ORDER : Prem Narayan Singh, J. 1. This criminal revision under Section 397 /401 of Cr.P.C.has been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 22.1.2022 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ratlam, wherein charges under Sections 294 , 323, 34, 326, 34, 506(II) of IPC and 25(I-B)(B) of ARMS ACT has been framed against the petitioner. 2. As per the prosecution case, on 30/09/2020, the complainant Bharatlal lodged a report that while he was present at the tea shop of Krishna with Khima and Ratanlal, the accused Kailash and Suresh armed with iron pipe and axe came there and after some conversation Kailash hit him with iron pipe on his head and Suresh hit by Axe on his head. It was further alleged that Bherulal, Dharmendra, Lakhan and Manish also came there and assaulted him. On medical examination Bharatlal was found to have received grievous injury by sharp object over his left ankle and simple injury over his head. After the investigation the police has filed a charge sheet against all of the accused persons. The learned Trial Court by the impugned order dated 22/01/2022 has framed the charges against the petitioners as mentioned in para NO. 1. 3.Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Trial Court has failed to appreciate that there is no allegation in the chargesheet itself that all the accused. persons were sharing any common intention to cause the injury to the complainant Bharatlal, therefore the invocation of Section 34 IPC is unsustainable.Learned Trial Court has also failed to appreciate that there was nothing on record to show any previous enmity of the accused persons with Bharatlal, therefore, if any incident occurred spontaneously, the common liability cannot be fastened on all the accused persons simultaneously, thus, framing of charge with the aid of Section 34 IPC is illegal and unsustainable.As per the prosecution case itself only two of the accused persons namely Kailash and Suresh were present and beating Bharatlal who allegedly caused the two injuries noted in the medical examination, and the other accused persons namely Bherulal, Dharmendra, Manish and Lakhan came on the spot at later stage, therefore these accused persons could not be charged with the same liability with the aid of Section 34 IPC. He further contended that in the bail petition, Hon'ble High Court has opined that prima facie, the dispute is purely of civil nature, therefore, the charges framed against the petitioners are not in accordance with law, hence the charges framed by learned trial Court are not sustainable in the eyes of law and it is requested to set aside the same. 4. Learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the contentions of the petitioners and submitted that defence of the petitioners cannot be considered at the stage of framing of charges. The opinion expressed in bail order is not binding upon the merits. Hence there is no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court accordingly, the revision petition filed by the petitioners deserves to be dismissed. 5. In the considered opinion of this Court at this stage is that the only point of determination in this case is as to whether the order of learned trial Court is suffering from incorrectness, illegality or impropriety? 6. In the light of the revision petition and the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the impugned order of framing of charges has been scrutinized in purview of the available record. 7. On this aspect learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the case of Apex Court passed in Chhota Ahirwar Vs. State of M.P. 2020 (2) MPLJ Cri. S.C. 268 wherein it is held that Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused. Mere participation in crime with others is not sufficient to attribute common intention. On the basis of aforesaid law laid down by Apex Court, counsel submitted that since the co-accused persons who are later on appeared on the place of incident, it cannot be presumed that they are included in predetermination and common intention for causing offence. 8. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the matter has been considered. 9. On the basis of aforesaid law laid down by Apex Court, counsel submitted that since the co-accused persons who are later on appeared on the place of incident, it cannot be presumed that they are included in predetermination and common intention for causing offence. 8. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the matter has been considered. 9. It emerged that the aforesaid judgment was passed by Apex Court considering the sanctity of conviction after trial and it is not regarding framing of charges. Therefore, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in that judgment is not exactly applicable in this case. 10. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Govind Jagesha Vs. State of Maharashtra (1999) 8 SCC 428 is poignant . The following excerpt of paragraph No. 7 of the judgment is condign to quote here. " No pre-meditation or previous meeting of mind is necessary for the applicability of Section 34 of the IPC. The existence of common intention can be inferred from the attending circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties. No direct evidence of common intention is necessary. For the purposes of common intention even the participation in the commission of the offence need not be proved in all cases. The common intention can develop even during the course of an occurrence. The circumstances of the present case clearly show that the accused persons had come on spot with deadly weapons and inflicted injuries. " 11. As per allegations made in the FIR and statement recorded under Section 161 of CrPC, it emerged that accused Bherulal came at spot with Sward, Dharmendra with stick, Manish with pipe and Lakhan with stone and started abusing the complainant. Therefore, it cannot be said that they are not liable to be charged for the offence. 12. On this aspect the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Iftikhar Khan (1973) 1 SCC 512 wherein it was observed that "to attract Section 34 of IPC, it is not necessary that any overt act should have been done by the co-accused. 