JUDGMENT : Arvind Kumar Verma, J. 1.The present First Appeal has been filed being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 23/02/2017 passed by the VI Additional District Judge Durg, District Durg in Civil Suit No.5624A/2011, whereby the civil suit preferred by the respondent No.1/plaintiff has been allowed. (For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court) 2.Facts of the case are that respondent no.1/plaintiff Nandkishore Khandelwal filed a suit for specific performance against Mankiyya @ Mudrika Yadav (Defendant No. 1) and cancellation of sale deed made by Mankiyya @ Mudrika Yadav in favour of defendant no.2- Prabhatchand Jain. To claim the aforesaid reliefs it was pleaded that on 18.06.05 the plaintiff entered into an agreement to sale with defendant no.1 for suit property situated at Khasra No.315 Area 10 decimil equivalent to 4300 sq.ft situated in P.H.No.65/19 (Pragati Nagar Risali) District Durg for a sale consideration of Rs.5,41,000/- out of which Rs.1,00,001/- was paid which was duly acknowledged by the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and the remaining amount was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed for which a period of one and half month was fixed vide agreement to sale (Ex.P/1). The plaintiff made various requests to execute the sale deed but defendant no.1 had not conceded to the request made by plaintiff therefore the plaintiff on 27.07.05 issued a notice to defendant.1 and also on very same day appeared before the Deputy Registrar Durg and submitted his written objection. The defendant no.1 on 13.09.05 replied the same that the agreement executed between the parties has been canceled and defendant no.1 is free to sale the suit property. On 14.10.05, defendant No.1 executed the sale deed in favour of defendant no.2. Subsequently, on 19.10.05 the plaintiff issued notice to defendant no.1 directing him to appear before the Registrar Office and to execute the sale deed however defendant no.1 had not appeared and ultimately. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract but the defendant no.1 had not performed his part of contract. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract but the defendant no.1 had not performed his part of contract. It was further pleaded that the defendant no.1 in order to cause wrongful loss to the plaintiff on 14.10.05 sold the suit property on a lesser value of Rs.3,00,000/- to defendant no.2 whereas defendant no.1 entered the agreement to sale the property to the plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.5,41,000/- out of which he had already received a sum of Rs. 1,00,001/-. This has been done only to deprive the plaintiff from his legitimate and genuine rights. The defendant no.1 even intimated defendant no.2 about the agreement, even then defendant no.1 & defendant no.2 in collusion with each other to cause wrongful loss to the plaintiff, the sale deed was executed in favour of defendant no.2 which is liable to be declared as null and void and plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract dated 18.06.05. 3.Defendant no.1 filed his written statement. The defendant No.1, who was executants of the agreement, had admitted the execution of said agreement dated 18-06-2005. However he denied that he had committed any wrong or breach of stated contract. He added that it is fault of the Plaintiff that he had not made any effort for getting the sale deed registered within the time prescribed under the agreement and, as such, since terms of agreement was not satisfied within the time framed i.e. within one and half month, it is terminated by efflux of time. It is further pleaded that in the notice dated 27.07.2005 it was nowhere mentioned that as to when the sale deed has to be executed. It is specifically mentioned in the written statement that vide notice dated 13.09.2005 it was informed to the Plaintiff regarding termination of contract and after being free from the agreement he had executed the sale deed on 14.10.2005 in favour of defendant-2. In para 9 of the written statement it is specifically mentioned that after termination of contract no such cause of action is available to the Plaintiff for bringing of suit. 4.Defendant no.2 filed his separate written statement in which he stated that the Appellant is the purchaser of the said land in question vide sale deed dated 14-10-2005. In para 9 of the written statement it is specifically mentioned that after termination of contract no such cause of action is available to the Plaintiff for bringing of suit. 4.Defendant no.2 filed his separate written statement in which he stated that the Appellant is the purchaser of the said land in question vide sale deed dated 14-10-2005. He denied the statement of the Plaint that he had knowledge of the agreement dated 18-06-2005 through the defendant-1. However he has specifically pleaded that after due verification and inquiry regarding title and possession of the suit land he had published the public notice about purchasing on the suit land in the name of his daughter Smt Pratibha Jain through the Advocate Ku Meenakshi Kudeshiya. Since no objection was received within eight days, the time as was prescribed for objection, he had purchased the said land vide sale deed dated 14-10-2005. It was further pleaded that after purchasing the said land he had completed the construction over the said land after getting the necessary permission from Nagar Palika. 