Sanil Kumar M. B. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner
2024-05-27
HARISANKAR V.MENON
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The petitioner who is the Managing Partner of a partnership firm of Chartered Accountants-M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates, has filed this writ petition challenging Ext. P38 order issued by the 1st respondent under Section 7B of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) as also Ext.P40 order issued by the 5th respondent Tribunal rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the above order. 2.1 The short facts, necessary for the disposal of this writ petition is as under: The petitioner claims that there were only three employees working in the firm. However, by Ext.P2 notice dated 01.01.2007, the 1st respondent herein applied the provisions of the Act as regards 28 employees said to be working with the firm. Later, adjudication was carried out under Section 7A of the Act. An ex parte order at Ext.P6 was issued by the 1st respondent herein dated 10.04.2007 holding that the petitioner is to satisfy Rs.4,95,819.75/- under Section 7A of the Act. The above proceedings were finalised on the basis of the report dated 29.12.2006 of the Enforcement Officer to the effect that at the time of their visit to the premises of the petitioner, there was an attendance register containing the names of 41 employees of which two were partners and 11 were students. The petitioner took up a stand that the 41 employees, whose names figured in the attendance register, were the employees of seven different firms working in the same premises; all of whom signed in the same register since the administrative control of the staff and coordination of the establishments were with the Manager of the firm M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates. However, this contention is not accepted by the 1st respondent in Ext.P6 order. 2.2. Insofar as Ext. P6 was an ex parte order, the petitioner filed a review petition under Section 7B of the Act as evidenced by Ext. P7. It is contended that the above application stood allowed by virtue of the endorsements on the office file dated 31.10.2007, as seen from Ext. P10 copy of the office note sheet obtained from the office of the 1st respondent. On account of the change in the incumbent in the office of the 1st respondent, proceedings under Section 7B are continued resulting in the issue of the Ext.
P10 copy of the office note sheet obtained from the office of the 1st respondent. On account of the change in the incumbent in the office of the 1st respondent, proceedings under Section 7B are continued resulting in the issue of the Ext. P38 order dated 03.06.2008 rejecting the review petition under Section 7B of the Act. Against the above order, though Ext. P39 appeal is preferred before the 5th respondent tribunal, the same stood rejected by Ext.P40 order dated 20.01.2011. 3. The petitioner, in such circumstances, has preferred this writ petition challenging Ext. P38 order issued by the 1st respondent as also Ext.P40 order issued by the 5th respondent. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel representing the 1st respondent herein. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order at Ext.P38 cannot be sustained in the light of the endorsements on Ext. P10 Office Note. He also pointed out that the 5th respondent Tribunal has rejected the appeal without issuing notice to respondents 2 to 4 in the appeal (respondents 2 to 4 herein) and therefore, the order at Ext.P40 cannot be sustained. He also contended that the findings in Ext.P38 to the effect that the petitioner had 28 employees - even without going into the controversy of clubbing of the units mentioned in the proceedings is without taking into account the contentions raised by the petitioner on the basis of the various documents relied on by him. 6. The learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent, relying on the counter affidavit dated 01.06.2013, contended that the petitioner’s firm, together with the closely integrated units that were seen functioning in the very same premises, had 28 employees, and therefore, the proceedings initiated were perfectly legal. It is also contended that the petitioner is the centre of all the activities in respect of the different establishments/firms as evidenced by the payment of large amounts of salary and allowances and meeting of the entire cost of building, electricity and water charges etc. It is also pointed out that the petitioner has not collected any rent from the firms/establishments functioning in the same premises, which is a pointer to the effect that the entire control of the different establishments was with the petitioner herein. 7.
It is also pointed out that the petitioner has not collected any rent from the firms/establishments functioning in the same premises, which is a pointer to the effect that the entire control of the different establishments was with the petitioner herein. 7. I have considered the submissions made across the Bar as well as the documents relied on. 8.1. The first issue to be considered is whether the proceedings dated 31.10.2007, as seen in Ext.P10 have allowed the application under Section 7B of the Act, on account of which there is no requirement for issuing a fresh order at Ext. P38. It is true that in Ext.P10 Office Note, there is an endorsement to the effect that, “he is informed that the 7B petition is already allowed and in this enquiry, he can inform the witnesses to be examined and he can produce any documents to prove his case”. The petitioner contends that this is an order under Section 7B of the Act, and therefore, the matter ought to have been re-considered by the 1st respondent under Section 7A of the Act. 8.2. Section 7B of the Act reads as under: “7-B. Review of orders passed under Section 7-A.- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (1) of section 7-A, but from which no appeal has been preferred under this Act, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of such order may apply for a review of that order to the officer who passed the order. Provided that such officer may also on his own motion review his order if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do on any such ground. (2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme. (3) Where it appears to the officer receiving an application for review that there is no sufficient ground for a review, he shall reject the application.
