ORDER 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the award dated 11.1.2019 passed in Case No.51/IDR/2017, whereby the petitioner has been directed to reinstate the respondent with full backwages. 2. It is stated that the petitioner has filed the present petition by assailing the order dated 11.1.2019 mainly on the ground that the private respondents have not discharged the initial burden placed upon them to prove his case that he worked for continuously for 240 days in a calendar year and in the absence of same, the trial court has shifted the burden on the petitioner to prove that private respondents had continuously worked with the petitioner for a period of more than 240 days. 3. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of apex Court in the cases of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 (Para 5, 8, 9, 22 to 32) and Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002) reported in 3 SCC 25 (Para 3) to submit that the initial burden lies on the workman to prove his case and the same cannot be shifted to the employer to his detriment. 4. Counsel for the respondent has supported the order impugned passed by the labour court which is just and proper and no interference is called for and prays for rejection of the petition. 5. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Before dealing with the questions raised by the petitioner, it would be expedient to refer to the issues which were framed by the trial Court. 5. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Before dealing with the questions raised by the petitioner, it would be expedient to refer to the issues which were framed by the trial Court. okn ç'u fu"d"kZ 1- D;k çFkei{k d¢ f}rh;i{k d¢ vèkhu lsok lekIrh dh fn-& 1-8-2015 d¢ iwoZ ,d o"kZ dh vofèk esa 240 fnu dk;Z fd;k gS\ gk¡ 2- D;k çFkei{k dh e©f[kd lsok lekIrh voSèkkfud NaVuh dh Js.kh esa vkrh gS gk¡ 3- D;k çFkei{k d¨ f}rh;i{k }kjk dk;Z dh vko';drk d¢ vuqlkj nSfud nj ij lhfer vofèk d¢ fy, fu;¨ftr fd;k tkrk gS\ çekf.kr ugÈ 4- D;k çFkei{k Lo;a dk;Z ls vuqifLFkr g¨ x;k Fkk\ çekf.kr ugÈ 5- D;k çFkei{k lsok lekIrh d¢ ckn ls csj¨txkj gS v©j iqu% lsok esa LFkkfir g¨us ij fiNyk osru ikus dk vfèkdkjh gS\ gk¡ 6- lgk;rk ,oa O;;\ vokMZ d¢ vafre iSjk vuqlkj 6- çFkei{k Jh tghj ealwjh ¼ihMCY;w&1½ us 'kiFk i= ij dFku fn, gSaA f}rh; i{k dh v¨j ls [k.Mu esa d¨Ã e©f[kd o nLrkosth lk{; çLrqr ugÈ dh x;h gSA 7. The issue no.1 relates for the purpose of this petition which is sufficiently thrown light on both the questions on which the burden lies on the workman to prove his case. 8. It appears that the learned Judge of the labour Court has directed the Petitioner/Corporation to submit the documents relating to the services of petitioner but despite many opportunities the corporation has failed to produce the same. Hence it is held that adverse inference shall be drawn against the petitioner in light of the affidavit of workman that he had worked continuously for more than 240 days. In this regard, counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the decision in the case of Range Forest Officer (supra), para 3 of the same reads as under:- “3.”...... It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead the evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 24 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact worked for 240 days in a year. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set-aside.” 9. In the case of Range Forest Officer (supra), the issue involved is similar to that of present case. In the case of Range Forest Officer, the apex Court has held that merely filing of an affidavit would not suffice and the case of the workman was dismissed and in the present case also although an opportunity to file the document was given to the petitioner-Corporation but still that would not discharge the initial burden casted on the employees to stand on their own legs. 10. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is unable to endorse the views expressed by the Labour Court in shifting the burden of proof on the petitioner. Reference may also be made to the decision rendered in the case of RBI v. S. Mani (2005) 5 SCC 100 , in which the Hon'ble apex Court has dealt with the issue of burden of proof in the following manner:- “Burden of proof. 28. The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that they had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal did not consider the question from that angle. It held that the burden of proof was upon the Appellant on the premise that they have failed to prove their plea of abandonment of service stating: "It is admitted case of the parties that all the 1st parties under the references CR No. 1/92 to 11/92 have been appointed by the 2nd party as ticca mazdoors. As per the 1st parties, they had worked continuously from April, 1980 to December, 1982. As per the 1st parties, they had worked continuously from April, 1980 to December, 1982. But the 2nd party had denied the above said claim of continuous service of the 1st parties on the ground that the 1st parties has not been appointed as regular workmen but they were working only as temporary part time workers as ticca mazdoor and their services were required whenever necessary arose that too on the leave vacancies of regular employees. But as strongly contended by the counsel for the 1st party, since the 2nd party had denied the above said claim of continuous period of service, it is for the 2nd party to prove through the records available with them as the relevant records could be available only with the 2nd party." 29. The Tribunal, therefore, accepted that the Appellant had denied the Respondents' claim as regard their continuous service. 30. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani [ (2002) 3 SCC 25 ], it was stated: (SCC P.26, Para 3). "3. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. 31. In Siri Niwas (supra), this Court held: (SCC pp.197-98, para13). “13. "The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act per se are not applicable in an industrial adjudication. The general principles of it are, however applicable. It is also imperative for the Industrial Tribunal to see that the principles of natural justice are complied with. 31. In Siri Niwas (supra), this Court held: (SCC pp.197-98, para13). “13. "The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act per se are not applicable in an industrial adjudication. The general principles of it are, however applicable. It is also imperative for the Industrial Tribunal to see that the principles of natural justice are complied with. The burden of proof was on the respondent herein to show that he had worked for 240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In terms of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an order retrenching a workman would not be effective unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. Section 25-F postulates the following conditions to be fulfilled by employer for effecting a valid retrenchment : (i) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu thereof; (ii) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days, average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months." It was further observed: (SCC P.198, Para 14) "14. As noticed herein before, the burden of proof was on the workman. From the Award it does not appear that the workman adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that he complied with the requirements of section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from examining himself in support of his contention he did not produce or call for any document from the office of the Appellant herein including the muster rolls. It is improbable that a person working in a Local Authority would not be in possession of any documentary evidence to support his claim before the Tribunal. Apart from muster rolls he could have shown the terms and conditions of his offer of appointment and the remuneration received by him for working during the aforementioned period. He even did not examine any other witness in support of his case." 32. Yet again in Hariram (supra), it was opined: (SCC P:250, Para 10) "10.....We cannot but bear in mind the fact that the initial burden of establishing the factum of their continuous work for 240 days in a year rests with the respondent applicants. 11. In view of the aforesaid submission and in the considered opinion of this Court, the trial court has wrongly shifted the burden of proof on the petitioner instead of the respondents. 11. In view of the aforesaid submission and in the considered opinion of this Court, the trial court has wrongly shifted the burden of proof on the petitioner instead of the respondents. So the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference in the order passed by the Labour Judge, Dewas and as a consequence, the impugned order dated 11.1.2019 is hereby quashed. 12. Resultantly, the present petition stands allowed and is disposed of, in aforesaid terms. 13. Certified copy, as per Rules.