5.Counsel for the appellant/defendant No.2 submits that the impugned order and decree are contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case, thus illegal. The learned Court of VI Additional District judge, has not perused the entire evidences because on the last date of execution i.e. 02/08/2005, neither the plaintiff’s approached to defendant No.1 for extension of time, nor he has given any undertaking to show his readiness and willingness, on the contrary, defendant No.1 after expiry of date 02/08/2005, he has informed the plaintiff about termination of agreement and sent a legal notice on 13/09/2005 wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the agreement had been terminated. The Court below has erred in not considering the admissions of respondent No.1/plaintiff during his cross-examination that he has accepted that the time period of agreement was one and half month from the date of execution of agreement i.e. 02/08/2005 and no further clause in the agreement for extension. Plaintiff also admitted that he has never intimated the exact date to the respondent/defendant No.1 for execution of sale-deed. Plaintiff also admitted that he has never intimated the exact date to the respondent/defendant No.1 for execution of sale-deed. He further submits that the Court below has not perused the admission of respondent/plaintiff that he himself has admitted that he did not file any suit or claim from the date of execution of the agreement i.e. 18/06/2005 till 02/08/2005, instead objections submitted to the Sub Registrar and legal notice for dire consequences were served on 27/07/2005 to the respondent/defendant No.1, but no specific dates have been given to respondent/defendant no.1 for execution of sale deed in notice dated 27/07/2005 though the time is essence of the contract and no suit has been filed till the expiration of the agreement. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are illegal and thus liable to be set-aside. 6.Counsel for respondent No.1/defendant No.1 submits that he had terminated the agreement vide notice dated 13/09/2005 and after termination he was free to sale the land. He, in paragraph 9 of his written statement, had stated – Áfroknh d- 1 }kjk oknh ls dksbZ /kks[kk /kM+h ugha fd;k x;k bdjkjukek j| gks tkus ds i'pkr Áfroknh d-1 }kjk foØ; fd;k x;kA oknh dks okn ykus dk dksbZ okn dkj.k mRiUu ugha gksrk gSA pwWafd bdjkjukek dh lHkh 'krZ j| gks pqdh FkhA 7.Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 1/plaintiff submitted that although Defendant No. 2 try to show that he is a bonafide purchaser, made a newspaper publication, no objection was received and the agreement between the plaintiff and Defendant No.1 from the date of purchase of the stamp paper i.e. 16.05.05 had expired on 30.06.06. Defendant No.2 while filing the present appeal raised the ground that since the plaintiff had not prayed to declaring the termination of the agreement as void, the suit is not be maintained. The said ground was raised for the first time in the appeal and not raised at the time of filing of written statement, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. In the matter of A. Kantamani v. Nasreen Ahmed reported in (2017) 4 SCC 654 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had came to the conclusion that if the objection regarding maintainability of the suit was not raised in the written statement, a fortiori no issues was framed and thus the Trial Court or the High Court could not render finding in the said plea. He submits that in the instant case, maintainability of the suit was not an issue before the trial Court, but before this Court, maintainability of the suit is raised. Further in the cross-objection under Order 14 Rule 2, the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the declaration against the cancellation of the agreement has not been raised. He further submits that unilateral cancellation of agreement to sale by one party is not permissible in law except where the agreement is determinable in terms of Section 14 of this Specific Relief Act. He further submits that the principles which can be enunciated is that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. . 8.Counsel for respondent No. 2.1 & 2.2 submit that during the pendency of the instant appeal, in compliance of the para 3 of the relief granted by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment and decree dated 23/02/2017, an amount of Rs. 2,10,000/- through DD No. 393651000024000 has been deposited in favour of the plaintiff on 27/06/2022. 9.I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10.There are 4 issues for determination to adjudicate this appeal. 1)(a) Whether, Defendants has raised the plea in a written statement regarding maintainability of suit.? (b) Whether, the suit filed by the plaintiff without seeking declaration relief with respect to unchallenged terminated contract is maintainable in law? 2)Whether, the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement?. 3)Whether, the Defendant/appellant has bonafide purchaser of the suit land?. 4)Whether, the Defendant No. 2 is entitle to get protection under Section 19 (b) of the Specific Performance Act, 1963. Discussion on Issues No. 1 (a) & 1 (b) 11.