JUDGMENT : Abhay S. Oka, J. Leave granted. 1. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel Additional Solicitor General appearing for respondent No.1. 2. The appellant has been arrested in connection with an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short “the PMLA”). Paragraph 416 of a decision of this Court in the case Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India reads thus: “416. The Union of India also recognized the right to speedy trial and access to justice as fundamental right in their written submissions and, thus, submitted that in a limited situation right of bail can be granted in case of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it is to be noted that the Section 436A of the 1973 Code was inserted after the enactment of the 2002 Act. Thus, it would not be appropriate to deny the relief of Section 436A of the 1973 Code which is a wholesome provision beneficial to a person accused under the 2002 Act. However, Section 436A of the 1973 Code, does not provide for an absolute right of bail as in the case of default bail under Section 167 of the 1973 Code. For, in the fact situation of a case, the Court may still deny the relief owing to ground, such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of accused himself.” (underline supplied) 3. In the facts of this case, the appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024. Thus, he will complete half of the prescribed sentence. In this case, obviously the trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed. This Court has held that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CRPC”) will apply even to a case under the PMLA. But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. 4. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. 4. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the power under Section 436A of the CRPC has to be exercised by the Court of first instance. 5. In the facts of the case, we find that there is no prospect of even the trial commencing, as the charge has not been framed. In these facts, we find that the appellant will be entitled to be enlarged on bail under section 436A of the CRPC on 27th May, 2024. Hence, there is no need to have multiplicity of proceedings. 6. Hence, we allow these appeals and direct that the appellant shall be enlarged on bail under Section 436A of the CRPC on 27th May, 2024. 7. For that purpose, the appellant shall be immediately produced before the Special Court to enable the appellant to complete the bail formalities such as furnishing bail bonds etc. The Special Court will pass a formal order fixing the terms and conditions for grant of bail. The bail formalities shall be completed by 26th May, 2024.