JUDGMENT 1. This first appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff under section 96 of CPC against the order dated 17.12.2012 passed in Civil Suit No.27-A/2008 (Khemchand v. Parsram and others) by Additional District Judge, Rehli District Sagar seeking setting aside of impugned judgment and decree. 2. Brief facts of the case relevant for disposal of present appeal are that plaintiff along with some other persons formed a partnership and above firm, purchased land bearing khasra No. 69 and 70 through registered sale deed dated 14.3.1983. Above firm was dissolved on 13.1.1984 and there was oral partition between partners of the firm. In above partition, plaintiff got suit property i.e. survey Nos. 69 and 70 on 13.1.1984. Partnership dissolution deed was executed on 13.01.1984. Plaintiff is owner of disputed property, i.e. survey Nos. 69 and 70. In the year 2016, defendants No. 1 to 3, illegally took possession of suit property. Plaintiff filed an application under section 250 of MPLRC before revenue court but this application is still pending and has not been decided till today. With aforesaid averments, plaintiff filed a present suit for delivery of possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction against defendants No. 1 to 3. In the instant case, defendants No. 1 to 3 did not appear before trial court and they have been proceeded Ex-parte. They did not file any written statement. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that trial Court has wrongly dismissed plaintiff’s suit on the ground that in view of section 250 and 257 (x) of MPLRC, civil court has no jurisdiction and revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction. With respect to above, learned trial Court wrongly relied upon Smt. Dhudo Bai Vs. Bajirao and another, (2004) 4 MPLJ 364 as plaintiff was owner of suit property. Therefore, he was entitled to recover possession from defendants. Hence, plaintiff’s suit before Civil Court was maintainable. On above grounds, it is urged that appeal filed by the appellant be allowed and impugned judgment and decree be set aside and case be remitted back to the trial court to decide the case afresh on merit. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. 5. On above grounds, it is urged that appeal filed by the appellant be allowed and impugned judgment and decree be set aside and case be remitted back to the trial court to decide the case afresh on merit. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. 5. Perusal of impugned judgment, especially paras 16 to 19, reveals that learned trial Court, after relying upon Dhudo Bai (supra) and also referring to sections 250 and 257 (x) of MPLRC, dismissed plaintiff’s suit as being not maintainable on the ground that under section 257(x) of MPLRC, civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred. 6. Issue before this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, plaintiff’s suit was barred under section 257(x) of MPLRC. 7. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer relevant provisions of sections 250 and 257(x) of MPLRC, which were in force at relevant point of time which are as under:- “250. Reinstatement of Bhumiswami improperly dispossessed.-1) For the purpose of this section and section 250-A Bhoomiswami shall include occupancy tenant and government lessee. (1-a) If a bhoomiswami is dispossessed of the land otherwise than in due course of law or if any person unauthorisedly continues in possession of any land of the Bhoomiswami to the use of which such person has ceased to be entitled under any provision of this code, the Bhoomiswami or his successor in interest may apply to the Tehsildar for restoration of the possession,- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) in case of a Bhoomiswami not covered by clause (a), within two years from the date of dispossession or from the date on which possession of such person becomes unauthorised, as the case may be. 257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities - Except as otherwise provided in this code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters:- xxx xxx xxx xxx (x) any decision regarding reinstatement of a Bhumiswami improperly dispossessed under section 250” 8. Perusal of plaint averments as well as evidence on record (especially khasra and khatoni Ex. P/1 and P/2) clearly reveals that plaintiff is owner of disputed land i.e. survey Nos. 69 and 70 and disputed land is agricultural land. In the instant case, defendant Nos. 1 to 3 did not appear before trial Court andthey did not file written statement. Thus, defendants were proceeded ex-parte in the trial Court. There is no evidence in rebuttal to that filed by the plaintiff with respect to his ownership of disputed land. Thus, from evidence, it is clearly established that appellant/plaintiff is owner of disputed agricultural land. 9. It is also evident from plaint averments that plaintiff has not sought any declaration with respect to title. Plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of possession on the basis of title and mesne profits. It is evident from plaint averments that defendants No.1 to 3 had dispossessed plaintiff in May-June 2006 and plaintiff has filed present suit on 17.11.2008. Perusal of section 250(1-a)(b) of MPLRC reveals that therein bhumiswami can file an application before Tehsildar within two years from the date of dispossession for recovery of possession. Present suit has been filed after two years of dispossession. Therefore, present suit would not be covered under section 250(1-a)(b) of MPLRC. 