JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. Heard 1. By way of instant petition, a notification dated 4th December, 2014 made in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 30 read with entries in column (3) against serial number (2) of First Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2013’ whereby for calculating the market value, the multiplier 1.00 (One) was provided, was subject of challenge. The said notification is reproduced hereunder:- “Notification No. F-4-28/Seven-1/2014 dated the 4th December, 2014.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 30 read with entries in column (3) against serial number (2) of the First Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (No.30 of 2013), the State Government, hereby, notifies that in case of rural areas, the factor by which the market value is to be multiplied shall be 1.00 (One). Provided that in any case compensation payable including (solatium and interest) shall not be less than Rs.6 Lacs per acre in case of barren land, less than Rs.8 Lacs per acre in case of non-irrigated single cropped land and Rs.10 Lacs per acre in case of irrigated double cropped land as per the provision of the Rehabilitation Policy, 2007 of the State. [Published in C.G. Rajpatra (Asadharan) dated 4-12-2014 Page 1240]” 2. On the basis of said notification, an award was passed on 14/12/2016. The bunch of petitions were also filed challenging the said notification i.e. WPC No.1649 of 2017 in between Smt. Anita Agrawal Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & ors. & other connected matters wherein the Division Bench of this Court on 30/10/2018 has struck down the notification of 4/12/2014 and passed the following order at para 11 and 12 which are reproduced hereunder:- “11. Drawing analogy from the view taken by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court, which we have quoted with due approval, Court is left with no option but to strike down the notification dated 04.12.2014 contained in Annexure P/1. A direction is issued that keeping in mind the legal position which emerges, the State Government will issue a fresh notification indicating the multiplier factors, in terms of the guidelines laid down in the statute and the judgment. 12. A direction is issued that keeping in mind the legal position which emerges, the State Government will issue a fresh notification indicating the multiplier factors, in terms of the guidelines laid down in the statute and the judgment. 12. It goes without saying that all awards and compensations in relation to not only these Petitioners but all such persons whose lands have been acquired and a multiplier of 1.00 has been used for calculating the compensation, the same will be required to be revised and revisited in light of the new notification, which is required to be notified by the State Government, on priority.” 3. The petitioners case, however was filed prior to the cases decided, on 19/05/2017. The State subsequently filed the review petitions bearing Review Petition No.190/2019 & other connected matters on the following back drop of the fact which is reproduced at para 4 of the order dated 12/12/2019 passed in Review Petition No.190/2019 & other connected matters. The relevant para 4 of the order is reproduced hereunder:- “4.The case of the State is that, the judgment has been given effect to and appropriate notifications have been issued. But the grievance is with regard to the further observation/direction given in the paragraph 12 of the judgment, whereby the review Petitioners have been directed to reopen all the settled cases wherein the awards have been passed and to adopt the multiplier based on the declaration as given above, which will virtually open a 'Pandora's box', also unnecessarily burdening the State even in respect of the cases where the parties concerned do not have any grievance and have accepted the amount as per the awards passed. This will unsettle the settled position. This made the review Petitioners to approach this Court by filing review petitions pointing out the 'error apparent on the face of record.” And the Court after hearing in the review petitions, in respect of para 12, at para 7 passed the following order:- “7. Paragraph 12 of the judgment (apart which review petitions have been filed) reads as follows: 12. Paragraph 12 of the judgment (apart which review petitions have been filed) reads as follows: 12. It goes without saying that all awards and compensations in relation to not only these Petitioners but all such persons whose land have been acquired and a multiplier of 1.00 has been used for calculating the compensation, the same will be required to be revised and revisited in light to the new notification, which is required to be notified by the State Government, on priority. After hearing both the sides and after going through the verdict passed by the Bench, we are of the view that the judgment will stand intact, even without 'paragraph 12' and we do not find any reason to interdict, alter or modify any of the finding or reasoning as discussed and as contained in paragraph 1 to 11. Since there was no such prayer in the writ petitions, we find it appropriate to delete 'paragraph 12' from the judgment dated 30.10.2018 in the aforesaid cases and the last paragraph numbered as 13' will stand replaced and substantiated as paragraph 12' of the judgment. It stands modified accordingly.” 