(2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme. (3) Where it appears to the officer receiving an application for review that there is no sufficient ground for a review, he shall reject the application. (4) Where the officer is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, he shall grant the same: Provided that, (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to all the parties before him to enable them to appear and be heard in support of the order in respect of which a review is applied for, and (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the order was made, without proof of such allegation. (5) No appeal shall lie against the order of the officer rejecting an application for review, but an appeal under this Act shall lie against an order passed under review as if the order passed under review were the original order passed by him under section 7-Â.” Thus a reading of Section 7B of the Act makes it clear that a person can apply for review against an order issued under Section 7A of the Act and the officer can either reject the application or grant the same. However, a written order is required to be issued, as is clear from sub-section (5) of Section 7A of the Act. Here, Ext.P10 contains only certain endorsements on the office file. Even the petitioner does not have a case that there was any written order issued by the 1st respondent allowing the application under Section 7B of the Act. It is also to be noticed that even after 31.10.2007, the petitioner appeared before the 1st respondent in response to notices issued under Section 7B of the Act as seen from Ext.P34 dated 10.04.2008 and Ext. P35 dated 05.05.2008. Therefore, the contention to the effect that the 1st respondent has no power to issue Ext. P38 in the light of Ext.P10 is only to be rejected. 9.1. The second issue for consideration is as to the sustainability or otherwise of the conclusion arrived at by the 1st respondent that the petitioner was employing altogether 28 persons.
P35 dated 05.05.2008. Therefore, the contention to the effect that the 1st respondent has no power to issue Ext. P38 in the light of Ext.P10 is only to be rejected. 9.1. The second issue for consideration is as to the sustainability or otherwise of the conclusion arrived at by the 1st respondent that the petitioner was employing altogether 28 persons. As noticed already, the proceedings against the petitioner commenced with Ext.P2 dated 01.01.2007. As per this coverage notice, it was concluded that there were 28 employees as on 01.02.2006. The petitioner later pointed out that the above 28 persons actually worked in seven different undertakings housed in the same premises and it was only that they were signing in a common register for the ease of staff control and co-ordination. However, by Ext.P6 order under Section 7A of the Act, this contention is not accepted. The reasons for doing so are highlighted in Ext.P6 proceedings. The main reason pointed out in Ext. P6 is the non-collection of rent by the petitioner from the different undertakings as contended by him. In Ext. P6 order, the 1st respondent has made reference to the reports submitted by the Enforcement Officer dated 29.12.2006. The said report is attested by the Manager of the petitioner, one Sri.K. Umesan. In the said report, it is pointed out by the 1st respondent that, the Enquiry Officer has concluded that M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates is a partnership firm of which the petitioner and one Sri.J.Sreekumar were the partners. These two individuals have independent practice as Chartered Accountants. Thus, there were three Chartered Accountancy Offices in the building. Apart from that, it was pointed out that M/s.K & B Certified Filing Centre, a partnership firm of the petitioner and Sri.J.Sreekumar, was housed in the said premises. Again, M/s. QR Accounting Support, a proprietary concern of the petitioner’s father was seen functioning there. There were two other private limited companies also seen functioning in the premises. Thus, the following establishments are noticed to be functioning in the above building: 1. Sri.M.B. Sanil Kumar - Chartered Accountant 2. M/s. Kumar & Biju Associates - Chartered Accountants Firm managed by Sri. M. B. Sanil Kumar. 3. M/s. K & B Certified Filing Centre. 4. M/s. Q.R Accounting Support. 5. M/s. Woodpecker “E”-Commerce (P) Ltd. 6. M/s. The Swarga Engineering Constructions (P) Ltd. 7. Sri. SreeKumar – Chartered Accountant.
