JUDGMENT : Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 1. Heard Mr. Anil Kumar Gulati, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO) Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.), in Special Criminal POCSO Case No. 17 of 2021, by which the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘Act of 1989’) and under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional rigorous imprisonment for 02 months, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional rigorous imprisonment for 02 months (all the sentences have been directed to run concurrently). 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 22.10.2020, the complainant/victim filed a written complaint (Ex.P/1) at Basna Police Station against the accused/appellant, stating that the appellant came in the marriage of her brother and called her towards the toilet situated in the courtyard and established physical relationship with her, despite her refusal, and had thereby impregnated her and subsequently, the accused/appellant refused to marry her. Based on this complaint, a First Information Report (FIR) vide Ex.P/2 was registered against the accused/appellant. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer visited the crime scene and prepared a crime details form vide Ex.P/3 and a Patwari map (Ex.P/28) as per complainant’s statement. The complainant/victim was then sent for medical examination, and her consent (Exs.P/4 and P/5) was obtained. The Doctor's slide was seized (Ex.P/14), and two semen slides were also seized (Ex.P/12). The birth register of the complainant/victim was seized (Ex.P/10), and her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded vide Ex.P/7. The seized properties were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.P/18, and the accused was arrested vide Ex.P/25 and produced before the Court vide Ex.P/26. 4. The birth register of the complainant/victim was seized (Ex.P/10), and her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded vide Ex.P/7. The seized properties were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.P/18, and the accused was arrested vide Ex.P/25 and produced before the Court vide Ex.P/26. 4. After completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge (POCSO), Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.) and the case was registered as Special Criminal POCSO Case No.17 of 2021. The statements of witnesses were recorded. 5. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 376(3) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read over and explained to the accused, who abjured his guilt. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined following witnesses :- 1. PW-1 statement of victim 2. PW-2 statement of victim’s mother 3. PW-3 statement of victim’s elder father 4. PW-4 statement of Belal Singh Nag 5. PW-5 statement of Bhuvneshwar 6. PW-6 statement of victim's father 7. PW-7 statement of Monu Kumar 8. PW-8 statement of Danddhar Bhoi 9. PW-9 statement of Umesh Kumar Sahu 10. PW-10 statement of Chhatrapal Patel 11. PW-11 statement of Ram Kumar 12. PW-12 statement of Dr. Varsha Satpathi 13. PW-13 statement of Premlata Nag 14. PW-14 statement of Veena Yadav 15. PW-15 statement of Meena Dhruv 16. PW-16 statement of Yashvant Dhruv 17. PW-17 statement of Dr. Rajesh Patel 18. PW-18 statement of Vikas Patle 19. PW-19 statement of Lekhram Thakur 20. PW-20 statement of Dukhmoti 7. Besides aforesaid ocular evidence, prosecution also exhibited following documents :- 1 Ex. PW-13 statement of Premlata Nag 14. PW-14 statement of Veena Yadav 15. PW-15 statement of Meena Dhruv 16. PW-16 statement of Yashvant Dhruv 17. PW-17 statement of Dr. Rajesh Patel 18. PW-18 statement of Vikas Patle 19. PW-19 statement of Lekhram Thakur 20. PW-20 statement of Dukhmoti 7. Besides aforesaid ocular evidence, prosecution also exhibited following documents :- 1 Ex. P/1 Written Complaint 2 Ex.P/2 First Information Report 3 Ex.P/3 Crime Details Form 4 Ex.P/4 Consent Letter 5 Ex.P/5 Medical examination report of victim 6 Ex.P/6 Property seizure memo 7 Ex.P/7 Statement of victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. 8 Ex.P/8 Police Statement of Videsh Sidar 9 Ex.P/9 Police Statement of Bhuneshwar Sao 10 Ex.P/10 Property Seizure Memo 11 Ex.P/11C Copy of admission discharge register 12 Ex.P/12 Property Seizure Memo 13 Ex.P/13 Duty Certificate 14 Ex.P/14 Property Seizure Memo 15 Ex.P/15 Duty Certificate 16 Ex.P/16 Spot Map 17 Ex.P/17 Panchnama 18 Ex.P/18 Memo to FSL for examination of seized articles 19 Ex.P/19 Receipt of exhibits 20 Ex.P/20 Duty certificate 21 Ex.P/21 Police memo 22 Ex.P/22 Memo to SHO regarding intimation of birth of dead child 23 Ex.P/23 Application for medical examination of victim 24 Ex.P/24 Application for medical examination of accused Dulamani Yadav 25 Ex.P/25 Arrest/Court Surrender Memo 26 Ex.P/26 Information of arrest 27 Ex.P/27 Memo to JMFC requesting to record the statement of victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. 28 Ex.P/28 Memo to Tahsildar providing spot map 29 Ex.P/29 Memo to BMO regarding preserving femur bone of dead child for DNA test 30 Ex.P/30 Memo to CMO regarding permission for taking blood sample of accused and victim 31 Ex.P/31 Memo to Jail Superintendent regarding permission for taking blood sample of accused 32 Ex.P/32 Memo to Tahsildar regarding permission for taking blood sample of victim 33 Ex.P/33 Consent letter of victim's father 34 Ex.P/34 Consent letter of victim 35 Ex.P/35 Consent letter of accused 36 Exs.P/36 to P/38 Property Seizure Memo 37 Ex.P/39 Memo to FSL for examination of seized articles 38 Ex.P/40 Receipt of Exhibits 39 Ex.P/41 DNA report 40 Ex.P/42 Identification form of victim 41 Ex.P/43 Identification form of Dulamani Yadav 42 Ex.P/44 Caste certificate 8. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The defence has neither examined any witness nor has exhibited any document. 9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who have committed aforesaid offence, convicted and sentenced him in the aforementioned manner, against which the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused/appellant. 10. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that as per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident, but this fact has not been proved by adducing lawful evidence. In this regard, only Dakhil-Kharij register (Ex.P/11C) of the victim has been seized, which shows that date of birth of victim is 17.05.2005, but it has not been proved by any of the witnesses that, on what basis aforesaid date of birth was recorded in the school. It is further submitted that since prosecution has failed to prove by adducing cogent evidence that, on the date of incident, victim was minor, hence the finding recorded by learned trial Court in this regard is not sustainable. He further submitted that learned trial Court erred in reading MLC report and statement of Dr. Varsha Satpathi (PW-12) and has also failed to consider that there is nothing in medical report to show that forcible sexual intercourse was committed upon the victim. He further submitted that the age of the victim has not been proved, that at the time of incident whether she was a minor through School Register. The learned trial Court had not considered the whole evidence in its totality and only appreciated the evidence of victim (PW-1). 11. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposed the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the offences committed by the appellant were heinous in nature and thus, the trial court had rightly convicted him. He submitted that the trial Court had considered all the arguments made by the appellant and there was sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He submitted that the trial Court had considered all the arguments made by the appellant and there was sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident which is proved by the school admission and discharge register Ex.P/11C which contains the date of birth of the victim as 17.05.2005. The evidence of the victim need not be required for any corroboration and on the sole testimony of the victim the conviction can be made. He also submits that the accused/appellant is already married and on the pretext of marriage he committed sexual intercourse with the victim, on account of which the victim became pregnant and she blessed with one girl child on 12.12.2020, who died immediately after her birth. The DNA report vide Ex.P/41 also confirmed that the father of the dead girl child is accused/appellant. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence needs no interference. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 13. In the instant case conviction of the accused/appellant is substantially based on the testimonies of the victim (PW-1), Dhakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P/11C) and DNA report (Ex.P/41). 14. As per case of the prosecution, the date of birth of the victim is 17.05.2005 on this basis on the date of incident from 14.03.2020 to 22.10.2020, the age of the victim was 14 years 27 months and 27 days. To substantiate this fact, prosecution has adduced Dhakhil Kharij Register of Government Primary School, Ganekera, District Mahasamund (C.G.), which has been proved by the Head Master of the said school Danddhar Bhoi (PW-8). This witness has clearly deposed in his deposition that in the Dhakhil Kharij Register information with regard to victim has been noted in Admission No. 1212 and she was admitted in Class-I on 16.06.2011. He has also stated that as per this Register, the date of birth of victim is 17.05.2005. 15. This witness has clearly deposed in his deposition that in the Dhakhil Kharij Register information with regard to victim has been noted in Admission No. 1212 and she was admitted in Class-I on 16.06.2011. He has also stated that as per this Register, the date of birth of victim is 17.05.2005. 15. The date of birth of the victim was recorded as 17.05.2005 in the Dhakhil Kharij Register prior to 15 years of the present incident on the basis of which victim was found to be aged about 14 years 09 months and 27 days on the date of incident. The appellant did not adduced any evidence to discard aforesaid age of the victim. 16. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, we find that the learned trial Court has rightly held in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment that on the date of incident the victim was child i.e. below the age of 16 years. 