12. On this aspect the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Iftikhar Khan (1973) 1 SCC 512 wherein it was observed that "to attract Section 34 of IPC, it is not necessary that any overt act should have been done by the co-accused. In this case, four accused persons were convicted on a fact situation that two of them were armed with pistols and other two persons armed with lathies and all four together walked in a body towards the deceased and after firing the pistols, the deceased .The finding of fact in that case was also the same . when a plea was made on behalf of those two persons who were armed with lathies that they did not do any overt act, this Court made the above observation. From the facts of the case that it can be said that there was no act on behalf of the two lathi holders although the deceased was killed by a pistol shot. The criminal act in that case was done by all the persons in furtherance of the common intention to kill the deceased. " 13. Similarly, in the case of Girija Shankar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2004) 3 SCC 793 the Hon'ble Apex Court.has held as under:- " Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34 , be it pre- arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of Section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1977 SC 109 ), the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision." 14. In the conspectus of the aforesaid legal position, the facts of the case are examined. It emerged that as per the FIR and statement of witnesses, Kailash and Suresh have started to commit the offence. Kailash has caused injury with iron pipe and Suresh has caused injury with axe. At the same time, another co-accused Bherulal, Dharmendra, Manish and Lakhan also came with arms and also caused injury by kicks and fists. hence, the accused persons Bherulal, Dharmendra, Manish and Lakhan are also involved in permedition and predetermination of the act. They will be liable for the charges under Section 34 of IPC. Defence of the accused persons cannot be considered at this stage. 15. On this aspect, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. They will be liable for the charges under Section 34 of IPC. Defence of the accused persons cannot be considered at this stage. 15. On this aspect, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. S.B. Johari and others AIR 2000 SC 665 is worth to mention here in which it is held that at the stage of framing charges the Court is not required to marshall and analyze the materials on record but only has to prima facie consider as to whether there is sufficient substance against the accused. In the case, the Court observed as under:- “It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for conviction the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross examination or rebutted by defence evidence if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. 16. In the case of State of M.P. Vs. Mohanlal Soni , (2000) 6 SCC 338 the Hon'ble Apex court further viewed that the crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie ponder as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal , 2000 (1) SCC 722 the Honble Apex Court observed if the trial court decides to frame a charge, there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal , 2000 (1) SCC 722 the Honble Apex Court observed if the trial court decides to frame a charge, there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial judge has formed the opinion, upon consideration of the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. 17. The aforesaid stand of the Hon'ble Apex Court has also been endorsed by Hon'ble Apex Court in another case rendered in VLS Finance Limited vs. S.P. Gupta and another reported as 2016 Law suit SC 111. Further in this context, the land mark judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Maharashtra State vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors. reported in AIR 1997 SC 2041 is propitious to reproduce here: "The law on the subject is now well settled, as pointed out in Niranjan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bijjaya [ (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47 : AIR 1990 SC 1962 ] that at Sections 227 and 228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction." 18. In light of the aforesaid settled proposition of law it is evinced that before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. At the juncture of framing of charges, the Court has to prima-facie examine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to evaluate or analyse the evidence in order to arrive at the conclusion that the materials furnished by prosecution are sufficient for convicting the accused or not. In the case at hand the finding of learned trial Court regarding prima-facie case against the accused appears to be correct. There is ample evidence available on record by which the charges against the applicant can be framed with the aid of Section 34 of IPC as the predetermination and premeditation of mind can be assumed by the learned Trial Court. 19. So far as the revisional power of this Court is concerned, it is well settled legal position that the jurisdiction of the revisional Court is not as that of an appellate Court, which is free to reach its own conclusion on evidence untrammeled by any finding entered by the trial Court. Actually the jurisdiction of revisional Court has a limited scope. The revisional Court can interfere with the impugned order of subordinate Court only when it is unjust and unfair. In case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner. 20. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amit Kapoor (Supra), is pertinent to quote here as under:- "The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression ‘prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice’, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. Though the section does not specifically use the expression ‘prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice’, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non- compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily.." 21. Further, in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Fateh Karan Mehdu [2017 (3) SCC 1998, the apex Court has observed as under:- "26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 22. Further, on this aspect the view of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a recent case of State through Dy. Superintendent of Police vs. R. Soundirarasu etc. reported as AIR 2022 SC 4218 is worth mentioning here: "Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure." 23. In light of the aforesaid principles of law and factual matrix of the case, there is no illegality, perversity or infirmity found in the impugned order of the learned trial Court regarding framing of charges against the petitioners, hence no interference is warranted by this Court. As a result thereof, this revision petition, being devoid of merits, is dismissed. Certified copy, as per rules.