Chandra Shekhar Jha, J.—Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. This is an application for quashing the order dated 29.03.2022 passed in connection with Trial Case No. 116 of 2022 arising out of Belaganj P.S. Case No. 184 of 2016 passed by learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe, Gaya where cognizance for the offence punishable under section Sections 302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 and Sections 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe (P.O.A.) Act, 1989, against the appellant. 3. The crux of prosecution case is that on 02.07.2016 at around 11 A.M. the husband of respondent no.2 went to Gaya for some purchase, but he did not return till night, however the items purchased reached home through horse cart at around 3 P.M. The informant further stated that she enquired regarding whereabouts of her husband from the godown owner (appellant) telephonically who told that the victim did not come to his shop. It is further stated that on 03.07.2016 at around 6 A.M. some co-villagers called on her mobile-phone and gave the news that her husband was murdered, and his dead body is hanging on the “peepal tree” near Sonpur Surya Temple. The informant further alleged that one of the accused persons, namely, Mahendra Chaudhary, who happens to be the agnate of the deceased threatened the deceased for life because of the fact that the husband of the deceased was a witness in some land dispute of Mahendra Chaudhary. It is further alleged that the appellant and his munshi had also threatened the informant to clear the debt or to face dire consequences. On the basis of which, a formal F.I.R. bearing Belaganj P.S. Case No. 184 of 2016 dated 03.07.2016 was registered against the appellant herein and other coaccused persons. 4. Mr. Patanjali Rishi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that from the facial perusal of the FIR, in issue, no prima-facie case is made out against the appellant/accused. On the basis of which, a formal F.I.R. bearing Belaganj P.S. Case No. 184 of 2016 dated 03.07.2016 was registered against the appellant herein and other coaccused persons. 4. Mr. Patanjali Rishi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that from the facial perusal of the FIR, in issue, no prima-facie case is made out against the appellant/accused. In support of his submission learned counsel while referring the FIR submitted that as the appellant/accused is the owner of a godown from where the husband of the informant was usually purchasing the good for his grocery shop and as such a sum of payment was due out of said business transactions, only for that reason, informant raised a suspicion against appellant as before couple of days of the present occurrence, appellant/accused asked for due payment to her deceased husband. It is submitted that the specific allegation through same FIR is raised against co-accused Mahendra Chaudhary out of land dispute, against whom police after investigating the matter, finding allegation true submitted charge-sheet in year 2016, itself, through charge-sheet No. 235 of 2016 dated 30.09.2016. It is pointed out that though through said charge-sheet police recorded the allegation appearing true against appellant/accused, also but investigation was kept open against him, whereafter detailed and thorough investigations finally through charge-sheet no. 328 of 2021 dated 06.09.2021, police by exonerating appellant/accused submitted final form against him. 5. It is also pointed out that appellant/accused was arrested during the course of investigation on 11.08.2021 and as such doubt cannot be raised regarding tampering of evidence or to influence witnesses as appellant was in judicial custody, to doubt investigation qua involvement of appellant/accused. 