17. So far as the allegation with regard to rape committed by the appellant with the victim is concerned, PW-1, who is victim in the case, in her examination-in-chief has stated that she had been talking to the accused on the mobile phone for a long time. On 14.03.2020, when her brother’s wedding was taking place, the accused came to her house. She used to talk with accused/appellant on the mobile phone and when she became pregnant, she told the accused about the same, upon which, the accused asked her to get it checked, but she did not do the same. Thereafter, when she was seven months pregnant, her family members came to know about it. Then, her family members went to the accused’s house, where the accused denied knowing the victim. Thereafter, victim went to the Police Station to file a report, where a female Police Officer, namely, Hemlata Nag, wrote her report as per her statement. The written report is Ex.P/1. Based on the written report, FIR was registered, which is Ex.P/2. 18. On 12.12.2020, the victim gave birth to a daughter, who died immediately after the birth. In connection with the incident, an investigation was conducted in the village of victim, and a spot map of the incident site was prepared, which is Ex.P/3. The victim underwent a medical examination, and her consent was taken, which is Ex.P/4. 18. On 12.12.2020, the victim gave birth to a daughter, who died immediately after the birth. In connection with the incident, an investigation was conducted in the village of victim, and a spot map of the incident site was prepared, which is Ex.P/3. The victim underwent a medical examination, and her consent was taken, which is Ex.P/4. The victim was taken to the Doctor, and in the Doctor's examination report, she gave her consent, which is Ex.P/5. 19. The father of the victim (PW-6), has stated in his deposition that he knew the accused and the incident occurred last year during the month of Kunwar. When he asked his daughter about her pregnancy, she told him that it was due to her relationship with Dulamani from village Khaira. However, when he went to village Khaira and inquired about the relationship, the accused denied any involvement with the victim. Later, when he again went to village Khaira with some other villagers, including Abhivran Sidar, Ishwar Sidar, Belal Sidar and Bhuvneshwar, the victim identified the accused in a meeting, but the accused denied any relationship with her. Witnesses Belal Singh Nag (PW-4) and Bhuvneshwar (PW-5) supported the testimony of the victim's father, stating that they had attended a meeting in village Khaira where the villagers asked the victim who is the father of her child and she identified the accused Dulamani as father of the child. However, the accused denied any involvement with the victim. 20. Regarding this, Lekhram Thakur (PW-19), has stated in his deposition that he had registered the FIR based on the written report lodged by the victim. Veena Yadav (PW-14), who was the Station House Officer at Saraipali Police Station on 22.10.2020, stated that she had recorded the victim's statement based on the verbal and written instructions of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Saraipali. Investigating Officer Vikas Patle (PW-18), stated that he had investigated the case, prepared the spot map (Ex.P/3), sent the accused for medical examination vide Ex.P/24, prepared seizure memos (Exs.P/6, P/10, P/12 and P/14), sent evidence to the State Forensic Science Laboratory vide Ex.P/18, prepared arrest memos vide Exs.P/25 and P/26 and recorded the statements of witnesses and the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. 21. Dr. Dr. Varsha Satpathi (PW-12), the medical officer who has examined the victim, has deposed that on 23.10.2020, the victim was brought before her for examination by Lady Constable, namely, Premlata Nag (PW-13) of Police Station Basna, District Mahasamund (C.G.). During the examination, she obtained the victim's consent for a physical examination, including a gynecological examination. Upon examination, she found that that the victim was mentally and physically healthy and in her full senses. She had a mole on her left hand. According to victim, her last menstrual period came on 01.0.3.2020. The victim stated that she was unmarried and her pregnancy test was positive, indicating she was seven months pregnant. The child’s heart rate was 150 beats per minute. As per victim, she last had sexual intercourse on 14.03.2020. The victim also revealed that she had been in a relationship with the accused, Dulamani, for the past year. Her secondary sexual characteristics were developed, and there were no external injuries on her body. Internal examination revealed no signs of injury. Her cervix was normal and healthy, with normal vaginal discharge present. Her hymen was already torn, allowing for easy insertion of two fingers. She prepared slides and swabs of victim’s vaginal discharge, sealed them, and handed them over to the Lady Constable for chemical examination. 22. Dr. Rajesh Patel (PW-17), had stated is his deposition that on 11.12.2020, he had sent an application to the Basna Police Station to the effect that the victim of the case related to Section 376 of the IPC registered in the Basna Police Station has been admitted to the hospital for delivery, which is Ex.P/21. On 12.12.2020, he had informed the Basna Police Station In-Charge about the birth of a dead child during the delivery of the victim who was undergoing treatment through a letter vide Ex.P/22. 23. In view of above discussion, we also affirm finding recorded by the trial Court that the appellant is the perpetrator of instant crime. 