ORDER : The petitioners who are accused Nos. 1 to 69 respectively in C.C.No.422/2019 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Perumbavoor seek to quash the final report and all further proceedings pursuant to the registration of FIR No.584/2019 of Perumbavoor Police Station. The petitioners are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 341, 447, 506, 188 & 294(b) r/w Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The matter relates to a church namely, Bethel Suloko Cathedral Church, Perumbavoor. Based on the complaint filed by respondent No.3, the Vicar of the Church, Perumbavoor Police registered FIR No.584/2019 alleging the aforesaid offences. The prosecution alleges the following:- 3. Respondent No.3, the defacto complainant came to the church on 10.03.2019 at about 7.30 AM. The petitioners who assembled there obstructed respondent No.3. The Munsiff’s Court, Perumbavoor, had issued prohibitory injunction in favour of the de facto complainant as per order in I.A.No.95 of 2018 in O.S.No.31 of 2018. The petitioners violated the order of injunction passed by the Munsiff’ Court. Accused No.11 showered abusive words towards the women assembled there. Accused No.4 intimidated the de facto complainant. The petitioners themselves formed an unlawful assembly on the premises of the church. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Annexure-A3 Final Report does not reveal the offences alleged. It is further submitted that the factional dispute among the parishners of the church resulted in the registration of the crime. The petitioners assembled in the Church only to offer prayers. They never had the mens rea for the commission of the offences. The prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of the offence of unlawful assembly. 6. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that there are sufficient materials to show that the petitioners themselves formed an unlawful assembly and committed the offences alleged. It is submitted that the members of the unlawful assembly had a common intention for the commission of the offences. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the prosecution could establish all the ingredients of the offences alleged. 8. The prosecution essentially alleges the offences punishable under Sections 143 & 147 r/w Section 149 IPC. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners themselves formed an unlawful assembly. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the prosecution could establish all the ingredients of the offences alleged. 8. The prosecution essentially alleges the offences punishable under Sections 143 & 147 r/w Section 149 IPC. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners themselves formed an unlawful assembly. 9. Unlawful assembly as defined in Section 141 of the IPC is an assembly of five or more persons if their common object is – 1. to overawe by criminal force (a) the Central Government, or (b) the State Government, or (c) the Legislature, or (d) any public servant in the exercise of lawful power; 2. to resist the execution of law or legal process; 3. to commit mischief, criminal trespass, or any other offence; 4. by criminal force; (a) to take or obtain possession of any property, or (b) to deprive any person of any incorporeal right, or (c) to enforce any right or supposed right; 5. by criminal force to compel any person-- (a) to do what he is legally bound to do, or (b) to omit what he is legally entitled to do. The foundation of this Section is the combination of five or more persons, united in the purpose of committing a criminal offence, and the consensus of purpose is itself an offence distinct from the criminal offence which these persons agree and intend to commit. The law does not declare the mere assemblage of men, however large illegal. The essence of the offence of unlawful assembly is the common object of the persons forming the assembly. Whether the object is in their minds when they come together or whether it occurs to them afterwards, is not material. But it is necessary that the object should be common to the persons who comprise the assembly. 10. The final report does not specifically state that the petitioners/ accused have united in the purpose of committing the criminal offences alleged. There is only a vague and general allegation that the petitioners assembled on the premises of the church and prevented CW1 and some other parishners. The prosecution failed to place any materials to show that the petitioners used any criminal force with intent to prevent CW1 to offer prayers in the church. 11. On a perusal of the Final Report, there is no specific mention of any of the ingredients to constitute the offence of unlawful assembly. The prosecution failed to place any materials to show that the petitioners used any criminal force with intent to prevent CW1 to offer prayers in the church. 11. On a perusal of the Final Report, there is no specific mention of any of the ingredients to constitute the offence of unlawful assembly. There are also no specific allegations to establish common object, the essence of the offence of unlawful assembly. Therefore, I am of the view that the acts do not satisfy the ingredients of the offence of unlawful assembly. The prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of unlawful assembly. The offences punishable under Sections 143, 147 and 149 are, therefore, not attracted. 12. The prosecution further alleges the offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 188 reads thus:- Section 188: Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.--Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 13. The prosecution allegation is that the petitioners violated the prohibitory order issued by Munsiff’s Court, Perumbavoor in I.A.No.95/2018 in O.S.No.31 of 2018. The prosecution has not placed any material as to whether the petitioners are parties to the litigation. The final report does not contain anything to show that the petitioners had knowledge of the order allegedly violated. 14. Section 188 of IPC applies to order made by public functionaries for public purposes and not to an order made in civil suit between the parties. Disobedience of a temporary injunction issued by the Civil Court will not therefore come within the purview of this Section. 