6. It is pointed out that the ld. trial court while taking cognizance deferring with police report as submitted aforesaid, relied upon para no. 10 and 13 and Supervision note of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Gaya, as available in case diary while taking cognizance against the appellant/accused. 7. It is also submitted by learned counsel that once the complainant/informant appears to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. that too on the exclusive note of suspicion as it appears from the face of the FIR itself, then the informant must ensure that the FIR/complaint be very well drafted with all allegation through its pleadings as to set out a prima-facie case, which is absent in the present case. 8. that too on the exclusive note of suspicion as it appears from the face of the FIR itself, then the informant must ensure that the FIR/complaint be very well drafted with all allegation through its pleadings as to set out a prima-facie case, which is absent in the present case. 8. It is pointed out that in such a circumstances it will not just be enough for the Court to look into the averment as set out in the FIR alone, rather to look into the other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments. 9. In support of aforesaid submissions learned counsel relied upon the legal reports of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of U.P. and Ors. as reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 947. 10. Mr. Rishi, learned counsel while traveling over the argument taking shelter of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim case (supra), submitted that the fact of the present case compelled to go through the statement of the witnesses as recorded during the course of investigation under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., which appears to be the basis for taking cognizance by ld. trial court against appellant/accused. 11. It is submitted that out of said statements and supervision note it appears that same is only repetition of the statement as made by the informant through FIR in issue suggesting only suspicion on its face, and therefore no prima-facie case appears to be made out against appellant/accused as alleged, rather the present criminal prosecution for such a heinous offence like murder is only out of ulterior and oblique motive for personal vengeance. 12. In support of his submission learned counsel relied upon the legal reports of State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. 13. The learned Spl.PP duly assisted by Mr. Mayank Bilochan, learned counsel for the informant while opposing the present appeal, submitted that the deceased husband of informant alleged to visit the shop of appellant/accused on the date of occurrence and same is sufficient to make out a prima-facie case against appellant/accused to set criminal law into motion. 14. It is submitted that probative value of evidence with such appreciation is not required/permissible at this stage, which may suggest conviction or acquittal of appellant/accused. 15. 14. It is submitted that probative value of evidence with such appreciation is not required/permissible at this stage, which may suggest conviction or acquittal of appellant/accused. 15. It is further pointed out that when the FIR is suggesting the involvement of appellant/accused, who is named thereof, which also appears from the statement of different witnesses as recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C it is sufficient to make out a prima-facie case as per settled principles of law. 16. It would be apposite to reproduce the impugned order of cognizance dated 29.03.2022 for better understanding of the fact:— vfHkys[k vkt laKku ds fcUnq ij lquokbZ gsrq ÁLrqr fd;k x;kA vfHkys[k esa okn nSfudh ,oa vkjksi i= dk voyksdu fd;kA voyksdu ls Árhr gksrk gS fd vuqlaèkkudrkZ us ÁkFkfedh ls ntZ dqy rhu vfHk;qDrksa esa ls ,d vfHk;qDr egsUæ pkSèkjh ds fo:} HkkŒnaŒfoŒ dh èkkjk&302] 201@34 