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of I. S. Sikander -vs- K. Subrnani: (2013) 15 SCC 27 : para 37 and 38 as under: 37. As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit, the plaintiff has not sought for declaratory relief to declare the termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law. As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit, the plaintiff has not sought for declaratory relief to declare the termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law. In the absence of such prayer by the plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of the suit schedule property on the basis of Agreement of Sale consequential relief of decree for permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. 38. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief sought for by the plaintiff for grant of decree for specific performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in his favour on the basis of non existing Agreement of Sale is wholly unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the point no. 1 is answered in favour of the defendant No. 5. 12.Admittedly in the present case, no such relief has been sought with respect to termination of contract, but defendant No.1 has not made averment that the suit is not maintainable. Defendant No. 1 only mentioned that there is no cause of action due to all condition of the agreement rescinded. 13.Respondent/Plaintiff has raised objection regarding applicability of law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of I. S. Sikandar (supra) by citing the case 'Mrs A. Kanthamani -vs- Mrs Nasreen Ahmad: AIR 2017 SC 1236 arguing that I. S. Sikandar case has been distinguished in the case of 'Mrs. A. Kanthamani in following terms: 14.34. Coming first to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant about the maintainability of suit, in our considered view, it has no merit for more than one reason. 15.35. First, as rightly argued by learned counsel for the respondent, the objection regarding the maintainability of the Suit was neither raised by the defendant in the written statement nor in first appeal before the High Court and nor in grounds of appeal in this Court. 16.36 Second, since no plea was raised in the written statement, a fortiori, no issue was framed and, in consequence, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court could render any finding on the plea.SC1242 17.37. 16.36 Second, since no plea was raised in the written statement, a fortiori, no issue was framed and, in consequence, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court could render any finding on the plea.SC1242 17.37. Third, it is a well-settled principle of law that the plea regarding the maintainability of suit is required to be raised in the first instance in the pleading (written statement) then only such plea can be adjudicated by the Trial Court on its merits as a preliminary issue under Order 14, Rule 2 of the CPC. Once a finding is rendered on the plea, the same can then be examined by the first or/and second appellate Court. 18.38. It is only in appropriate cases, where the Court prima facie finds by mere perusal of plaint allegations that the suit is barred by any express provision of law or is not legally maintainable due to any legal provision; a judicial notice can be taken to avoid abuse of judicial process in prosecuting such suit. Such is, however, not the case here. 19.39. Fourth, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of I. S. Sikander (supra) turns on the facts involved therein and is thus distinguishable. 20.40. Lastly, the suit filed by the respondent seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 05.03.1989 was maintainable for the reason that the cause of action to file the suit arose on the expiry of period mentioned in the agreement (31.12.1989) for its performance as provided in Article 54 of the Limitation Act and it was rightly filed immediately within 10 days on 10.01.1990. 21.Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff argued that since no such plea on maintainability of suit on the ground of absence of challenge of the termination of agreement was raised in the written statement, the same cannot be allowed to be raised in the First Appeal strictly. This Court cares with the argument raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff. 22.In this regard, I have gone through the record and found that in para 9 of the written statement of Defendant No. 1, he has not made averment regarding maintainability of the suit for non-claiming of relief of declaration of termination of agreement as void. This Court cares with the argument raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff. 22.In this regard, I have gone through the record and found that in para 9 of the written statement of Defendant No. 1, he has not made averment regarding maintainability of the suit for non-claiming of relief of declaration of termination of agreement as void. Defendant No. 1 only referred as there is no cause of action arise due to termination of agreement since the terms and conditions was fully terminated. 