Sri.M.B. Sanil Kumar - Chartered Accountant 2. M/s. Kumar & Biju Associates - Chartered Accountants Firm managed by Sri. M. B. Sanil Kumar. 3. M/s. K & B Certified Filing Centre. 4. M/s. Q.R Accounting Support. 5. M/s. Woodpecker “E”-Commerce (P) Ltd. 6. M/s. The Swarga Engineering Constructions (P) Ltd. 7. Sri. SreeKumar – Chartered Accountant. The petitioner contended that all these establishments were independent and there was no connection between them, apart from the fact that they were functioning in the same premises. The petitioner pointed out that the private limited companies were permitted to function from the same building only because the stakeholders in the said companies were the petitioner’s clients. The 1st respondent did not accept this contention. He has pointed out that all these establishments maintain a common attendance register in the same book and the staff control and coordination is managed by Sri. Umesan, who was the Manager of the firm M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in Ext.P6 is to the effect that all the seven establishments are “functionally, financially, geographically integrated and have a common managerial control” as pointed out in the report of the Enforcement Officer. 9.2. However, the petitioner was declared ex parte by the 1st respondent while issuing Ext. P6 order. The petitioner, it is noticed, had submitted Ext.P5 application pointing out that he may not be available on the date of hearing on account of his absence from Kerala, requesting an adjournment of the hearing. It is seen that the said letter has been sent by registered post to the 1st respondent as seen from the postal acknowledgement card etc. But while issuing Ext. P6, the 1st respondent has not referred to the said adjournment request. 9.3. It is in the above background the application is presented by the petitioner under Section 7B of the Act for review. Along with the said application for review, the petitioner has furnished various documents like the certificate of practice of the Chartered Accountants, Pan cards, Profit and Loss account of the Chartered Accountant’s firm as well as the individuals Sri J.Sreekumar and M.B.Sanil Kumar, copies of Income Tax returns of the individuals and the partnership firm, the certificate of registration issued by the Registrar of Companies to two Companies etc. It is also noticed that a proof affidavit at Ext. P30 is filed before the 1st respondent. In Ext.
It is also noticed that a proof affidavit at Ext. P30 is filed before the 1st respondent. In Ext. P30 proof affidavit, it is pointed out that: (i) M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates is a Chartered Accountant Firm having independent practice as seen from the Income Tax returns etc. (ii) Sri. J. Sreekumar has an independent Chartered Accountancy Practice as reflected from the Income Tax returns. (iii) Sri. M.B. Sanil Kumar has an independent Chartered Accountancy Practice. (iv) M/s K & B Certified Filing Centre is engaged in e-filing of the returns with the Registrar of Companies. (v) M/s.QR Accounting Support is owned by Sri. N. Bhaskaran Nair carrying on accounting works. (vi) M/s. Wood Pecker E-commerce (P) Limited. (vii) M/s. Swarga Engineering Constructions (P) Limited is engaged in construction activities. Thereafter, the petitioner pointed out that there is no unity of ownership, unity of management, unity of finance, unity of labour and unity of employment or functional integrity. It is also seen that the petitioner has specifically requested for an opportunity for examining the Enforcement Officer Smt.M.S.Sudha, whose enquiry report is made on the basis of Ext.P6 order. However, as seen from Ext.P35 dated 05.05.2008, the 1st respondent has denied this request stating that he is only considering a review application under Section 7B of the Act. 9.4. It is these contentions, that are taken into account while issuing Ext.P38 order. The 1st respondent has referred to the documents produced as well as the contentions raised. In Ext. P6 order, the 1st respondent has resorted to the clubbing of the different undertakings. However, in Ext. P38 order, the 1st respondent has taken a U-turn. He referred to the balance sheet of the firm M/s. Kumar and Biju Associates and concluded as follows: “A further reading of the photocopy of the audited Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account as at March 2006 submitted on 20/09/2007 in respect of M.s Wood Pecker E-Commerce Pvt. Ltd. and Swarja Engineering and Construction Pvt. Ltd, shows that the establishment was on its pre-operative stage and no expenditure is shown on account of salary/wages and allowances. Only two expenditure item are shown in the said Profit and Loss Account ie; Printing and Stationary and Audit Fee. The total expenditure for the year is also minimal.
