JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has preferred present petition, under Articles 14, 19, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and challenged judgment and order dated 21.9.2012, passed by Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No. 291 of 2002 as well as judgment and order dated 23.1.2002 passed in Lavad Suit No. 307 of 1997 passed by the Board of Nominees, Rajkot with below mentioned prayer:- "6(A) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 21.09.2012, passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No.291 of 2002, at Annexure-A to this petition, and also judgment and order dated 23.01.2002, passed in Lavad Suit No.307 of 1997 by the Board of Nominees, Rajkot, at Annexure: B, so far as it rejects the suit against respondent No.2. 3) Pending final hearing and disposal of the petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay further execution, operation and implementation of the judgment and order dated 21.09.2012, passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No.291 of 2002, at Annexure-A to this petition, and also judgment and order dated 23.012002, passed in Lavad Suit No.307 of 1997 by the Board of Nominees, Rajkot, at Annexure: B, so far as it rejects the suit against respondent No.2. (C) Pending final hearing and disposal of the petition, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent No.2 to secure the amount of suit with interest at the rate of 18% accruing as on today. D) Such other prayer as may be deemed just and proper may be granted in the facts of present case. 2. The brief facts giving rise to present petition are that the petitioner is a specified society registered with various objects. Therefore an agreement came to be executed between the petitioner and the respondent No.1 for the period between 01.01.1981 to 31.12.1981 for distribution of fertilizer by the respondent No.1. As per the said agreement the respondent No.1 came to be appointed as agent and the fertilizer shall be supplied as per the indent sent by the respondent No.1 and on cash payment/bank guaranty only the fertilizer may be supplied. Therefore, as per the agreement, bank guarantee was also required to be executed. As per the said agreement the respondent No.1 came to be appointed as agent and the fertilizer shall be supplied as per the indent sent by the respondent No.1 and on cash payment/bank guaranty only the fertilizer may be supplied. Therefore, as per the agreement, bank guarantee was also required to be executed. Therefore, respondent N .2 executed bank guarantee in favour of the petitioner federation for an amount of Rs.3 lacs and thereby respondent No.2 agreed to pay on demand by the the petitioner federation for the fertilizer supplied to the respondent No.1 to the extent of Rs.3 lac. The amount of supply of fertilizer was to be paid by the respondent No.1 to the petitioner but the respondent No.1 failed to pay the same regularly and therefore, the petitioner heard upon the respondent No.1 to pay the outstanding amount of fertilizer supplied to respondent No.1 on various occasions and therefore, respondent No.1 accepted the liability and had also made part payment. Inspite of admission of liability respondent No.1 did not pay the outstanding amount and therefore, petitioner called the respondent No.2 by way of letter dated 3.3.1983 to pay outstanding amount as per the bank guarantee executed in favour of the petitioner. The said letter was replied by respondent No.2 stating that since the fertilizer was supplied to the respondent No.1 without any prior intimation to the respondent No.2, the respondent No.2 is not liable to pay the amount of bank guarantee. Said letter was replied by the petitioner stating that all the indents were sent with prior intimation to the respondent No.2, however, respondent No.2 did not repay the amount and therefore, the petitioner sent notice through his advocate on 13.8.1994 upon respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to repay the outstanding amount of Rs.2,75,585.09 with interest accrued thereon. Instead of that notice the amount was not forthcoming and therefore, the petitioner filed Lavad Suit No. 60 of 1987 before the Board of Nominees, Rajkot and the said suit came to be dismissed for non prosecution vide order dated 21.4.1997. Thereafter restoration application was filed and same was allowed and the suit has been renumbered as Lavad Case No. 307 of 1997 and the said suit came to be disposed vide order dated 23.1.2002 whereby learned Board of Nominees, decreed the suit qua the respondent No.1 and rejected the suit qua respondent No.2. Thereafter restoration application was filed and same was allowed and the suit has been renumbered as Lavad Case No. 307 of 1997 and the said suit came to be disposed vide order dated 23.1.2002 whereby learned Board of Nominees, decreed the suit qua the respondent No.1 and rejected the suit qua respondent No.2. Against that decision the petitioner has preferred appeal before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal being Appeal No. 291 of 2002 and the same was dismissed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal vide order dated 21.9.2012. 3. In view of the above, facts the petitioner has filed present petition and challenged impugned orders. 4. Heard Mr. Chirag B. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jay Trivedi, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No.1 and Mr. Shirish Joshi, learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 bank. 5. Mr. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Board of Nominees has without considering the fact that the respondent has executed and signed an agreement as guarantor as a member of federation and not as a bank however, this fact is not considered by the Board of Nominees and even by the Cooperative Tribunal in Appeal. He has further submitted that the concurrent findings record by the Board of Nominees and the Cooperative Tribunal is perverse and the same deserves to be set aside. He has further submitted that without considering the fact that the notice came to be issued by the petitioner federation for the said dues which is mentioned in the notice, the Board of Nominees has passed impugned order which is confirmed by the Cooperative Tribunal, therefore, the same is erroneous, perverse and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.1 In support of his submission, Mr. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon and referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bank of India vs. C.L. Vimla and Others reported in 2015 (7) SCC 337 more particularly paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 of the said judgment which reads as under:- "13. We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding the liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 13 and 14 of the said judgment which reads as under:- "13. We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding the liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The legislature has succinctly stated that the liability of the guarantor is coextensive with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This Court has decided on this question, time and again, in line with the intent of the legislature. In Ram Kishun and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 11 SCC 511 , this Court has held that “in view of the provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act, the liability of the guarantor/surety is co-extensive with that of the debtor.” The only exception to the nature of the liability of the guarantor is provided in the Section itself, which is only if it stated explicitly to be otherwise in the Contract. "14. In the case of Ram Kishun (supra), this Court has also stated that it is the prerogative of the Creditor alone whether he would move against the principal debtor first or the surety, to realize the loan amount. This Court observed: “Therefore, the creditor has a right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against the principal debtor for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether the principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the creditor as to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal debtor at his instance”. Thus, we are of the view that in the present case the guarantor cannot escape from her liability as a guarantor for the debt taken by the principal debtor. In the loan agreement, which is the contract before us, there is no clause which shows that the liability of the guarantor is not coextensive with the principal debtor. Therefore Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act will apply here without any exception." 5.2 In view of the above, Mr. In the loan agreement, which is the contract before us, there is no clause which shows that the liability of the guarantor is not coextensive with the principal debtor. Therefore Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act will apply here without any exception." 5.2 In view of the above, Mr. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner urges before this Court that present petition may be allowed and the impugned orders may be quashed and set aside. 6. As against that Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel for the respondent bank has objected the petition however, the respondent has not field any affidavit. He has submitted that the findings recorded by the Board of Nominees and confirmed by the Cooperative Tribunal are recorded after considering the submission and evidence which is led before the board of of nominees, more particularity exhibit 73 the evidence of the witnesses of the present petitioner. He has further submitted that the Board of Nominees has not committed any error while appreciating the evidence of those witnesses while passing the order which was confirmed by the Cooperative Tribunal. 6.1 In support of his submission he has referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court dated 14.6.2017 in Special Civil Application No.5833 of 2008 and more particularly paragraph No.6 which reads as under:-. 6. The Court has attentively and carefully gone through the facts and the judgment of the Board of Nominee as well as that of Co-operative Tribunal, with the help of both the learned advocates. In view of the nature of findings on factual front, recorded by the courts below, it is not required to delve into the merits of the aspect as to whether under Section 96 of the Act the Board of Nominee had the jurisdiction to decide the case of the plaintiff qua the bank guarantee given by the Bank was part of the banking business falling outside the purview of Section 96 of the Act. 6.1 The transaction between the petitioner-Federation and original defendant No.1 of giving financial assistance was backed by the bank guarantee given by respondent Bank-defendant No.2, and the same was the transaction of the year 1991-92. A copy of the bank guarantee dated 23rd August, 1991 forms part of the record of the petition which makes it clear that the said bank guarantee was for the period 1991-92. A copy of the bank guarantee dated 23rd August, 1991 forms part of the record of the petition which makes it clear that the said bank guarantee was for the period 1991-92. The suit was based on the agreement which was for the period between 01st April, 1991 and 31st March, 1992. The bank guarantee was given accordingly relatable to such period. 6.2 While passing the judgment, the Board of Nominee observed, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the amount was recovered after 1991-92 from defendant No.1. On the basis of the copy of the account, it was observed by the Court that the amount recovered after 1991-92 and subsequent to period of 01st April, 1991 to 31st March, 1992, was higher than the amount payable to the plaintiff. It was the categorical finding, therefore recorded on the basis of the evidence on record that the amount has been recovered in respect of the transaction between 01st April, 1991 and 31st March, 1992. In that view, it is recorded that question does not arise for any liability of defendant No.2 Bank. It is further categorically recorded that the due amount has been recovered as on 31st March, 1992. Not only that, thereafter also for the years 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994- 95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 transactions had taken place between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and new agreements have been entered into. For those agreements, defendant No.2 had not given any guarantee. Therefore, it transpires clearly from the findings recorded that the due amount which was for the disputed period, had already been recovered and the question of enforcement of bank guarantee would not have even otherwise arisen. 6.3 because of the aforesaid factual findings and the aspects emerging concurrently from the judgment of the Board of Nominee as well as confirming judgment of the Tribunal, this Court does not find it necessary to go into any other aspects including in respect of operation of Section 96. 6.2 In view of the above, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that present petition is devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have perused the material and documents placed on record. 8. 6.2 In view of the above, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that present petition is devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have perused the material and documents placed on record. 8. Present petition is filed by the petitioner against the concurrent findings recorded by the Board of Nominees and confirmed by the Cooperative Tribunal after evaluating the evidence of the witnesses, who have been examined by the petitioner and cross examined by the respondents. Further, the findings record by the Board of Nominees are on the basis of the evidence led by the petitioner and therefore, it cannot be said that it is recorded on conjecture and surmises but it is proved beyond reasonable doubt with support of the oral and documentary evidence of the witnesses and therefore I am of the opinion that there is no error committed by both the authorities in passing the impugned orders. There is not any illegality or perversity found in both the concurrent orders. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, present petition does not deserve to be entertained and the same deserves to be dismissed. 10. Accordingly, present petition is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any stands vacated forthwith.