JUDGMENT : Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J. 1.This second appeal has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.02.2011 passed in Civil Appeal No.13A/2008 by Third Upper District Judge, FTC, Surguja (Ambikapur) (CG), whereby the learned first appellate Court has set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.12.2007 passed in Civil Suit No.44A/2007 by Second Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur (Surguja) whereby, learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. (For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status before the trial Court) 2.Facts of the case in nutshell are that the plaintiff filed suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction alleging inter-alia that he had purchased suit land situated at Village Maharainipur Tehsil Sitapur Distt. Surguja total area 1.344 hectare (Schedule A of the plaint), vide registered sale deed dated 15.12.1980 (Ex-P/1) from defendants 1 & 2 and his name was also mutated in the revenue record. Defendants 1 & 2, after selling their property, left their native village Kotchall and started living in village Kanchira Tahsil Dharamjaigarh Distt. Raigarh. Vide Revenue Case No.378/A-23/82-83 proceeding was initiated before the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Ambikapur under Section 170B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short ‘the Code 1959’) on the ground that there was a benami transaction in the name of the plaintiff as suit land of defendants No.1 & 2, who belong to aboriginal tribe is in possession of defendants No.3 & 4, who are non-tribal. After enquiry, the SDO (Revenue) dismissed the application vide Order dated 16.4.1984 holding that there is transaction between persons belonging to Scheduled Tribes to Scheduled Tribes, i.e. between plaintiff and defendants No. 1 & 2, hence, Section 170B of the Code 1959 is not applicable. After the lapse of 15 years, on February 2001, defendants 1 & 2 again moved an application before the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) for returning the land. The said application was also rejected by the SDO (Revenue) on the ground of res-judicata. Thereafter, defendants 1 & 2 have preferred an appeal before the Collector, Surguja, who in turn, vide Order dated 28.3.2003 set aside the order passed by the SDO (Revenue) and directed the plaintiff to return the suit land to defendants 1 & 2. The said application was also rejected by the SDO (Revenue) on the ground of res-judicata. Thereafter, defendants 1 & 2 have preferred an appeal before the Collector, Surguja, who in turn, vide Order dated 28.3.2003 set aside the order passed by the SDO (Revenue) and directed the plaintiff to return the suit land to defendants 1 & 2. On the strength of that order, defendants 1 & 2 are trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land, hence, the plaintiff has filed civil suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction. 3.The Defendants 1 & 2 filed their written statement denying the substantive contentions of the plaintiff and pleaded that they had given the suit land on mortgage to defendant No.3 Vindhyachal @ Jhitku in the year 1980 and after lapse of 8-9 years, in the month of Falgun, they requested Vindhyachal @ Jhitku to return the land after obtaining the mortgaged amount, but he refused to return the same, thereafter they enqruied the revenue record and came to know that Vindhyachal @ Jhitku had got the name mutated in the name of plaintiff and cultivating the same as a Benami. It is further contended that plaintiff is not the son of Ghasiya Ram and name of Ghasiya Ram’s son is Harishchandra Sidar, but defendants 3 & 4 prepared forge and fabricated sale deed in the name of the plaintiff and they are cultivating the suit land, whereas, they have never executed sale deed of suit land, rather defendant No.3 has got executed the same by impersonating other person as defendant No.1 & 2. Thus, aforesaid transaction is not only benami transaction but it is forged and fabricated also. It has further been pleaded that, by filing instant civil suit, plaintiff has challenged Order dated 28.3.2023 passed by Collector under Section 170B of the Code 1959, which is barred under Section 257 of aforesaid Code. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4.The learned trial Court after framing six issues, examined the witnesses adduced by both the parties and after considering the evidence brought on record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4.The learned trial Court after framing six issues, examined the witnesses adduced by both the parties and after considering the evidence brought on record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, defendants 1 & 2 preferred appeal before first appellate Court and the learned first appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 24.02.2011 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court holding that sale deed executed between the parties was benami transaction as actual purchaser of the suit land was Vindhyachal @ Jhitku, but he purchased the suit land in the name of Ravindra Sai @ Harishachadra Sidar. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant/plaintiff has preferred the second appeal. 5.This second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- “1.Whether the suit as framed and instituted claiming declaration of title and injunction could be held to be barred by jurisdiction under Section 257 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959? 