4. (a) Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that though the petitioners were before the Court, agitating their right that cannot be held to be prejudicial for the reason that on a similar matter, which was subsequently filed by some of the other land oustee after the notification of 2019 came into being. It is further submitted that when the very basis of the computation of the award to determine the market value was removed, which is based on notification whereby multiplying factor was used as 1.00 (One), the entirety of the award so passed in favour of the petitioners goes down though subsequent notification was issued on 2nd May, 2019 wherein the multiplying factor was enhanced to 2.00 (Two) instead of 1.00 (One) after the judgment that was given a prospective effect. (b) It is submitted that the petitioners were not sitting on the fence as the entire action was under challenge before the Court. (b) It is submitted that the petitioners were not sitting on the fence as the entire action was under challenge before the Court. Referring to a judgment passed by this Court in WPC No.4197/2021 & other connected matters decided on 18/07/2024 the submission is made that those petitioners were not before the Court and after the judgment was passed by the Division Bench initially on 30/10/2018 whereby the notification for multiplying factor 1.00 (One) was set aside and the fresh notification was issued in 2019, they filed the petition. It is stated that they were sleeping over their right, therefore, there is a difference and line has to be carved out. (c) Referring to the judgment of 2022 SCC Online 130 in between State of Manipur & ors. Vs. Surjakumar Okram & ors. it is submitted that where the statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, the right cannot be built up under it and on declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, it becomes void ab initio and saving the past transactions are within the exclusive domain of the Court. He would submit that the doctrine of overruling though was not available to the petitioners but as the law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in (2007) 3 SCC 557 in between P.V. George & ors. Vs. State of Kerala & ors. and held that the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the equity jurisdiction. He further relies in (2009) 2 SCC 479 in between S.S. Balu & Anr. Vs. State of Kerala & ors. to submit that the case of the petitioners is different than that of the other petitioners as they were dormant and the delay defeats the equity. (d) It is further submitted that the High Court cannot use the doctrine of prospective overruling which is laid down in (1999) 9 SCC 559 in between State of H.P. & ors. vs. Nurpur Private Bus Operators’ Union & ors. for the Act which is repealed and since the petitioners were before the Court, the similar principle would be applicable and the Act by the State cannot be validated on the ground of prospective overruling. vs. Nurpur Private Bus Operators’ Union & ors. for the Act which is repealed and since the petitioners were before the Court, the similar principle would be applicable and the Act by the State cannot be validated on the ground of prospective overruling. Learned counsel further submits that the lands were acquired under a compulsory acquisition under “the Act of 2013’ and the object of it is that the adequate compensation is required to be paid for which the petitioners have constitutional protection under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if the compensation has not been adequately calculated, then in such case, the technicalities cannot be given preference, therefore the gap of first notification which was of 2014 and subsequently after the same was set aside when the fresh notification was issued in 2019 whereby multiplying factor was raised to 2.00 (Two), petition having been preferred and were pending before the Court, the Government be directed to issue proper notification. 5. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that the earlier judgment passed by this Court in a bunch of petitions whereby the notification dated 4/12/2014 was set aside was subject of review and in the review, the entire para 12 whereby it was directed to recalculate the compensation by using the multiplier of 1.00 (One) to be revisited has been deleted. Learned counsel further submits that since the past Act done by the State since cannot be corrected on the doctrine of prospective overruling, therefore on the principles of equity, the para 12 having been deleted, the petitioners cannot be in a better position. He further relies on the judgment passed by this Court in WPC No.4197/2021 & other connected matters wherein the Court has observed that subsequent notification of 2/05/2019 would be a prospective has been upheld. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. In order to appreciate the rival submission, the events would be also necessary inasmuch as when the earlier award was passed and was under challenge based on the notification of 4/12/2014 whereby the multiplication factor was used as 1.00 (One) for computing the market value, the same was under challenge. 