24. On 12.12.2020, he had informed the Basna Police Station In-Charge about the birth of a dead child during the delivery of the victim who was undergoing treatment through a letter vide Ex.P/22. 23. In view of above discussion, we also affirm finding recorded by the trial Court that the appellant is the perpetrator of instant crime. 24. During course of submission learned defence counsel draw our attention towards some contradictions and omissions in depositions of the prosecution witnesses, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384 , while considering the reliability of the statement of the victim has held that “minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault was enough for conviction and does not require corroboration unless there were compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The Court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience”. The same was reiterated in Pappu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 176. 25. Learned counsel for the appellant during course of argument also raised objection that except victim there is no credible evidence in support of her statement even deposition of her father and mother is based on information given by victim and medical evidence also does not corroborate, therefore, only on the basis of deposition of victim holding guilty to the appellant by the learned trial Court is not sustainable. 26. We are not inclined with the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant as it is settled proposition of law that conviction of the accused could be based on sole testimony, without corroboration and it has also been held that the sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by the Court merely based on assumptions and surmises. 27. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the victim is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. 27. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the victim is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the victim. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it was observed and held as under: “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 550 ] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. vs. Pappu, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 594 , this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384 ], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. …The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. …The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. …Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. …Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … *** 21. …The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 86 , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 86 , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622 , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in [Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9 ] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1952 SC 54 ]. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130 ], it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 ]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 ]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 28. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj Chaudhary, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 575 , it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by Court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283 ]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30 ].” 29. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30 ].” 29. In the case of Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384 (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635 )].” 30. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the evidences of the victim (PW-1), Dhakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P/11C) and DNA report (Ex.P/41), statement of Dr. Varsha Satpathi (PW-12), the medical officer who has examined the victim and MLC report Ex.P/5, it is quite clear from the documentary and oral evidence presented by the prosecution on record and its analysis that the accused, after luring the victim for marriage, forced her to have sexual intercourse and established physical relations several times, as a result of which the victim became pregnant and gave birth to a dead girl child and the DNA test report (Ex.P/41) proves that the accused and the victim are the biological parents of the deceased child. The prosecution has also been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident the victim was minor i.e. below the age of 18 years and the accused on the said date, time and place, committed penetrative sexual assault by repeatedly having sexual intercourse with the minor victim. The prosecution has also been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident the victim was minor i.e. below the age of 18 years and the accused on the said date, time and place, committed penetrative sexual assault by repeatedly having sexual intercourse with the minor victim. Thus, this Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellant. The conviction and sentenced as awarded by the trial court is hereby upheld. The present appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 31. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 24.10.2020 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as awarded to him by the learned trial Court. 32. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.