23.Section 14 (1) (d) of the Specific Relief Act, deals with the contract in its natural determinable. A bare perusal of the agreement (Ex.P/1) would show that the said agreement does not contain any clause which gives rise to either of the party to determine the agreement unilaterally. It is pertinent to mention here that Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act clearly provides that the person who has reasonable apprehension that the instrument can cause serious injuries has to apply the Court to declare it void or voidable. Defendant No. 1 had not approached the Court under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and as such, the unilateral termination of the agreement is contrary to Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act. In the subsequent judgment of A. Kantamani v. Nasreen (Supra), the judgment of I.S. Sikandar (Supra) was considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had came to the conclusion that if the objection regarding maintainability of the suit was not raised in the written statement, a fortiori no issues was framed and thus the Trial Court or the High Court could not render the finding in the said plea. 24.In the instant case, the maintainability of the suit was not an issue before the Trial Court. The parties were knowing fully well that what are the issues framed went into trial, but before this Court maintainability of the suit raised, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the Defendant No. 1 cannot be upheld. Discussion on Issues Nos. 2, 3 & 4 25.It is an admitted fact that the agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 for purchase of suit land on 18.06.2005 (Exhibit P-1). The sale consideration was agreed between them was Rs. 5,41.000/- out of which Rs. 1 lakh was paid in cash as advance. Discussion on Issues Nos. 2, 3 & 4 25.It is an admitted fact that the agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 for purchase of suit land on 18.06.2005 (Exhibit P-1). The sale consideration was agreed between them was Rs. 5,41.000/- out of which Rs. 1 lakh was paid in cash as advance. Document (Ex.P-1) clearly specify that execution of sale deed was to be made within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of agreement, but there is no mention that if the execution to sale is not executed within 1 ½ months, what would the consequences of that. 26.Before expiry of 1 ½ months, the plaintiff has raised a written objection before the Deputy Registrar Office, Durg, on 27/07/2005 (Ex.P/2) that he came to know that defendant No. 1 is likely to sale the land in question in high cost and he had also issued notice to defendant no. 1 through his counsel on 27/07/2005 in which he has mentioned to receive rest amount and to execute the sale deed. But in the said notice, the plaintiff did not mention that on which date sale deed is required to be executed and on which date he will pay the rest amount. It is also pertinent to mention here that neither the plaintiff given a cheque to the defendant for remaining sale consideration nor he has paid cash amount to the defendant no. 1. It is also pertinent to mention here that within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of the agreement to sale, the plaintiff has not given sale consideration to the Defendant No.1, therefore, the defendant No. 1 issue notice to the plaintiff dated 13/09/2005 (Ex.P/7). After expiry of date, the Defendant No. 1 had intimated regarding termination of contract and mentioned specifically therein that since the time of 1 ½ months as per prescribed period under the agreement, has expired without its performance, therefore, Defendant No. 1 became free from his obligation and also informed regarding termination of contract. 27.Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under:- 16. 27.Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under:- 16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- (a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract under section 20; or (b) who has become incapable of performing or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (c) Who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. For the purposes of clause (c),- (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court; (ii) the plaintiff 1050 [must prove] performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. 28.“Readiness”- Financial capacity of plaintiff to perform his part to pay same consideration amount and “willingness” is that his mental attitude that he is always ready and prepared to perform his part of the contract. Meaning thereby, readiness and willingness to perform contract requires not only pleading but also proof of the same. Mere plea is not sufficient, but it has to be proved. The basic principals behind Section 16 (c) read with explanation (ii) is that any person seeking benefit of specific performance of the contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout entitling him to specific relief. 29.In Ajayab Singh v. Tulsi Devi, AIR 2000 SC 2493 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the Section 16 (C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that the person making the averment as per convenience with regard for truth would be precluded from getting equitable relief. 29.In Ajayab Singh v. Tulsi Devi, AIR 2000 SC 2493 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the Section 16 (C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that the person making the averment as per convenience with regard for truth would be precluded from getting equitable relief. 30.It is an undisputed fact that the agreement for purchase of the suit land between the Plaintiff and the original Mankiyya (now deceased), was executed on 18/06/2005 (Ex.P/1) with specific terms prescribed time and limit for its performance i.e. 1 ½ months from the date of execution of the agreement. The prescribed period of part performance of the agreement is 02/08/2005. 