Only two expenditure item are shown in the said Profit and Loss Account ie; Printing and Stationary and Audit Fee. The total expenditure for the year is also minimal. This throws light to the fact that these firms are firms on record but not having any activity so far, or the said companies are in the pre-operative state. A reading of the audited Balance Sheet of M.s M.B Sanil Kumar, Chartered Account, Kumar and Biju Associates gives the following facts. Sl.No. Expenditure Head 2001-02 2002- 03 2003-04 2004- 05 2005- 06 1 Salary and Allowances - - - - 800950 2 Remuneration 512400 581300 618500 639000 --- 3 Professional fee paid 180320 174970 237695 303706 409537 4 Stipend to article - Clerk & Account Trainees --- --- --- --- 661050 5 Staff Welfare Expenses 7863 18801 18219 14873 22483 6 Repair & Maintenance Building 58436 36000 36000 40544 42000 7 Electricity & Water Charges 39627 64782 59535 66026 77517 8 Telephone & Communication 106580 106320 119270 95993 94808 9 Repair & Maintenance – Others 15088 17762 46067 16398 18381 The aforesaid Table of Expenditure shows that Sri. M.B. Sanil Kumar borne the whole expenses of Repair and Maintenance of building, Staff Welfare expenses, Repair and Maintenance of others and Electricity and Water charges etc; whereas in the Profit and Loss Account of other firms none of these expenses are included. The Salary and allowances, remuneration, Professional fees, stipend to article & Clerk & Account Trainees, Telephone & communication etc; are also paid from his own pocket whereas in the Profit and Loss Account of some other units these figures are very minimal or far lower than the figure shown in the Profit and Loss Account of Sri. M.B. Sanil Kumar. …………………. Therefore, there is no need to go into the controversy of clubbing of all these units as it is immensely evident that Sri. M.B. Sanil Kumar is the service provider and Consultant who bears almost all costs in all practical sense to render his service to his client establishments for the purpose of EPF coverage.” Thus, the 1st respondent has concluded that there is no requirement for any clubbing and the petitioner is the actual “service provider and consultant” on account of which, he has to make a contribution under the statute. 9.5.
9.5. It is the sanctity of the above conclusion arrived at by the 1st respondent that is under challenge in this writ petition. Admittedly, there were seven establishments in the premises at the time of the visit by the Enforcement Officer. According to the 1st respondent, it is actually Sri. Sanil Kumar who is the “service provider and consultant”. However, the 1st respondent does not dispute that all these establishments had independent statutory registrations. They were also having separate books of accounts and accounting as reflected from the Income Tax returns. The two Private Limited Companies were found in the initial stages of their existence, on account of which there were only pre-operative activities being carried out. It is also to be noticed that the area of operation of five out of seven establishments were different. 9.6. In this connection, it is noticed that the question regarding the clubbing of various businesses/establishments for the purpose of various statutes has gained the attention of courts on earlier occasions. In the Management of Pratap Press, New Delhi v. Its Workmen [ AIR 1960 SC 1213 ], the question considered by the Apex Court was whether the two activities carried out by a single owner, is one single industrial unit or two industrial units. It is found by the Apex Court as under: “2. The question whether the two activities in which the single owner is engaged are one industrial unit or two distinct industrial units is not always easy of solution. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for the decision of the question and each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. In some cases the two activities each of which by itself comes within the definition of industry are so closely linked together that no reasonable man would consider them as independent industries. There may be other cases where the connection between the two activities is not by itself sufficient to justify an answer one way or the other, but the employer's own conduct in mixing up or not mixing up the capital, staff and management may often provide a certain answer.” Again, in the Management of Pakshiraja Studios v. The Workers in Pakshiraja Studios, represented by the Secretary, Commerical and Allied Employee’s Union [ AIR 1966 SC 1410 ], the Apex Court found as follows: “3.
The only question raised before us is whether Pakshiraja Studios as engaged in the pure studio business and as engaged in the production and distribution of pictures, form one single industrial unit or two distinct industrial units. There can be no doubt that there can be a studio, which carries on studio business pure and simple - earning money by "shooting" pictures for producers, by "recording" for talking pictures, by way of hire for "setting" by "processing films" by preparing "still photos", and such other activities, without engaging itself in the production and distribution of the same. There is equally no doubt that there are many studios which are engaged in purely studio activities. Producers of films take the assistance of such studios, for producing films, and have to pay for the service of the studios, irrespective of the profits and losses. There is nothing however to prevent the owner of a studio himself turning a producer, and using his own studio for the same service as an independent producer might have done. When the owner of a studio turns producer, it is for him to decide, whether he will keep his studio business and the production business separate and distinct or mingle them. If he mingles them, these several sides of his business activities become one unit, vis-a-vis the employees; and he will not be heard to say that the high profits of say, the production side, will be disregarded, in deciding whether there is an available surplus. At the same time, if there are heavy losses, in one of the lines, say, production side, the employees will not be heard to say that these losses should be kept out of account in deciding the question of available surplus” In the very same judgment, the Apex Court considered the relevancy of the trading accounts of various units and how the same is to be considered while considering a question of clubbing as under: “6. On behalf of the appellant, great emphasis has been laid on this fact of the trading account of the studios, and the trading account of the pictures having been separately prepared, and the further fact that this separate balance sheet “of the picture business was filed before the Income Tax Officer”. We are not however concerned with what happened before the Income Tax Officer.