2.Whether the Lower appellate Court was justified in holding that Defendant No.3 - Vindhyachal has purchased the suit land fictitiously in the name of Plaintiff Ravindra Sai?’ 6.Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff belongs to tribal community and respondents/ defendants 1 & 2 are also belong to same community. The plaintiff purchased suit land from defendants 1 & 2 vide registered sale deed, therefore, provisions of Section 170B of the Code 1959, is not applicable in the instant case. It is further submitted that the learned first appellate Court has held that said transaction of sale purchase was benami transaction and actual purchaser of the suit land was Vindhyachal @ Jhitku, but he purchased the suit land in the name of Ravindra Sai @ Harishachadra Sidar. But this finding of the learned appellate Court is perverse as no evidence has been adduced by the defendants to prove the fact that it was a benami transaction. No evidence has been brought by the defendants to prove the fact that defendant Vindhyachal @ Jhitku is cultivating suit land after 1980, rather he cultivated it only for two years on Adhiya by taking it from the plaintiff. No evidence has been brought by the defendants to prove the fact that defendant Vindhyachal @ Jhitku is cultivating suit land after 1980, rather he cultivated it only for two years on Adhiya by taking it from the plaintiff. Only on this ground, the Collector held that said transaction is benami transaction, whereas, except those two years, plaintiff and his family members are cultivating the suit land. It is further submitted that the plaintiff Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar and his witnesses have deposed that actual name of plaintiff No.1 is Harishchandra Sidar, but he is also called in local level (ghar ka nam) as Ravindra Sai. It is further submitted that the learned appellate Court has set aside the well reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court only because plaintiff Ravindra Sai has admitted that there is no other document in which his name has been mentioned as Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar. It is further submitted that since the plaintiff is the actual purchaser/owner of the suit land, who belongs to Tribal community, and therefore, subject sale of the suit property is valid one, and therefore, provision of Section 170 B of the Code 1959 is not applicable in the instant case. But, the first appellate Court without considering the evidence available on record, has set aside the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and judgment and decree passed by the trial Court may be restored. 7.None present for respondents 3 & 4, though served. 8.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants 1 & 2 would submit that the plaintiff himself has admitted in his cross-examination that except in the plaint filed by him, there is no other document which would show the two names of the plaintiff i.e. Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar. 7.None present for respondents 3 & 4, though served. 8.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants 1 & 2 would submit that the plaintiff himself has admitted in his cross-examination that except in the plaint filed by him, there is no other document which would show the two names of the plaintiff i.e. Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar. It is further submitted that defendant No.3 Vindhyachal @ Jhitku has one son namely Ravinder @ Nirmal, who is defendant No.4, and since defendant No.3 is not belonged to Tribal community, he could not have purchase the suit land of a person belongs to Tribal community, therefore, defendant No.3 purchased the suit land as benami transaction in the name of Ravindra Sai, S/o. Ghasiya, whereas said Ghasiya has no son namely Ravindra Sai rather Harishchandra Sidar is the only son of Ghasiya Ram, therefore, when the Collector passed Order under Section 170B of the Code 1959, defendant No.3 Vindhyachal @ Jhitku filed instant civil suit in the name of plaintiff naming him as Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar. It is further submitted that since the Collector has passed order under Section 170 B of the Code 1959, holding that said sale deed dated 15.12.1980 (Annexure-P/1) is a benami transaction therefore, he has directed to return the suit land to the actual owner of it i.e. defendants 1 & 2. This order gave rise to filing of instant civil suit whereas, civil suit is barred against the order passed under Section 170 B of the Code 1959. It is lastly submitted that judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is based on evidence available on record, hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record along with record of the trial Court as well as first appellate Court. 