14. Section 188 of IPC applies to order made by public functionaries for public purposes and not to an order made in civil suit between the parties. Disobedience of a temporary injunction issued by the Civil Court will not therefore come within the purview of this Section. This Court in Govinda Kunjuraman Asari v. Krishnan Nair Chellappan Nair [ 1952 KLT 547 ] considered this question and held that obviously, the Section applies to orders promulgated by public servants in respect of matters relating to safety, health or convenience of the public, or in other words, to orders promulgated by public functionaries for public purposes. The Court specifically held that the penal Section does not apply to an order passed by a Civil Court in respect of matters affecting the parties to a suit and in such cases the proper remedy for the disobedience of such an order is committal for contempt. The Allahabad High Court in Azizurrahman v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1986 (1) Crimes 339] observed that willful disobedience of an order of injunction is excluded from the scope of Section 188 of IPC. 15. Yet another aspect that requires consideration is the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. as far as the offence under Section 188 IPC is concerned. As per Section 195 (1)(a) of Cr.P.C., a Court can take cognizance of the offence under Section 188 IPC only on a formal complaint filed by the public servant himself. This view is fortified by the decisions in Govinda Kunjuraman Asari (Supra) and Santhosh Kumar v. State of Kerala [ 2020 (5) KLT 322 ]. 16. To attract the offence under Section 188 IPC knowledge of the order by the offenders is also an essential ingredient. It is not enough in cases under Section 188 to prove that the order has been duly promulgated and the accused must have the knowledge of the order which he is charged with disobeying. [See: In re Sundara Mudaliar and Others [AIR 1937 Madras 535], Lalchand v. Emperor [AIR 1966 Sind 93] and Bishan Datt and another v. Emperor [AIR 1948 Allahabad 50]. 17. Even if it is assumed that the penal Section 188 IPC is there, the prosecution failed to place materials to show that the petitioners had the knowledge of the order, the disobedience of which has been charged. 18. 17. Even if it is assumed that the penal Section 188 IPC is there, the prosecution failed to place materials to show that the petitioners had the knowledge of the order, the disobedience of which has been charged. 18. Resultantly, I am of the view that there cannot be any prosecution under Section 188 IPC against the petitioners. 19. The Final Report further alleges that accused No.11 showered abusive words towards certain women assembled there. The specific words allegedly used by accused No.11 has not been placed in the charge sheet. It is trite that to attract offence under Section 294(b), the words uttered must be obscene and it must be to the annoyance of others and it must have been uttered in or near any public place. The meaning of the word 'obscenity' used in Section 294 IPC has the meaning explained in Sections 292 and 293 of IPC. [See: Dhanisha v. Rakhi N. Raj [ 2012 (2) KHC 111 (DB)] 20. This Court in Latheef v. State of Kerala [ 2014 (2) KLT 987 ] held that abusive or humiliating or defamatory words will not as such amount to obscenity as defined under the law. This Court held that in order to satisfy the test of obscenity to attract the offence under Section 294(b), the words alleged to have been uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of its hearers [vide: Sajan C.K. v. State of Kerala [ 2019 KHC 528 ] & Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala [ 2008 (1) KHC 812 ]. The Final Report in the present case does not contain the ingredients of offence under Section 294(b) IPC. 21. The prosecution also alleges offences under Sections 341 and 447 of the IPC. The Final Report does not specifically state that a particular accused wrongfully restrained CW1. There is also no allegation that the accused intentionally obstructed the charge witness from proceeding further. 22. 21. The prosecution also alleges offences under Sections 341 and 447 of the IPC. The Final Report does not specifically state that a particular accused wrongfully restrained CW1. There is also no allegation that the accused intentionally obstructed the charge witness from proceeding further. 22. As far as the offence under Section 447 IPC is concerned, the prosecution has to establish that the petitioners entered into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unalwfully remained there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence. The Final Report does not contain any such allegations. 23. Finally, the prosecution also alleges offence under Section 506 of IPC. The ingredients of the offence under Section 506 are absent in the Final Report. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the allegations are trivial in nature. The learned counsel for the petitioners relying on Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code submitted that the overt acts alleged, even if proved, only reflect no harm to anybody or if any harm was caused, the harm was so light that no person of any ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. The alleged incidents, even if proved, are only negligible wrongs or trivial offences. The learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the judgment in Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka ( 2015 (7) SCC 423 ), submitted that where, in the opinion of the Court, the chances of ultimate conviction are bleak, and no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage. 25. I am of the considered view that the continuation of the prosecution against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of the Court. I am of the further view that the Final Report does not establish the ingredients of the offences alleged. Resultantly, the Crl.M.C. is allowed. All further proceedings in C.C.No.422 of 2019 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Perumbavoor stand quashed.