31.Relevant paragraphs of notice issued by Defendant No.1 to the plaintiff dated 13/09/2005 (Ex.P-7) is reproduced as under:- 32.No doubt, notice (Ex.P/7) was received by the plaintiff on 14/09/2005, but he did not react spontaneously and remained silent. After 1 month of the notice dated 13/09/2005 (Ex.P/7) and after execution of the sale deed dated 14/10/2005, the plaintiff had issued notice to defendant No. 1. Inference can be drawn against the plaintiff that he has knowledge about the sale-deed executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of Defendant No.2 on 14/10/2005, thereafter, the plaintiff issued notice to defendant no. 1 for showing readiness and willingness. 33.It is very important fact that defendant no. 2 had issued notice for purchase of the suit property through paper publication in the name of his daughter i.e. Smt. Pratibha Jain on 28/08/2005 (Ex.D/1) through Advocate Ku. Minakshi Kudeshiya and objections were invited within 8 days from the date of publication of the notice. There was no written objection raised by the plaintiff, nor it is proved that he has made oral objection before the Advocate Ku. Minkashi Kudeshiya or Smt. Pratibha Jain. 34.In the matter of Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi and another: (1994) 4 SCC 18 : "14. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract." 35.In the matter of K. Nanjappa -vs- R. A. Hameed : AIR 2015 SC 3389 : its has been observed as: 21. In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the Court has to keep in mind Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. This Section preserves judicial discretion to grant decree for specific performance. However, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case and to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. 25. In the case of K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar (2015) 1 SCC 597 : ( AIR 2015 SC 9 ), this Court held:"13. Indisputably, remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy. The court while granting relief or specific performance exercises discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Act specifically provides that the court's jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. 36.Another aspect of the case would be that as per term of the agreement, it is obligation on the part of the purchaser to made complete payment of sale consideration and get registry of sale-deed within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of agreement. No doubt, there is no mention in the agreement that if the execution of sale is not completed within 1 ½ months, then what would be the consequences of that. The plaintiff has knowledge and obligation to make complete payment of the sale consideration and get registration of the sale-deed within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of the agreement. 37.In this context Hon'ble Supreme Court Court in Chand Rani (dead) by Lrs. v. Kamal Rani (dead) : (1993) 1 SCC 519 held as under: "25. The plaintiff has knowledge and obligation to make complete payment of the sale consideration and get registration of the sale-deed within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of the agreement. 37.In this context Hon'ble Supreme Court Court in Chand Rani (dead) by Lrs. v. Kamal Rani (dead) : (1993) 1 SCC 519 held as under: "25. From an clear that analysis of the above in the case property there case law it is of sale of immovable is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that is to be performed in conditions are: a reasonable time if the 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, example: the object of making the contract." For 38.In view of the above principals of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that when Defendant No. 1 has terminated the agreement vide notice dated 13/09/2005 (Ex.P/5), the plaintiff is duty bound to react spontaneously and termination of agreement was to be questioned by the plaintiff. 39.Admittedly, after execution of agreement, on 18/06/2005 within 1 ½ months prescribed period for purpose of such agreement, it was not materialized and remained as non-performed agreement. Vide notice dated 13/09/2005 (Ex.P/7), Defendant No.1 intimated the plaintiff regarding termination of the said agreement and further intimated him about releasing his liabilities from performing the said agreement. It is very important fact that after knowledge of termination of such contract, the plaintiff has remained silent for one month, which shows the conduct of the plaintiff that he was not ready and willing to perform the contract according to its true construction. 40.On perusal of the judgment passed by the Court below, this Court found that in para 26 in its first part, the learned trial Court has observed regarding readiness and willingness, however, suddenly without regarding 'notice of agreement to the defendant-2' the findings has been given that the defendant-2 has purchased the property for value but with notice and hence he is not entitled of protection under Section 19 (b) of Specific Relief Act 1963. In this para it is no where discussed as to how and by which material the Learned Judge has found the fact of 'notice of agreement to the defendant-2'. So many vital facts are overlooked by the learned trial Court. No such public notice was published by the plaintiff in rebuttal to the public notice as was published by the defendant no. 2 on 28/08/2005 (Ex.D/1). 41.Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the matter of 'Abdul Mazid -vs- Burhanuddin Ahmad and other" AIR 1980 Gauhati 44 as under: 32. In AIR 1961 Orissa 129, Dhadi Dalai v. Hasudeb Satpathy, the requirements for being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice were enumerated as follows:"Under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act 4 things are required to be established (1) that the transfer is for value; (2) that the money has been paid; (3) that the purchase was done in good faith; and (4) that the purchase including payment of money was without the notice of the original contract." 34. In AIR 1957 Pat 224 Ramchander Singh v. Asghari Begum it was held that "very little evidence, and in certain circumstances a mere denial, regarding want of knowledge of the plaintiff's contract would discharge this onus and shift the onus on the plaintiff. In AIR 1923 Lah 108. Kanshi Ram v. Ishwardas, it was similarly held that where the consideration is paid in full and vendees are I gnorant of the original contract, good faith must be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Similarly in Durga Prasad v. Smt. Lilawati, AIR 1972 All 396 , 397, it was held that under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act "the initial burden is always on the vendee to show that he had no knowledge of the agreement. But the vendee has only to discharge this burden by leading a negative evidence. The negative can only consist of his own statement denying the fact that he had knowledge of the same. As soon as the vendee denies knowledge of the notice, the burden is discharged and then the burden shifts on the vendor to prove that the vendee had the notice of the earlier agreement." 42.In the present case, the plaintiff has never paid further part of sale consideration to Defendant No.1. Even he has not sent a cheque of sale consideration. Even he has not sent a cheque of sale consideration. He has also not sent any intimation to the Defendant No. 1 that on which date, he is willing to execute the registry of the suit land. I found from the record that after giving notice Ex.P/7 on 13/09/2005, the plaintiff has remained silent. The plaintiff has never filed passbook showing availability of money and on which date, he is willing to get registry of suit land. On the contrary, the plaintiff was trying to stop the Defendant No. 1 to sell the land. As per the agreement, the prescribed period for execution of sale-deed was within 1 ½ months from the date of execution of agreement i.e. 18/06/2005. The last date of prescribed period was on 02/08/2005, from 02/08/2005 to 18/10/2005, the plaintiff became silent. Even though defendant No. 1 sent a notice to the plaintiff on 13/09/2005 i.e. Ex.P/7 and informed the plaintiff due to non-payment of sale consideration. He rescinded the agreement. Again the plaintiff remained silent for one months. It is also very important factor in the present case that defendant No. 2 has issued notice through paper publication through his Advocate Ku. Minakshi Kudesiya and asked objection about the suit property. The plaintiff in his cross-examination at para 18 has admitted that 43.No doubt, defendant No. 2 has published the notice in the name of her widow daughter instead of his name, but it is not a material because, the plaintiff was knowledgeable about publication of notice, but he did not raised objection before the concerned counsel, which shows at this juncture, the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part performance of sale consideration due to which his willingness to perform part consideration is not proved. 44.It has to be borne in mind that “willingness” shows mental attitude of the person that he was always ready and prepared to perform his part of contract. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was always ready and always willing to perform his part of contract. The Trial Court has overlooked this fact that the plaintiff has never shown availability of money for performing the agreement. Therefore, the Trial Court’s finding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, is perverse and is bad-in-law. The Trial Court has overlooked this fact that the plaintiff has never shown availability of money for performing the agreement. Therefore, the Trial Court’s finding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, is perverse and is bad-in-law. 45.Defendant No. 1 has purchased the suit land with a value for money after paper publication and no objection was raised, therefore, Defendant No. 2 is a baonafide purchaser of the suit land. Purchase of the land was done in good faith i.e. (1) the transfer is for value; (2) the money has been paid; (3) the purchase was done in good faith; and (4) the purchase including payment of money was without the notice of the original contract. 46.The Court while granting relief of specific performance exercised discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 specifically provides that the court's jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. In this case, the learned Trial Court failed to consider that plaintiff has not always ‘Ready’ and ‘Willing’ to perform his part of contract and Defendant No. 2 is a bona-fide purchaser of the suit land. 47. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 23/02/2017 passed by the VI Additional District Judge Durg, District Durg in Civil Suit No.5624A/2011 is hereby set-aside. 48.Defendant No. 1 is directed to pay the deposited amount by the plaintiff at the time of execution of agreement along with 6 % interest from the date of filing of the suit before the Trial Court till its actual realization. 49.No order as to cost. 50.Decree be drawn accordingly.