We are not however concerned with what happened before the Income Tax Officer. If there had been any loss on either the studio line or on the production line, and the owner had still kept the two separate in his income tax statements, that might have been of some assistance to show that he himself treated the two lines as separate and distinct. That however is not the position here. Consequently, the fact that a separate balance sheet of profit and loss account for the "picture" side was produced before the Income Tax Officer cannot furnish any reason for thinking that the owner was keeping the picture side separate from the studio side. Whatever tendency this fact that separate balance sheets were prepared for these different lines of business might have had by itself to show that these were distinct units, is totally nullified by the numerous circumstances set out by the Tribunal, some of which have been mentioned above, viz., the fact that one single bank account was maintained; no separate staff was maintained for the production side; there is one accountant for the two sides of the business; the administrative staff was also the same.” After finding so, the Apex Court upheld the conclusion of the Tribunal that both businesses were not distinct and were found to be one single unit. 9.7. In L.N. Gadodia and Sons and Another v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner [ (2011) 13 SCC 517 ], the question considered by the Apex Court was again with respect to the clubbing of two concerns for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Act. After referring to the judgment in Pratap Press referred to above, the Apex Court has laid down as under: “20. In the present case the Directors of the two petitioner companies belong to the same family. The Managing Director is common. The two senior officers i.e. Commercial Manager and Technical Manager are common. At the time of inspection, the enforcement officer noticed that the employees of the two companies were being swapped. Both of them have same registered address and common telephone numbers and a common gram number. The audited accounts revealed that the second petitioner company had given a loan of Rs 5 lakhs to the first petitioner in the year 1988. The two companies are family concerns of the Gadodia family.
Both of them have same registered address and common telephone numbers and a common gram number. The audited accounts revealed that the second petitioner company had given a loan of Rs 5 lakhs to the first petitioner in the year 1988. The two companies are family concerns of the Gadodia family. Hence, in the facts of the present case we have to hold that there is an integrity of management, finance and the workforce in the two private limited companies. The two companies have seen to it that on record each of the two entities engage less than twenty employees, although the number of employees engaged by them is more than twenty when taken together. The entire attempt of the petitioners is to show that the two entities are separate units so that the Provident Funds Act does not get attracted. The material on record however, leads to only one pointer that the two entities are parts of the same establishment and in which case they get covered under the Provident Funds Act. 22. It cannot be denied that the two petitioners carry on a trade or business for private gain from the premises wherein the two companies are situated. They would therefore, fall within the definition of "commercial establishment" and consequently, under the definition of "establishment". The only question is: whether they are to be treated as two separate establishments or one establishment for the purposes of this Act? 23. The petitioners have contended that the two entities are two separate establishments. They have tried to draw support from Section 2-A of the Act which declares that where an establishment consists of different departments. or has branches whether situated in the same place or in different places, all such departments or branches shall be treated as parts of the same establishment. It was submitted that only different departments or branches of an establishment can be clubbed together, but not different establishments altogether. In this connection, what is to be noted is that, this is an enabling provision in a welfare enactment. The two petitioners may not be different departments of one establishment in the strict sense. However, when we notice that they are run by the same family under a common management with common workforce and with financial integrity, they are expected to be treated as branches of one establishment for the purposes of the Provident Funds Act.