10.The issue which gave rise to filing of instant civil suit was the Order dated 28.3.2003 passed by Collector, Distt. Surguja in Revenue Case No.234/A-23/01-02 (Annexure-P/1) whereby, the Collector Surguja allowed the appeal filed by defendants 1 & 2 and passed order under Section 170-B of the Code 1959 for reversal of the suit land to defendants No.1 & 2, who belong to aboriginal tribe. Surguja in Revenue Case No.234/A-23/01-02 (Annexure-P/1) whereby, the Collector Surguja allowed the appeal filed by defendants 1 & 2 and passed order under Section 170-B of the Code 1959 for reversal of the suit land to defendants No.1 & 2, who belong to aboriginal tribe. Being aggrieved by that order, the appellant/ plaintiff filed civil suit, whereas, as per Section 257 (1-1) of the Code 1959, jurisdiction of civil Court is barred against such order. The provisions of Section 257 (1-1) of the Code 1959 read thus:- 257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities--Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters: XXX Aforesaid provision creates bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a dispute which requires to be decided by the Sub Divisional Officer/Revenue authorities under Section 170B of the Code. 11.The issue for consideration as to what extent in a provision of exclusive jurisdiction any interference can be made by the civil court. The Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P. MANU/SC/0157/1968: AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 has laid down several test with regard to interference by civil court in provision relating to exclusive jurisdiction by the Special Tribunal/Revenue Authorities and held as under: (i) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the Inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see If the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (iv)When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (v)Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (vi)Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii)An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii)An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. 12.The same principles are again enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead.) by LRs, and others MANU/SC/0238/2000 (2000) 3 SCC 689 , wherein the decision of Dhulabhai MANU/SC/0157/1968: AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 (supra) has been noticed. Para 5 of the said report, which is relevant, succinctly states as under:- 5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (1) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (II) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., It was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 13.Thus, in such cases civil court has to see only to the extent whether basic fundamental principles of the judicial process have been followed or not by the competent authority while passing the order impugned and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 (supra) and case must fall within the parameter of the tests mentioned in case of Dhulabhai MANU/SC/0157/1968: AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 (supra) ant State of Andhra Pradesh MANU/SC/0238/2000: (2000) 3 SCC 689 (supra). 14.While considering similar issue in the matter of 170-B of the Code Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhumaniya Vs. Harisingh and others 2001 RN 85, reported in Revenue Niryana, held as under:- 22. The civil Court has gone into the questions which were required to be decided by the SDO and as a matter of fact, decided by the SDO, The matters which are required to be decided by the SDO are not final as against the order of the SDO there is further appeal and revision provided under the Code. The orders thus passed are final and the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred u/s. 257(1-1) of the Code. Thus, the Courts below could have seen only to the extent whether basic fundamental principles of the judicial process have been followed or not by the competent authority passing the order and the Jurisdiction of the civil court is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai (supra) and case must fall within the parameter of the tests mentioned in para 19 of this order. The Courts below have not considered the material such as the voters list which was referred to by the SDO and also the lease deed filed by the respondent, granted to Luraiya Sahariya. 15.In view of the aforesaid legal preposition inspite of the bar created under section 257(1) (L-1) of the Code against orders passed by the Revenue Authorities under section 170A and 170B of the Code in their exclusive jurisdiction even then the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and consider the matter up to the extent whether the authority concerned has complied with the prescribed procedure or not while holding the enquiry and passing the order. But such jurisdiction is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 (supra) (supra). The civil Court cannot consider the questions decided by such revenue authorities on merits under their exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it is held that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain such suit upto the aforestated extent. 16.In view of the aforesaid legal preposition, even if the contention of the plaintiff is to be examined, as to whether the inter-se transfer of land between plaintiff who is the member of aboriginal tribe and defendants 1 & 2, who are also the members of aboriginal tribe (because as per the plaintiff, it is not a benami transaction), the provisions 170-B of the Code would be attracted? 