ORDER : This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The prayer in this petition is to set aside Annexure A3 order in CMP No.16060/2023 in C.P.No.94/2023 in Crime No.1766/2018 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Nedumangad. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 4. As per order dated 07.02.2024, the learned Magistrate proceeded to commit the case to Sessions Court and dismissed CMP No.16060/2023, holding that this is a case to be tried by the Children's Court/Sessions Court. In paragraph Nos. 6, 7 and 8 the learned Magistrate extracted the legal position and held in paragraph No.9 that in the light of 86(4) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'JJ Act' for short), the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction and the case has to go for trial before the Children's Court. 5. In this matter, the point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this crime was registered for an occurrence on 04.12.2018. During the time of occurrence, Section 86(4) of the JJ Act, a new provision introduced as per the amendment, came into force from 01.09.2022, was not in force. Since the amendment has no retrospective operation, the present case cannot be transferred in tune with the mandate of Section 86(4) of the JJ Act and the Magistrate alone has jurisdiction to try the case. Accordingly, he prays for setting aside the order impugned. 6. Whereas it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that Section 86(4) of the JJ Act has application in the pending cases also and therefore, the learned Magistrate rightly passed Annexure A3 order and the order impugned does not require any interference. 7. Extracting the legal provisions prior to amendment with effect from 01.09.2022, Section 86 of the JJ Act provided as under : “Section 86. (1) Where an offence under this Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term more than seven years, then, such offence shall be cognizable, non-bailable and triable by a Children’s Court. (2) Where an offence under this Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years and above, but not more than seven years, then, such offence shall be cognizable, non-bailable and triable by a Magistrate of First Class. (2) Where an offence under this Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years and above, but not more than seven years, then, such offence shall be cognizable, non-bailable and triable by a Magistrate of First Class. (3) Where an offence, under this Act, is punishable with imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only, then, such offence shall be non-cognizable, bailable and triable by any Magistrate” 8. After the amendment, Section 86(4) of the JJ Act has been introduced and the same reads as under : “86(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Commission of protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 or the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, offences under this Act shall be triable by the Children’s Court.” 9. The sum and substances of the argument mooted by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amendment is not retrospective. In this connection, it is necessary to refer the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 840 and SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 765 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 491, where the Apex Court made in clear and unambiguous terms that, namely, that procedural amendments are presumed to be retrospective in nature, unless the amending statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise. And also, that generally change of “forum” of trial is procedural, and normally following the above proposition, it is presumed to be retrospective in nature unless the amending statute provides otherwise. This determination emerges from the decision of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087; Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 4 SCC 392 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 728 and Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 15 SCC 460 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 489, as well as, a number of further judgments noted above. 10. In a latest decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neena Aneja and Another v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., reported in 2021 KHC 6168 : 2022 (2) SCC 161 , the Apex court considered the effect of amendment to Consumer Protection Act, 2019, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 10. In a latest decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neena Aneja and Another v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., reported in 2021 KHC 6168 : 2022 (2) SCC 161 , the Apex court considered the effect of amendment to Consumer Protection Act, 2019, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. After elaborately considering almost all the decisions, including New India Insurance Co.Ltd.'s case (supra), Ajay Agarwal's case (supra) and Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P. (2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340, the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No.64 held as under : “64 Having stated the above position, we need to harmonize it with the principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued right, as discussed in Part C of this judgment. Simply put, while S.6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right from the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal proceedings at a particular forum are saved from the effects from the repeal. The question whether the pending legal proceedings are required to be transferred to the newly created forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed, this Court in New India Assurance (supra) and Maria Christina (supra) has held that forum is a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore the litigant has to pursue the legal proceedings at the forum created by the repealing act, unless a contrary intention appears. This principle would also apply to pending proceedings, as observed in Ramesh Kumar Soni (supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur (supra) and Sudhir G Angur (supra). In this backdrop, what is relevant to ascertain is whether a contrary intent to the general rule of retrospectivity has been expressed under the Act of 2019 to continue the proceedings at the older forum.” 11. This principle would also apply to pending proceedings, as observed in Ramesh Kumar Soni (supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur (supra) and Sudhir G Angur (supra). In this backdrop, what is relevant to ascertain is whether a contrary intent to the general rule of retrospectivity has been expressed under the Act of 2019 to continue the proceedings at the older forum.” 11. Even though in the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court, considering the difficulties faced by the consumers covered by the Consumer Protection Act, ordered to continue the cases instituted before the commencement of the Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020 and continue before the forum corresponding rules under the 1996 Act and not to be transferred in terms of the pecuniary jurisdiction set for the forum established under the Act, 2019, the ratio laid therein is that forum is a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore the litigant has to pursue the legal proceedings at the forum created by the repealing act, unless a contrary intention appears. This principle would also apply to pending proceedings, as observed in Ramesh Kumar Soni (supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur (supra) and Sudhir G Angur (supra). 12. Thus the legal position as regards operation of the procedural law, which would decide the forum in legal proceedings, unless expressly or impliedly provides otherwise, the same is retrospective in operation and the new forum could have jurisdiction to consider the cases pending before the introduction of the amendment and in relation to occurrence before the amendment. 13. Having scrutinized the legal position in this frame, in view of the introduction of 86(4) of the JJ Act, all offences covered by Section 86(4) of the JJ Act shall be triable by the Children’s Court and not by the Magistrate Court. Thus, the impugned order, holding the said view, is perfectly justifiable and accordingly, Annexure A3 order in CMP No.16060/2023 in C.P.No.94/2023 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Nedumangad, stands confirmed. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is dismissed.