10. Further, with respect to issue involved in the case it would be appropriate to refer observations and principles laid down by Full Bench of this Court in Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal v. Chetu Batte, 1976 RN 146 = AIR 1976 MP 160 which are as under:- “1. The questions referred to this Full Bench are whether the civil Court cannot take cognizance of a suit instituted by Bhumiswami on the basis of his title, against a trespasser; and whether the decision in Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain, AIR 1967 Madh Pra 14, is no longer good law. 2. Chetu brought the suit against Ramgopal on the averment that he is the Bhumiswami of survey No. 138/3 (area 5 Biahas 9 Biswas) of village Kulhar, Tahsil Basoda. On or about July 15, 1963, the defendant wrongfully took possession of the suit land. --------- 6. The above dictum may be analysed thus:— (1) Section 250(2) confers jurisdication on the Tahsildar to decide a Bhumiswami's application for restoration of possession. (2) The Tahsildar has to make an enquiry into the respective claims of the parties. On or about July 15, 1963, the defendant wrongfully took possession of the suit land. --------- 6. The above dictum may be analysed thus:— (1) Section 250(2) confers jurisdication on the Tahsildar to decide a Bhumiswami's application for restoration of possession. (2) The Tahsildar has to make an enquiry into the respective claims of the parties. (3) The enquiry, which is contemplated, is of a summary nature. (4) The Tahsildar has to decide whether the person complaining of dispossession is or is not a Bhumiswami and whether he has been dispossessed or there has been unauthorised and illegal continuance of possession by the person complained against. (5) But both the questions, (a) as regards title of the Bhumiswami, and (b) of possession, are not finally decided by the Tahsildar. The party aggrieved by an order under section 250 has a remedy to file a civil suit for establishing his title to the land and for obtaining possession of the same. (6) Section 257(x) of the Code does not bar such a civil suit, i.e. a suit for possession of land founded on title. It is only a suit of the type of one under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for restoration of possession of land, which is barred by section 257(x) of the Code. (7) The decision of the Revenue Court will not operate as res judicata in such a civil suit. 15. Under the general law, a suit for possession based on title can be instituted in the Civil Court within 12 years from the date of dispossession. The principle that possession must follow title has received greater weight and sanctity when the distinction between the scope and effect of Article 142 and those of Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, has been watered down and simpler provisions have been substituted in Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act of 1963. It will be anomalous to read section 250 as providing for a suit for possession based on title, which is to be instituted within two years only. It will be anomalous to read section 250 as providing for a suit for possession based on title, which is to be instituted within two years only. It will entail a fantastic result that if a suit is not brought within two years under section 250, the Bhumiswami's right will be extinguished, because, by virtue of section 26 of the Limitation Act, if a suit for possession is not instituted within the period of limitation prescribed them not only the remedy is barred but right is also extinguished. Section 26 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right. 17. We, therefore, hold that a Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the speedy remedy provided in section 250 of the Code. It is open to h to take recourse to the summary remedy under section 250, or even without it straightway bring a suit in the civil Court for declaration of his title an possession. Even if there has been a decision under section 250 by a revenue Court, the party aggrieved may institute a civil suit to establish his title to the disputed land. We further hold that Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain, AIR 1967 Madh Pra 14 : 1964 Jab LJ 707 was correctly decided. The civil Court can take cognizance of a suit. This is our answer to the questions referred to us.” 11. Principle laid down by Full Bench in Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal (Supra) has been affirmed by Hon’ble apex Court in Rohini Prasad and other v. Kasturchand and other, 2000 RN 141 = AIR 2000 SC 1283 . 12. Hence, In view of facts and circumstances of the case as well as principles laid down by Full Bench of this Court in Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal (supra) and which has been affirmed by Hon’ble apex Court in Rohni Prasad (Supra), in this court’s opinion, suit filed by plaintiff for recovery of possession/mesne profits and permanent injunction on the basis of title is maintainable and it is not barred under sections 250 and 257(x) of MPLRC. Findings recorded by the trial Court with respect to above in para 15 to 20 are contrary to evidence on record as well as contrary to law. Hence, the same are perverse and liable to be set aside. 13. Findings recorded by the trial Court with respect to above in para 15 to 20 are contrary to evidence on record as well as contrary to law. Hence, the same are perverse and liable to be set aside. 13. Resultantly, appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and impugned judgment and decree dated 17.12.2012 passed by learned trial Court in Civil Suit No. 27-A/08 is set aside and case is remitted back to trial Court to decide the suit afresh on merit on the basis of evidence available on record after hearing the parties. 14. Parties are directed to appear before trial Court dated 23.9.2024. 15. This appeal is disposed off accordingly.