7. In order to appreciate the rival submission, the events would be also necessary inasmuch as when the earlier award was passed and was under challenge based on the notification of 4/12/2014 whereby the multiplication factor was used as 1.00 (One) for computing the market value, the same was under challenge. Anita Agrawal and others filed the petitions on 12/06/2017 and the present petition whereby the said notification was challenged was filed on 19/05/2017 meaning thereby prior to the said filing of the petitions, the instant petition was filed. 8. In the case of Anita Agrawal and others, the notification dated 4/12/2014 which uses the multiplier to be 1.00 (One) was set aside and further direction was given to recompute the compensation wherein the multiplier of 1.00 (One) was used for calculating the compensation. The extract of the relevant part of the order para 11 and 12 have been reproduced earlier. Subsequently, the State filed the review petitions bearing number Review Petition No.190/2019 and other connected matters primarily on the ground that since omnibus direction has been given by the earlier order which was sought under review, the settled cases the awards have to be again reopened which would open a pandora box and even for the parties who did not object, their cases would be required to be opened. Consequently, the para 12 was deleted. Perusal of the review order at para 6 would show that since prayer for recalculation of multiplier was not prayed for all the parties but for individual relief was granted, on the basis of concession this para 12 was deleted. Perusal of para 6 would be relevant which is reproduced hereunder:- “6.When the matter came up for consideration before this Court on an earlier occasion, it was doubted whether the declaration/direction given as per 'paragraph 12' was ever prayed for in any of the writ petitions. Today, during the course of hearing, it is conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that, it was never a prayer in the writ petition, but for individual grievances of the writ Petitioners in respect of which, relief has been granted based on the reasoning given in the judgment as disclosed from paragraph 1 to 11.” Therefore, the perusal of such order clearly demonstrate that the exception was carved out in favour of persons who were already there before the Court and other persons. Therefore, the right in personam was saved of person who were before the Court. If the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, interest of those who were already before the Court are saved and others who have not approached the Court in time are subject to principles of delay and laches and acquiescence. The similar proposition has been held by the Supreme Court in case of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 . 9. Perusal of the aforesaid quoted para in the review would show that the reopening of the entire land acquisition cases which are settled was never prayed for but for individual grievances the said para 12 was deleted. Consequently, the object of the order as appears to be that the petitioners who were before the Court that part was saved and it was not made a omnibus application. 10. During the course of argument order passed by this Court in WPC No.4197/2021 was produced wherein the subsequent notification since was given a prospective effect that was under challenge and which left a gap in between the earlier notification of 2014 and subsequent notification of 2019. In this back drop, the Court observed that the notification of 2/05/2019 whereby the multiplier factor was used to be 2.00 (Two) instead of 1.00 (One) as which was existing in earlier notification of 4/12/2014 it was covered by doctrine of stare decisis. These petitioners came up subsequent to earlier litigation came to an end and they were not before the Court in the earlier point of time in 2017. The para 6 of the review order therefore has carved out the exception to the effect of the order to whom it to be applied. 11. The principle which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in different cases and in a case reported in (2017) 16 SCC 104 in between Shoeline Vs. Commissioner of Service Tax and ors. which is primarily based on the case law of State of U.P. Vs. 11. The principle which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in different cases and in a case reported in (2017) 16 SCC 104 in between Shoeline Vs. Commissioner of Service Tax and ors. which is primarily based on the case law of State of U.P. Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 the legal principles were reiterated it was in back ground of the fact that when a particular set of employees were given relief by the Court and prayer was made that all the alike employees should be treated alike by extending that benefit, principle which has been reiterated that the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier they are not to be treated differently. The Court observed that however the principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. The person who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after a long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then they cannot claim the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case. They would be treated as a fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. Para 20 of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “20. Having said so, we find one peculiar thing in the instant case. Though the service tax levied for the period in question was to the tune of Rs 11,62,728 which stands paid by the