vkbZihlh ,oa 3¼2½¼5½ ,llh@,lVh ,DV ds vUrxZr vkjksi i= la[;k&235@16 fnukad 30-09-2016 dks lefiZr fd;k x;k FkkA ftl ij fnukad 11-11-2016 dks mijksDr èkkjk esa laKku fy;k tk pqdk gS rFkk 'ks"k cps nks vfHk;qDrksa esa ,d vfHk;qDr ekfud pUæ [ksrku dks vuqÁsf"kr fn[kkrs gq;s rFkk nwljs vfHk;qDr dUgkbZ lko dks vlR;kfir fn[kkrs gq;s iwjd vkjksi i= la[;k&328@21 fnukad 6-9-2021 dks mijksDr èkkjkvksa esa lefiZr fd;k gSA ijarq okn nSfudh ds ikjk uEcj&10] 13 ,oa iqfyl vèkh{kd dk Ik;Zos{k.k fVIi.kh esa ,d vfHk;qDr ekfud pUæ [ksrku ds fo:} mijksDr of.kZr lHkh èkkjkvksa esa i;kZIr lk{; ekStwn gSA vr% mijksDr of.kZr ,d ek=k vfHk;qDr ekfud pUæ [ksrku ds fo:} mijksDr of.kZr lHkh èkkjkvksa esa ÁFke n`"V~;k ekeyk curk Árhr gksrk gSA rnuqlkj mijksDr of.kZr ,d ek=k vfHk;qDr ds fo:} HkkŒnaŒfoŒ dh èkkjk&302@201@34 vkbZihlh ,oa 3¼2½¼5½ ,llh@,lVh ,DV ds vUrxZr vxzrj dk;Zokgh gsrq ÁLrqr fd;k tkrk gSA dk;kZy; bl okn dks fopkj.k iath esa ntZ djsA rFkk ,d ek=k vfHk;qDr ekfud pUæ [ksrku ds fo:} lEeu fuxZr djsaA okn fnukad 4-7-2022 dks mifLFkfr gsrqA ¼ys[kkfir½ gLrk{kj@& vLi"V 17. Thus it would also be apposite to reproduce the statement of witnesses as recorded under Paragraph Nos. 10 and 13 of the case diary which appears to be the basis of taking cognizance of the ld. Thus it would also be apposite to reproduce the statement of witnesses as recorded under Paragraph Nos. 10 and 13 of the case diary which appears to be the basis of taking cognizance of the ld. trial court:— ikjk&10 bl dk.M ds lk{kh v'kksd pkSèkjh isŒ LoŒ dSyk'k pkSèkjh lkŒ jkSuh cktkj Fkkuk&csykxat ftyk&xk dk c;ku fy;kA ;g e`rd ds HkkbZ gSaA bUgksaus vius c;ku esa ÁkFkfedh dk iw.kZ:is.k leFkZu djrs gq, vkxs crk, fd fnukad 2-7-2016 dks 11%00 cts fnu esa nqdku dk leku ykus x;s FksA rhu cts fnu esa nqdku dk leku VeVe ls ?kj pyk vk;k ijUrq budk HkkbZ e`rd eukst pkSèkjh ?kj ugha vk;s rc esjh HkkStkbZ okfnuh lhrk nsoh x;k xqnke ij xqnke ekfyd ekfud pUæ ls ckr fd;k rks cksys dh eukst pkSèkjh ;gka ugha vk;s rc ge yksx lHkh ifjokj ds yksx le>s fd x;k esa gh esjk HkkbZ fdlh ifjokj ds ;gka jg x;k gSA fnukad 3-7-2016 dks 6%00 cts lqcg xkao ds yksxks ds }kjk Qksu vk;k fd vki ds HkkbZ eukst pkSèkjh dks xzke lksuiqj ds lw;Z eafnj ds ikl gR;k dj 'ko dks ihiy ds isM+ esa Vkax fn;k gSA rc ge lHkh ifjokj tc lksuiqj lw;Z eafnj ds ikl igqapk rks ns[kk fd esjs HkkbZ dks gR;k dj 'ko dks IykfLVd jLlh ls ckaèkdj ihiy ds isM+ esa Vkax fn;k gSA ge yksxksa dks iw.kZ fo'okl gS fd gekjs HkkbZ dks egsUæ pkSèkjh isŒ LoŒ cfy pkSèkjh ftlls tehuh fookn dks ysdj gekjs HkkbZ dks èkedh nsrk Fkk fd rqedks ;k rqEgkjs csVk dks mBk ysaxs mUgksaus gh gekjs HkkbZ dk gR;k fd;k gS rFkk bZèkj rhu fnu igys xqnke ekfyd ekfud pUæ ,oa eqa'kh ?kj ij èkedh fn;s Fks fd ckdh :i;k ns nks ugha rks vatke cqjk gksxkA blfy, ge yksxksa dks fo'okl gS fd esjs HkkbZ dh gR;k egsUæ pkSèkjh] xksnke ekfyd ekfud pUæ ,oa eqU'kh ds }kjk fd;k x;kA bUgksaus vius c;ku esa bruk gh ckr crk;s vU; dksbZ mYys[kuh; ckr ugha crk;sA ikjk&13 lk{kh eqUuh nsoh ifr Áse dqekj pkSèkjh lkŒ&jkSuh cktkj Fkkuk&csykxat ftyk&xk dk c;ku fy;kA bUgksaus vius c;ku esa crk;h fd e`rd eukst pkSèkjh buds nsoj gSA e`rd fnukad 2-7-2016 dks nqdku dk leku ykus ds fy, 11%00 cts fnu esa x;k x;s FksA buds nqdku dk leku 15-00 cts fnu esa VeVe ls vk x;k ijUrq e`rd eukst pkSèkjh ?kj ugha vk;s rks bu yksxksa us eukst pkSèkjh dk [kkst&chu djus yxs ysfdu dqN irk ugha py ldkA fnukad 3-7-2016 dks lqcg dks eksckbZy ds }kjk xkao ds yksxksa ds }kjk [kcj fd;k x;k fd eukst pkSèkjh dks lksuiqj lw;Z eafnj ds ikl gR;k dj 'ko dks ihiy ds isM+ ij yVdk fn;k gS tc buds ifjokj ds yksx igqaps rks ns[kk fd eukst pkSèkjh dks gR;k dj 'ko dks isM+ esa Vkax fn;k gSA vkxs iwNus ij crk;h fd eukst pkSèkjh dks budk xksfr;k egsUæ pkSèkjh ls tehuh fookn py jgk Fkk ftl ij bUgksaus èkedh fn;k Fkk fd rqedks ;k rqEgkjs csVk dks mBk ysaxsA bèkj rhu pkj fnu igys xksnke ekfyd ekfud pUæ ,oa eqU'kh dUgkbZ lko buds ?kj ij vkdj èkedh fn;k Fkk fd nqdku dk ckdh iSlk okil dj nks ugha rks ifj.kke cqjk gksxkA budks iw.kZ fo'okl gS fd eukst pkSèkjh dk gR;k mDr rhuksa vkneh ds }kjk gR;k dj yk'k dks isM+ esa Vkax fn;k gSA bUgksaus vius c;ku esa bruk gh ckr crk;hA 18. It would be apposite to reproduce relevant Paragraph No. 26 of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim case (supra)— “26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 19. It would be appropriate to reproduce the paragraph no. 102 of the Apex Court decision in the case of Bhajan Lal Case (supra), which reads as under:— “102. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 19. It would be appropriate to reproduce the paragraph no. 102 of the Apex Court decision in the case of Bhajan Lal Case (supra), which reads as under:— “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 20. In view of aforesaid factual and legal submissions it appears that the police after due investigation submitted final form against the appellant/accused by exonerating him and didn’t send up for the trial. It appears that exoneration out of investigation of appellant/accused was reported by police to ld. trial court through charge-sheet no. 328 of 2021 dated 06.09.2021. It appears that through FIR, informant raised the allegation against co-accused Mahendra Chaudhary, at first instance, where subsequently she also raised suspicion against appellant/accused that the day before the occurrence, appellant/accused threatened her husband to pay due amount for purchase aginst credit. It appears that the goods purchased admittedly received on same very day of the occurrence by 3 P.M. to the house of informant and as such the suspicions as raised out of business transaction also appears non-founding and non-convincing on its face. 21. It appears that the goods purchased admittedly received on same very day of the occurrence by 3 P.M. to the house of informant and as such the suspicions as raised out of business transaction also appears non-founding and non-convincing on its face. 21. This Court dare to visit the statement of witnesses as recorded during the course of investigation under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. for the reasons that the averments as set out through written information does not appear to make out any prima-facie case against the appellant/accused as same only shows a secondary suspicion qua appellant and therefore by taking guiding note of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim case (supra), it becomes essential to visit the aforesaid statements of the witnesses as recorded during the course of investigation. It appears from said statements as reproduced above that same is nothing, but the repetition of the statement as made by informant herself, which is the basis of the present FIR, moreover, both witnesses are hearsay in nature, raising suspicion only, same is the position of supervision note of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Gaya. 22. Taking cognizance for such a heinous offence in such a casual manner almost with no material as approved under the law, can only be said a legal terrorism under seal of Court to terrify an innocent person. 23. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, it appears that the case of appellant/accused is covered under the guidelines nos. 1, 5 and 7 of the Bhajan Lal Case (supra), accordingly the order of cognizance dated 29.03.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua appellant, arising thereof as passed in connection with Trial Case No. 116 of 2022 arising out of Belaganj P.S. Case No. 184 of 2016 pending before the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe, Gaya/concerned court, is hereby quashed and set aside. 24. Hence, this application stands allowed. 25. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to learned trial court alongwith the copy of this judgment.