17. Section 170B reads as under:-- 170-B. (1) Reversion of land of members of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud--Every person who on the date of commencement of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of the Commencement of Amendment Act, 1980 shall, within (two years) of such Commencement notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land. (2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by subsection (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs. (2-A) If a Gram Sabha in the scheduled area referred to in clause (1) of Article 211 of the Constitution finds that any person, other than a member of an aboriginal tribe, is in possession of any land of a Bhumiswami belonging to an aboriginal tribe, without any lawful authority, it shall restore the possession of such land to that person to whom it originally belonged and if that person is dead to his legal heirs. Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the possession of such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who shall restore the possession to such land within three months from the date of receipt of the reference. (3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (1) the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void and- (a) Where no building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferer and if he be dead, in his legal heirs; (b) Where any building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding, he shall fix the price of such land in accordance with the principles laid down for fixation of price of land in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894) and order the person referred to in sub-section (1) to pay to the transferer the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferer. Provided that where the building or structure has been erected after the 1st day of January, 1984 the provisions of clause (b) above shall not apply: Provided further that fixation of price under clause (b) shall be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Provided that where the building or structure has been erected after the 1st day of January, 1984 the provisions of clause (b) above shall not apply: Provided further that fixation of price under clause (b) shall be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case before the Sub-Divisional Officer. 18.From a bare perusal of the aforestated provision, it is abundantly clear that a person who is in possession of the agricultural land, which belong to a Tribe, who has been declared to be and Aboriginal Tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 within period of 2.10.1959 and ending on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, 1980, within 2 years should supply all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land and Section 170B of the Code would be attracted even if transaction of transfer of land is between two aboriginal tribes. 19.The Supreme Court in case of Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others MANU/SC/1154/2002 (2003) 1 SCC 692 , has held that no where in the entire scheme of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 170B of the Code as enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such transaction of transfer as where entered into by a member of an aboriginal tribe in favour of a member not belonging to a aboriginal tribe. Their Lordships have further held that there is no exception in the enactment so as to exclude from the purview of section 170B of the Code that the inter se transfer between aboriginal tribe is not hit by section 170B of the Code. Had it been so the legislature had specifically said so. In this context it would be profitable to refer para 8 of the case of Bhaiji MANU/SC/1154/2002: (2003) 1 SCC 692 (supra) which reads thus: 8. It is well known that some of the aboriginal tribe are nomadic and some Indulge in crimes traditionally and historically. Had it been so the legislature had specifically said so. In this context it would be profitable to refer para 8 of the case of Bhaiji MANU/SC/1154/2002: (2003) 1 SCC 692 (supra) which reads thus: 8. It is well known that some of the aboriginal tribe are nomadic and some Indulge in crimes traditionally and historically. The purpose of settling land with the tribals mostly which is done at very concessional rates and at times even without involving an obligation to pay the land revenue, is so done with a view to see that the aboriginals, settle at one place abandoning nomadism and picking up tilling the soil as their vocation by settling at one place and earning livelihood by labour and toil. It is also well known that creamy layers have developed and even as amongst socially unprivileged some have acquired affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may indulge in exploiting his fellow beings. Possibility cannot be ruled out where a non-tribal may manage to have land transferred apparently but not in reality in the name of a tribal and taking advantage of his status, affluence or any other means, conferring him with capacity to exploit, may till the land to his own advantage depriving the aboriginal tribal from the benefits of the land settled by the State with him. All such cases are taken care of by Section 170B. The purpose of enacting Section 170B of the Code is very wide. The object sought to be achieved, as its drafting indicates, is to gather and make available all statistics with the State officials so as to find out how much land belonging to aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone to whom it does not belong as on the cut-off date. The information having been collected, the enquiry under sub-section (3) shall be directed towards finding out the nature of transaction resulting in transfer of land- whether such transaction of transfer has resulted in the aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right in the land. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 1980, have to be read as part of one whole scheme. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 1980, have to be read as part of one whole scheme. If the submission of Shri Gambhir is correct then the object of enquiry under sub- section (3) would have been to find out if such transaction of transfer has resulted in an aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right by a person not belonging to an aboriginal tribe. But that is not so. Nowhere in the entire scheme of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170B, as enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such transactions of transfer as were entered into by a member of an aboriginal tribe in favour of a member not belonging to an aboriginal tribe. No exception has been enacted by the legislature so as to exclude from the purview of Section 170B transactions of transfer between two persons both of whom are members of aboriginal tribes. Had it been so, the legislature would have specifically said so. The language of the section as drafted in 1980 is clear and unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt so far as this aspect is concerned. 20.Thus, it has authoritatively been laid down by the Supreme Court that transaction of transfer between two members of aboriginal tribe would also come with purview of Section 170B of the Code 1959 and its applicability to aboriginal tribes have not been excluded by the legislature. 21.Having considered the afore-stated decision of the Supreme Court, if the facts of the instant case is looked into, then it is found that vide Order dated 28.03.2003 (Annexure-P/8), the Collector has held that since the transfer made vide registered sale deed (Ex-P/1) is fictitious/benami, therefore, he passed order under Section 170B of the Code 1959 for reversal of the suit land to defendants No.1 & 2, who belong to aboriginal tribe. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court against such order is clearly barred under Section 257 (1-1) of the Code 1959. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court against such order is clearly barred under Section 257 (1-1) of the Code 1959. Even if it is considered that the alleged transaction was between two members of the aboriginal tribe, therefore, provisions of Section 170B of the Code 1959 is not attracted, is not found to be sustainable in the light of afore-stated decision of the Supreme Court, particularly considering the allegations levelled by defendants No.1 & 2, that they have never executed registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and he has got executed the alleged sale deed (Ex-p/1) by personating other person as them (defendants No.1 & 2), that too by fictitious name of Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar, S/o. Ghasiya, whereas Ghasiya has no son namely Ravindra Sai @ Harishchandra Sidar and except in the civil suit, there is no other document of Harishchandra Sidar showing his name as Ravindra Sai. Inquiry of such type of allegation is well within the purview of the revenue authorities to be considered, while considering the case under Section 170B of the Code 1959. therefore, contention raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff that since the transaction was made between two aboriginal tribes, hence, provisions of Section 170B of the Code 1959 is not attracted, is not legally acceptable, therefore, it deserves to be and is accordingly rejected. 22.It is also apt to note here that Section 170B of the Code provides procedure for inquiry relating to transaction hit by Section 170B of the Code 1959. Order made under Section 170B of the Code 1959 is appealable under the provisions of Section 44 of the Code 1959. Although second appeal against such order is barred, but revision against the order passed by the first appellate Court is maintainable in accordance with Section 50 of the Code 1959, which shows that legislature has taken proper care and has provided adequate remedy in case of grievance against the order made under Section 170B of the Code 1959. But in the instant case, the plaintiff instead of taking recourse to law under the Code 1959, has filed civil suit which is barred under Section 257(1-1) of the Code 1959, therefore, finding recorded by learned first appellate Court in this regard is upheld. But in the instant case, the plaintiff instead of taking recourse to law under the Code 1959, has filed civil suit which is barred under Section 257(1-1) of the Code 1959, therefore, finding recorded by learned first appellate Court in this regard is upheld. 23.In view of the above consideration, the issue that, whether subject transfer made vide registered sale deed (Ex-P/1) is fictitious/benami or not, is also not in the domain of consideration of the Civil Court. Accordingly, both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of defendants No.1 & 2/respondents No.1 & 2. 24.In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. 25.Parties shall bear their own costs. 26.All the pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 27.A decree be drawn accordingly.