JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is inter-alia filed inter-alia for following prayer: “(B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus or writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order and/or directions quashing and setting aside the detention order dated 30/09/2023 passed by the Respondent No. 1 (Annex. A) to this petition) and further be pleased to direct the respondents to release the petitioner detenue from the detention forthwith.” 2. The present petition is directed against order of detention dated 30.09.2023 passed by the respondent-detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) by detaining the petitioner-detenue as defined under section 2(c) of the Act. Under the order of detention dated 30.09.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Police, City Ahmedabad by which the petitioner has been detained as a ‘dangerous person’ based on two offenses registered with Isanpur Police Station. The grounds of detention would indicate that the detaining authority has relied upon two IPC offenses registered with Isanpur Police Station. 3. Learned advocate for the petitioner has challenged the order of detention on the ground that the nature of offense for which the FIR has been registered do not appear to be arising out of private dispute and has no relation with the public order and therefore, the ordinary law is sufficient to take care of the situation and therefore, petitioner was not required to be detained. 3.1 Learned advocate has also challenged the order of detention on the ground that the petitioner in each of the offenses has been enlarged on bail on the very date of his arrest and therefore, the sponsoring authority as well as detaining authority ought to have resorted to the lesser drastic remedy of cancellation of bail before passing the order of detention. 4. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader has objected to the grant of the petition by submitting that the detaining authority has relied upon two offenses registered under the IPC, particularly under Chapter XVI and XVII of the IPC and therefore, petitioner is rightly treated as a dangerous person and therefore, the ordered to be detained. 5. Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 5. Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The petitioner has challenged the order of detention dated 30.09.2023 passed by the detaining authority, Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and the grounds of detention relies upon two offenses registered with Isanpur Police Station, the details of which in tabular form are as under: S. No. Police Stand and C.R. Number Sections Date of Arrest/ Date of Bail 1. Isanpur Police Station C.R.No. 11191022230106/23 13.02.2023 324, 294B and 506(2) of the IPC and under Section 135(1) of the GP Act 18.02.2023 18.02.2023 2. Isanpur Police Station C.R.No. 11191022230888/23 18.06.2023 324, 323, 294B and 506(2) of the IPC and under Section 135(1) of the GP Act 08.09.2023 08.09.2023 6. The Court has firstly taken into consideration the fact that in connection with the first offense registered with Isanpur Police Station, the petitioner was arrested on 18.02.2023 and was immediately released on the same day. Similarly, in the second offense, the petitioner was arrested on 08.09.2023 and was released on the very day i.e. on 08.09.2023. In the opinion of the Court, the detaining authority ought to have taken into consideration the fact that before passing the order of detention, the cancellation of bail of the detenue ought to have been preferred as is held by the Apex Court in case of Shaik Nazeen vs. State of Telangana and Others, 2023 (9) SCC 633 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made following observations in Para-19 as under: “19. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. The Court has also taken into consideration the nature of offenses for which the petitioner has been arraigned as an accused. The perusal of the FIR would indicate that the scuffle had ensued on account of the private dispute between two individuals. In the opinion of the Court, the individual dispute would not lead to the disturbance in public order and disturbing the even tempo of life. The perusal of the FIR would indicate that the scuffle had ensued on account of the private dispute between two individuals. In the opinion of the Court, the individual dispute would not lead to the disturbance in public order and disturbing the even tempo of life. Therefore, as is held by the Apex Court in case of Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 , the word ‘public order’ to mean as the activity which would disturb the even tempo of life. The Court observed as follows: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 8. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 9. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 30.09.2023 being No. PCB/DTN/PASA/533/2023 passed by the respondent detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. 9. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 30.09.2023 being No. PCB/DTN/PASA/533/2023 passed by the respondent detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 10. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.