The two petitioners may not be different departments of one establishment in the strict sense. However, when we notice that they are run by the same family under a common management with common workforce and with financial integrity, they are expected to be treated as branches of one establishment for the purposes of the Provident Funds Act. The issue is with respect to the application of a welfare enactment and the approach has to be as indicated by this Court in Sayaji Mills Ltd. The test has to be the one as laid down in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. which has been explained in Pratap Press.” 9.8. In Eddy Current Controls (India) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund and Another [ 1994(1) LLJ 522 ], the question considered by a Division Bench of this Court was as regards the two units of a company. The first unit was set up in the year 1974 and the second one in 1979. The two units were having separate registrations under various statutes. Considering this scenario, the Division Bench found as under: “12. It is in the light of these principles that we have to consider the question as to whether the two establishments of the petitioner-company, one at Chalakudy and the other at Coimbatore, form part of a single unit for the purposes of the Act or whether they are independent units. On the facts found by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner as also by the Government of India, it is clear that the factories at Chalakudy and Coimbatore are owned by the petitioner-company. The product manufactured in the two factories is the same, namely eddy current clutches and motors, specified in Sch. I to the Act. The fact that only a motor with a lesser horse power is manufactured at Coimbatore is irrelevant. The registered office is the same for both the factories at Chalakudy and Coimbatore. The factory at Coimbatore, has been described by the company as a unit and the activity carried on there is the same as that of the factory at Chalakudy. The balancesheet, profit and loss account, income and expenditure account are all common for all the units of the company as per the Eighth Annual Report of the company for the year ending 30 June, 1979.
The balancesheet, profit and loss account, income and expenditure account are all common for all the units of the company as per the Eighth Annual Report of the company for the year ending 30 June, 1979. Three employees from the Chalakudy unit are employed in the Coimbatore unit and their salary and provident fund are paid from Chalakudy unit. As per the balance-sheet during 1978–79 an amount of Rs.32,331.25 has been transferred to the head office accounts from the Coimbatore unit and a sum of Rs. 6,41,219.05 has been transferred during 1979–80. The cash book further shows that a sum of Rs.20,000 has been transferred to the Coimbatore unit on 21 December, 1981, by telegraphic transfer. The profit and loss account shows that raw materials worth Rs.2,16,973.76 has been transferred from the head office to the Coimbatore unit in 1980–81. The same Managing Director, Finance Manager and Secretary are the persons empowered to operate the bank accounts of both the factories. Thus, it is clear that there is financial and functional dependency between the two units. There is unity of ownership, management, supervision and control and general unity of purpose. It is further to be noted that the factories at Chalakudy and Coimbatore are manufacturing the same product. Thus it can be seen that there is unity of production as well. Judged in the light of the above facts, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by respondents 1 and 2 that the Coimbatore factory is only a branch of the establishment and is not an independent unit.” 9.9. The sustainability or otherwise of Ext.P38 and P40 orders have to be considered in the light of the principles laid down in the above judgments. Admittedly, there were seven establishments functioning on the very same premises. Out of the above, three establishments were Chartered Accountancy firms. M/s.K & B Certified Filing Centre was providing electronic filing of returns. M/s.QR Accounting Supports was providing accounting work. In other words, five out of the seven units were providing the very same line of service. It is only as regards the two Private Limited Companies, there is some difference. However, there is a positive finding to the effect that a reference to the audited balance sheet and the profit and loss account of these companies did not reflect any expenditure towards salary, wages and allowances.
It is only as regards the two Private Limited Companies, there is some difference. However, there is a positive finding to the effect that a reference to the audited balance sheet and the profit and loss account of these companies did not reflect any expenditure towards salary, wages and allowances. The only expenditure shown was printing and stationery and audit bills, that too minimal. In such circumstances, it can only be concluded that these two companies were only a ruse to escape coverage under the Act. Similarly in Ext.P38 order, the 1st respondent has made reference to the balance sheet of the petitioner. In the above balance sheet, substantial amounts are shown towards salary and allowances, staff well fare expense etc. Similarly, repair and maintenance of the building, electricity and water charges, telephone and communication are also met by the petitioner. The petitioner claims that there were only three employees with him as stated in paragraph 2 of the writ petition. It is hard to believe that the amounts reflected in the balance sheet were against the salary and wages of the three employees alone. Again the 1st respondent has pointed out that no rent is collected from the other establishments by the petitioner. Even on the face of positive findings to the above effect in Ext. P38 order, in the appeal filed before the Tribunal or in the writ petition before this court, this has not been controverted. Therefore, the finding rendered by the 1st respondent in Ext. P38 cannot be said to be illegal. For the very same reason, the ultimate findings in Ext.P40 also cannot be found fault with, even though there is very little consideration of the issue from the side of the Tribunal. In such circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with Exts.P38 and P40 orders issued by respondents 1 and 5 respectively. In such circumstances, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.