therefore request to kindly float the enquiry into the matter and take necessary legal action against the defaulters, who have to trespass the Municipal Corporation property. But, as seen from the documents, i.e., the Adangal, Inam Register, Diclot and ROR Form 1-B, extract of Nellore Village referring to Sri Syed Alli Peera as the owner and possessor of the said land. So, the said Syed Alli Peera is the ancestor of petitioners’ vendor. The Genealogy certificate of Syed Alli Peera duly certified by the Tahsildar was also issued indicating his vendors as the legal heirs. 10. And as seen from the impugned FIR, the case in Crime No.42 of 2016 was registered against the petitioners under Sections 420, 468, 471 r/w 34 IPC. 11. It is pertinent to mention here that, the main ingredient of Section 420 IPC, the offence of cheating, such as fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person to deliver any property to any person is not made out. 12. 11. It is pertinent to mention here that, the main ingredient of Section 420 IPC, the offence of cheating, such as fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person to deliver any property to any person is not made out. 12. As regards Section 468 IPC, the ingredients such as forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating is not made out. 13. As regards to Section 471 IPC, the ingredients such as dishonestly uses as genuine any document which is forged is not made out. In a case of Sri Gulam Mustafa versus The State of Karnataka and another, Crl.A.No.1452 of 2023, dated 10.05.2023, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “It was submitted that as the specific allegations pertain to cheating, criminal conspiracy and trespass, being cognizable offences under the IPC, and the same relating to the property belonging to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community would attract provisions of the SC/ST Act. It was reiterated that the property in question belongs to the respondent no. 2 and her family members, and any construction raised on the subject-land is by creating forged documents. 29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336 , at Para 7 thereof, it was held that when 20 the complaint fails to disclose any criminal offence, the proceeding is liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code: “In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 Code which it has erroneously refused.” (emphasis supplied) In State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have 16 extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or 17 the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 31. In Vinod Natesan v State of Kerala, (2019) 2 SCC 401 , this Court took the position outlined hereunder: “11. … Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of the accused and a civil dispute is tried to be converted into a criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) 14. On perusing the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Gulam Mustafa’s case (referred to above), it is pertinent to mention here that, the recognition by Section 482 of the power inhering in the High Court to prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice is a valuable safeguard for protecting liberty. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court observed that, the registration in favour of the petitioners was one year prior to the registration of the present impugned FIR which shows that the instance referred to is altogether a different transaction or an afterthought made to give a colour of criminality. Either way the complaint fails and therefore is liable to be quashed. 16. Accordingly, all the Writ Petitions are allowed. Either way the complaint fails and therefore is liable to be quashed. 16. Accordingly, all the Writ Petitions are allowed. The impugned FIR No.42 of 2016 on the file of Nellore IV Town Police Station, is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand closed.