appellant, liability on account of penalty and interest is also fastened upon the appellant. The legal position which is settled is that this service tax was not payable for the period in question i.e. 9-7-2004 to 31-3-2006 inasmuch as such a liability arises only w.e.f. 18-4-2006 after the insertion of the relevant charging Section 66-A in the Finance Act, 1994. This legal position is not confined to only those who approached the Court but is a declaration of law. It can be treated as judgment in rem. We may reproduce the following observations from Arvind Kumar Srivastava [State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 191] : (SCC pp. 363-64, para 22) “22. It can be treated as judgment in rem. We may reproduce the following observations from Arvind Kumar Srivastava [State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 191] : (SCC pp. 363-64, para 22) “22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” Emphasis supplied 12. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment in the facts of this case would show that in this case while the notification of 4/12/2014 was challenged, initially the division bench made it a judgment in rem but with the subsequent review petition the boundaries were carved out wherein the persons who were not before the Court the order was not made applicable. Therefore, the judgment relied on by the State in WPC No.4197/2021 in between Ramadhar and others & other connected matters who approached to the Court in the year 2021 cannot be equally applied to the case of the petitioners since the case of the petitioners was pending long back since 2017 wherein the challenge to the notification was made. Incidentally the case of the petitioners was left out, however the notification was set aside. Therefore, the principle that the petitioners were agile of their rights and were before the Court cannot be shelved. 13. Now coming back to the present case. Section 26 (2) of ‘the Act of 2013’ purports that the market value calculated is to be as per sub section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule. This factor is in dispute. Since in 2014 the factor was 1.00 which was under challenge and was set aside. Subsequently, the factor was enhanced to 2.00 by the notification of 2/05/2019. This factor is in dispute. Since in 2014 the factor was 1.00 which was under challenge and was set aside. Subsequently, the factor was enhanced to 2.00 by the notification of 2/05/2019. Therefore, if the factor of 1.00 was used in determining the market value of the land though the doctrine of prospective overruling cannot be applied by this Court as has been held in the case of P.V. George (supra) in a appropriate cases the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even without applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, indisputably may grant a limited relief in exercise of their equity jurisdiction. Para 14 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “14. For the views we propose to take, it is not necessary for us to consider all the decisions relied upon by Mr. Rajan. The legal position as regards the applicability of doctrine of prospective overruling is no longer res integra. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 142 of the Constitution of India may declare a law to have a prospective effect. The Division Bench of the High Court may be correct in opining that having regard to the decision of this Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1967 SC 1643 ) the power of overruling is vested only in this Court and that too in constitutional matters, but the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even without applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, indisputably may grant a limited relief in exercise of their equity jurisdiction.” 14. Supreme Court in the case of State of Manipur & ors. (Supra) has observed that where a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional as if it had never been the rights cannot be built up under it. Contract which depend upon it for their consideration are void. It further held that on declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, it becomes void ab initio. Saving past transactions are within the exclusive domain of the Court. Section 26 of ‘the Act of 2013’ since mandate to determine the market value the multiplying factor would be a crucial role to play. If the computation has been made on the basis of the earlier notification, then it would be deemed that it was not existed in the statute book. Section 26 of ‘the Act of 2013’ since mandate to determine the market value the multiplying factor would be a crucial role to play. If the computation has been made on the basis of the earlier notification, then it would be deemed that it was not existed in the statute book. Though subsequently the State has came out with a notification whereby the multiplying factor has been enhanced to 2.00 in respect of the rural areas, the petitioners having been before the Court agitating their right, so the case of the petitioners have to be reconsidered for calculating the compensation which arrived on a statute which is already repealed. Accordingly, the State would be obliged to issue a fresh notification to apply new multiplied notification within a period of 3 months to re-calculate the quantum of compensation. 15. With such observation, the petition stands allowed.